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Abstract. 
This thesis concerns aspects of settler post-colonial discourse, exaniined 
through fictional and non-fictional prose writing from Australia, Canada 
andj'Jew Zealand. Major works discussed have been published between 
the 1970s and 1990s. T1;lese include fiction by Kate Grenville, Elizabeth 
Jolley, and Sally Morgan, from Australia; Alice Munro, Audrey Thomas, / 
Aritha Van Herk and Rudy Wiebe, from Canada; and Stevan E1dred-Grig~ 
/' 
Patricia Grace, Keri Hulme, Witi Ihimaera and Ian Wedde, from New 
Zealand. 
Section One of the thesis begins with an Introduction which 
contextualises the following discussion in relation to background issues of 
definition of the term 'post-colonialism', and then describes the scope, 
method and selection of texts in the thesis. The argument is briefly stated 
and expanded upon in discussion of the theoretical perspectives. Chapter 
One suggests a reading of Empire as (M)Other in relation to Britain's settler 
colonies, and the status of the latter, within the terms of the familial 
metaphor, as extensions of Empire. The ambivalence of that status -- as 
extension and as autonomous being -- is explored in consideration of 
affective relations between colonies and Empire. Also considered are the 
consequences of this 'familial'-colonial background for the attainment of 
'autonomous' Nationhood, imaged as 'self-hood' according to a masculine 
model of the self. Analysis of discourses of (national) identity reveals 
'subjective sovereignty' to be a discursive illusion, disturbed by two 
sources of 'disunity': 'neo-imperialism' is suggested as an 'external' threat 
to sovereignty, while post"solo_nialism~constitut~s~J~e'g!fference within', ./ 
~~~-"---"--~- ----~--~ - --- . 
akin to the functioning of the unconscious in relation to the subject. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of subjective processe~ in three fictional 
texts. 
Section Two introduces a focus on how subjectivity is articulated 
through post-colonial discourses. Chapter Two explores the post-colonial 
textual mediation of relationships to the land, including the 
representation of land and landscape in writing, and the resultant 
facilitation of settler appropriation of the land -- of belonging. It concludes 
with a reading of post-colonial fictional critiques of colonisation and 
textuality as the basis of an authentic relationship to the land. Chapter 
Three considers discourses from indigenous and 'other' subject-positions 
which, rather than subsuming the land under their own identity, seek to 
gain and express their identity in relation to the land, attempts at elision of 
the alienating intervention of textuality. It concludes with discussion of 
texts which problematise the authority of textuality. Chapters Four and 
Five more fully examine the subject-positions of 'self' and 'other' in the 
context of the settler post-colonial ambivalence of authority and 
authenticity. Chapter Four considers strategies of privileging and 
. appropriating the discursive place of the 'post-colonised' in order to 
authenticate the authority of the 'post-colonisers'. Chapter Five addresses 
the 'authorising' of the 'other' into a 'self', or a subject in discourse, and 
entry into the discursive market as the ambivalent attempt both to accede 
to subjectivity and to articulate it with the integrity of authenticity. The 
problems with this invoke the subjective problematic of hybridity which is 
introduced at the end of Chapter Five. 
Th~e~lhirci section_develops the preceding exploration of discourses into 
a consideration of subjective and discursive problematics, informed by an 
understanding of post-colonialism as a condition of instability resulting 
from the re-introduction of what the dominant (National) discourse 
constitutively excludes. In its phallocentric subjective moment, the 
exclusion is shown to be that of the maternal body and thus any possibility 
of a feminine sex; in its imperially-informed cultural moment, it is 
difference and heterogeneity which are submitted to and subsumed under 
the. colonising gaze: they are disavowed, and the disavowed objects 
repressed to the 'national' unconscious. Chapter Six posits an analogy 
between the productions of sexual and colonial difference. Similarly in 
that chapter the return to, and reconsideration of, motifs and analyses in 
the thesis enacts the thematic-analytic focus on the return of the body and 
its contaminations of unity, purity and linearity. In Chapter Seven, the 
theory of the abjection of the subject is employed to suggest a reading of the 
non-autonomy and non-integrity of settler post-colonial subjectivities and 
cultures: the settler post-colonial subject is abjected by the internal 
difference of its own heterogeneity -- the body-difference for which the 
metaphor of the land (as mother) is used -- and by the perceived radical 
cultural otherness or externality of post-modernism. However, it is argued 
that these others are constitutive of the post-colonial self, and that cultural 
and political agency must therefore relinquish its privileging of purity and 
sameness, principles which themselves re-play the dynamics of 
imperialism. Chapter Seven concludes with an argument against the 
imperialism of identity and against the identity of a text. Chapter Eight 
concludes the third Section, and the thesis as a whole, with the exploration 
of a textual-cultural 'case-study' in the discourses and problema tics which 
have constituted the preceding discussions. 
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Note on Textual Practices. 
I have often used textual features such as parentheses in unusual ways 
within phrases and even within words. In every case the purpose has been 
not simply to change the meaning or significance of the words -- to subvert 
-- but to allow them to hold a number of simultaneous, often inconsistent, 
and sometimes contradictory meanings, all of which are possible readings 
or interpretations of the language used. This strategy opposes 
phallocentric language, and enacts the complexity and ambivalence of 
settler post-colonial discourse. Although I retain the forms used in 
original sources within quotations, I employ hyphens in terms such as 
post-colonialism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism, my 
formulation being motivated by the preference for representing the 
possibilities of articulation between the constituent parts of each term .. 
All italicised words and phrases within quotations belong to the 
original unless it is specifically noted that the italicisation is my own. 
Underlinings within quotations are all my own emphases, and are used to 
avoid confusion particularly where the quotation itself contains italicised 
words. I have avoided the practice of italicising or providing bracketed 
translations of words or small phrases in indigenous languages which 
occur either in quotations from texts, or where appropriate in my own 
discussion. In the former instance there is almost always sufficient 
contextual information to make the sense clear, and in the latter I similarly 
attempt to ensure that the context is clear to the reader. Similarly, I have 
avoided the use of sexist language or other inappropriate forms, such as's' 
plurals for Maori words. However, where these occur within quoted 
sources, I do not gloss them with 'sic'. Readers are now aware of the 
unacceptability of sexist language, and are able to recognise it in earlier 
sources without its having to be explicitly noted. 
Finally, citations from fictional texts are followed by page number in 
-,-
brackets. 
SECTION I 
INTRODUCING THE SUBJECT 
OF 
POST -COLONIAL DISCOURSE 
1 
INTRODUCfION. 
I. Background: Issues of Definition. 
'Post-colonialism' is not primarily a literary term. Indeed, the word 
declares its historical or temporal component (post-), and its political basis 
(colonialism). Thus it is clear that on one level the term refers to a 
condition following colonialism. The simplest and least helpful definition 
of post-colonialism would be the legalistic one of having been, but no 
longer being, a colony. However, this definition is both misleadingly static 
and so general as to be no more than an initiating gesture, opening up 
more searching questions as to what it means no longer to be a colony. 
Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra refer to "the equivocation with history 
contained in the prefix 'post'. As with other fashionable combinations 
such as 'postmodernism', the prefix seems to construct a simple version of 
history in which the 'modern' or the 'colonial' is totally superceded." 
They maintain, however, that "it is useful to distinguish between the 
postcolonial as an historical moment, and ... postcolonialism ... in which 
certain tendencies are always inherently present. Postcolonialism in this 
second sense is the underside of any colonialism, and it can appear almost 
fully formed in colonial societies before they have formally achieved 
independence."l This view usefully recognises that the 'post-' of post-
colonialism is a qualifier which introduces a reflexive element into what is 
qualified. To apply analogously to post-colonialism Simon During's 
advocating of a diacritical approach to post-modernism, it can be said that 
"given that 'post-' which rules its usage, it remains a notion which needs 
to be defined against [colonialism]."2 Therefore the purely temporal and 
serial notion of post-colonialism as following colonialism must be 
expanded to include colonialism's continued implication in post-
------~---------~--". 
colonialism. 
--------' , 
On the other hand, unlike 'modernism', 'structuralism' and other 
terms whose primary application has been to epistemologies, ontologies 
and the cultural products of these (although of course they are implicitly 
political), and which have also generated forms governed by the prefix 
'post-', colonialism differs fundamentally in that it names a real relation 
in terms of specific world-historical events. The nature of the imperial-
colonial encounter has varied with time and place, from classical Greek 
colonies as "replica ... societies,"3 to territorial expansion and the creation 
2 
of political and economic dependencies. It has similarly differed between 
intent and effect, so that it can be claimed, for example, that "modern 
Western colonialism ... still means that a power possessing superior force 
is holding another people under control. ... But its aim is not exploitation 
of natives, but a development of both natives and resources."4 This is a 
view which posits subjection as an unintentional and unfortunate by-
product of the positive 'civilising' intention. However, the coincidence of 
these two aspects of colonisation is articulated in the definition of 
colonisation as "the expansive force of a people; it is its power of 
reproduction; it is its enlargement and multiplication through space; it is 
the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to that people's language, 
customs, ideas and laws. "5 While' such definitions privilege the cultural 
productivity of colonialism over the economic and/or political 'side-
effects', Margaret Atwood emphasises that "there are cultural side-effects 
which are often identified as 'the colonial mentality' ... but the root cause 
for them is economic."6 Finally, even definitions which foreground the 
economic basis of colonialism demonstrate variance between intent and 
effect, so that it can be recognised that 
Economic gain and political power are important motives for creating 
a colonial situation ... [but] colonialism could be characterised by the 
search for economic and political advantage without concomitant real 
economic or political gains, and sometimes even with economic or 
politicallosses.7 
Historians' discussions of the colonisation of Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand reflect the co-existence of these conflicting perspectives on 
colonialism. For example, C. Manning Clark describes the complicity of 
the 'civilising mission' with the material oppression of the Aborigines in 
the colonisation of Australia: 
The Europeans offered the aborigines the precious gift of their 
civilisation in return for the right to use the wealth of their land. The 
European hoped that the aborigine would perceive the benefits of 
civilisation, abandon the life of the savage, and become a labourer on 
the bottom rung of the ladder of European society.8 
By contrast, Keith Sinclair emphasises the complicity of colonisation and 
Christianity, from the belief of the Aborigines Protection Society "that 
'Christianity could be harmonized with colonization,'" to Samuel 
Marsden's belief that the Maori would not be converted unless they were 
"also raised in the scale of civilisation. They should be taught the arts and 
3 
handicrafts of Europe as well as the gospels. "9 Similarly in Canada in the 
1840s, "Colonization and religion were to go hand in hand. The clergy 
took up the challenge and formed colonization associations, in order to 
people the vacant lands."10 However, not all involved in the Christian 
mission were optimistic about their relationship to colonisation. Anglican 
and Wesleyan missionary societies noted, with regard to New Zealand, 
"nothing to convince them that systematic colonisation would not hinder 
if not cancel out the work of the missionaries."ll Clearly no one theory of 
colonialism can be adequate to explain the political fact in its many specific 
forms and resultant socio-political formations, nor to unify the different 
positions and perspectives in relation to colonialism out of which the 
many definitions are produced. 
Further, the term 'colonisation' has been applied in ways ranging from 
metaphor to direct political analysis of the position of other oppressed 
groups, notably women. Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues that "the term 
"colonization' has come to denote a variety of phenomena in recent 
feminist and left writings in general. ... to characterize everything from 
the most evident economic and political hierarchies to the production of a 
particular cultural discourse about what is called the 'Third World."'12 In 
positing feminism itself as a colonising discourse, Mohanty argues that 
"However sophisticated or problematical its use as an explanatory 
construct, colonization almost invariably implies a relation of structural 
domination, and a suppression -- often violent -- of the heterogeneity of 
the subject(s) in question. "13 This contrasts with Frankel's suggestion that 
rather than viewing colonisation as "merely a form of territorial 
expansion," we should recognise a colony as "a social unit in process of 
transformation, "14 a view which, while it conveniently elides the 
violence which attends colonisation as a process, also allows theoretical 
room for the agency of the colonised. Thus a critical 'double-bind' is 
invoked, as Henry Louis Gates, Jr explains: 
You can empower discursively the native, and open yourself to 
charges of downplaying the epistemic (and literal) violence of 
colonialism; or play up the absolute nature of colonial domination, 
and be open to charges of negating the subjectivity and agency of the 
colonized, thus replicating the repressive operations of colonialism. 
In agency, so it seems, begins responsibility.15 
If 'colonialism', as the term upon which post-colonialism is dependent, 
is a term of such multiple and conflicting Significations, how is it possible 
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to define post-colonialism? Indeed it is one of the lessons of the preceding 
discussion that post-colonialism cannot be substantively defined in unified 
and comprehensive terms: it has no 'identity'. There are further parallels 
between the instability of the term 'colonialism' and the way in which I 
use the term 'post:-~ol~nialism' _ilL this __ the_ais. While retaining this 
---------------~---
understanding of the suppression of subjective heterogeneity, I specify 
settler (post-)colonialism as rendering subject-positionality more complex 
and ambivalent than overt domination and suppression. With regard to 
the debate about whether colonialism has an economic basis with cultural 
'side-effects', or a cultural basis with economic 'side-effects', I argue the 
impossibility of determining finally relations of cause and effect, and 
suggest rather that colonialism locates culture in an economic exchange 
relation within which subjects are actively positioned. With regard to the 
slippage between intent and effect noted by theorists of colonialism, I posit 
this as indicative of a complexity of subject-formation, and subjectivity 
beyond (the politics of) conscious choice. These are the issues I believe 
require the analysis rather than the embarrassed silence of the politically 
engaged critic. 
Because the problems of defining post-colonialism inform the analysis 
of subjectivity and discourse through which the particular problematics 
identified in the thesis emerge, I shall expand upon these ideas in 
discussion of the argument below. First, however, it is necessary to explain 
the scope and methods of the thesis in order to contextualise the argument 
that follows. 
II. The Scope and Method of the Thesis. 
(i) Scope. The rubric of 'settler post-colonialism' refers in this thesis to 
those societies which have developed out of the (predominantly) British 
settlement of colonised lands and the concomitant displacement of the 
indigenous populations, resulting in numerically and culturally dominant 
settler populations. I address this phenomenon in relation to Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand, through cultural discourses of the late 
twentieth century. Discussion of settler post-colonialism in these three 
countries raises the challenge of exploring the meaning of 'post-
colonialism' in contexts where political and cultural issues are blurred by 
the lack of unified effort toward independence or an analysis of colonial 
oppression shared by the dominant culture. I do not claim wider purchase 
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for my argument than these contexts, although I similarly do not preclude 
the' possibility that some of the cultural features and discursive strategies I 
identify may have relevance in other post-colonial situations. 
Nevertheless, where I use the term 'post-colonial' I refer only to settler 
- post-colonialism in the three nations specified. 
(ii) Method. The thesis is only broadly 'comparative': my in~ention 
was to analyse discourses across the three national contexts on the basis of 
~--~~-~--------'--' 
similarities in demography, history, political structures, and even 
dominant cultures, while acknowledging important differences and 
--------~,-'--~--' --~~" -~--""~~" 
specificities within these sa~~/ and other, areas. To an extent differences 
r ancfsimi:iclrities, once broadly established, have been assumed in the detail 
of my argument, so that the thesis does not necessarily seek comparable 
examples of all specific discourses or discursive strategies for each of 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The nations themselves are only 
partly useful as the determining structures within which discourses are 
analysed: they are the structures within which dominant discourses are 
institutionalised and others are marginalised and thus their power must 
be acknowledged; ,but at the same time they reinforce biases which 
themselves are destabilised -- though not necessarily dismantled -- within 
(other discourses of) post-colonialism.16 The thesis treads a treacherous 
path between acknowledging the currency of political calls for the" /) 
recognition of specificities, and the danger that these will too easily (ossify 
into positive knowledges which are reductive of the multiplicity of 'ways-~ 
in which 'reality' may be inscribed in discourse, and the multiplicity of 
positions from which 'reality' may be 'truly' constructed., Therefore, while 
positive knowledges are a crucial component of post-colonial discourse 
production, the aim of the thesis is not the production of 'knowledge' 
about Australia, Canada, or New Zealand, but an analysis of discourses in 
____ '\.~ "~_~ ___ ~~ __ ~~ _____ w ____ -~_~~ __ ~_ ~~ ~ __ ~~"' __ 
and of settler post-colonialism pertaining to all tnree, ~~m,pari~ 
a~~_ ~~gges!ions~hLc~wl1L:r:~§()IlC\!~~if!~!el.1UyJQxgi!Sh. Similarly, while 
culture, race, gender, class, and sexuality are further structures within 
which subjectivity is institutionalised, and my analysis addresses these just 
as frequently as 'national identity', I do not posit them as more 'natural' 
than nationality; they are often constituted within, or in relation to, either 
the nation, or other discourses which exercise their own marginalisations 
or suppressions of heterogeneity. Therefore, rather than arguing for 
discursive relativism or pluralism, I point to the split subject of (post-
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colonial) discourse, and its lack of mastery of the language which produces 
it. 
(iii) Selection of Texts. When I refer to 'cultures' and 'practices' within 
discursive contexts, I refer to the textual construction and dissemination of 
these. Cultu~ dissourse a~9:_!~~Il_tity~~nU.;QJlstrw;;te(:t~n<:tdisseminated i~~ 
Janguage, and ~ r~sponses to issues will often be responses in and to texts. I 
have not sought to privilege empirical or experiential 'knowledge' over 
textual discourses, primarily because the thesis concerns analysis of textual 
discourse, not some (questionable) notion of 'culture' in the Real. To this 
extent, 'Truth' in the sense of 'accuracy' is not the object(ive) of my 
analysis, and this applies as much to non-fictional discourses as to 
unrecorded 'reality'. Non-fictional texts have been employed as discursive 
instances whose 'truth' lies in their purchase in a particufar cultural 
context, their power to construct a cultural'reaUty'. I have attempted an 
approximate balance in quantity, focus and contemporaneity of these 
between Australian, Canadian and New Zealand sources, although 
problems of access to materials have made Canadian sources harder to 
attain. I have attempted a similar balance between Australian, Canadian 
and New Zealand fiction, and between women and men writers. 
However, I do not claim that the fictions I have selected for discussion are 
'representative', either of their 'nations' -- a notion which my focus upon 
difference and heterogeneity would surely problematise, anyway -- nor of 
fiction within their national contexts -- a similar qualification pertains. 
Neither are they selected on the basis of their evaluation as 'the best' or 
'great': such critical assumptions are irrelevant to my thesis and untenable 
in the terms of my argument. Instead, I have selec~_ed texts which_serve 
the type of argument I wish to make: it is not an argument about the 
'stat;'--()-~--th~characteristics of Australian, Canadian, or New Zealand 
fiction, nor even about post-colonial fiction in general; rather, it is about 
discourse and subjectivity, ~e~ts ar~_used t~_~~£lore ancl_~ve~~ 
conte~tualis~_this~ For this reason, they are fictions published in the 1970s, 
80s and 90s, so that they have entered the discursive 'market-place' in the 
late twentieth-century cultural context upon which my argument focuses. 
At the same time, ~~y analysis"_~_~_~~~_~~()_cl~~!!lQ~!!§!!C\t~" the literariness, 
constructedness, and artifice of all textuality, so that the method is applied 
similarly to fiction and to interviews, critical writings, cultural 
commentary and journalism. Because of the focus on discourse as 
opposed to literary genres and practices, I have considered it sufficient to 
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limit the range of texts for analysis to forms of prose writing. Finally, with 
regard to theoretical texts to which I have referred, I have respected the 
specificity of theoretical arguments and analyses to the cultural context of 
their production. For this reason I have privileged theories developed in 
relation to Australian, Canadian and New Zealand post-colonialism and 
other cultural analyses such as feminism and post-modernism. However, 
my method of analysing discourses in relation to subjectivity has required 
the use of psychoanalytic and other theorists of subjectivity, many of 
whom are European, British or American in either origin or location. It is 
consistent with my argument against the sealed autonomy of a post-
colonial discursive and cultural context that I accept these as 'available' 
sources within these contexts, and it has simply been a matter of 
calculating their value for my own analysis. An important example 
consists in my use of the psychoanalytically-informed analyses of colonial 
discourse by Homi Bhabha: although he does not address the settler post-
colonial societies that I do, both his psychoanalytic approach, and many 
details of his analysis have been methodologically valuable to my thesis. 
See my fuller introductory discussion below concerning theoretical 
perspectives in the thesis. 
III. The Argument of the Thesis. 
In this thesis ~~~osi~'post-cOIOnialism' as a cultur~l problematic ne~t~er 
to be celebrated nor ~plored, but rather to be consIdered as a condItion 
whose constituent discourses and effects -- in short, whose meaning --
must be specifically calculated. I argue that 'post-colonialism' is, in the 
context of settler societies, usefully distinguished from 'Nation' as 
response to Empire. Nationhood interpellates a subjectivity which 
represses and suppresses the other of the colonial encounter, and 
constructs itself out of the valorised terms of the dominant culture (itself 
derived from Empire). Post-colonialism, as the return of the repressed --
the eme~gence of discourses whichcoritest dominant structures, and the 
recognition and power of those discoursE?s_t()_ci~s_t~~i!i~~ l1!~ __ 'LuJhQJitY-Qf 
dominan! _ d!scourses -- constitutes a belated rE:!play:i~g()L t~~ col~ial 
encounter with difference. In other words, a different discursive situation 
obtains: the 'emergence' of discourses of identity and resistance in relation 
to the constructions of a dominant (National) culture coincides with the 
re-energised (and narcissistic) desire for the 'local' othe~ 
indigenous discourses of identity is that they offer 'belonging' and 
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'authenticity' to a _~~~~n~n~!smal culture whose authority_ is 
. aestabilised by the anxieties which att~nd t~e~i~<:.r~~§iggl}':_glQRal 
delegitimation of imperialism (the basis for their existence), and at the 
same time which 'recognise' the threat of absorption into Jnternational 
in-difference by the neo-imperialist structures of late capitalism -- the _ 
'external' Other. The reassurance offered by a 'local' culture which shores 
up against the imposition of cultural sameness by a western capitalist 
world-market compromises the 'decolonising' project of native peoples, 
neutralising their difference by appropriating it to the purposes of national 
legitimationi at the same time, the authority and autonomy of the 
dominant discourse is compromised by its newly avowed constitutive 
dependence upon that which it has excluded. 
Settler post-colonialism therefore confounds the positions of self and 
other in relation to discourse and discursive strategies. As a result, claims 
to identity -- claims which have been seen as constitutive of post-colonial 
discourse itself -- are abjected by disruptions from inside and outside that 
identity. However, if 'post-colonialism' has no 'identity', this does not 
mean that identity is not a heavily invested term (of desire) in post-
colonial discourses. At the same time, though, the concept of identity is a 
concept in crisis: partly because of the competing claims to (privileged) 
identity made in. post-colonial discourses -- these ambivalently 
problematise and strengthen the concepti but rather more crucially, the 
difficulties, in settler post-colonialism, of differentiating subject-positions 
through the contaminations of discourse problematise the autonomy and 
integrity upon which claims to identity are predicated. For example, 
Hodge and Mishra emphasise that "'postcolonialism' as the period that 
follows a stage of colonisation is not necessarily subversive, and in most 
cases it incorporates much from its colonial past."17 This leads them to 
posit the necessity of distinguishing between oppositional and complicit 
post-colonialisms.1 8 l However, settler post-colonialism may be 
characterised by the ambiguity and ambivalence of oppositional and 
complicit positions, such that discursive strategies which may be identified 
as 'complicit' with the cultural legacies and political structures of 
colonialism may also be the most powerful strategies and discourses of 
resistance to oppression. Thus it is not only difficult, but unhelpful to 
attempt to distinguish positions once and for all. For example, it has been 
claimed that "Whatever its limitations, national identity is often the only 
shield the colonized have against the peremptory characterizations of the 
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colonizer."19 On the other hand, the meaning of that assertion of national 
identity cannot be understood as identical with the parallel claims and 
assertions of a dominant settler culture: "While acknowledging that 
nationalism can still be a site of resistance and radical struggle, post-
colonial perspectives shun the unitary, self-identical (masculine) subject 
projected by most forms of modern nationalism."20 Nevertheless, this 
does not preclude analysis which points to 'moments' of both subversion 
and complicity within discourses; this is central to my method. Therefore, 
unlike Hodge and Mishra, I believe that the term 'post-colonialism' may 
be used, in the words of Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, "to cover all the 
culture affected by the imperial processes."21 
Just as 'colonialism' cannot be reconciled to one, self-sufficient 
definition, I maintain thatp~~!-colonialism is not contained within any 
one discourse, but addresses the mUltiplicity of, and relations between, 
discourses in tension. Rather than 'defined', it is evoked through a focus 
on sites of articulal!~nlihi_~Aitlf;!J~betw:een:- diScourses.~-I;d~ed,iti~-my 
__ --~-_~~~~ ___ r------~------- - - - ----- -_ 
intention to challenge the privileging, in descriptive or definitive analyses 
of 'post-colonialism', of its programmatic content (of decolonisation), and 
through exploration of the proliferation and complexity of subjective and 
discursive positions, effectively to empty it of 'content' as such. Consistent 
with my contention that post-colonialism has no 'identity', I argue that 
there is no privileged subject of post-colonialism through which 'it' is 
most accurately articulated. However, these gestures must not be 
understood as emptying it of politics, but on the contrary to posit post-
colonial politics as the continually changing tensions, negotiations, 
alliances and a poria of discourse and difference -- in short, as political. 
Therefore,_my arg\l~1illi stands i~p-E0sition to the view, "deconstruct 
identity and you deconstruct the agent of history and of politics."22 On the 
contrary, I would argue, 'deconstruct identity and you produce the agent of 
history and of politics.' The argument is methodologically and 
theoretically consistent with the following succinct summary of the place 
and problem of identity in relation to politics: 
This question of identity remains one of the major problems in the 
relation of psychoanalysis to the political. But the call for the old 
unified subject. .. raise[s] as many problems as it offers to solve. In 
the first place, it requires a kind of imperialism of identity, so that we 
are only allowed one, and our politics then has to have a single 
meaning too .... In the second place, the demand for a single identity 
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assumes that we can choose to have a single, coherent, 
unproblematised identity as a matter of will. In the third place, the 
argument for the necessity of the unified subject for politics relies on 
a fairly crude theory of intentionality, which imagines that you need a 
totally unified subject to be able to have any form of will or agency at 
all. Finally, it presupposes politics as an entirely intentional activity. 
The point about the challenge of psychoanalysis is that it questions all 
that.23 
Through an exploration of cultural discourses in relation to psychoanalytic 
theories of subjectivity, I address the possibilities, even the need, for a 
politics which exceeds th~ hegemon)'-~f-c~~sciousness. The description of 
the theoretical perspectives which inform my thesis will clarify the 
argument further. 
Finally, against the unity of the term 'post-colonialism', I suggest that 
there are three aspects of the post-colonial which must be differentiated in 
order to reveal the complexity of late twentieth-century settler post-
colonial cultures or societies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
First, there are post-colonial discourses, cultural products and practices, 
some of which challenge dominant discursive constructions of culture, 
gender, and so on, and some of which do not, or are articulated from 
within these constructions. Nevertheless, all are either implicit or explicit 
cultural or subjective responses to legacies of colonial and colonising 
practices. Through thematic concerns with· issues such as land and 
language, they raise and address questions of belonging, identity, 
authenticity and authority. Second, post-colonialism is what I understand 
to be the cultural condition characterised by the co-existence of these 
discourses, not in peace and tolerance, but variously in tension, 
negotiations, alliances, and aporia. Therefore, as opposed to an 
understanding of post-colonialism which implies or assumes 
'decolonisation', I take it to be more the 'problem(atic)' than the solution. 
The third aspect I have specified and indeed emphasised, is post-
colonisation, which I argue to be the strategic moment in post-colonial 
discourses which replays the colonial scene and~l1:stig~~s hybridity. It is 
this aspect which enables recognition of the complex constitution of the 
post-colonial subject as a subject of difference and desire; to be non-
identical with its consciousness and non-autonomous from the 
other/Other. This, then, is the crux of my argument. However, it is in 
accord with the nature of the thesis, in its attempt to theorise settler post-
colonialism, that a discussion of theoretical perspectives probably 
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elucidates more of the material which follows than does an isolated 
summary of the 'argument' itself. 
IV. Miscegenations: Theoretical Perspectives. 
The the~retical perspectives _which inform this thesis reflect my 
argument about the 'impurity' of settler post-col,onial cultures and 
discourses. Correspondingly, I enact a theoretical non-integrity through 
the variety of modes of thought I employ, an,d a non-autonomy of 
approaches which opposes the sealing of one approach from another. 
Fundamentally, I believe that settler post-colonialism cannot be theorised 
in any sense which assumes the cultural or discursive purity of any 
constituent ontology or epistemology: it is itself the messy product of the 
encounter and productive miscegenations of different worlds and different 
world views. is the relations of these which comprise the theoretical 
materials of post-colonialism, and they include 'European' theories which 
are part of the cultural inheritance of the settler-majority societies under 
discussion. However, if I do not grant post-colonial theory the purity of 
integrity and the privilege of autonomy, I do privilege post-colonialism 
and post-colonial theorists (theorists of post-colonialism) as productive of 
the dialogue within which I wish to position my own discourse. A 
bibliographical strategy must therefore be explained: I create a separate 
section for (post-)colonial sources not in order to evoke a theoretical or 
analytical autonomy for the field, but to privilege that rubric for the 
analysis of cultural discoursesi its contents are themselves reflective of the 
theoretical interactions to which I allude here. Similarly, I must clarify 
that a widely interactive body of theoretical sources and analyses does not 
imply an attempt at a global or totalising theory for post-colonialism, 
whose inclusiveness is understood as its proximity to a holistic Truth. As 
Henry Louis Gates has observed, "It's no longer any scandal that our own 
theoretical reflections must be as personal, reactive, and local as the texts 
we reflect upon. Of course, discarding the imperial agenda of global theory 
also means not having to choose between Spivak and Said, Greenblatt, 
Pease, or Jameson, Bhabha or JanMohamed or Parry, even Fanon or 
Memmii or rather, it means not representing the choice as simply one of 
epistemic hygiene."24 
Psychoanalysis is the most immediately visible theoretical basis for my 
analysis, a field which already has a history in the study of (post-)colonial 
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cultures. Gates identified, in the work of Frantz Fanon, "the convergence 
of the problematic of colonialism with that of subject-formation."25 
However, the convergence must be tempered with the recognition that 
"What seems potentially more fruitful is the dialogue in which, although 
the two discourses [of psychoanalysis and cultural theory] remain distinct--
they are always to some extent talking past each other -- the questions 
untranslatably specific to each can provoke new thinking and insights in 
the other."26 Thus the relationship between these fields includes tensions 
and aporia, as well as some productive parallels, and any analysis must be 
sensitive to the specific conditions of each. My use of a psychoanalytical 
account of the formation of subjectivity is 'enablea' by the pervasive 
historical and contemporary discourses of identity which implicitly posit 
socio-Symbolic structures such as nation, culture, race and gender -- as well 
as, more conventionally, the individual -- as isomorphic with a human 
'self', as subjects to and of desires, identifications and resistances in 
relation to 'others'. The idea of a nation or culture as a 'self' is a powerful 
metaphor or discourse; however it is usually articulated from a humanist, 
masculine subject-position. The 'self' is centred, and assumes the 
hegemony of consciousness. To the extent that it articulates a dominant 
epistemological perspective within the societies under discussion, it 
conforms to -- or produces -- a particular type of 'truth', and its power is 
not to be underestimated. ;It is in the context of such discursive production 
that it has been objected that "While certain structures of sexuality are 
provocatively mapped onto those of race, gender itself is eliminated in 
favour of an undifferentiated 'colonial subject'. And once again, the 
psychoanalysis that is used is that which many would consider the 
patriarchal version."27 However, my strategy has involved the 
acknowledgement of the discourse and its appropriation in a manner 
which uses it 'against itself', in relation to theorists who have questioned 
its founding assumptions. This strategy is consistent with an 
understanding of post-colonialism itself as a cultural-discursive effect of 
questioning dominant National assumptions. 
My approach therefore has a history which reaches back to some very 
""------- - - - -
conventional and at the same time questionable metaphorical bases. In 
the light of this I wish to refute the assumption that a psychoanalytic 
model must refer to the normative clinical practices of psychoanalysis, 
diagnosing maladjustments or illnesses and treating these according to 
conventionally accepted treatment practices informed by dominant 
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assumptions about social and individual norms. I distance myself 
theoretically and methodologically from such 'humanist' psychoanalysis, 
and emphasise that "It is cultural analysis not cultural therapy that is at 
issue here. "28 Specifically, my use of psychoanalytic theory comprises 
"psychoanalysis after the feminist rereading of Lacan's rereading of Freud," 
developments and revisions which have sought "to pose cultural and 
social questions in new ways, to see things differently. "29 Lacan's 
rereading of Freud emphasised the function of language and/in relation 
to the unconscious, that is, what is repressed in the assertion of the Self. 
Just as the psychoanalytic account of subjectivity has been revolutionised 
by the Lacanian theory of the unconscious which disrupts the presence and 
unity of the conscious Self, I argue that an analysis of post-colonial cultural 
discourse must acknowledge the otherness which disturbs unity. Thus 
both the 'I' and 'Nation' are problematised by the effects of otherness -- the 
'others' of post-colonialism. 
Further, feminist rereadings of Lacan have emphasised the feminine, 
that is, what is excluded by the phallocentric subjective norm. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that "you could say that Lacan produced the most 
effective repression of sex of all by semiotising it, turning it into a sign 
system and denying sex's ontological status in favour of that of 
linguistics."30 I use that work of Julia Kristeva which describes, in relation 
to the traditional psychoanalytic focus on the mother-infant relationship, 
the function of the maternal body as that which is excluded by the 
phallocentric subject of culture; the body which represents the abjection or 
failure of that subject. However( the meaning of the body in such theories 
cannot be understood as constituting a 'natural' discourse outside of 
language. The value of theories of 'the body'.in relation to a subversion of 
phallocentric privilege, and in the context of my own thesis, lies in their 
location within an understanding of a 'corporeal anti-humanism'. As 
Elizabeth Grosz warns, "Corporeal anti-humanism is not a return to 
essentialism or biologism. On the contrary, instead of presuming a 
'natural' or biologically given body . . . [it refers] only to a socially 
constructed body, a body produced as such by specific powers. The body 
thus produced, the subjectivity thereby engendered, is an intensive point 
of investment for relations of power and resistance."31 The work of Luce 
lrigaray exposes the already gendered terms of 'production' of sexual 
difference as 'explained' by Lacan. She, like Kristeva, addresses the 
blindspot of sexual difference in masculine and feminine subjective 
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formation, but goes further to explore the possibilities of bringing the 
excluded female specificity troublesomely back into language and 
philosophy. This work is consistent with the recognition of the need to go 
beyond the Freudian-derived model which continues to underlie even 
Kristeva's revision: specifically, "In the Freudian model, the impure 
manifests itself not in some other space but as a disruption to any pure 
realm."32 Irigaray does not advocate essentialism so much as the 
exploration of the potential to realise a 'space' of impurity. Therefore, 
where Lacan may be seen to have substituted language for sex, feminist 
revisions have returned sex to language. This attention to differential 
structuring also enables the question of subjectivity in relation to other 
systems of hegemony and marginalisation, or dominance and oppression -
- race, culture, sexuality -- to be asked. The terms of production of sexual 
difference, in being revealed as 'belated', parallel the terms of the colonial 
'encounter with' or production of cultural difference. These terms have 
been described by Homi Bhabha as 'hybrid'. 
In his feminist-psychoanalytically-informed analyses of colonial 
discourse, Bhabha demonstrates the relevance and usefulness of post-
structuralist theories, theories which have been regarded with suspicion by 
those who speak for the marginalised or oppressed. For example, the 
question has been posed, "does the postmodern abandonment of the 
Enlightenment narrative of universality, freedom and equality leave 
feminist thought bereft of its most powerful weapons in the face of actual 
political struggle and historical confrontation?"33 However, it has been 
pointed out that "the real anxiety posed by poststructuralism is th'at its 
temporality is such that it always makes you pose the question of where 
you are beginning. It's not the problem of ends; it always re-poses, as it 
were, from the end the question of where one is starting from .... It makes 
that point of beginning properly belated, so that nobody can claim that 
kind of purity."34 Clearly, this understanding of post-structuralism is 
entirely consistent with my argument about the belatedness and impurity 
of the settler post-colonial cultural context and processes of subject-
formation as the (belated) replaying of the colonial encounter with (the 
already hybridised terms of) difference. It also underlies the strategic 
prominence of introductions and re-introductions, and the inconclusive 
nature of 'conclusions', within the thesis itself. 
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Finally, the late twentieth-century context of my analysis, and the 
location of post-colonial societies within an international context from 
which they cannot remain isolated or autonomous, requires that I address 
the pertinence of post-modern cultural phenomena and analyses to those 
post-colonial cultures. Post-modernism can no more be reduced to a 
singular or static term than can post-colonialism: both must be thought in 
complexity even when they are thought in relation; however, in the 
context of this thesis I ground the consideration of post-modern cultural 
phenomena in their effects on and relevance for settler post-colonial 
cultures. Rather than the paranoid defensiveness of claims to 
epistemological purity, claims which regard beginnings as beyond question 
or challenge, my theoretical perspective advocates "an alliance across 
difference on the grounds of a related critique [which] seems to represent 
one of the ascendant political modes of the 1980s and 1990s."35 
V. The Organisation of the Thesis. 
The thesis is divided into three sections. Section 1 contains this 
Introduction and Chapter One, and is introductory and orientational, 
grounding the material which follows in an analysis of the forIl1;ti~n· and-
structures of identity and subjectivity. Section 2 comprises Chapters Two, 
Three, Four and Five, and locates and articulates identity and subjectivity 
in discourses which I posit as thematically and epistemologically central to 
settler post-colonialism. Section 3 includes Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, 
and draws the preceding material together in consideration of 
'problematics', particularly hybridity and abjection, which have been 
revealed in the subjective and discursive structures of settler post-
colonialism. There is no formal conclusion to the thesis, but a variety of 
(in)conclusive gestures which enable the thesis to be concluded as a text, 
while, as textuality, remaining without closure. The following is a more 
detailed account of each section and chapter of the thesis. 
(0 Section 1: The Introduction addresses the scope, method, 
organisation and argument of the thesis as a text. Chapter One completes 
the introductory first section through its establishment of the theoretical 
basis for, and the contextualisation of, the analysis of discourses which 
follows. It is through Chapter One that the subject -- of the thesis, and of 
post-colonial discourse and culture -- emerges, or is revealed. I posit a 
parallel between the terms 'colonialism', 'Nation' and 'post-colonialism', 
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and the psychoanalytic stages or processes of mother-infant 
interdependence and ambivalence, the assertion of the autonomous Self 
(through accession to the Name and the Law of the Father), and the 
de centring of that unified autonomous Self through the functioning of the 
unconscious and the insertion of the subject into a socio-Symbolic order 
which exceeds it. The emphasis in this chapter is on Nation -- a discursive 
rather than 'natural' structure -- and particularly on its comparison with 
the Self in its discursive articulation as 'I'. I explore the parallel in relation 
to historical and other cultural discourses which themselves employ the 
metaphor of culture as an evolving self, and then I problematise it with 
reference to feminist revisions of the informing psychoanalytic model. 
These demonstrate the already-gendered nature of the terms in which 
(phallocentric) psychoanalysis claims to describe (sexual) difference. It is 
against this problematisation of subjectivity and identity, of the positions 
of self and other, and of (sexual! cultural) difference, that chapters within 
the following section comprise analyses of specific post-colonial discourses. 
(ii) Section 2: The relationships between the chapters in this section 
demonstrate more than linear progression in relation to the structure of 
the argument. Thus the organisation of the chapters enacts the strategic 
nature of reading itself. A linear reading reveals the emphasis on land in 
Chapters Two and Three, and a thematic concern with 'belonging' in a 
spatial sense, its signification of presence and authenticity, the 'self' as 
image located in relation to the land(scape) -- as opposed to the symbolic 
terms of 'nation' and 'authority' -- which contributes to its status as 
pivotal in discourses of contestation. Both chapters consider the role and 
function of textuality: in asserting the authority of belonging, and 
constituting the 'object' of resistance; while also providing the grounds of 
resistance, and the 'ungrounding' of authority. Chapters Four and Five 
also concern spatial issues, specifically the location of the self as subject in 
discourse, and the articulation of belonging. In these chapters it is, in a 
sense, discourse rather than land which serves as the ground of assertion 
and resistance, in representation rather than 'presence'. Specifically, 
presence asserted in discourse, including discourse relating to the land, is 
shown to be the representation of presence, subject to the Symbolic laws of 
language. Land and the self are known through discourse and 
demonstrate the alienation of the subject in language. 
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A non-linear reading reveals a relationship between Chapters Two and 
Four, which focus upon the 'self' in relation to nation and authority, and 
Chapters Three and Five, which focus on the position of the 'other'. Such 
a reading also demonstrates the ambivalence of these positions of 'self' 
and 'other' in relation to (discourses of) the land and belonging in settler 
post-colonialism. The 'self' occupies the discursive position of authority, 
but is subject to anxiety regarding authenticity and thus may appropriate 
the subject-position of the 'other'. Conversely, the 'other' signifies 
authenticity, but lacks the subjective authority in the Symbolic order to 
articulate this. Thus it is necessary for the 'other' to appropriate the 
subject-position of the 'self'. The section ends with a consideration of the 
differance of identity, the hybridity of subjectivity where the constitutive 
ambivalence and interdependence of 'self' and 'other' along 
racial! cultural axes in settler post-colonialism problematises post-colonial 
discourses of identity. 
(iii) Section 3: This section contains Chapter Six, which brings the body 
back to the thesis, privileging what has been excluded by phallocentric 
authority; Chapter Seven, which in the context of the return of the body, 
explores subject-abject relations and problematises, while not rejecting, 
notions of autonomy and integrity in political discourses and programmes 
of settler post-colonialism; and Chapter Eight is a case-study which takes a 
paradigmatic cultural and textual instance of the argument of the thesis, 
offering a reading of the fictional text in terms of that argument. 
Along with the three chapters, this section comprises three different 
and distinguishable moments of its functioning. It is located at the end of 
the thesis, and thus it is 'in conclusion'. It was necessary to provide a 
sealing gesture -- a ceiling -- to the thesis as a textual object, while leaving 
the argument and the discourse open, as consistent with an analysis of 
post-colonialism which posits no conclusive 'arrivals', nor even stasis, but 
the endless negotiation of culture through the movement and circulation 
of discourse. The openness of providing no formal conclusion constitutes 
'inconclusion', and consistent with this, aspects of Chapters Six to Eight 
function as re-readings of earlier material, in terms of the emergent 
problema tics of hybridity and abjection, enacting the very process of open 
discourse for which I argue. Finally, the reintroduction of the excluded 
body of the other (of phallocentric subjectivity) suggests 'in(con)clusion', as 
the 'other' occupies a 'feminine' position in relation to the subjective 
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morphology of phallocentrism which privileges 'masculine' sameness and 
autonomy. In short, while exclusion forms the basis of phallocentric 
subjective morphology and authority in order to privilege sameness, 
inclusion (of otherness) is the basis of the post-colonial problematic. 
However, in using the term 'problematic', I suggest that inclusion is not 
simply the solution to cultural marginalisation and oppression to be 
celebrated. Rather, it raises questions of subjective morphology -- and 
agency -- founded on, or structured by, inclusion and difference, in relation 
to the currency of discourses of identity and the politics of consciousness. 
VI. Use and Definition of Tenns. 
A number of terms are used in the thesis in a sense which differs from 
their common use, or their use within another specific discursive context. 
In a discussion which employs both literary and psychoanalytic concepts 
and terminology, I differentiate the meanings of terms in common such as 
Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real by using upper-case initials to suggest the 
strictly psychoanalytic sense, and lower-case for the literary or 'common' 
sense. 
There are a few terms which I use both in a sense which implies their 
dominant (or) phallocentric structuring, as well as without or specifically 
against that loading. The word 'nation' is left lower-case where it refers 
simply to the general concept or construct in its common understanding, 
or to a concept of nation which is inclusive of difference and 
heterogeneity; however, it is given an upp~-case initial when I use it in 
the context of the argument which posits J"!~!!~~ as the dominant 
discourse of sameness or identity in relation to valorised principles or 
discourses. Similarly, the construction of the self which is isomorphic 
with phallocentric valorisations of autonomy and sameness (according to 
the phallic norm) is represented as Self. 
The use of upper and lower case in the word 'other' is more complex. 
In psychoanalytic theory, the counterpart of the self in the mirror/colonial 
encounter is the (lower-case) other. The position of the Symbolic Father, 
the socio-Symbolic Law, language, the unconscious, the third term which 
intervenes in the mother-infant dyad, are all· represented by or as the 
(upper-case) Other. While conforming to these conventions, I most 
frequently refer to the Other in the context and sense of 'Nation's Others'. 
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This formulation refers to the other (of the colonial/mirror encounter) 
repressed to, and returned from the 'National unconscious' -- that is, the 
internal heterogeneity that the dominant discourse of Nation must 
exclude in order to articulate itself in unified terms -- as identities. Thus, 
in post-colonialism, discourses of indigeneity, the feminine, and so on are 
both the mirror-other of Nation, and are articulated through their 
constitution by the National Symbolic order, signifying their alienation 
from themselves (through the Other of language and the unconscious) 
and from the Self (as other). In short, they are constituted through the 
National unconscious (the Other), and are articulated through language 
(the Other), and therefore are Nation's Others. 
I also employ the unusual form of (M)Other for 'Empire'. The more 
usual form for representing the mother in relation to the infant would be 
(M)other, the small '0' signifying the mother as the counterpart in the 
mirror relation -- the infant's first 'other'. However, my intention is both 
to evoke this meaning and to suggest the imperial Law represented in and 
by this 'mother' -- the Other as the Law, the 'phallic' (M)Other of colonial 
phantasy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
(DIS)PLACING THE SUBJECf OF POST -COLONIAL DISCOURSE. 
1.1. Introduction. 
The emergence of a culture into post-colonialism is generally posited in 
terms of a dominantly linear model of historical and cultural 
'development' from the colonial beginning.1 However, there is less 
agreement about what follows the 'colonial' stage. Such judgements are 
bound up with a network of historical, political, cultural and literary 
assumptions, informing the views of specific commentators. While it 
would be correct in politico-legal terms to regard colonialism as followed 
simply by post-colonialism, such a view encourages a reductive view of 
the complexity of cultural impulses and forms generated by colonialism. It 
underlies assertions that post-colonialism announces the concern with 
national identity and the production of cultural objects (such as 'post-
colonial fiction') to foster and embody this.2 'Post-colonial' thus suggests a 
'decolonising' political and cultural impulse. However, if 'nationalism' is 
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specified as a stage between colonialism and post-colonialism, some 
important issues which otherwise could have been obscured, may be 
addressed. Indeed, nationalism has been situated as a stage between 
colonialism and post-colonialism in discussions of the literary 
'development' of Australia and New Zealand, as the impulse underlying 
the search in literature for, or construction through literature of, national 
identity. However it is more useful to transform the term 'stage' from a 
temporal (linear) to a spatial metaphor, so that the categories are not seen 
as mutually exclusive, nor as expressive of a uni-directional linear 
"progression," but as co-existing, intersecting, and reflecting back on each 
other; in short, as inter-acting.3 
Nation,!lis!11, as the imp\l1~~oJ2o~~EeciiY~~!1e J_d~J:'!!ity and character of 
particular colonies was, at various times an important feature of colonial 
New Zealand, Australian, and Canadian culture. In fact, nationalism 
necessarily precedes the politico-legal status of nation as its motivating 
sentiment and ideology. At the same time, the specification of 
nationalism as a 'stage' upon which the transformation from colonialism 
to post-colonialism is played out allows for the subsequent 
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problematisation, in post-colonialism, of that response to Empire, thus 
extending beyond the implied closure of the colony-to-nation historical 
account.4 In this way, nationalism remains as a floating middle term able 
to reach back to colonialism in its impulses, and as implicated in the post-
colonial responses it has generated. Indeed, the persistence of nationalism 
into post-colonialism has produced many of the important literary 
tensions addressed by this thesis. Therefore, while some of the rationales 
underpinning Empire are addressed and critiqued in this first chapter, it 
takes as its beginning point the construct of Nation, reaching back to 
colonialism and forward to post-colonialism in consideration of issues 
which frequently relate to all three in a play of discursive mirrors and 
reflected identities. 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish an ontological and discursive 
link between 'Nation' and 'self', such that they are more than analogous 
or parallel, but actually interdependent constructs. Further, these 
constructs may be understood through a psychoanalytic account of the 
entry into subjectivity. An historical coincidence of the emergence of the 
colonial nationalisms discussed in this thesis, and the rise of scientific 
discourses of organicism which sometimes linked themselves specifically 
to the project of nationhood, may be cited: Suzanne Zeller refers, in a 
study of early Victorian science and its role in the idea of Canada as a 
transcontinental nation, to a book review published in the Canadian 
Naturalist and Geologist in 1858 which expressed the view that "the 
destiny of British North America appeared subject to the same natural 
laws which guided every living organism."S She goes on to point out that 
"The concept of nationality ... [became] increasingly racially oriented by 
the late nineteenth century. The nation-state replaced the state as the 
object of loyalty, while the nation was increasingly personified and 
idealized as 'a huge collective self."'6 At the same time, 'evolutionism' 
has been described as "an explanatory principle common to most 
nineteenth-century social thinkers," and the evolutionism of the 'New 
Liberals' 
placed less importance on the principle of natural selection, which 
was more consistent with the older individualism, and more on the 
evolution of whole societies, on the growing dominance of 'mind' in 
social life. Society moved to higher and higher stages, ethically and in 
terms of its organisation, as the faculty of Reason ... asserted its 
dominance over chaos and the 'baser' human motives.7 
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Psychoanalysis as theory and practice, became arguably the prototype of 
these sciences of the 'self', and, both deriving strength from and 
strengthening capitalism and liberal individualism, this individualism 
understood as the "divorce of the formally free individual from his or her 
class position [which] leads all sociological explanations back to concepts 
about individuals and the nature of their subjectivity. Social structures are 
understood as systems of inter-subjectivity."8 These convergences point to 
the relevance of a psychoanalytic interpretation of the emergence of 
nations. 
The link between Nation and 'self' is initially found in historical 
discourse concerning the emergence from colony into nationhood of 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Britain, as Empire, is imaged as 
'Mother', while the colonies constitute 'daughters' understood politically, 
economically and culturally in terms of their status as extensions of, and 
with differences from and similarities to, and dependence on and loyalty 
to, Britain/Empire. Such imagery serves to naturalise both the imperial-
colonial relation, and the eventual nationhood of Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand. Referring to the prevalence of the vocabularies of kinship 
and home in discourses of nation, Benedict Anderson argues that 
Both idioms denote something to which one is naturally tied .... [I]n 
everything 'natural' there is always something unchosen. In this 
way, nation-ness is assimilated to skin colour, gender, parentage, and 
birth-era -- all those things one can not help .... [P]recisely because 
such ties are not chosen, they have about them a halo of 
disinterestedness.9 
However, the will to naturalisation effaces its own cultural construction; 
specifically that it is a gendered discourse which reinscribes patriarchal 
gender-identities and family structures and relations, relations which 
although "traditionally ... conceived as the domain of disinterested love 
and solidarity," have more recently been analysed in terms of "family-as-
articulated-p.ower-structure."lO When the colonies are seen in terms of 
similarity to, and dependence on the Imperial Mother, they are gendered 
feminine; when seen in terms of rebellion, self-actualisation and 
independence they are imaged male. Thus while the nuclear family 
remains consistently the metaphor for imperial-colonial relations and 
emergent nationhood, it is a flexibly gendered discourse. 
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The very flexibility of gender can be found in the inconsistencies and 
impasses produced by Freudian psychoanalysis in its attempts to account 
for the passage of the girl into 'normal womanhood'. In a discourse which 
attributes a priori privilege to masculinity in the phallocentric model of 
subjectivity, girls face difficult and ultimately ambivalent passages to 
mature womanhood. This culminates in Freud's uncertainty as to 
whether they ever fully resolve the Oedipal complex, and his description 
of their less assured place within the symbolic order of subjectivity. 
However, it is not a question of rejecting this analysis and its applicability 
to the processes of development from colonial status to sovereign 
nationhood, because of its phallocentrism. Instead, it is useful to accept its 
accuracy as an account of the constitution of the (male) subject under 
patriarchy, and thus to discover the isomorphism of the patriarchal male 
'self' and Nation, and its basis in the repression-oppression of the 
feminine-difference, both culturally determined facts. It should therefore 
be clear also that it is certainly not a matter of exchanging the terms of 
privilege within the same binary model so that that which is currently 
feminine becomes the privileged term. This would require, for example, 
the recuperation of Empire (Mother) -- a clearly problematic implication. It 
is the morphology which must be dismantled, freeing the currently 
contained 'masculine' and 'feminine' terms from binary polarisation. 
In his return to the theories of Freud, psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan 
contributed the postulate of the 'mirror stage' as an account of the infant's 
psychical development towards active subjectivity. According to Lacan, 
the infant initially experiences its body as a fragmented collection of drives 
and impulses, satisfied by and therefore combined in Imaginary wholeness 
with the mother. It does not yet differentiate its own body from its 
mother's. Indeed, it is not until the advent of the 'mirror stage', when the 
infant perceives its image in a mirror that it has a sense of its own body at 
all. The perception of its image serves to unify the body into a whole and 
unique entity, separate from the mother. However, the paradox is that the 
image both provides the basis for the genesis of the ego, and institutes a 
distance between the child's 'sense' of itself and the image of itself with 
which it identifies as itself. In other words, the recognition of its whole and 
unique body occurs at the expense of Imaginary wholeness or plenitude by 
splitting the self into perceiver and perceived, the latter being an 
inaccessible image in the mirror. As Lemaire has stated, "Disguised as a 
deceptive access to the instance of the total corporeal'!', as distinct from 
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the background, this stage is in fact only the first step in human 
alienation. "11 The child thus sees an 'other' who is at the same time itself. 
Further, this identification requires the repression of the multiplicity of 
sensations and drives which had been experienced in their immediacy. It is 
because the child both identifies with its other (its image), and is the rival 
of its (distanced) other -- identifying with it meaning wanting to take its 
place -- that the mirror stage is both the precondition of primary 
narcissism, and "owing to the irreducible gap which it opens between the 
infant and its fellows, the very source of human aggressivity."12 Indeed, 
Lacan teaches that these two drives are inextricably associated. With the 
mirror stage the child has entered the Imaginary order of unmediated dual 
relations between 'self' and 'other': 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from 
insufficiency to anticipation -- and which manufactures for the 
subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession 
of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of 
its totality that I shall call orthopaedic -- and lastly, to the assumption 
of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid 
structure the subject's entire mental development.13 
The introduction of a third term -- the Other -- to the dual relationships 
which characterise the Imaginary lea:ds the child from the Imaginary into 
the Symbolic mode. As Wilden explains: 
In Lacan's interpretation, perception is certainly primary in human 
existence, but it is the notion of the self, rather than that of 
subjectivity which perception generates. The child's release from this 
alienating image, if indeed he is released from it, will occur through 
his discovery of subjectivity by his appropriation of language from the 
Other, which is his means of entry into the Symbolic order in the 
capacity of subject.14 
The Symbolic is the order of language, the social, the Law-of-the-Father, 
and is actualised with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. The Oedipal 
stage is that governed by the Phallus, the Law which forbids the child 
(sexual) access to the mother, and where repression into the unconscious 
of that (sexual) desire for the mother is exchanged for possession of the 
Phallus and a place in the Symbolic order as a subject. It is with the 
introduction of this third term that a system of exchange can exist, where 
the Phallus is the term exchanged between self and other,and a relation of 
social communication can exist. The Symbolic is therefore the site of the 
mediation of language in the only partly successful attempt to traverse the 
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distance between, or repair the fragmentation of self and (m)other /image; 
it is the site of the formation of systems of substitutes and equivalences 
which enable the subject to mediate the desire arising from the lost unity 
with, or the perception of the absence of, the (m)other. The only partial 
satisfaction of this desire ensures the continuation -- through the chain of 
substitute-signifiers -- of language. In other words, in the Symbolic order, 
"language mediates (and, once again, alienates) the subject's desire."lS 
Therefore subjectivity is actualised through the Oedipal stage, in which the 
child exchanges the dual relation with the mother for language and a place 
in the Symbolic order. 
The centrality accorded to language in the attainment of subjectivity 
can also be paralleled with the place of language in the constitution of 
nationhood and nationality. Just as the 'centre' of the subject is shown by 
Lacan not to be embedded in some essence of the individual, but in the 
Symbolic order of language to which it (in a state of fundamental 
alienation) accedes, Anderson further argues that "If nationalness has 
about it an aura of fatality, it is nonetheless a fatality embedded in history . 
. . . [F]rom the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood."l6 
Thus the constitution of nation -- like subjectivity -- in language is an idea 
of central importance to this thesis. 
1. II. Empire as (M)Other. 
'Nation' is an idea that is constituted against an Other, and in a post-
colonial analysis of the beginnings of 'new' nations with the process of 
decolonisation, that Other is, if not solely then intially or most 
immediately, 'Empire'. However, in the case of Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand, Empire -- Britain -- was only ever ambivalently Other. 
Expression of the colonial relationship to Britain has, over time, included 
similarities, dependence and loyalty, which have continually interacted 
with perceptions of difference, the drive to independence and the 
weakening of loyalty. Indeed, it can be shown the inter-relationship of 
these factors has functioned to preserve a relative balance of them in the 
constitution of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand nationalisms: 
differences and independences fuelled loyalties as much as similarities; 
similarities 'justified' independence, and so on. Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that the presence and relative importance of such factors 
has always varied considerably between the three nations, and other factors 
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have been influential. What follows is therefore not an 'historical' 
account, in the traditional sense, of the emergences of Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand into nationhood,17 Instead, it is an examination of the 
influences and implications of certain discursive patterns upon the 
construction and problematisation of national 'identities'. When I refer to 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in this and any other context, my 
own argument will show that I am employing synecdoch~ -- the part 
perhaps best rendered as 'the dominant discourse within' or 'those who 
use their power to speak for or about' Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. 
1. II. (i). Colonies as extensions of Empire. Initially, the colonies of 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand were defined principally in relation to 
Britain, as extensions of Empire, even of Britain itself. The notion of 
colonies as extensions evokes the undifferentiated bodies of mother and 
infant in pre-Imaginary space. Similarities included the perception of 
racial co-terminosity, a population composed of the same racial type -- the 
Anglo-Saxon. This perception, of course, depended on the disregard of the 
indigenous populations as either not 'there', which owing to wars and 
diseases was increasingly the case,18 or as not part of the colonies' 
populations,19 In this sense the colonies were increasingly something like 
literal extensions of Britain. However, in another sense they embodied the 
extension of an idea of Britain, one which reached back to a lost British 
past for values and principles to be transposed on to colonial lands. In 
terms of the psychoana.lytic model of evolving subjectivity, this nostalgia 
is evocative of the nostalgia for the lost mother which conditions men's 
relationships with women as 'sons' to 'mother-substitutes', and even 
more so the functioning of the super-ego set up as heir to the Oedipus 
complex, which 
presides, Freud writes, over the formation of ideals, over the moral 
conscience and self-observation .... Better than a mother, then, is the 
working out of the idea of the mother, of the maternal ideal. Better to 
transform the real "natural" mother into an ideal of the maternal 
function which no-one can ever take away from you.20 
Thus responses to the colonies by those British settlers who had been 
separated from the Imperial Mother-land were characterised by nostalgia 
for the Imaginary space of unmediated relation between the self and the 
Mother. British philosopher J.N. Findlay claimed that the "'visionary and 
idealized England which absorbs the emotional energies of New Zealand .. 
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. keeps it permanently in a state of feeblemindedness and infantilism.'''21 
Emigration and settlement was often founded on the belief that the ideal 
values of the Old World, such as ownership of land as measure and 
guarantee of economic independence and social prestige, would be a reality 
in the New World for all regardless of class.22 In the philosophy of his 
'systematic colonisation', E. G. Wakefield "looked back to a legendary past, 
to the squire surrounded by his contented cap-tipping yokels."23 In a 
similar vein, emigration propagandist Samuel Sidney envisaged. the 
recreation in Australia of a lost British past: '''every striving man who 
rears a race of industrious children ... living on his own land, looking 
down to the valleys to his herds -- towards the hills to his flocks, amid the 
humming of bees."'24 Thus the establishment and settlement of pastoral 
or rural colonies in Australia, Canada and New Zealand pandered to 
nostalgia for an idealised image of pre-industrial Britain's environment 
and social order. However, the notions of colonial similarity and colonies 
as extensions of Britain did not evoke any idea of the equal status of the 
colonies. The discourse emphasised less colonial affiliation than filiation. 
Keith Sinclair states that "Wakefield has fostered the idea, which rapidly 
became a myth, that New Zealand was ... created as nearly in the image of 
the motherland as could be expected."25 It has been said that "Ever since 
the late nineteenth century, New Zealand has commonly been considered 
the most dutiful of Britain's daughters."26 Indeed, such discourse, 
complicit as it was with the notion of filial ties to Britain, went further to 
posit the naturalness of links to Britain. In 1888, Canadian politician 
George Parkin emphasised the 'naturalness' of links with Britain as 
opposed to the 'unnaturalness' of annexation to America in extremely 
affective discourse. Deploring the 'murderous' disavowal, "'deliberately, 
in cold blood'" of Canadians' "'devoted regard for a mother land with 
which they are connected by a thousand ties of affectionate sympathy,'" he 
argues that, "'In Great Britain reorganized as a federation, or union, or 
alliance, Canada would hold an honourable place, gained on lines of true 
national development; in annexation to the United States she could have 
nothing but a bastard nationality, the off-spring of either meanness, 
selfishness, or fear.'''27 Further, colonial expressions of the terms of 
loyalty to Britain have also emphasised allegiance in the face of 
acknowledged political and cultural difference from Britain and the other 
colonies. This has been argued in relation to Canadian Confederation: 
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The framework of union was the over-riding British allegiance, 
which threw the colonies together in a potentially hostile world .... 
Here were men drawn together not because of the common social 
traditions, which in the case of some of them were closer with the 
Americans than with their fellow colonials, but because of a common 
political loyalty .... Confederation was not a matter of official British 
despatches, but of the British memories in the hearts of the colonists -
- a tribute to the force of history.28 
The colonial relationship was therefore one of loyalty to Britain itself, 
enacted in the development of British-defined and British-controlled 
institutions of government and civil and social organisation. It was also a 
relationship of cultural and ideological dependence, and dependence for 
both economic and defence well-being. Thus the, similarity tended to be 
expressed in terms of a filial relationship. 
1. II. (ii). Dependence and Disappointments. The dependence of the 
colonies on Britain has been portrayed by historians, politicians, and 
writers and critics of fiction in terms of the dependence of a child on an 
adult, although it could be said that Britain and the colonies did not share 
similar views of this dependence. Arthur Lower claims that from the 
1840s, Britain saw the British North American colonies principally as 
markets, potential customers for its goods, empty lands, or strategic areas. 
As a result, "in England there was virtually no-one who had the same 
sentimental attitude towards the colonies ... as had the average colonist 
towards the mother-country .... The bonds of Empire down until the 
twentieth century were knit up almost exclusively by the colonists."29 In 
fact, novelist Eleanor Dark portrayed the British view of Australian 
colonial dependence in the unflattering terms of a "troublesome, 
undisciplined infant" of whose needs and demands Britain would be 
relieved to be rid, particularly as its characteristics approached those of 
rebellious adolescence: 
It was a peculiar colony, persistently claiming the notice of English 
Ministers .... It struggled, it quarrelled, it starved, it recovered to 
struggle and quarrel again .... Never a Governor's despatch arrived 
which was not loaded with requests ... food, stores, stoves, kettles, 
tubs, ploughs, lanthorns, handcuffs, leg-irons, paper, paint, candles ... 
and still it went on struggling, muddling, working, idling, rebelling, 
quarrelling, drinking -- a distant, uncouth, unpredictable, 
unresponsive land.3D 
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The colonial relationship was one of dependence in economic, defence, 
domestic and cultural matters and the necessary separation between colony 
and imperial centre in anticipation of colonial nationalism was effected 
more by disappointments than by ideological rebellion. The New Zealand 
government during the 1860s to 1880s hoped for British supplies of troops 
and money towards the struggle with Maori for control of the North 
Island. Subsequent tensions with Britain were more the result of its 
indifference to, rather than interference in, New Zealand affairs. 
Similarly, economic links between New Zealand and Britain have been 
characterised by the same dependence and later sense of abandonment, 
culminating in Britain's entry into the European Economic Community in 
1973.31 Northrop Frye describes the British attitude toward Canadian 
interests in the nineteenth century as "flaccid ... from the Treaty of Ghent 
in 1814 through all the nineteenth century boundary disputes" and 
resulting in "a strong sense of [Canada's] not getting the support it 
needed."32 To some extent this lack of support related to Britain's 
cognisance of its own interests in the matter of British North American 
independence -- the opportunity to "reduce, or eliminate, the cost of 
governing the dependencies."33 From an Australian perspective it has 
similarly been argued that "the invocation of imperial interests was always 
a two-edged sword, in the sense that, if they were invoked by Australians 
in their own interests, they could also be invoked by the British 
government, whose concept of imperial interests would, in the last resort, 
be that which prevailed. "34 Thus, the economic, political and defence 
interests of Australia and the other dominions depended for support upon 
compatibility with the interests and priorities of Britain itself. 
Nevertheless, in such cases the expression of the wish or need for such 
support only tended to emphasise further the belief in the desirability, 
even 'naturalness' of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand links with 
Britain, whether in terms of dependence or the desire for a fully recognised 
partnership: "Australia did not denounce Britain for having failed to 
protect its interests. It complained, it is true, but that led to no sentiment 
for separation from the parent."35 
1. II. (iii). Colonial Comparisons to Britain and America. The colonies 
were defined both by their similarities to and differences from Britain, both 
of which were included or co-existed, not necessarily peacefully, in the 
defining principle of the relationship between the colonies and Britain --
simply that the former were 'colonial'. Differences were expressed in 
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terms of a focus on the status of colony itself, one which resulted in 
comparisons with America, the most advanced colony. However, there 
was a tendency for Britain and America to be defined against each other, so 
that their respective qualities represented nothing so much as each others' 
opposites, in the same way that phallocentric subjectivity polarises the 
sexes into opposites in which 'woman' is the negation of 'man'. Among 
nineteenth century perceptions of Australia was the belief that, "the less it 
was like Britain, the more it was like the United States, and vice versa."36 
Similarly, it has been argued that 
Upper Canadians ... saw much to admire south of the border, as well 
as much to abhor. Anti-Americanism remained powerful; however, 
Upper Canada was as much a colony of the United States as it was of 
Great Britain, and its search for identity, its developing ideology, 
above all the emerging conflict between tories and Reformers, can 
only be understood in terms of a debate with two major reference 
points -- Britain and the United. States -- rather than one.37 
Conversely, differentiation from America repositioned colonies in closer 
relation to Britain. In the case of Canada, the American-Canadian war of 
1812 has been described as having served precisely this function: 
The most important aftermath of the war lay not in the boundaries 
but in psychological effects . . . . The conflict strengthened the 
sentiment of Anti-Britishism, on which the American nationality 
had been founded, and caused the courses of the two nations to 
deviate more widely .... It accentuated Upper Canada's dominant 
hatred, whose incidence it changed slightly from hatred of 
'republicanism' to hatred of 'the Americans' or 'the damn 
Yankees' .38 
Thus America served as a third term between the colonies and Britain, the 
term occupied in psychoanalytic theory by the figure of the Symbolic 
Father. It is the mediation of this third term which fractures Imaginary 
duality between mother and infant, and instigates Symbolic subjectivity. 
The perception of the phallus of the Father leads to the son's identification 
of his own body with that of the Father, rather than with the 'castrated' 
Mother, while the girl, herself identifying with the Mother's 'lack', will 
take the Father{'s phallus) as, the object of her desire. However, as well as 
embodying features of the Father-function, America, when serving 
comparatively as the most advanced colony is placed more in the role of 
older brother to the colonies. Frederick Philip Grove actually employed 
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something like this image, located in the discourse of family relations in 
his comparison of Canada and America: 
Canada and the United States are of pretty much the same age. But 
even in individual families we find the quick, brilliant boy side by 
side with the slow plodding one; and not always is it the quick 
brilliant boy who remains at the end to show the world what stock he 
came from. Too often he is the prodigal son. 
Thus, with her neighbour and brother growing faster and faster, 
Canada has slowly, slowly grown up within that neighbour's shadow. 
The two have lived in comparative outward peace, involved only 
now and then in those brawls which are the flaws in the history of 
Europe.39 
Admittediy there is a curious gender change for Canada in the second 
paragraph, relocating Canada in the more frequently feminine colonial 
imagery, while family relations briefly give way to neighbours. However, 
reference to history's "brawls" nicely evokes the sibling relationship. More 
importantly, however, there is a basis in psychoanalytic theory for the 
ambiguous Father-brother imaging of America. Luce Irigaray explains: 
If man remains fixated on his first love object, his mother, 
throughout his life, what will be his wife's role in his sexual 
economy? ... If in order to correspond to man's desire, woman must 
play the part of or identify with his mother, he will be in some sense 
the brother of his children, since he has the same (type of) love object: 
the rna tern a!. 40 
Comparisons with America evoked the same degree of ambivalence as, 
and in fact were integrally linked with, comparisons with Britain. When 
America was seen in terms of its relative advancement, comparisons were 
expressed in terms of envy and even resentment. Norman Macdonald 
states that from 1791 to 1815, "travellers frequently remarked on the 
comparative backwardness of the social and economic life in the British 
North American Colonies, and the remarkable development of 
corresponding sections of the United States."41 Lower remarks that some 
time before Confederation, the name 'British North America' gained more 
than geographical meaning, and served to differentiate it from the other 
American community: "As Durham noted, the pace of life was less rapid 
and sure, the tone of life less exuberant and less generous than in the'. 
republic .... The mere presence of 'The States' continuously thrust a 
painful contrast on men's notice, intensifying every grievance."42 In 
psychoanalytic terms, America has the phallus, and the resentful daughter 
34 
must identify with Britain. Nevertheless, envy was not the only response 
generated in the 'daughter' colonies by the relative advancement of 
America. Grove's comparison between Canada and America cited above is 
certainly at least ambivalent. He calls more directly for a favourable 
Canadian self-image (while retaining the terms of the comparison) when 
he states that "the Canadian travelling in the United States is still 
recognized as a Canadian. They call us slow. Let us glory in that epithet."43 
Sometimes comparisons with America were positive. Specific 
similarities between Australia and America included the most general 
perceptions of their shared liberalism and federalism, contained in claims 
that, for example, "The American influence contributed peripherally to the 
climate of liberal opinion which influenced the framing of Australian 
State constitutions in the [eighteen-] fifties," and that "American ideas 
exercised a marginal influence on the Australian labour movement but 
had a more direct impact on Australian federation and the framing of the 
federal constitution."44 
However, as has already been mentioned, the terms of difference from 
Britain also emphasised the colonial stat,us itself. The colonies were 
likened to America in their 'new'-ness. For example, Australia was 
variously referred to as "'another America', a 'new America', 'the 
America of the South', 'the Future America', 'a humble imitation of the 
United States,'" among others.45 Colonial 'new-ness' was, however, an 
ambiguous term. It could signal superiority, when, like America, it was 
associated with escape from poor conditions in the 'Old World' and fresh 
opportunities in the 'New World'. However, Wakefield's term, 'New 
People', as a description of the 'Americanised' character, and as applied to 
those in Australian and Canadian settlements, was in no sense a 
complimentary description. They were 
'a people who, though they continually increase in number, make no 
progress in the art of living; who, in respect to wealth, knowledge, 
skill, taste, and whatever belongs to civilisation, have degenerated 
from their ancestors; ... and who delight in a forced equality, not 
equality before the law only, but equality against nature and truth; an 
equality which, to keep the balallce always even, rewards the mean 
rather than the great, and gives more honour to the vile than to the 
noble .... We mean, in two words, a people who become rotten 
before they are ripe.'46 
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By the 1850s it was also believed that New Zealand settlers "were already 
coming to resemble Wakefield's anathema, 'a new people' .... A visiting 
Frenchman thought insolence ... was a la mode in New Zealand as was 
familiarity in America."47 Such comparisons frequently functioned to 
assert the superiority of 'British' characteristics and colonial links with 
Britain. Rudyard Kipling, an apologist for Empire, observed of the 
Canadian-American border that, "'Always the marvel ... was that on one 
side of an imaginary line should be Safety, Law, Honour, and Obedience, 
and on the other frank, brutal decivilisation."'48 
On the other hand, Thomas Cholmondeley believed that the 
characteristics regarded as 'American' were rather the characteristics of the 
British colonist: "The American is essentially a colonist, and his ways and 
doings express a habit of life, rough and ready, free and daring, generous 
but dangerous, of infinite suppleness, dexterity, and resource. He cannot 
be equalled for contrivance . . . ."49 To be 'colonial' was to be inferior 
when it meant being a 'raw', 'distant' cultural outpost of Britain and 
Europe. However, the colonies were also associated with the strength and 
vigour both necessary to and produced by pioneering conditions. Indeed, 
from a current post-colonial perspective, to be 'colonised' is an expression 
of being the victim of imperialism; for the indigenous peoples it refers to 
the dispossession of land and destruction of culture, and for the post-
colonisers it refers to a sense of dislocation from or deprivation of a 
European belonging and inheritance. However, in colonial discourse to be 
'colonised' was not necessarily the expression of being victims of 
imperialism. An early New Zealand meaning of being 'colonised' as 
having learnt to endure pioneering conditions, can be found in Alexander 
Bathgate'S novel Waitaruna (1881), in which a recent arrival from Britain 
to New Zealand is chided, '''Though you are not so green as many "new 
chums" ... you are not sufficiently colonised yet to be satisfied with 
carrying a toothbrush and a paper collar as sufficient baggage for a week. "'50 
In defining the colonies, whether against Britain and/or America, or 
against each other, there was an inevitable tendency to specification of 
colonial identity for each. The terms of colonial identity, of course, were 
not initially 'national', but were variously 'newness', racial, or simply the 
mere fact of being 'colonial'.51 In the loosening of ties to Britain, there 
was an increased focus by the colonies on their own identity. Early 
Australian immigrants wished to define the colony against the English 
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image of the 'convict hell', and did so by fostering the distinction between 
"being convict (and British) and being Australian." In this spirit, "Writers 
such as Marcus Clarke and Price Warung condemned the brutality of the 
system, rather than the depravity of the convicts, and for them this 
reflected on the morality, not of Australia, but of England."52 Further, the 
qualities which manifested themselves in service to Britain were taken to 
represent the qualities of the individual colonies themselves, not simply 
the state of being colonial, culminating in assertions of nationhood. In 
fact, it could be argued that the pursuit of a national 'self' or identity 
increasingly focused not on differentiation from Britain or even America, 
but on differentiation from the other colonies and later dominions. 
Certainly, it has been shown that Canadian identity was formed very much 
in distinction from American, but in a comparable way, New Zealand 
identity was differentiated from Australian. This was influenced both by 
proximity and by a similar threat of absorption of New Zealand into the 
Australian Federation. According to Sinclair, New Zealanders' "feeling 
that they were not Australian was a major influence on the growth of 
national sentiment. Australians tended to define themselves as non-
British. By seeing themselves as 'non-Aus', New Zealanders could 
continue to feel both New Zealanders and Britons."53 There was therefore 
a tendency to specification of colonial identity itself in drawing 
comparisons with Britain and America. Further, while the colonies were 
defined in this sense against England, the qualities of putative superiority 
were loyally put to Britain's service. Much later, however, the strength or 
significance of links to Britain through the Commonwealth changed. An 
Australian commentator has declared of the 1970s that "there are other 
countries than Britain in the Commonwealth that makes it useful to 
Australia ... i this is the major contrast with earlier decades, when the 
presence of others detracted, if anything from the utility of the 
Commonwealth as a means of influencing Britain to pursue Australian 
interests. "54 
Colonial differentiation from America was therefore expressed in two 
rather different ways: the difference from America itself, or Americans, 
and the difference from the political ideologies -- democracy, 
republicanism -- associated with post-1812 America. This resulted in two 
slightly different, though continually inter-related reassertions of loyalty 
from the colonies: loyalty to Britain, and loyalty to the principles of 
Empire. While loyalty to Britain was expressed through the perpetuation 
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of British cultural institutions and the sense of a 'racial' coterminosity, 
loyalty to Empire was more like the implication of the daughter in the 
. perpetuation of patriarchy. 
1. II. (iv). Loyalty to Empire. In historical and ideological loyalty to 
Empire, the colonies demonstrated a willingness to put pioneering 
qualities to the military and domestic service of Britain, in return for 
defence and the ability to bathe "in the reflected glory of empire," and "saw 
themselves as proof of the fitness of the British race to govern the 
world."55 Indeed, such ideology informed much of the New Zealand 
dissatisfaction with Britain's failure to become involved in the 1860s 
'Maori Wars'. Sinclair states that, in contradistinction to the British view 
that the matter was a 'domestic' New Zealand one, "to the settlers it 
seemed that they were fighting Britain's war, a war in the cause of Britain's 
civilising and colonising mission." The reasoning was that the settlers 
"saw themselves as carrying on the British imperial mission."56 
Therefore, the belief in the principles of Empire was strengthened by the 
belief in the coterminosity of colonial 'self' and Empire. 
Imperialism has not always been regarded as incompatible with 
nationalism in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. It has been claimed, 
for example, that "New Zealand originally owed her name for clinging to 
the motherland to the policy of her Government, from the eighteen-
nineties until the First World War, in supporting the campaign for 
im perial federation. "57 Similarly, in a discourse which evokes the 
perpetuation of the nuclear family down through the generations, it was 
claimed that "By 1944 Australia ... had come of age with the plaudits of a 
generous Motherland. She had asserted her Dominion independence. 
She had proclaimed her intention of administering her own little 
Empire .... "58 Carl Berger has argued that "Canadian imperialism was one 
variety of Canadian nationalism," and that "When critics belaboured 
imperialism because of its hostility to 'Canadian nationalism' what they 
really meant was that they believed in [sic] incompatible with that kind of 
nationalism which they endorsed."59 Similarly it has been argued that 
Australian nationalism of the 1880s was, "to a considerable extent ... 
expressed through imperial institutions (even imperial symbols), rather 
than through denunciation of them."60 However, another important 
factor in perpetuating the link was the lack of perception of exploitation by 
Empire (that is, among those whose perceptions 'counted'). There is an 
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ironic link between the belief that the 'decline' of the British Empire 
through the steady granting of independence to the colonies, was due in 
large part to the Empire's own 'liberal' policies, and the way that these 
policies functioned to strengthen colonial and later 'Commonwealth' 
sentimental ties of loyalty. As a result of such 'liberalism', "The British 
provincials in general neither felt exploited nor desired to be liberated,"61 
because "To be a British subject never meant subjection in Canada."62 
Between 1848 and 1871, which saw the "development of Canadian 
nationhood from colonial self-government ... to continental stature ... [.] 
the colonial policy of the United Kingdom was liberal": 
In general, that is, it looked to the day when the colonies of 
settlement, increased in strength and practised in self-government, 
would swing out into natural orbits of their own, attached still, it was 
hoped, by ties of allegiance and affection to the mother country.63 
Such 'liberal' policies therefore emphasised sentiment as the basis of 
colonial allegiance to Britain, both in terms of what Britain hoped for, and 
what was asserted by the colonies themselves. Underneath this, 
independence was not simply easily achieved by the colonies, it was to 
some extent foisted upon them as consistent with British self-interest. 
Although Morton argues for the importance of the liberal principles of the 
British Empire in facilitating colonial independence, the implications of 
which will be clarified below, he also points out that British economic 
liberals "suspected the colonies of seeking to combine a maximum of self-
government with a maximum of imperial aid."64 However, it remained 
that colonial political reforms frequently strengthened the basis of links 
with Britain at the same time as preparing the way to national 
'sovereignty'. For example, the basis of Australian Federation and 
Canadian Confederation lay in the unification of the disparate colonies 
into whole entities which would acknowledge and continue their 
relationship with the Imperial (M)Other. Therefore, while both Australia 
and America have federal constitutions, the basis of these has been 
acknowledged as very different. Comparing the war of independence and 
subsequent civil war which attended and conditioned the development of 
the American nation, Cowen has pointed out, in naturalistic terms, that 
"No such drama attended the birth of Australian federation, nor has it 
faced any comparable threats." The discourse also suggested affective 
relations: the establishment of "closer constitutional bonds" between the 
Australian colonies and "the mother government. "65 Similarly, Morton 
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refers to Canadian reluctance to "sever the connection" with the United 
Kingdom. "They were, they protested, British in feeling and mode of 
government. "66 This loyalty was based on principles which could not 
have been more different from those of the American notion of the 
Imperial relationship. The basis of Canadian nationhood has been 
differentiated from that of America, in terms of what has been seen not 
only as opposing conditions of actualisation, but of a completely different 
notion of the imperial-colonial relationship: "In American belief, colonies 
... if not exploited and tyrannized over, were in constant danger of 
exploitation and tyranny." Where the American experience was 
articulated in discourse of imperialism and liberation, the Canadian 
discourse emphasised "national autonomy by evolution."67 
The 'liberal' colonial policies of Britain meant that Australian, 
Canadian and New Zealand nationhood was eventually achieved by a 
(feminine) process of evolution to maturity, rather than rebellion which 
signalled the American entry into independent nationhood and gendered 
America as male within the Oedipal narrative. 
As Freud himself noted, the girl remains in contiguity with the pre-
oedipal period in ways that are barred for boys. For boys there is a 
singular and momentous break with the pre-oedipal and the 
maternal. The boy's first acts of repression must definitively separate 
him from the mother. In the case of the girl, there is no clear-cut 
division between the pre-oedipal and the oedipal; she occupies an 
oedipalised position only gradually and unsurely. Her oedipal 
complex may persist indefinitely or fade because of disappointments, 
rather than end through a dramatic repression.68 
1. n. (v). The Ambivalence of Colonial Nationalism: The Dutiful 
Daughter Announces Her Manhood. Colonies whose independence has 
been secured by Act of Parliament rather than by a war of independence are 
more likely to retain ambivalent attitudes toward the former imperial 
centre, especially when the indigenous populations are sufficiently in the 
minori ty to allow the settler perception of the imperial connection to 
dominate cultural and political expression. 
Certainly various' disillusionments with Britain's failures of economic 
and defence support resulted in early pushes for colonial self-government. 
Richard White points out, in the case of Australia, that "From the 1820s, a 
number of issues -- freedom of the press, trial by jury, control of Crown 
Lands, the extension of self-government, opposition to transportation --
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were framed in terms of conflict between the British government and 
colonial opinion."69 Similarly, Malcolm McKinnon argues that there was 
"an early manifestation of New Zealand nationalism in the vocal and 
often intemperate agitation conducted by the settlers for the granting of 
representative institutions and a responsible government in general, and 
for control over land disposal in particular."70 Northrop Frye has argued 
that apart from superficial expressions of loyalty, there was, in nineteenth 
century Canada, "much resentment, and a feeling that colonials would 
have been treated with more respect in London if, like Americans, they 
had represented an independent nation. "71 
However, self-government was not necessarily seen as complete 
independence from Britain. A New Zealand politician in 1890 depicted 
Britain as a kind of guardian angel in declaring that 
'New Zealand should be a country for New Zealanders. With the 
wings of Great Britain over us we need look to no other country or 
colony for protection .... [W]e are here the pioneers of a great nation, 
and shall, no doubt, have a ,glorious future .... I think we shall 
become in every respect a country quite as great as Australia, and with 
a nationality of our own.'n 
Of course the belief in, or wish for independence of Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand from Britain varied, and Sinclair refers to early twentieth 
century New Zealand politicians such as Ward and Seddon, who regarded 
the possibility of New Zealand defence independence as "wholly illusory," 
while Australians and Canadians wanted their own navies, and Canadians 
anticipated the pursuit of an independent foreign policy.73 
On the other hand, expressions of desire for colonial independence 
create a tension within the metaphor of colonies as daughters of the 
Imperial (M)Other: within phallocentric discourse it is hardly possible to 
image the independence and self-actualisation of the daughter: 
Women take up a place in the symbolic order only as variants of 
men. In Freud's understanding, women take up a post-oedipal or 
symbolic position only in one of two ways: they can identify with 
men, acting and speaking as if there were no difference, in which case 
they suffer from what Freud calls the 'masculinity complex'; or they 
can accept their 'castration' and their 'inferiority' to men and accept a 
symbolic position only through the mediation of men.74 
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Neither of these options provides direct access for the daughter to an active 
place as subject within the Symbolic order. Therefore, 'Nation' as 
gendered discourse must exercise a flexibility so that when maturity is 
reached and sovereignty is attained, the images of nationhood necessarily 
become male. 
Just as American rebellion in the form of the War of Independence is 
discursively consistent with America's imaging as male, so it is generally 
regarded as being in the competition and victory on the sportsfield, and 
more seriously in the Boer War and most importantly on the battlefields 
of Gallipoli that nationhood was 'earned' by Britain's colonies. Yet the 
images of competition, separation and warfare, as constitutive of the male 
Oedipal complex and its resolution are fundamentally compromised by the 
repression of the 'feminine'; in this case both the disavowal of the 
'feminine' entry into mature nationhood, and the 'feminine' that is 
repressed in the phallocentric constitution of the male subject. In other 
words, while the boy separates more definitively than the girl from the 
mother during his Oedipal phase, repressing his own feminine and 
maternally connoted pleasures, during certain privileged moments, these 
repressed pleasures may return. Thus nostalgia for the mother is more, if 
not only, available to the son who has separated from the mother than the 
daughter who remains in touch with the maternal continent (and thus 
does not have the distance which generates nostalgia). 
While the 'dutiful daughter' image expressed New Zealand's 
dependence on and loyalty to Britain, 'she' underwent a mysterious 
transformation when called upon to serve in war. As Jock Phillips puts it 
with regard to the Boer War, "feelings of duty to the imperial protector 
Britain, of blood loyalty to Anglo-Saxon kith and kin, and of personal 
obligations to mother and motherland ... New Zealand, the youngest son, 
would show that it is reaching adulthood and could playa part in world 
destiny."75 Thus masculinity formed the basis of the possibility of 
national independence or maturity. Sinclair points out that "W.P. 
Morrell, who in 1935 first interpreted the history of New Zealand as the 
growth of a nation, concluded that New Zealand announced its manhood 
to the world on the bloody slopes of Gallipoli in 1915."76 
However, further examination of the underlying terms of this 
'manhood' reveals a less conclusively independent 'nationhood'. It has 
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been said for example, that the Boer War had "awoken New Zealanders to 
their imperial responsibilities,"77 while Britain's imperial wars provided 
the opportunity for "the new Australian type to face the test of 
nationhood" where some were so bold as to suggest that the new type was . 
. . a decided improvement on the 0Id."78 While Phillips argues that New 
Zealanders blamed British generals for the failure of the Gallipoli 
enterprise, there remains a component of nostalgia in the conclusion that 
"Though the New Zealanders often expressed a continuing love of 
England, there was little love for the men from the motherland."79 These 
wars were fought with and for England/Empire, not against. Even on the 
sportsfield, arguably the site of sublimated or socially regulated 
nationalistic battles, it was claimed that Australian test victories over 
England from 1874 served as proof that the race was not degenerating 
under the Australian sun, and, in terms which emphasised connection 
with rather than competition against the English, the Australian players 
were seen as retaining "'the manhood and muscle of their English 
sires. "'80 In a slightly different vein, New Zealand success against the 
English in the 1905 rugby test series was "proof of the superior strength and 
dexterity of the New Zealand men .... It was the country life, the lack of 
urban decadence which produced superior physical manhood. This was to 
be New Zealand's special contribution to the Empire and to the race."81 
Therefore, in various ways, nationhood/manhood was achieved without 
completely breaking ties to the Imperial (M)Other. In short, (M)Other was 
only ambivalently the Other of 'Nation'. 
1. III. Nation as Sovereign Self. 
'Nation' was therefore constituted as a process of 'maturation', rather 
than rebellion or separation based on perceptions of exploitation or 
fundamental difference. A 'national' lack of perception of exploitation 
facilitated the expression of the relationship between the colonies and later 
the nations within a discourse of 'filiation', encompassing extension, 
similarity, dependence and loyalty. As a result, in Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, Empire has only ambivalently been the 'Other' of Nation. 
The expression of disappointment at failure of British support only 
emphasised further the belief in the relevance and propriety of such 
support, and the principles upon which it could be proffered. Perceptions 
of the nations as extensions of Empire, characterised by similarities to 
Britain, fuelled in part by lack of perception of exploitation, led to the 
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preservation of British political, legal, economic and cultural institutional 
forms and ties. But this very perception of lack of exploitation, and its 
expression from the point of view of "British provincials" points to the 
fundamental fact that the 'voice' of Nation 'against' Empire was 
constructed politically and ideologically, and suppressed what was, in the 
case of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, nation's more important 
'Other' -- the heterogeneity within 'itself'. 
In the mirror stage, the identification with the image in the mirror 
effects for the infant a sense of its body as whole and unique, a one-ness 
with boundaries, whose movements s/he can control, driving the 'excess', 
the multiplicity of sensations and impulses -- and thus possible other 
configurations of self -- into the unconscious. Now Benedict Anderson's 
description of the features of a nation can be seen to parallel those of the 
mirror-stage infant's body-image. He terms the nation a "limited 
sovereign community": "limited," in that "even the largest has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations;" "sovereign," in that 
"nations dream of being free, and if under God, directly so;" "community," 
such that "regardless of actual inequality and exploitation, the nation is 
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. "82 Similarly, the 
infant's body is perceived as "limited" in the sense of having boundaries 
which separate or differentiate it from another body; "sovereign" in its 
ability to generate and largely control its own movements (although it may 
still be young enough to require parental or other support);83 and finally 
"community" could be seen as the perception of itself as one -- horizontal -
- 'self', as 'actual' difference is repressed and consigned to the unconscious. 
With the oedipus complex and its resolution, the child assumes a place 
in the symbolic order by way of submission to the Law-of-the-Father 
(preventing incestuous relations with the mother), to enjoy the privileges 
of the Name-of-the-Father: 
The oedipus complex severs the child from its dependence on the 
(m)other by means of the castration threat which pits the child's 
narcissistic investment in the integrity of its body against its desire for 
access to the mother's body. Only then can it gain a position within 
the socio-symbolic order, and· the privileges associated with the 
N ame-of-the-Fa ther. 84 
Following from this, another parallel can be found between the separation 
from the 'maternal continent'85 into 'male' nationhood/subjectivity, and 
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Anderson's explanation of the differences associated with the change from 
monarchies to nations. When he points out that "in the older imagining . 
. . states were defined by centres, borders were porous and indistinct and 
sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another"86 he evokes Irigaray's 
description of feminine fluidity, described by Grosz87 as "a striking 
metaphor of the mother-daughter relationship": 
it is continuous, compressible, dilatable, viscous, conductible, 
diffusable ... it allows itself to be easily traversed by flow by virtue of 
its conductivity to currents coming from other fluids or exerting 
pressure through the walls of a solid; ... it mixes with bodies of a like 
state, sometimes dilutes itself in them in an almost homogeneous 
manner, which makes the distinction between one and the other 
problematical. 88 
However, in a footnote to his point, Anderson argues that 
Schoolchildren remember monarchs by their first names ... , 
presidents by their last (names). In a world of citizens, all of whom 
are theoretically eligible for the presidency, the limited pool of 
'Christian' names makes them inadequate as specifying designates. 
In monarchies, however, where rule is reserved for a single surname, 
it is necessarily 'Christian' names . . . that supply the requisite 
dis tinctions. 89 
While the significance of the subject's 'exchangeability' in the chain of 
signifiers -- the 'equality' of citizens in liberal democracies, for example, in 
relation to potential presidency -- will be elucidated further into the 
chapter, the concern to establish the 'last name', which in patriarchal, 
patrilineal societies amounts literally to the Name-of-the-Father, 
demonstrates the isomorphism of such nations and phallocentric 
subjectivity. 
Nationalism as been defined as "the set of ideas or policies which seeks 
to order aspects of human life around the nation, however defined,"9o and 
perhaps more specifically as "primarily a political principle which holds 
that the political and the national unit should be congruent."91 However, 
as well as evoking something like body-and-mind congruity, 'nationalism' 
-- as 'idea', 'policy', 'principle' -- attains its 'materiality'~2 as discourse. Just 
as it is discourse which engenders the subject (subjectivity is attained with 
the entry into discourse), rather than the subject being the origin of 
discourse, so it is "nationalism which engenders nations and not the other 
way round."93 
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Two apparently contradictory bases for the emergence of nationalism 
have been identified. There is the nationalism which focuses upon 
liberation from some external or foreign ruling power (the nationalism 
associated with decolonisation), and the nationalism which focuses upon 
internal (national) unity. The former, an 'outward facing' nationalism has 
been described as typically the concern of the political 'left', while the 
latter, 'inward facing' nationalism is generally the focus of the political 
'right'.94 Although it will be demonstrated that this separation is 
ultimately an 'idealist' gesture, and that the one always tends towards, or 
even implies the other, in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where 
political and cultural dominance was quickly attained by the settlers, the 
process of political 'decolonisation' was effected by comparatively weak 
discourses of liberation. There was, therefore, a concomitant emphasis on 
the nationalism of internal unity, and the forging of 'national identity' 
through the narcissistic construction of images of the national self. It is 
relevant at this point to recall that the role of the mirror stage in the 
genesis of the ego turns upon the function of the gaze and the centrality of 
the image in the anticipation of subjectivity. Writing of Canadian national 
identity, Germaine Warkentin stated that descriptions of Canadian identity 
"have been worth something, but what they add up to is fragmented, 
indecipherable. With what are we to identify ourselves?" The problem, 
according to Warkentin, is that "Searchers for a Canadian identity have 
failed to realize that you can only have an identification with something 
you can see or recognize. You need, if nothing else, an image in a 
mirror. "95 
Indeed, the 'family romance' discursive paradigm has functioned to 
naturalise the political and ideological construct of Nation, so that 
humanistic concepts such as identity become applicable to the nation in 
the first place. Discourses of colonial filiation and independence as a 
process of gradual maturation have had a profound impact on the project 
of defining national identities, in explaining the almost obsessive nature 
of the search and the ways in which these identities are articulated. 
When Nation is imaged as 'self', a unity is implied which has 
important consequences for the political and cultural expression of this 
nation/ self. The Freudian psychoanalytic discourse of subjectivity, 
emerging out of the nineteenth-century liberal-humanist tradition, 
appears to cast the subject into the trajectory of such scientific and other 
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discourses of the individual as health and human development, morality, 
and spirituality. These have functioned to legitimise the synecdoche 
involved in speaking of 'nation', rather than specifying interests, 
ideologies, and conditions within nation which contrast or contradict. For 
example, Northrop Frye's reference to "Canada ... or the place where 
Canada is,"96 suggests that nation is not so much a place, as some spirit 
which inhabits a place. Nevertheless, while Frye's statement avoids the 
implication that Canada or any nation is essentially there in a 
geographical sense, there is another form of essentialism which 
dehistoricises Nation in the suggestion of a national 'spirit' which is the 
defining element. Such a national 'spirit' or spiritual embodiment of a 
national identity or culture, came to be referred to, in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Germany, as the Volksgeist, the spiritual aspect of a 
people which constitutes the (national) culture.97 This view however 
promotes the notion of culture as "not just the spiritual 'driving force' of a 
society, but [as] intimately or organically related to its members in much 
the same way that the human mind is related to the human body."98 
There are two important and related points to be drawn from this view 
of culture, which may, though does not necessarily, mean a national 
culture. First, the prevalent organic metaphors constructing naturalistic 
accounts of national or cultural development imply, as has been argued, 
certain specific ideological perspectives. Such metaphors are certainly 
ubiquitous in historians' accounts of the change of political status from 
colony to nation, and changes in relationships to imperial centres. But 
they also promote an essentialist view of Nation and national identity. 
Similarly, there is a teleological kind of reasoning which links identity and 
maturity. Such reasoning either posits 'identity' as something located in 
the future, to be achieved, or looks backwards from the standpoint of 
'maturity' so that phenomena, cultural and otherwise, which derive from 
before 'maturity' are somehow inauthentic, or non-identical with 
'identity'. Implications of this include the notion that as organic 
constructs, cultures are at least potentially 'whole' and unified, while the 
human development model also suggests a continuity and an 
inevitability, such that cultures deemed to have omitted one or more 
phases are seen as 'distorted' or perverted in their development. Frye 
refers to a "foreshortening" of Canadian cultural history,99 a judgement 
which refers less to Canadian cultural production than to a preconceived 
pattern of 'normal' development. Consequently, 'stages' of 'development' 
47 
are not merely descriptive of a process, but imbued with positive or 
negative value, even moral value, in themselves. They are qualitative 
judgements of the culture, with the valorised term being 'maturity' or 
'adulthood'. However, it has been defined as axiomatic that "We must 
beware of imagining that the idea of development should be administered 
by the idea of improvement," a notion which carries the "echo of 
nineteenth century imperial optimism."IOO Further, the moral 
implication of reference to a view of normalcy or naturalness leads to the 
second important aspect of the organic view of culture deriving from a 
belief in Volksgeist. Emphasis on wholeness and unity implies a 
valorisation of purity which has as its inevitable corollary a devaluation of 
difference. Difference can only be excluded, and in a paradigm which 
encourages moral discourse, vilified. 
Confusion over the ontological status of national identity is often 
reflected in contradictory verbs expressing its actualisation. The discourse 
of 'nation' as expressed in terms of (human) development from 
dependent infancy to sovereign maturity has given rise to references to the 
evolution of Canadian national identity,lOI and the teleology of 'maturity', 
with its concomitant implication of pre-maturity as inauthenticity or 'non-
identity', has enabled commentators to speak of the emergencel02 of 
identity. It has also been claimed, for example, that "New Zealand writers, 
politicians, academics and critics have ... tried to discover, perhaps even 
foster, a distinctively New Zealand culture," an assertion followed closely 
by reference to New Zealanders turning increasingly to "their art, their 
literature, their history, politics, wars, and their sporting achievements in 
order to uncover their identity as a people."I03 Is 'identity' therefore 
fortuitously happened upon, or divested of some obscuring force, and does 
the latter reveal 'true' national identity which a veil of ideology (false 
consciousness) had mutated into 'false' national identity? Or is identity 
nurtured from an immature to a mature state, and is this nurturance one 
which simply allows a natural, pre-determined course to be worked out, or 
is it an actively shaping, determining process? Is 'identity' only 
authentically 'identity' when maturity is reached? 
As Richard White has observed of Australian national identity, an 
argument relevant to all national assertions of identity, 
There was no moment when, for the first time, Australia was seen 'as 
it really was'. There is no 'real' Australia waiting to be uncovered. A 
48 
national identity is an invention. There is no point asking whether 
one version of this essential Australia is truer than another because 
they are all intellectual constructs, neat, tidy, comprehensible -- and 
necessarily false.104 
White's use of the word 'false' is somewhat unfortunate because of its 
implication that there is an opposing 'truth'. When it is admitted that 
national identities are constructed, a set of completely different questions 
from those of essence and truth or correctness must be addressed. 
However, it becomes both possible and necessary to acknowledge the 
different methods by which identities are constructed, and thus to address 
not the authenticity or inauthenticity of each or any of them, but the 
ideological interests and assumptions which underpin and inhabit them. 
National identities, in order to function as such, must appear to be 
inclusive; indeed, in order to appeal they must, in short, appear, and they 
do so as images or representations. They cannot be 'found' as naturally 
occurring phenomena outside of the discursive realm, and in this sense 
they are not arbitrary. They are products of the acts of their construction. 
Occasionally, though not always, these constructions are deliberate and 
self-conscious. However, when the contents of the images of national 
identities are analysed in relation to the principles underlying their 
construction, aspects of their ideological purpose and functioning become 
clear. It also becomes clear that such constructions, contrary to their 
purpose of representing national identities, draw on a range of 
metaphysical, ideological and political inheritances deriving from beyond 
the boundaries of nation itself. In fact, as Richard White argues, "The very 
idea of national identity [is] a product of .European history at a particular 
time;" it is "part of the 'cultural baggage which Europeans have brought 
with them, and with which we continue to encumber ourselves."10S 
Three ways, for example, in which national identity may be 
constructed include the search for, or identification of, something 
considered distinctive about the nation, the identification of something 
typical of the nation, or the recognition and valorisation of the exceptional 
instance. Of course such categorisation is artificial, and there is frequently 
overlap. Further, the following discussion does not seek to present a 
comprehensive list of 'distinctive', 'typical', and 'exceptional' features in a 
composite portrait of national identities, but to focus upon the methods 
and functioning of their construction, with a small number of examples 
for clarification and illustration. 
49 
First, the national identity may be considered to inhere in something 
seen as distinctive about the country or its people, something that can 
differentiate it from others. Such distinctive characteristics are commonly 
derived from the flora and fauna of a land, which then emblemise the 
nation's identity. However, even when such things can be called 
'indigenous' or distinctive, it is not the flora or fauna themselves which 
signify identity, but the meanings and affect with which they are imbued. 
This is clear in the statement that "A country that can boast of kangaroos, 
koalas and platypodes needs few other symbols of national identity."106 
Suzanne Zeller explains that by the 1860s, with the addition of botany to 
the inventory sciences, 
Certain plants, their geographical distribution, and Canada's potential 
for cultivation were adopted as symbols and pressed into service as 
portents of this expansive destiny. The maple leaf ... had been used 
as an emblem in Quebec since the seventeenth century and was 
widely accepted by the 1830s among both French and English 
Canadians. Much as the Geological Survey of Canada encouraged 
appreciation of the Laurentian Shield as a peculiarly Canadian 
environmental attribute, so botany seemed to show the maple, widely 
distributed across Canada from Lake Superior eastward to the Atlantic 
seabord, to represent Canadian unity.107 
Indeed, the attachment of national affect is what enables a feature of the 
landscape to be considered both emblematic and distinctive, when in a 
nation like Canada, which is both geographically vast and diverse, and yet 
also part of a politically divided larger continent, these designations must 
be at least problematic within the 'natural' paradigm that is invoked. 
Zeller continues: 
The maple lacked the undesirable connotation attached to the beaver, 
a member of the rodent family. But it posed problems later when it 
was shown not to grow west of Manitoba; nor could the maple, 
ironically, represent permanence. 'If it remains in the tree,' Sandford 
Fleming admitted, 'it disappears with the summer, if plucked from 
the tree it ... almost immediately wilts ... and perishes.'108 
Such flora and fauna or other features of the landscape, even aspects of the 
indigenous cultures, are emblemised through their containment in 
arrested or stereotypical representatIon, and ultimately function through 
their commodification.109 Similarly, sentimentalised figures from the 
'cultural past' may also be invoked in the spirit of national distinctiveness. 
Such figures have sometimes derived from stereotypes of a past which no 
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longer threaten with their 'reality' and thus allow for nostalgia. For 
example, the romanticisation of the 'noble bushman' to the point of 
"national culture-hero" of Australia, relied upon the separation of the 
image from the 'real' figure of the past. Richard White has referred to "the 
contribution of urban bohemianism to the imagery of bush life," and 
points out that the bush-worker "was ennobled as 'the Bushman' and his 
capacity for drunkenness and blasphemy forgotten."110 Similarly in New 
Zealand in the 1950s and 60s, the "itinerant direputable unattached male 
now achieved a legendary status." As Phillips argues, "the society was now 
so orderly and settled and men so securely locked into job and home that 
the itinerant frontier male was no longer any [moral and economic] threat 
at all and his habits could be winked at."l11 
Clearly, one of the problems with such a method of constructing a 
national identity is that it fails to account for the appearance of the same 
phenomenon in another country. This is particularly the case when the· 
distinctive features are abstract qualities such as 'mateship'.112 Dennis 
Altman suggests a source for the Australian myth of mateship in the 
writings of English-born Alexander Harris in the 1840s. After spending 
years in Australia, Harris went to Britain and the United States and wote of 
his colonial experiences. Altman cites Harris' observation of '''the 
exertions bushmen of new countries, especially mates, will make for one 
another, beyond people of the old countries."'113 There is a generality to 
this statement which compromises its Australian 'distinctiveness'. 
However, while the 'content' of the image is not necessarily unique, such 
that "One can find similarities to this in other frontier societies," the 
strength of the image is perhaps 'distinctive': "the features of settlement 
that helped promote the more generalised conception of mateship were 
less evident on the highly individualistic North American frontier. Even 
New Zealand, the country whose white history most resembles 
[Australia'S]' has not elevated mateship to the level of mythology."114 
Thus, it is not only the strength, but the functional position. of the notion 
of mateship which makes it distinctive: "What is unique to Australian 
mateship is precisely its mythological character."llS Therefore, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the purpose of such images of national 
distinctiveness, or the way they function to appeal, by way of the attached 
affect, to a sense of belonging, and through belonging, to national 
unification. For example, to cite Zeller again: 
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In recognition of the sense of nationality they deemed indispensible 
to the further progress of the country, Egerton Ryerson, J.H. Morris, 
and others organized a procession of native-born Canadians. Those 
born in Canada or, it was emphasized, in any other British North 
American colony distinguished this fact by wearing the symbolic 
maple leaf. Ryerson believed that the movement would 'blend the 
whole population of Canada in one deep, universal, unanimous 
feeling of devotion to the best interests of their common country'.1l6 
Similarly, the use of the kiwi in New Zealand reaches beyond significance 
as 'national bird' to a symbolic naming of New Zealanders themselves. 
Through a play of ideological associations, and the masking of the 
discourse of nationalism itself (through reference to nature), the sense of 
belonging is experienced positively as 'natural', and the resultant 
unification of national affect is available to the purposes of the 'ruling 
class'. 
Second, the construction of national identity in terms of typicality is 
frequently related to 'national distinctiveness' through a process of 
generalisation and normatisation of a distinctive, or distinctively strong, 
feature or characteristic. The normative function appeals to paranoid fears 
of either what is 'outside' (difference), or being 'outside' (exclusion). It can 
therefore be seen that the notion of typicality encompasses both 
xenophobia and conformity. In the case of national identity constructions 
founded on 'typicality', it is less an object than an idea or an image that is 
commodified: it is held to reflect the mass of the population -- thus the 
numerically normative, or 'descriptive' sense of 'typicality'; however, the 
numerical implication masks the process of imposition of a normatising 
image, so that, for example, "the true 'Australian' was not a statistical 
concept but a figure with some consciousness of a particular historical 
mission. "117 In short, the image is actually transmitted and imposed on to 
the population, prescribing its applicability, whether to individuals as 
'types' within the population, or the mass 'way of life' that is considered 
'typical' of that nation. Such images, because they are reflective, tend to be 
backward-looking, and even nostalgic, in that they represent not a current 
image, but one derived from the past. For example, Jock Phillips points 
out that "As men settled into their domestic niches and as the society 
became more bureaucratic, organised and urban, so men clung to images of 
exaggerated physical prowess. Growing fat in sedentary jobs, men 
responded to models of frontier masculinity."llS Similarly, with regard to 
the Australian bushman, Beryl Donaldson Langer points out that "While 
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the centrality of the bush in the nation's image of itself was hardly an 
accurate reflection of Australian life, which was already highly urbanised, 
identification with bush workers continued into the twentieth century."119 
Yet these images deploy their nostalgia to the purposes of definition and 
determination of the future. Zeller points out, in the context of the 
growing belief in the association of "Canada's 'northernness' and its 
connotation of an appealing manliness," that 
By 1858 [Alexander] Morris had constructed a full-blown image of a 
'Great Britannic Empire of the North,' with its 'goodly band of 
Northmen from Acadia, and Canada, and the North-West, and the 
Columbia, and the Britain of the Pacific.' They constituted 'a noble 
army of hardy spirits encased in stalwart forms.' He invited Canadian 
audiences to 'consider the energetic character inherited by our people, 
which the fusion of races and the conquering from the forest of new 
territories' had fostered, and which climate had 'rendered hardier.' 
The result, he predicted, would be one nation, a 'harmonious whole -
- rendered the more vigorous by our northern position',120 
However, where there is an awareness of national diversity, images of 
typicality are less likely to succeed. For example a unified 'Canadian' 
identity is more overtly compromised by its specific French and English 
colonial pasts, and the continuing existence of two politically and legally 
acknowledged historical and cultural heritages. Thus it has been claimed 
that "the idea of a representative figure was more than a rhetorical self-
contradiction: it struck at the essence of her necessarily fragmented 
cultural history. "121 Yet the problem has been identified as more strongly 
an English-Canadian one, because, according to certain French-Canadian 
nationalist arguments, "even if you deny that these attributes give them 
the right to call themselves a nation, there is no denying the 
distinctiveness of the values they cherish. These are loyalty to the family, 
to the church, to the soil, to the homeland, and to the race."122 By contrast, 
English-Canada has been defined as "everything . . . that is not French 
Canada. "123 Thus despite the recognition of diversity, there remains a 
drive to unite this into a nationhood that can be imaged. Indeed, as will be 
argued more fully later in the chapter, diversity itself tends to become 
reified into that image. The conflation of "national health with virility"124 
has been identified in the context of New Zealand's earliest international 
involvements in war, and it "ignored" not only "half the country's 
people" -- the women -- but also those men who did not conform to the 
stereotype of virility. Homosexuals were not only considered "effeminate" 
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but, having been totally excluded from military services, as threats to 
national security. Thus, while such images function powerfully to appeal 
to a sense of unity, they also have strong normative implications. In short, 
the 'typical' figure appeals to unity, not simply through assertions or 
'recognitions' of typicality, but also through their normative functioning 
which works to suppress a-typicality, and devalue or vilify difference. To 
return to the Australian notion of 'mateship', part of the 'typically 
Australian' outlook was based, in Russel Ward's formulation, on 
a comradely independence based on group solidarity and relative 
economic plenty, a rough and ready capacity for 'stringy-bark and 
greenhide' improvisation, a light-hearted intolerance of respectable 
or conventional manners, a reckless improvidence and a conviction 
that the working bushman was the 'true Australian', whose privilege 
it was to despise 'new chums' and city folk.125 
More specifically, Altman points out that "the top and the bottom of 
colonial society are largely excluded from the construction of the myth," 
that "convicts were not usually thought of as exemplifying mateship," and 
"Mateship is not generally associated with the officers and gentry." The 
myth was also racially exclusive, such that '''the mateship of the pastoral 
workers rigidly excluded Asians from the nomad tribe,'" and "there are 
few examples of Aborigines being admitted to the magic circle of 'mates'. 
In any event, individual cases can do little to shake the institutionalised 
exclusion of Aborigines."126 Similarly, the image was specifically male, 
despite its ability in its more social and class-based formulation, to 
encompass women.127 Richard White points out that "A set of values had 
been identified with 'The Coming Man' and these were commonly 
attributed to the Australian 'type.'" Moreover, 
Men embodied these values. The emphasis was on masculinity, and 
on masculine friendships and teamwork, or 'mateship' .... Women 
were excluded from the image of 'The Coming Man,' and so were 
generally excluded from the image of the Australian 'type' as well. 
They could acquire a kind of second-rate masculinity by being clever 
with horses or being a 'tomboy', a phenomenon which began to 
appear in the late nineteenth century. More often, women were 
portrayed as the negation of the type.128 
It is both historically and epistemologically consistent that this search 
for the 'one-ness', or unifyingly typical figure or characteristic should 
almost always result in representations of masculinity and virility. 
Women have generally been excluded from the national identity 
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constructs of these once-colonial nations. Their participation can only be 
in terms of a 'second-rate' imitation of the male construct, while their 
more frequent status as negation of the male 'type' illustrates the 
singularity of phallocentric subjectivity: women as non-men. Therefore, 
their exclusion is not simply a function of some deliberate conspiracy 
among men. As has already been shown, a culture founded on 
phallocentric structures of subjectivity cannot image the sovereign nation-
self as female. This is actually borne out, rather than refuted, by the 
relatively stronger position of women in (English) Canada's cultural 
production and representation: "In the absence of clearly defined national 
characteristics women are not automatically excluded from the realm of 
the typical. The confusion about national identity might not in itself 
facilitate women's entry into culture, but it does leave open this possibility 
...• "129 I would expand upon this with the point that it is not simply the 
lack of a fixed and exclusive typicality which excludes women on the level 
of representation, but the lack of typicality in its structural sense which has 
not totally repressed/suppressed difference from its phallocentric 
morphology. Hence the arguably stronger obsession with "'the old identity 
riddle', the continuing search for Canadian identity. "130 Indeed, 
Donaldson Langer points to an historical basis for the perpetuation of 
Canada's 'feminine' and therefore compromised sovereign 'subjectivity': 
Whereas the Australian identity was premised on opposition . . . to 
British tradition and constraint, as an assertion of frontier notions of 
rugged manliness and simple bush virtue, the fact that English-
Canadian identity was shaped by a dual opposition (to Britain and the 
United States) meant that the frontier ethos was modified 
considerably. With political and cultural absorption into the United 
States as a constant possibility, emphasis on British ties and traditions 
was a way of preserving national integrity.131 
When Britain is 'mother', Canada's defensive identification with 'her' 
against the American 'threat' is clearly that of the daughter who must 
recognise her own femininity, or castration/lack of wholeness. 
Third, there is also a relationship between national identity sought 
through appeals to typicality and that which posits the valorised exception, 
which seeks to achieve a sense of unity through appeals to national pride. 
This perhaps parallels the narcissistic mirror-stage (unifying) identification 
as opposed to the aggression which characterises the fear and resultant 
(paradoxical) exclusivity of typicality. What is valorised is, nevertheless, 
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ideologically determined and, like the 'typical' figure, ultimately 
normative. However, qualities attributed to the valorised exception may 
be seen as instantiating the pinnacle of 'national' qualities, or may be 
extrapolated and applied to the national population in a rallying function. 
It has been observed of New Zealand that "there can be few nations which 
have so single-mindedly defined themselves through male heroes. The 
national icons ... have all been male."132 Obviously not all New 
Zealanders, however, belong to the national representative rugby team, 
the All Blacks, and yet the synecdochal convention of referring in sporting 
commentaries and discussions to 'New Zealand versus Australia' and so 
on, creates a sense of national participation and the desire for national 
victory and glory in the sporting achievement. The (admissable) qualities 
associated with sports teams and individuals are held to reflect national 
character. The manager of the All Black team which toured Britain in 1905 
is cited as having declared that "'Rugby football is the New Zealand 
national game, every boy in the colony plays it, and this team, chosen 
almost by national assent, is the result of much care and thought. It 
represents the manhood and virility of the colony.'''133 
1. III. (i). Literature and National Identity. Literature has served as the 
~-~~~~~~~- ~ ~ 
most consistent source and transmitter of images of national identity. For 
example, it has been claimed that '''it is through literature that a 
civilization expresses itself, through literature its values and its tendencies 
become conscious and its creative force becomes eloquent and evident,"134 
and that "The notion of the Australian national character is imported 
from literary stereotypes, satire, and other works of imaginative 
exploration."135 In fact, as will be argued, assertions of the 'achievement' 
of national identity have tended to be contemporaneous with the 
development and transmission of myths of national literary identity, or 
literary nationalism. Margaret Atwood states that 
A piece of art, as well as being a creation to be enjoyed, can also be ... 
a mirror. The reader looks at the mirror and sees not the writer but 
himself; and behind his own image in the foreground, a reflection of 
the world he lives in. If a country or a culture lacks such mirrors it 
has no way of knowing what it looks like; it must travel blind.136 
However, apart from the notion of reflection, the 'mirror' image 
appropriately evokes the function of unification, and through unification, 
the production of (national) character and (national) identity which has 
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been discussed in relation to individual psychical development and the 
development of nationhood. Benedict Anderson has described the crucial 
functions of print, and print-capitalism in the very possibility of the 
development of the Nation, functions which turn upon the unification of 
linguistically and otherwise diverse population-groups.137 Similarly, 
Ernest Gellner describes the requirement of a centralised, high (literate) 
culture in the constitution of nationhood.138 In short, print effected a 
unification of the population through communication and the ability to 
conceptualise a 'community', and centralised a 'high' culture which 
required a trained -- literate -- population for its dissemination. Further, 
Timothy Brennan has pointed to a special association between the novel 
and the nation: "It was the novel that historically accompanied the rise of 
nations by objectifying the 'one, yet many' of national life, and by 
mimicking the structure of the nation, a clearly bordered jumble of 
languages and styles. "139 
Nevertheless, the mirror functions two ways: the relationship 
between Nation and literature is symbiotic, and it is the nation which has 
been seen to constitute -- or unify -- the literature as a literature, 
embodying a nation's literary identity. Indeed, it has been stated that "only 
a national literature can be considered literature at all, since only such a 
literature is representative."140 The imagery of the body has been deployed 
to render the notion of a literary identity, and thus to locate literature 
within the now familiar organic and developmental discourses of the 
individual. Vincent Buckley argued his certainty that "there is a body of 
Australian work which is distinctive as a body, and the parts of which bear 
a distinctive and intimate relationship with one another."141 He went on 
to identify the size, rather than the existence of this 'body', as the point of 
critical contention, but consistent with the image of the literature as a 
'body', he refers to Stephenson's insistence that this literature "would be 
arriving, or ... would be recognized, any time now."142 The 
distinctiveness of Australian literature was not in question; however, its 
autonomy, at this anticipatory juncture, was. Buckley refers to Arthur 
Phillips' "stress on the 'family relationship' between Australian and 
English Literature,"143 and argues that "as a dependent literature, its 
development follows the changes in the English literature of the same 
period, and is part of the English literature of the period."144 It follows, 
therefore, that "it can't be analysed on the grounds that it is entirely 
separate and autonomous literature. Its distinctiveness doesn't go as deep 
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as that, and it isn't as complete as that."145 This same characterological 
imagery enabled Northrop Frye similarly to declare of Canadian literary 
history that 
It is not much wonder if Canada developed with the bewilderment of 
a neglected child, preoccupied with trying to define its own identity, 
alternately bumptious and diffident about its own achievements. 
Adolescent dreams of glory still haunt the consciousness (and 
unconscious), some naive and some sophisticated.146 
However, 'autonomy' was precisely the aim of literary nationalists. 
Like 'identity' itself, the achievement of national literature was congruent 
with the achievement with 'mature' literature. Thus Frye asserted that 
"Canadian literature since 1960 has become a real literature,"147 a view 
which begs the question of what the literature was before this time. 
Similarly, Leonie Kramer stated that an Australian "national literature ... 
. will not be derivative, and the sign that it has grown to maturity will be its 
independence of foreign influence, and unself-conscious expressions of its 
own sense of place and identity."148 This mature autonomy is founded 
necessarily upon phallocentric assumptions. David Walker points out that 
the "refusal to remain deferential to the parent culture was a vital emotion 
among [Australian] literary nationalists precisely because it helped 
overcome their sense of cultural impotence,"149 and Buckley'S over-riding 
concern with the viability of Australian Literature as an object of study -- a 
subject of self-reflection -- encompasses the need to see "what other 
disciplines (if any) must be called into play to help us erect it into a study at 
all. "150 
An implication of· such organic developmental imagery is a national-
literary essentialism. It enables Margaret Atwood to refer to discussion of 
"Canadian literature, as Canadian literature -- not just something that 
happened to be written in Canada,"lSl and to argue for the identification of 
literary, including thematic, patterns which "taken together, constitute the 
shape of Canadian literature insofar as it is Canadian literature, and that 
shape is also a reflection of a national habit of mind."152 
The logic of the relationship between national unity and literary 
images of national 'selfhood' involves the embodiment of the national 
'self' in the individual writer who transmits these images. 
'Representative' literature is the product of the convergence of nation and 
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individual writer. David Lloyd explains, in relation to Irish nationalism, a 
process which is entirely applicable to Australia, Canada and New Zealand: 
The proper function of the Irish writer would ... be to represent the 
people, in every sense of that word. If, at one level, this involves the 
demand to depict Irish people and their ways, it is intrinsic to [the] 
argument that proper depiction is a function of the 
representativeness of the writer as Irish. In a sense of the word quite 
strictly analogous to its usage in democratic political theory, the writer 
is the people's representative. Accordingly, the concept of 
representation in play here involves an implicit narrative of 
development: by representing in himself the common identity of the 
Irish people, ... the writer produces the national and subjective unity 
which is as yet only a latent potential. [Thus one may insist] upon a 
continuity between individual and national identity that is borne by 
literature.153 
There appears to be an enactment of this analysis in Atwood's critical 
strategy in Survival, where she treats texts "as though they were written by 
Canada .... [U]ntil recently our authors were treated only as private 
people. Authors are also transmitters of their culture."154 
The search for, or identification of 'representative' or typical national 
literature has been made in terms of literary characteristics such as themes, 
motifs, perspectives, and so on, which encapsulate 'essential' aspects of the 
nation. For example, Australian nationalist literature has tended to be 
'recognised' by its use of the motifs of the Bush, and Mateship, and its 
'democratic' perspective, while New Zealand nationalist literature was 
'recognised' by its use of the 'Man Alone' motif -- 'alone' initially against 
the natural elements, and later against an unjust society. Writing 
admitted to the New Zealand 'nationalist' canon was populated by, and 
represented the voices of reticent, even inarticulate, 'good rural blokes'. 
Canadian 'nationalist' writing has perhaps been less clearly demarcated, 
particularly into an historical period of dominance, but also into motifs 
and perspectives. However, Frye identified the 'Garrison mentality' which 
shares with Australia and New Zealand the idea of 'man' (which may be 
inclusive of 'woman', but this does not alter the 'masculine' structure of 
the quest), pitted against hostile external forces, notably landscape, climate 
and so on. Margaret Atwood isolated 'survival' as the characteristically 
Canadian ethos. Yet even Canada's resistance to the representative figure, 
whether literary or otherwise, has become reified into a Canadian 
'characteristic'. Coral Ann Howells has argued that "Canadian 
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distinctiveness may be seen to lie in efforts towards autonomy through 
displacing the authority of other traditions in order to give a place to what 
has been traditionally regarded as marginal. As a process of 
decentralization it is characteristically Canadian."155 The reification is 
most clearly evoked in the image of the location of Canadian identity being 
found "not nationally, but in a mosaic of regional experiences."156 Like 
those of 'national identity', signs of literary nationalism comprise 
emblemised, ultimately commodified ideas of land, society, and history, 
culminating in the greater truth to the literary purpose of the label 
(signifier) than its 'meaning' or referent (signified). H.P. Heseltine 
despaired of Australian literature: "'Is our tradition after all to be summed 
up in this or that single word -- Mateship? Landscape? Nationalism? Is 
what we have received from the literary past so thin that the simple labels 
do, in fact, suffice?"'157 
Again, like emblems of national identity, the question of the truth or 
falsity of these emblems is not the salient one. As labels or emblems, they 
are clearly reductive, and yet as David Walker has argued in a slightly 
different context: 
This is not to say that there are no discoverable patterns of thinking 
about the character of . . . society and the functioning of the· 
imaginative writer. There are. But the patterns are not as 'natural' 
'inevitable' or self-evident as some critics appear to believe.158 
The point is that the construction of national literatures and literary 
nationalisms did tend to be self-conscious processes of myth-making. The 
myth that Australia and New Zealand 'gained' national identities in the 
1890s derived in significant part from the self-conscious national myth-
making of the editorial policy of, and contributions to, the Australian 
journal, the Bulletin. The Bulletin has been described by Adrian Mitchell 
as having been, "[i]n most views of Australian literary history ... the 
spawning ground for a new authentic Australian Literature." Serving as 
"the exclusive forum for the new realism," the Bulletin "above all 
required original writing; there was to be no imitation of the old Anglo-
Australian conventions."159 As Kramer explains, 
The legend of the nineties is both a legend and a reality. It is a reality 
in that the work of Paterson, Lawson and later Furphy is distinctive 
in its representation of place and people, and in its cultivation of the 
idiom of Australian speech. It is legendary in that, while representing 
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a part of the reality, the part in turn has been represented as the 
whole, or at least as the essence of the whole.160 
Similarly, Walker's Dream and Disillusion concerns "four men and their 
friends all of whom wanted to establish a national culture in Australia."161 
Such an undertaking clearly undermines notions that a national culture is 
either always already there, or even that it 'naturally' evolves. New 
Zealand literature entered a 'nationalist' period in the 1890s, very much 
influenced by the literary scene in Australia, and many prominent New 
Zealand writers contributed regularly to the Bulletin, which was also read 
relatively widely in New Zealand. However, New Zealand entered a 
second 'nationalist' phase in its literary history in the 1930s, when because 
of the social conditions of the time, largely the impact of the Depression, 
social criticism was regarded as the only valid motivation for the writer. 
Such views were promulgated at the time by the "literary group," 
consisting of Sargeson, Fairburn, Brasch and Glover, amongst others. 
Charles Brasch's influence was heightened by his position as the first 
editor of the principal New Zealand literary journal, Landfall. Sargeson 
has been seen as the "father" of New Zealand literature, "being widely 
regarded as the first writer to have successfully adapted local idiom into a 
literary medium, which enabled him to deal with and depict New Zealand 
experience."162 Elizabeth Thomas describes the role that influential critics 
played in perpetuating the social-realist function and mode of writing. She 
cites H. Winston Rhodes' declaration that authors must write about 
"'ordinary people in their own context, and through them comment on 
the human condition in a wider sense,'" and refers to Bill Pearson's 
emphasis on "the artist's position as a moral teacher who must awaken 
the social conscience of the public."163 A similar mission was deemed 
appropriate to Australian writers of roughly this (nationalistic) period, 
when "a certain literary canon emerged in the 1930s and 1940s. It 
enshrined 'the common man' and the virtues of egalitarianism and a 
spontaneous fraternal 'socialism' as values that were basic to the 
Australian tradition."164 As in New Zealand, the implied function of the 
artist was "that of reflector of a communal experience, an active interpreter 
and shaper of a common culture,"165 a function which rendered social 
realism the 'natural' artistic mode. According to David Walker, "Esson 
and Palmer often felt obliged, as Australian writers, to deal with aspects of 
working-class or rural life about which they knew relatively little,"166 a 
view which reflected what Tim Rowse termed an anti-elitist tradition, 
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"involving a denial of the exceptional nature of intellectual activity. 
Literature was a formulation of common Australian experience; and 
bearers of the tradition were mediators of values that included the 
important virtue of egalitarianism."167 
However, terms such as 'obligation' and 'denial' point to the 
construction of literary traditions, and their attainment of 'nationalist' 
status as a process of the suppression of other forms of writing and other 
imaginative and critical perspectives. Elizabeth Thomas points out that 
the 'typical New Zealander' was indeed only a certain type of New 
Zealander, and not in fact numerically 'typical'. Similarly, although the 
relationship is probably less the co-inciding of the two points, the New 
Zealand "literary group" of the 1930s was a male one, while "Robin Hyde is 
usually the only woman to be accorded mention in discussion of writing of 
this time."168 However, positive critical recognition of her work was only 
given to those works, or even those aspects of her work which conformed 
to the dominant realist tradition, while the more 'subjective', 'poetic', and 
'idealistic' "lapses" were castigated.169 Susan Sheridan has referred to the 
"pejorative characterization of women's writing which emerged in the 
1890s" in Australia,170 and has identified a very similar response to the 
works of Miles Franklin and Barbara Baynton. Franklin and Baynton "are 
praised -- but only for transcending their female qualities and 
preoccupations. In both cases, praise is given to their representations of 
'The ~ush' -- and 'The Bush' comes to signify nationalism, literary 
originality and, by implication, masculinity."171 However, Sheridan's 
purpose is to show how literary nationalism and 'masculinism' were 
conflated into the same structure, and she does this by showing "what 
happens when the excluded terms of the dominant discourse on cultural 
nationalism are made explicit:" 
Furphy's phrase, 'temper democratic, bias offensively Australian' 
employs terms from the political end ofa spectrum that runs through 
to the specifically literary; the obvious substitution in political terms 
would seem to be 'temper aristocratic, bias offensively British', 
signifying the class-bound colonial culture which the nationalists set 
themselves against. However ... to substitute terms from the less 
political and more cultural end of the spectrum serves to show up the 
link between 'good' politics and 'good' writing which is assumed in 
the cultural-nationalist discourse of the Bulletin in the 1890s, and to 
show up the suppressed association between these positive terms 
(democratic and nationalist politics, realist and vernacular writing) 
and masculinity.172 
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A very different argument has been made regarding the relationship 
between Canadian nationalism and Canadian literature. While stable 
'identity' has been shown in psychoanalytic terms to require the repression 
of (individual) multiplicity, and the unification of the pre-Imaginary 
fragmented body, in national terms this has been a more difficult task for 
Canada than for Australia and New Zealand. This, of course, does not 
mean that the latter are more homogeneous societies, but that the 
constructions of national population have more successfully repressed 
multiplicity in the forms of social and state institutions)73 However, in 
Canada, the presence of the legacies of two historical imperialisms, the 
French and the English, and the political movement surrounding French 
separatist nationalism, as well as the physical proximity of the United 
States, and the long history of diverse immigration in Canada's "English" 
. settlement, have combined to render the possibility of constructing a 
unified national image or identity for Canada extremely problematic. 
Multiplicity is the condition of Canadian national self-hood. As Coral 
Ann Howells puts it, 
The awareness of such multiplicity problematizes the sense of one's 
own identity for instead of the self being solid and unified it becomes 
a more shifting concept without fixed boundaries .... This feminine 
awareness finds interesting parallels in the problematic concept of 
Canadian national identity, which has notoriously escaped 
definition) 74 
The implications of this for Canadian literature have been described as 
both a more secure place in 'Canadian Literature' in the institutionalised 
sense, for women writers, and an apparently very different 'political' basis 
to, or investment in, Canadian (literary) nationalism: 
[I]t would seem that in Canada there is a connection between the 
preoccupations of nationalism and of women's fiction as strong 
though not as obvious as is to be found in many post-colonial Third 
World cultures. The ideological coincidence between nationalism 
and feminism would suggest one of the reasons why so much 
attention is being paid to women writers in Canada now. It might 
also be argued that women's stories could provide models for the 
story of Canada's national identity .... [W]omen's stories about 
procedures for self-discovery which are as yet (as always?) incomplete 
may be seen to parallel the contemporary Canadian situation)75 
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1. III. (ii). The Discursive Illusion of the Sovereign Self. To 
summarise, nations sought their identities in literature, while literature 
sought its constitution as literature through nations. This two-way 
specular relation can be explicated by way of two underlying conditions. 
First, literature is a discursive construct, an ordering of language, and it is 
upon entry into the Symbolic order of language that subjectivity is attained 
and identity may be -- must be -- spoken. Second, the entry into language 
alienates the subject, effecting a linguistic castration, simultaneously with 
its constitution: 
Language isolates the subject from the Real -- both the subject's own 
being or libido and ... the phenomenal world -- restricting it forever 
to the realm of signification. When the subject passes through what 
Lacan calls the "defiles" or grooves of signification that constitute its 
entry into the Symbolic order, it is reduced to the status of a signifier 
in the field of the Other (l'Autre).1 76 
The Imaginary autonomy of the self produced in the specular relation of 
the mirror stage and subsequent specular identifications, is fractured with 
the entry into the Symbolic, which as a process, depends upon the Other, 
and the Other constituting the subject's alienations and dependencies in its 
particularities. Cameron defines Lacan's "overdetermined" Other as "the 
Law of the parents in the Oedipal situation (especially the Father and his 
substitutes), the unconscious, and the very structure of articulated 
language itself, the site of the signifier and the locus of the constitution of 
the subject."177 While the implications of the function of the unconscious 
in decentring the subject, appropriately positioned by Cameron as pivotal 
between the two other senses of the Other, will be the focus of the section 
of this chapter dealing with post-colonialism, it is the first and third aspects 
of the Other which are of particular relevance at this point. 
Language functions along two axes, the metaphoric axis of substitution 
(of signifier for signified), and the metonymic axis of the combining of 
signifiers in a chain which defers meaning until the point of closure. The 
subject's place in the Symbolic order is its place in the order of 
signification. The entry into language through Oedipalisation "separates 
the signifier, the paternal function, the Name-of-the-Father, from the 
biological father, thus permitting the child to take the father's place in 
turn. "178 The metonymic axis of language is that which determines that 
the subject takes up a position in the articulated structure of language, the 
potentially endless passage from signifier to signifier. This system is, like 
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the social order, preconstituted, and it is 'for this reason that "We 
inevitably lack any masterful understanding of language and can only 
signify ourselves in a Symbolic system over which we have no command 
but rather which commands us."179 
Thus we approach the paradox of subjectivity: the attainment of 
subjectivity with the entry into the Symbolic order (of language) 
determines that while what is attained is, through the function of 
substitution, the possibility of the enunciation of'!' for the self, and a 
position from which to articulate it, this is at the cost of, or predicated on, 
the exchangeability of the self for a signifier in the chain of signifiers which 
is language, a system structured by the ultimate exchangeability of all 
signifiers in the economy of the sign. The subject is constitutively 
alienated in, or castrated by language, where "in receiving a name and its 
substitution rules, it is transformed into a representation of itself."180 
To return to the two-way relation of dependence between nation and 
literature, by positing 'nation', which has already been shown to have been 
imaged as the reading or writing self -- as subject -- it can be argued that 
'nation' both reads the text for specular identifications, and is interpellated 
by the literary text, called upon to recognise itself in a (pr)offered subject-
position: 
The reader who is hailed simultaneously identifies with the subject of 
the speech, the enounced (an Imaginary operation), and takes her 
place in the syntax that defines that subject position (an operation of 
the Symbolic). The reader is thus the spoken subject, constituted 
through identification with the subject of speech. Although the 
subject constitutes itself through speaking, then, it is always 
simultaneously spoken -- and not just in reading because the subject 
receives its language and desires from the Other.181 
Having demonstra.ted the illusory nature of subjective autonomy, and the 
nature of identity as inter-subjectivity, albeit by temporarily suspending 
consideration of the pivotal constitution and functioning of the 
unconscious and desire, an analogous argument may be made in relation 
to the illusory autonomy of nations such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand within the international order. 
1. III. (iii). Neo-Imperialism as Threat to Sovereignty. Ernest Gellner 
has explained the basis of the nation in the "generalized diffusion of a 
school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements 
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of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication," and 
pointed out that with the nation comes the "establishment of an 
anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized 
individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind. "182 
They are effectively held together by the advent of modern mass 
communications, whose role in the dissemination of the nationalist idea 
consists not in the content of 'nationalist' messages, but in the 
"pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one 
to many communication, which itself automatically engenders the core 
idea of nationalism quite irrespective of ... the specific messages 
transmi tted. "183 This could be argued to work in two mutually 
interdependent ways. First, it creates what Anderson termed the 
"imagined community" of nation -- a sense of the possibility that large 
numbers of people, mostly strangers, are receiving the very same 
transmission at the same time. But while the message is transmitted as 
one to many, establishing the indifference of the individual citizen, it is 
received as something more like one to one, and it is the co-incidence of 
these 'senses' that effects the individual citizen's interpellation by the 
ideology of nation, his or her 'own' sense of belonging to the fact of nation. 
In short, the modern idea of the nation is one emerging out of, and 
requiring, modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation. Gellner 
further argues that there is an association between European imperialism 
at the time of the emergence of industrial society in Western Europe, and 
the character of the nationalisms that followed the "virtual conquest of the 
entire world by European powers, and sometimes by European settler 
populations."184 Of course it is the latter which describes the eventual 
establishment of Australia, Canada and New Zealand as white-settler-
dominated nations. However, Gellner characterises this imperialism as 
unusual: 
Normally, political empire is the reward of military orientation and 
dedication. It is perpetrated by societies strongly committed to 
warfare .... 
N one of this was true of the European conquest of the world. It was 
eventually carried out and completed by nations increasingly oriented 
towards industry and trade, not by a militaristic machine,185 
The repressed 'unconscious' of this account would of course be the story of 
the militaristic conquest of indigenous populations. However, this does 
not detract from the perception of the centrality of the requirement of 
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expanded commodity and labour markets which motivated British 
imperialism. 
The rise of industrial capitalism saw the growth of an economy based 
on circulation of goods and capital. David Lloyd has explained the 
paradoxical logic of circulation and its establishment of the indifference of 
the subject-nation: 
Because according to the logic of capitalist circulation in the labor as 
in the commodity market, anyone thing can be exchanged for any 
other, including humans, the very forces that unleash the individual 
from traditional ties and impose the injunction to moral and 
economic "self-making" are those which assert the identity of all 
subjects.186 
This paradox has already been discussed in relation to the economy of the 
sign in the subjective sphere. It is now clear that capitalism is such an 
economy on the national scale. Thus Lloyd refers to 
the naturalness that accrues to the rhetoric of economic development 
by way of its congruity with the schema of development in the 
subjective economy: where the individual subject, within a narrative 
that to function must be universally the same, is to be integrated first 
with the nation and then with "humanity" (the family of nations), so 
each individual nation state must be developed into increasing 
integration in the global capitalist market.187 
It was precisely the processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, and 
unification through the centralised technologies of mass communications, 
upon which 'whole', 'unique' and 'mature' nationhood were predicated 
which located the nation within the order of the international-Symbolic. 
At the same time, capitalism requires the indifference of nations (and 
citizens) as sources of labour and commodities (producers and consumers) 
for the global circulation of capital. Thus, the nation-subject is 
constitutively compromised both in its autonomy and its privileged 
position of command over its 'destiny' within, and the functioning of, the 
international-Symbolic economic and cultural system. As Lloyd puts it, 
"To be in perpetual debt is the normative condition of the subject, because 
an identity gained by way of the other can never be autonomous; in other 
terms, one labors to produce oneself for others. "188 
The indifferent, inter-dependent, once-colonial nation-subjects of 
world capitalism have been understood as the subjects of economic and 
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cultural neo-imperialism. Lloyd states that "to be inauthentic is to be 
made by another, to be given meaning, or read, by another." He further 
describes such inauthenticity as "equally the perpetual condition of the 
colonized: dominated, interpreted, mediated by another."189 The 
'Canadian mentality' has been described as one of colonial 'inauthenticity' 
as a result of that country's debilitating proximity to the United States: 
Canadians have shared, or copied, their neighbours' exuberance but 
they have had to live with their own realities. The result has been a 
certain artificiality in outlook. Just because Canadians have always 
been looking over their neighbours' fence they have tended to 
exaggerate the point of view they have borrowed from him [sic]. They 
have been small-town people giving themselves big-city airs,190 
The same 'suburban' imagery is used by Dennis Lee when he states that 
"Canadians were by definition people who looked over the fence and 
through the windows at America, un-selfconsciously learning from its 
movies, comics, magazines and TV shows how to go about being alive."191 
In the context of modernisation and urbanisation under capitalism, this 
suburban imagery is particularly appropriate. Tim Rowse has described, 
from the Australian context, the evocation of a national ethos by writers 
demonstrating an "increased preoccupation with ... the everyday, the way 
of life, the basic common sentiments that Australians displayed, the things 
they typically enjoyed at home on the weekends."192 The totalising 
impulse of the '''[illumination of] the macrocosm through the 
microcosm"'193 was never achieved more effectively than through 
television, which "has proved to be a superb medium for holding up 
average suburban daily life as an object for contemplation."194 
Remembering the nature of mass media communications as one to many 
in transmission but one to one in reception, the commercial content and 
effect of television has helped produce, through its apparent reflection of 
consumer products and even images of a 'way of life', that very suburban 
ethos. As Rowse points out, "Contemporary modes of collective 
consumption are very home and suburb-centred."195 However, the 
messages do not simply offer themselves for consumption by pre-formed, 
autonomous subjects who exercise choice in the matter of consumption. 
In interpellating the individual consumer, media images construct 
particular subject positions which define the subject as consumer. In other 
words, the suburban consumer, individually and collectively, is read and 
spoken by media messages. To return to Lee's image of the Canadian 
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consumer' of American popular culture, it is precisely "how to go about 
----------being alive" which is being learnt, and the 'reality' which is thus produced 
is a culturally and technologically media-ted one. This mediation can be 
understood in the subjective sphere as an alienation from the self: hence 
Lee's description of a resultant Canadian self-contempt: "The disdainful 
amusement I and others like me felt for Canadian achievement in any 
field, especially those of the imagination, was a direct reflection of our self-
hatred and sense of inferiority. "196 
Canada has always been located in the dual position as "part of North 
America and the British Empire."197 However, in accepting capital after 
the Depression, Canada found that "'one kind of colonialism was replaced 
by another,'It and according to George Woodcock's claim, this resulted in 
"'a permanent wounding of the Canadian collective pride, a wounding 
that is one of the reasons we tend to agonise so much about our 
identity.1II198 Indeed an insidious loss of identity is evoked by Dennis Lee's 
characterisation of the Canadian response to cultural dependence on the 
United States. He argues that this dependence has not been clearly enough 
identified as a form of colonialism, and that an intellectual 'Uncle Tom-
ism', a 'selling-out' has resulted from the loss of identity and the 
disavowal of this loss: 
[T]he idea that these things confirmed our colonialism with a 
vengeance would have made us laugh our continentalized heads off. 
We weren't all that clear on colonialism to begin with, but if anybody 
had colonialism it was our poor countrymen, the Canadians, who in 
some unspecified way were still in fetters to England. But we weren't 
colonials ... .199 
To return to the developmental paradigm within which the nation-
subject has been located, assertions of (national) maturity were associated 
with images of masculinity. Indeed, "phallic assertion" has been described 
as one mode of discourse and subject-position within the Symbolic 
order.200 However, having demonstrated the illusory (Imaginary) nature 
of the autonomous phallocentric subject within the Symbolic, the 
constitutively 'compromised' nation-subject, the nation-subject of and in 
neo-imperialism, is recast as female, and characterised by sexual imagery, 
particularly images of passivity and vulnerability. 
The entry of Britain's former daughter colonies into the 'family of 
nations' upon 'maturity' saw the increasing role of the United States in 
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their economies, cultures and international relations. Japan was also 
becoming increasingly important, however historical links with the 
United States, as well as cultural factors placed the United States in a more 
central position in relation to the former colonies. Indeed, Japan's role has 
been inextricably linked to its Westernisation, thus ensuring its 
participation in the capitalist requirement for global cultural 
homogenisa tion. 201 
'Maturity' has been linked causally with the increased involvement of 
Australia with the United States. Experienced by Australian intellectuals 
as "a rebellion against cultural provinciality and as a mature, rational 
confrontation of vested interests," Australia's 'coming of age' implied, 
among other things, "the shift of the Australian outlook away from 
Britain towards the USA and the Pacific basin."202 Rowse continues that 
The concept of 'imperialism' is rarely used to understand this 
'maturation', but Grattan's analysis ... suggests that one significance 
of the imagery of maturation and nationalism was the long-term 
assistance it gave to the realignment of Australian capitalism towards 
the USA and away from British capitalism.203 
The association of national maturation and (neo-)imperialism can also be 
employed as a pivot upon which to turn back to the psychoanalytic 
discourse of the psychical development toward (sexual) maturity, and the 
place in the (patriarchal) Symbolic, of the individual subject, in this 
context, the female subject in particular: 
In Freud's understanding, the girl's oedipus complex must ensure 
that she relinquishes her primary libidinal attachment to the mother 
in order eventually to take her father as love object. Her passive yet 
amorous, seductive relation to him inherits the structure of her prior 
maternal attachment, and is itself the mediating or transitional phase 
between (homosexual) maternal attachment and non-incestual 
heterosexual attachment. Although she must abandon the mother, 
the girl must retain an identification with her in order to acquire the 
appropriate feminine attributes.204 
Among these attributes are "the substitution of the desire for the phallus 
for the desire for the mother" and "the acquisition of the skills of 
seduction," becoming a "passive object, who seeks, not (actively) to desire, 
but (passively) to be desired."20s 
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Expressions of familial relatedness have 'naturalised' the turn of the 
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand gazes towards the United States. 
An ambivalence of affect accompanied a perception of unavoidable 
similarities between Australians and Americans in Alfred Deakin's 1908 
belief in the need to invite the American fleet to extend its Pacific cruise to 
Australia: '''The closer the alliance between us the better, for although I 
am fully alive to the many objectional features of their political life, after 
all they are nearest to us in blood and in social, religious and even political 
developmen ts. "'206 This 'relatedness' constitutes, for Dennis Lee, the 
difficulty that Canada has had in challenging American neo-imperialism, 
just as the durability of English colonialism has been at least in part a 
function of the links of family (and) history: 
The prime fact about my country as a public space is that in the last 25 
years it has become an American colony. But we speak the same 
tongue as our new masters; we are the same colour, the same stock. 
We know their history better than our own. Thus... the way it 
undercuts ... is less easy to discern -- precisely because there are so 
few symptomatic ... battlegrounds ... in which the takeover is 
immediately visible.207 
However, the relationship between Britain's former colonies and the 
United States has not generally been expressed in terms of filial ties as it 
was with Britain. Although it has been claimed that Canadian 
"Confederation was a marriage of convenience, a strategem to protect the 
family interests against an uncle to the south . ... "208 the discourse 
expressing the Canadian, and even other Dominion relationships to the 
United States has more often revolved around sexual images, including 
seduction. 
While the impact of American television, movies, films and 
magazines, widely disseminated in Canada, has effected the "American 
cultural penetration of Canada,"209 it has also been emphasised that 
Americans "are not forcing Canadians. Canadians should be, and in fact 
are, quite free to refuse to look at, listen to, or read any American program, 
film or magazine. "210 However, although the penetration was not forced, 
it has been shown to be occurring in a context of power imbalance in 
diverse areas of the relationship between the two nations. Since the 1960s 
Canadians have become increasingly aware of an erosion of the strategic 
mutuality between Canada and the United States, and there has been "an 
increasing generalized Canadian concern about U.S. economic and cultural 
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domination. Thus although the defense relationship continued to be 
intimate, it was not without its problems."211 The following passage is 
suggestive of a partnership, or a marriage, in which Canada fears for its 
identity in relation not simply to an overbearing partner, but to a 
structural inequality between it and the United States: "because the United 
States predominates in the bilateral relationship there is no danger of a 
loss of U.S. sovereignty stemming from an intimate relationship with 
Canada. This fact alone seems chilling to many Canadians."212 Within 
this 'unequal marriage' metaphor is an expression of ambivalence which 
is evocative of seduction which, in the commonly understood sense of the 
term, effects a desired behaviour or relation not through force, but through 
attractive enticements. This ambivalence is in fact contained in the 
Freudian description of the girl's seduction of the father as preparation for 
adult seduction by the father-substitute. Even the role of "seek[ing] ... 
(passively) to be desired" confers some activity on the girl, while the 
father-seducer, to seduce, must himself be seduced, rendering the process a 
mutual one, even if it is acted out between 'unequal' participants.213 
Further in relation to the passage above, what is traditionally lost by the 
seduced is, apart from innocence, 'reputation', and the reference to 
constraints on Canada's international place or 'voice', could be construed 
in this way as a very literal loss of reputation. 
C. Hartley Grattan warned that this 'loss of reputation' would not be 
entertained by Australian nationalism. Although he was confident in 1938 
that "as Australia becomes more mature, less 'colonial' and 'dependent', 
the cultural borrowings between the two countries will multiply," he was 
also aware of widespread determination that "Australia 'would not go the 
way of Canada."'214 However, Australia's gaze was described as having 
turned from "the constraints of British imperialism ... towards the U.S.A., 
the nation that was to consummate its dominance of world capitalism 
during World War II."21S The notion of American 'seduction' has also 
been lent support by the characterisation of Australia as an innocent, but 
sexually mature and alluring young woman. Richard White describes 
such 'feminine' images, or allegorical portrayals of Australia: 
Firstly, she often had a particula:r relationship with Britannia or John 
Bull: there was a stress on the fact that she was the daughter, that she 
had parents, that she was growing up, approaching adulthood, about 
to flower into womanhood. Secondly, there was a distinctive stress 
on her remarkable beauty, but also on her innocence, her purity and 
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her vulnerability. She often found herself in difficult situations, 
modestly blushing at vice, naively shocked at corruption, or in 
imminent danger of being raped.216 
Thus the way was set for perceptions of Australia and its inhabitants as 
vulnerable and innocent victims of the forces of corruption. The United 
States, or more precisely, 'Americanisation', embodied just such a 
corrupting influence. By the 1920s, "Hollywood was blamed for increasing 
vulgarity. Jazz, doubly evil because it was black as well as American, was 
seen as leading to immorality. American comics were seducing Australian 
children."217 With increasing industrialisation, women occupied a more 
central role in a new Australian 'identity' founded on the principles of 
'way of life' and consumerism. In 1947, the Argus Women's Magazine 
"told its readers that 'the American Way of Life is Easy for the Housewife' . 
. . . For the next two decades women were inveigled into buying small 
labour-saving devices and persuading their husbands to buy bigger 
ones."218 
The strength of the American 'threat' to New Zealand has also been 
expressed as a function of the ambivalence of affect it generates among 
New Zealanders. Echoing Lee's observation that a lack of obvious 
battleground makes the incursion more insidious, it has been claimed of 
New Zealand that 
the American threat is not military nor seriously economic, and the 
fact that it is limited primarily to the media may make it much more 
difficult to perceive and therefore to counteract -- if we choose to 
counteract. For many people in the world, the American way of life, 
even with all its inequalities, is highly attractive -- one might say 
seductive.219 
However, concern over American economic expansion and its 
standardising mechanisms which both require and effect the elimination 
of cultural differences, has been related to the importance of a renewed 
focus upon, or sense of the importance of New Zealand's national identity: 
nationalism associated with these differences -- that is, the desire of 
some people to preserve and enjoy their own distinctive way of life --
creates political barriers against the expansion of those mechanisms. 
Issues of culture and national identity are therefore of fundamental 
importance in the world today.22o 
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Indeed, it is claimed that in opposition to the increasing domination by the 
United States and the 'seductive' way of life it offers, New Zealand, instead 
of 'succumbing', "can begin to develop a sense of autonomous identity 
that unites our people in opposing internal exploitation of the 
disadvantaged and external exploitation by the mighty. "221 
Therefore, responses to the 'neo-imperialism' of the United States 
have included a more concerted effort to reassert national sovereignty, and 
perhaps more clearly than in the context of British imperialism, to which 
the colonies were historically and sentimentally affiliated, the discourse 
has approximated that of the call for the liberation of the 'exploited' from 
the 'exploiters'. 
1. IV. The Post-Colonial Problematisation of Identity: The Unconscious as 
Difference Within the Self. 
Post-colonialism comprises discourses which valorise 'authenticity'. 
In challenging the external threat to sovereign identity of (neo-) 
imperialism, post-colonialism concerns the rejection of false or impo_~~s! 
identities, a~~The-i~-~-eplacement ~ith, or- revef~tiQn--()( n~tEEal!~ 
~nc9fonlsed~ or true 0 idel}JHi~s," The underlying assumption in the view 
that Nation would, when divested of 'alien' garb, be truly revealed, is that 
the nation is essentially there, a view which nationalism deceptively, and 
indeed self-deceptively, affirms. It is also a view of 'nationalism' which 
sees it as external to Nation, acting upon it. However, as Gellner points 
out, "Nationalism sees itself as a natural and universal ordering of the 
political life of mankind, only obscured by [a] long, persistent and 
mysterious somnolence," but in reality, "nationalism is not the awakening 
of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present 
itself. It is ... the consequence of a new form of social organisation."222 
Nations are produced -- engendered -- by a process; they are not 
essentially there so that their true form may be revealed. Yet nations are 
not on the other hand false. The true-false dichotomy is once again not 
applicable. Nations are both imaginary and real. They are imaginary in at 
least two senses: nationalism has been described as "an imaginary cultural 
artefact . ... an imaginary production of ... history and historiography;"223 
and it is Imaginary in the psychoanalytic sense of constituting a nostalgic 
desire for unity, the repair of the alienation effected by the mirror stage, 
when one confronts the image of oneself in the field of the Other, which 
/ 
74 
the entry into the Symbolic register of language both confirms and 
mediates through the insertion of the self into, and the assertion of the self 
through, the'!'. Similarly, although nationalism "comes from no place, 
no real place,"224 the nation is imaginarily located in, or identified 
primarily as, a place. The position of Nation in an essentialist 
epistemology is an effect of the naturalising discourse of the individual 
and its maturation to sovereign self-assertion. However, nations are real, 
in the sense that their constitutive discourse of nationalism has "real 
effects in the real world."225 Therefore, a non-essentialist epistemology 
does not preclude a realist ontology. 
However, the post-colonial concern with and for authenticity is more 
ambiguous than simply the need to remove, or at least parry, influences 
alien to Nation to reveal its underlying truth. This is a view of 
subjectivity which sees it as ideally centred or knowledgeable, but 
determined. It takes account only of what Paul Smith has termed the "sub-
jection of the subject." He explains that 
modern social theory is often a rather too neat conjunction of 
powerful social determinants and a prosaic, nay, passive self-
awareness. Indeed the "subject" is ultimately construed there as little 
more than a compliant object designed to fit into the structures which 
can apparently be described satisfactorily enough by empirical 
research.226 
In post-colonial discourse, identity and authenticity are inextricably 
implicated in questions of legitimacy, and it is the very questioning of 
legitimacy which constitutes a significant aspect of the problematisation of 
identity. It has been variously claimed that "the 'problem' of identity is 
the formal expression of a significant difficulty concerning the legitimacy 
of the ... nation-state,"227 and that post-colonialism is a 'crisis' not only for 
those who bore the burden of imperialism: who have seen the 
destruction of their language and the mutilation of their culture. It is 
also a crisis for those who have been agents of colonialism and, who, 
once colonialism itself has lost its legitimacy, find themselves 
without strong ethical and ideological support.228 
The notion of authenticity is compromised both for the colonised, who are 
no longer purely 'themselves', and for the colonisers, whose appropriation 
of the Name-of-the-Father and imposition of his Law contains a built-in 
paradox which threatens the whole presence-to-self of identity. This 
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paradox turns upon the dual meaning of 'legitimacy' as a biological and a 
moral state, but both conferred by the Law: 
The question of origins calls identity into question, and the question 
of identity calls the origin into question. And if, according to a legal 
code dating back to Roman times, the identity of the father is as the 
nuptial ceremony declares, the legal fiction retains constantly the 
trace of that anxiety that inspired the arbitrariness of its namings. The 
uncertainty that attaches to the paternal origin both biologically and 
"morally" threatens always to undermine the integrity of the name, 
of the determination of paternal property and of identity itself. But 
because the self-identity of the subject, to which the father calls him, 
must always be established in opposition to the father, identity itself 
contradicts the appeal to originality that founds it. Hence the 
ambivalence that attaches to the concept of originality .... Hence, also, 
the reason why any nationalism must police the desire of women 
and, indeed, contain the mother within the matrix of a "motherland" 
which is always to be possessed by the sons of the fathers as their 
rightful inheritance.229 
The policing of the "desire of women" is the basis not simply of 
patriarchy, but upon which phallocentric subjectivity is 'erected'.23o It is 
the repression of the excess of the phallic self -- the feminine -- which 
constitutes subjectivity through the formation of the unconscious. The 
unconscious is the crucial term in the constitution of subjectivity which 
has, until this point in the discussion, been bracketed, or barred231 in order 
to emphasise more strongly the moment(ousness) of its return. 
This 'symptomatic' return -- symptomatic of structuring repressions; 
symptom as metaphor of the repressed -- is analogous to the reappearance 
in post-colonial discourse of the repressed/suppressed difference within 
Nation. However, the post-colonial recognition of, and challenge to, the 
attempt to obscure or annihilate internal difference in the name of Nation 
-- in short, the recognition of the constitution of a national 'self' by way of 
a process of internally perpetuated colonisation -- has been founded upon 
notions of subjectivity, and the relationship between the subject and the 
social which ultimately misconstrue the formation and functioning of the 
(na tiona!) unconscious.232 
Post-colonial discourses typically posit the falsity, or at least partialness 
of 'nationalist' national identity, that national identity constructed by the 
dominant discourse of nationalism, as a function of the suppression of 
different 'groups' -- groups of difference -- within Nation. They posit as 
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more authentic, more complete, national identities which recognise and 
include these 'groups'. Thus while the nationalist concern for political 
and cultural unity reaches its extreme in expressions of the moral urgency 
of purity (the implications of legitimacy might be remembered here), the 
post-colonial concern for inclusiveness has been expressed in similarly 
moral terms. For example, the introduction to the volume of essays 
entitled Culture and Identity in New Zealand contains the apologetic 
admission that "There are some glaring gaps in this book. We regret the 
absence of ... contributions from Maori women, from Pacific Islanders, 
from lesbian feminists, all of which were originally planned for 
inclusion."233 The assumption is that the national identity has been false 
as a result of excluding, or at least marginalising, the perpectives of 
women, indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and others. Thus a 
national identity founded on the 'totality' is ideologically determined to 
redress a political and cultural imbalance, restoring 'equality' to marginal 
discourses. 
However, there is a problem with such a 'common-sensical' 
conception which exposes precisely its ideological determination from 
within the dominant discourse of nationalism. Such post-colonial ~ 
understandings of identity tend towards, and demonstrate a nostalgia for, ~ 
the very unification against which they were articulated. For example, the 
description of a cultural or national identity as "an aggregate concept"234 
tends towards the reification of that aggregate into essence. It may be 
regarded as defining "the very fabric" of a society,235 or may be interrogated 
for an "identity that embraces the many differences among us that brings 
us together in spite of or even because of the differences."236 It has been 
metaphorised in the Canadian 'mosaic' ideology, which describes both the 
diversity of peoples and cultures comprising the nation, and yet also the 
"unity in diversity"237 that as a tangible object -- Canada as mosaic -- it 
represents. This mosaic is evoked in the reference to the "host of [regional 
and non-regional] identities that are relevant to different situations" and 
which together "constitute a [Canadian] national identity which is greater 
than the sum of its parts. "238 Indeed, the nostalgia for unity which 
permeates even post-colonial recognition of and respect for differences and 
protean forms is most compromisingly evident in the hopeful conviction 
that "Only when the dominant culture ceases to reinforce prejudices will a 
common identity outweigh the separate ones."239 
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This unifying inclusiveness constitutes a response to the post-colonial 
anxiety surrounding legitimacy. It is a response which, faced with 
evidence of the fictionality of purity -- the 'return' of feminine desire --
turns to the legal fiction of legitimacy, in which the Law-of-the-Father 
confers the Name-of-the-Father, taking the 'many' differences into the 
One of post-colonial Nation. The Father's place is (re-)inscribed, and the 
bastards of maternal transgression claimed and named.240 
Therefore, such conceptualisations of post-colonial difference have 
ultimately posed no challenge to the Nation-self. The 
repressed/ suppressed has returned from an 'unconscious' conceptualised 
in a manner "consistent with ... a 'stratified' model of personality," as 
"more or less simply ... a storehouse of repressed content or as a mere 
barrier blocking awareness."241 The belief in the possibility of the 
restoration of this 'awareness' -- undergoing a process of cultural and 
political 'consciousness raising' akin to the normative assumptions and 
functioning of ego-psychology -- is founded upon two misleading premises 
about the nature of subjectivity and the mediation of the unconscious. 
There is 
the assumption that there could exist, one day, a kind of self-
regulating human 'subject' which would in itself combine a sentience 
(albeit determined by the social environment) with a fully conscious 
activity (which may be exerted in and upon that environment). The 
underlying faith here is in the possibility of a balance, or of exactly a 
rationality. The second assumption is that such a 'subject' would be 
intrinsically part of some social totality which could be described as 
purely a sum of its social parts ... : it is as if the social were to be 
understood as a complex but finally solvable calculation, with a neat 
whole number as its sum.242 
Further, post-colonial identities are founded upon the belief that 
marginalisation constitutes falsification of an essence. Therefore, in post-
colonial societies it is possible to find indigenous peoples engaging in and 
articulating their authentic native identities, and women similarly 
expressing the need for, and articulating versions of, real identities as 
women. Such claims to authenticity tend, however, to be grounded in the 
epistemological privileging of precisely their marginal or victim status. 
Jean Bethke Elshtain has challenged the view that if the values of the 
dominant discourse are oppressive, those of the powerless will not be: 
"The presumption is that the victim speaks in a pure voice .... But the 
belief in such purity may itself be one of the effects of powerlessness, and 
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that belief, congealed in language, is endlessly self-confirming."243 The 
'purity' can only be that of the victim as one of the "various monolithic 
Others"244 which suppress their own internal difference; in other words, 
the purity of a 'counter-Self' (an alter-ego?) of the dominant discourse. 
It is necessary, therefore, to question the ontology of those post-colonia1 
'groups' of Nation's difference. Post-colonial societies are characterised by 
a proliferation of groups and group-interests struggling for recognition of 
specificities held to be natural. However, these specificities and the 
assumptions which inform them are historically and ideologically 
determined. The assertion of identities of native peoples as native peoples 
necessarily occurs within a post-colonial context in which there is an Other 
-- the Coloniser -- against which 'native' is defined, has meaning, in short 
is known as such. It is post-colonial identities which are asserted, 
identities asserted as authentic which are fundamentally inauthentic by 
virtue of having been gained through the Other. The unified expressions 
of Maori, Australian Aborigine, Canadian Native Indian and Inuit 
identities have been constituted against, or in distinction to the colonising 
settlers and their descendants. 'Pre-colonial' identities were regionally, 
tribally and sub-tribally specific.245 Similarly, referring back to the "glaring 
gaps" in Culture and Identity in New Zealand, before the mid-1970s, it 
would not have been likely to have occurred to anyone to specify lesbian 
feminists as a 'group'. Their 'recognition' occurred at a specific moment 
in feminist/lesbian history. Indeed, it would be more accurate to 
characterise it as a 'cognition'.246 
The term "glaring gap" is a particularly apt pointer to the fact that such 
'groups' are not merely historically and ideologically determined, but 
structurally determined by the dominant discourse which recognises them: 
"the 'new subjects of history' it posits ... could only be those collective 
subjects who are visible and accessible, those who confront European 
hegemony as its unified, articulate, Manichean (polarised) opposite."247 
Difference has therefore returned to the consciousness of the 'post-
coloniser'. It has passed into political (Symbolic) meaning through 
language, thus alienating it from its being-self. Post-colonial contestatory 
groups are not the return of repressed content from the unconscious of 
Nation, but are symptoms or metaphors of the repression/suppression of 
difference upon which Nation was erected. Further, they return in forms 
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which replicate the structure of that Nation-self, in and as language and 
the Symbolic order. As Andrew McCann points out, "those narrative 
voices that are most readily recognised as the voices of the Other, by virtue 
of both their political immediacy and their will to power, involve their 
own measure of denial whereby still other voices are effaced. "248 
A clear example occurs in the discourses of indigenous peoples of 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand who reject multi-culturalism as 
obscuring their prior rights as the original inhabitants of their lands. 
Spokespersons for Canada's indigenous peoples have challenged Canada's 
multicultural policy arguing that "their ~peciaL15tC\t'l!§uas CanadCl~~()!1gi~~! 
peoples is negated by the poli~y. Thus they have rejected multiculturalism 
-ouc~ori~~d and ~have cho~~'n instead to lobby for constitutional 
recognition of their treaty and aboriginal rights."249 Similarly, Maori 
Sovereignty, while "at its most conservative ... could be interpreted as the 
desire for a bicultural society,"250 generally does not seek equality "in 
white terms" at all, but priority status for Maori. Accepting "nothing less 
than the acknowledgement that New Zealand is Maori land and ... 
[seeking] the return of that land," Donna Awatere defines the project of 
Maori Sovereignty: "The aim is to redesign this country's institutions 
from a Maori point of view. The aim is to reclaim all land and work it 
from a Maori point of view. The aim is to enter the Pacific arena from a 
Maori point of view. To forge a distinctive New Zealand identity from a 
Maori point of view."251 Spokespersons for such perspectives in New 
Zealand identify, and are identified as, Maori Nationalists. Like 
'Australian', 'Canadian' and 'New Zealand' nationalism, -~MaQri 
Nationalism is a response to colonialism; it rejects the 'colonial' or 
'colonised' identity as inauthentic, and seeks both priority through 
authenticity and authenticity through priority. Maori Nationalism is 
similarly constituted against its own Others: both what Awatere terms 
"white hatred,"252 but also, from within Maori the "collaborators" 
identified by Atareta Poananga as "those who choose to identify with those 
who overran and continue to oppress the tangata whenua,"253 and those 
Awatere describes as "colonial Maori", the "forces within Maoridom that 
have become colonised beyond recall. These people have accepted as 
normal the key concepts underlying white culture."254 Yet despite the 
pessimism underlying this expression, Awatere concludes that "Every 
Maori belongs to us. No-one is beyond recall,"255 while Poananga declares 
that "This tradition of ongoing nationalism should be buried deep within 
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every MaorL"256 Thus there is a paradoxical inhabiting of the 'left-wing' 
liberationist position of decolonisation at the same time as the more 'right-
wing' assertion of the association of political domination with racial or 
cultural uniformity. The argument for indigenous political and cultural 
domination is founded on a mirroring of the very principles of racial and 
cultural discrimination against which it emerged. 
It is therefore necessary to examine further the production and the 
nature of dominant and marginal discourses. It is necessary to redress the 
error of regarding the dominant discourse as a singular and unified 
construct and marginalised discourses as similarly singular and unified 
within themselves. As Richard Terdiman has warned, 
We must not be taken in by the rhetorical abbreviation in the phrase 
'dominant discourse'. The moving and flowing network of practices 
and assumptions by which, at any of a series of endlessly divisible 
moments, social life is structured, ought not be abstractly reified. 
Such a hypostatization would ignore that dominant discourse is not a 
'thing', but a complex and shifting formation.257 
Thus, under imperialism, the 'dominant' discourse should not be seen as 
simply and singularly imperialist; under nationalism, it is not, again, 
simply and singularly nationalist. Its power derives from the strength of a 
conjoining of supporting discourses. These include, among others, racism, 
patriarchy, capitalism, heterosexism, all of which have themselves been 
supported by networks of discursive institutions such as religion, science 
and economics. Nor do these conjoining discourses together solidify into 
an impenetrable monolith whose strength lies in the sheer fact of the 
weight of so many isomorphic discourses. Their strength also derives 
from the flexibility of their articulation, their ability to shift focus, adapt to 
contingencies. 
For example, Michael King, an historian who has faced both challenge 
and criticism as well as acceptance and approval for his researches into and 
presentations of Maori historical issues and materials, wrote the 
'selectively' autobiographical Being Pakeha, "a book about belonging and 
not belonging" because it seemed an appropriate time to ask "What [does] 
it mean to be a Pakeha in New Zealand?"258 Addressing the question of 
"whether or not there is such a thing as Pakeha culture in New Zealand/' 
he argues that "For many Pakeha people, including myself, the inclination 
and indeed the need to define Pakeha-ness has been given momentum by 
\ 
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the current Maori cultural renaissance. "259 However this concern has not 
emerged 'solely as the product of Pakeha observation, on the 'sidelines' of 
this Maori renaissance. 'Donna Awatere has rejected any suggestion that 
"white New Zealanders have developed a culture that is particularly New 
Zealand in nature," other than "that which exists through opposition to 
the Maori. "260 
Culture has therefore become the term central to the debate over post-
colonial authenticity, legitimacy and identity. However, precisely because 
it is a post-colonial debate (constituting a self-reflection which marks an 
alienation; an alienation which projects the 'subject' from being into 
meaning), authenticity eludes both 'sides'. Each is marked by the other, 
generating and compounding anxiety over cultural identity, and thus 
(because of the structuring, naming functions of 'culture'), over legitimacy. 
This issue can be addressed with reference to an article entitled "Te 
Pakeha,"261 which, in the context of the Maori 'cultural renaissance' 
addresses precisely the vexed issue of whether Pakeha have a culture. The 
article's address simultaneously demonstrates and disavows its own 
anxiety in the title, whose associations with, amount to an appropriation 
of, the name of Te Maori, a cultural event of international significance 
which focused on Maori. On the other hand, while the attempt, whether 
sincere or not, to 'feel' the authenticity of Te Maori as a cultural event has 
clearly at times, and in different ways, rebounded on Pakeha,262 some 
confusion of affect could be expected in the paradox of Te Maori as a 
cultural event, with its own appropriation of Pakeha forms and 
involvement with Pakeha values and concerns. The taonga were not seen 
in their 'authentic' contexts: they never could have been together in any 
'authentic' context, let alone in museum settings, or in New York. While 
referring to the "fierce debate" that such matters caused within the Maori 
community, Simon During mentions the account of the difficulties 
experienced by the organiser of the exhibition in New York, including 
"how to insure an object whose value is more magical than economic?"263 
Therefore, while "Te Pakeha" mirrored Te Maori, implicitly identifying 
the possibility of an authentic New Zealand culture with Maori, Te Maori 
mirrored Pakeha cultural forms. The anxiety which increasingly regards 
the only 'authentic' consideration of New Zealand culture to be Maori, at 
least in outward form, betrays its own appropriation specifically of the 
outward form alone. Further, this appropriation of strategic and 
82 
substantive discursive forms employed by Maori, and Maori mirroring of 
the Pakeha in post-colonial cultural expression, functions to secure, once 
again, the basis for the presence of Pakeha in Aotearoa/New Zealand,264 
-- and the impossibility of authentic identity. 
It must not be assumed that counter-discourses issue in a one-to-one 
relation from those whose 'voices', once suppressed, begin to emerge: 
native peoples, women, the working classes, homosexuals. Examination 
of post-colonial discourses would reveal how they both intersect and 
contradict, how discourses competing with the dominant are just as much 
competing with each other, or at least working both with and against each 
other. In short, the post-colonial world is articulated as a battle between \ 
discourses. 
The relative powerlessness of black men and white women has been 
debated in terms of the men's complicity with patriarchy and the women's 
with racism. Yet both have defined themselves as 'oppressed' by the 
dominance of white, male, middle-class power structures. An analysis of 
such situations requires a post-colonial problematisation of identity which 
focuses on difference rather than the inevitably binary structure of 
opposition. Acknowledging difference within 'groups' means that such 
identifications are more likely to be recognised as constructs and less likely 
to operate monolithically through the suppression of heterogeneity and 
establishment and perpetuation of a hegemony. Stereotypes can be broken 
down, as can restriction of concepts of identity to the 'group-whole' 
opposition whi<;h retains the marginal sub-set status of the group, or the 
'group-other group' opposition which adopts a rigidly inside-outside 
structure, encouraging notions of group purity or contamination. 
However, as the example above has begun to indicate, the tension 
between contestatory discourses results not only from the contrasting or 
even contradictory claims and priorities of each, but in the fact that any 
subject is interpellated by multiple discourses, multiple social formations. 
When the basis of the difference within groups is recognised to lie in the 
difference within the constituent subject, then this principle of difference 
prevents the mere replacement of the 'subject-other' oppositions with a 
'subject-group' opposition. 
Being divided among discourses and ideologies, the subject cannot be 
held to be coterminous with the 'individual', with its implications of 
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undividedness and coherence. Neither the subject of political domination 
-- the sub-jected subject -- nor the subject of controlling consciousness can 
be theorised in terms which account for agency in resistance to dominant 
discourses and power structures. The former is entirely determined, and 
thus can move to no position from which to resist. The latter is entirely 
present to its consciousness, and thus has no desire to resist -- nothing is 
lacking in its current constitution. Indeed, there would be no reality to 
resist but merely the subjective perception of it. It is necessary, therefore, 
to take account of the function of the unconscious in the constitution of 
the 'divided subject', and its implications for the 'subject's' interpellation 
into, or resistance of, ideological discourses. 
Unlike notions, discussed earlier, of the unconscious as a storehouse or 
repository of repressed content which simply limits the subject's 
awareness, and the content of which retains its integrity of form, Lacan 
"formulates the unconscious as the 'edge' at which the subject is 
structured in relation to the symbolic."265 The Symbolic is understood 
here as "the place where we are in language and in social formations and .. 
. also the process whereby we fit into them. "266 However, although the 
term 'subject' has the advantage of foregrounding its constitution in 
language, it has the disadvantage of converging on the putative coherence 
of 'individual'. Because the existence and mediation of the unconscious 
"precludes the presumptive celebration of any unary self capable of 
accounting unproblematically for its actions, let alone for its motives or its 
constitution,"267 it is more accurate to refer to 'subject-positions'. In this 
way the subject can be seen more accurately as a "complex of psychical 
formations which are constituted as the subject is positioned in relation to 
language."268 These psychical formations are provisional, shifting and 
partial, so that "all subjects arise at a temporally shifting intersection of 
multiple interpellations. In effect, one is the subject of race, gender and 
class discourses as they are disproportionately activated by different 
cultural media. "269 
It is because of the structuring function of the unconscious that 
discourses of resistance which posit centred, self-sovereign counter-
identities can only be symptomatic of 'their' repression. 'They' return, in 
other words, as symptomatic discourses. As Elizabeth Grosz points out, 
Irigaray suggests a close resemblance between the unconscious in its 
relation to consciousness and women in relation to patriarchal social 
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relations. She accepts Freud's identification of the repressed with 
femininity but goes one step further: if what is repressed is the 
feminine ... it is possible to regard women, not as having an 
unconscious, but as being it (for men, for the phallic, for patriarchy). 
Freud's concept provides a dazzling metaphor of women's 
simultaneously repressed/oppressed social position and the 
permanent possibilities of resistance -- the threat the unconscious 
poses to civilisation in its symptomatic 'return'.270 
It certainly is possible to be dazzled by the reflected image of a 'return', but 
only when the freight of the term 'symptom' is overlooked. Despite the 
many differences between the projects of Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, 
the latter has also drawn an analogy within patriarchy between the 
feminine and the unconscious. However, remaining 'undazzled', she has 
developed the implications of this analogy for women as subjects of 
feminist resistance to patriarchy. She argues that 
we must use "we are women" as an advertisement or slogan for our 
demands. On a deeper level, however, a woman cannot "be." It 
follows that a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with 
what already exists so that we may say "that's not it" and "that's still 
not it." In "woman" I see something that cannot be represented, 
something that is not said, something above and beyond 
nomendatures and ideologies.271 
Kristeva therefore accepts "woman" as a politically necessary slogan or 
identification, just as the subject comprises colligations of subject-positions 
which effect a temporary suture in the constitutively split subject that 
enables the 'I' to be articulated. This is consistent with Lacan's designation 
of identity as "orthopaedic,"272 explicated by Catherine Clement as "a kind 
of prosthesis. Something added, something that did not exist at birth that 
helps you to stand up straight within yourself."273 Indeed, in the context of 
"demands" which are articulated through the Symbolic order of language 
(as opposed to desire, which is always what is lacking, left·unarticulated), 
such an orthopaedic prop of identification is clearly necessary. Yet as 
Kristeva has shown, the danger of using the prop of woman-as-identityis 
that it props up patriarchy. She illustrates this in discussion of three 
'generations' of feminism, and their relations to the socio-symbolic order. 
Kristeva describes her first 'generation' of feminists as "existential 
feminists," whose project, centred on 'equal rights', is "deeply rooted in 
the socio-political life of nations."274 Their demands are "all part of the 
logic of identification with certain values: not with the ideological (these 
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are combatted, and rightly so, as reactionary) but, rather, with the logical 
and ontological values of a rationality dominant in the nation-state. "275 
Thus she points to the insufficiency of the 'ideological' as the only site or 
point of intervention. The second generation, by contrast, is characterised 
by "an exacerbated distrust of the entire political dimension."276 Their 
project is one of seeking to "give a language to the intra-subjective and 
corporeal experiences left mute by culture in the past," and of "demanding 
recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex."277 
Thus, "the struggle is no longer concerned with the quest for equality but, 
rather, with difference and specificity."278 
The first 'generation' could be described as supporting patriarchal 
structures by engaging with and seeking participation in them, while the 
second supports patriarchy more by omission than commission, by leaving 
it untouched. Kristeva advocates a third position, one which it could be 
said articulates a relation between the first two. It is one in which 
having started with the idea of difference, [this] feminism will be able 
to break free of its belief in Woman ... so as to channel this demand 
for difference into each and every element of the female whole, and, 
finally to bring out the singularity of each woman, and beyond this, 
her multiplicities, her plural languages .... 279 
It is a position which sees the dichotomy man/woman in the sense of "an 
opposition between two rival entities" as one belonging to metaphysics, 
and seeks "the demassification of the problematic of difference," 
not in the name' of some reconciliation. .. but in order that the 
struggle, the implacable difference, the violence be conceived in the 
very place where it operates with the maximum intransigence, in 
other words, in personal and sexual identity itself, so as to make it 
disintegrate in its very nucleus.28o 
Indeed it is a position which takes account of the function of the 
unconscious in the constitutively split subject. Subjectivity as place in the 
Symbolic is held in constant relation with the process of its provisional, 
temporary, contingent assumption: "This process could be summarized as 
an interiorization of the founding separation of the socio-symbolic 
contract, as an introduction of its cutting edge into the very interior of 
every identity whether subjective, sexual, ideological, or so forth."281 
If the identity of the subject is constituted in a "line of fiction,"282 then 
it is a necessary fiction. But it is also necessarily a fiction. Thus ultimately 
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we return to the apparent contradiction between the determined and the 
determining subject, and note that the split subject of psychoanalysis holds 
these positions in a constant and productive tension. Because of the 
constant vacillation between the determined and the determining 
positions (within the social, and with access to language), the 
psychoanalytic subject is never entirely a 'subject' in either sense. It could 
be described as a "perpetual oscillation between fading and return. "283 As 
has been argued, subjectivity is both the place within the Symbolic, and the 
process of coming into being, which in never settling into stasis, could be 
termed placelessness. It is only partial and is mediated by the unconscious 
which is formed through the particular. subject's lived relations to the 
social order, his or her individual history. This enables the subject to 
legislate between proffered subject-positions, assuming or rejecting 
particular positions, and not necessarily in a conscious way. In fact, the 
subject is never outside. of the process of ideology. Thus, as Smith points 
out, 
it becomes necessary to propose that 'choice' or conscious calculation 
is possible only as the by-product of the human agent's negotiation 
among and between particular subject positions. Resistance is indeed 
produced by and within the ideological. Where discourses actually 
take hold of or produce the so-called 'subject', they also enable agency 
and resistance.284 
In other words, the subject is subject to and of multiple discourses and 
social formations which are not always non-contradictory, and never 
cohere into a whole, undivided individual. No subject fully inhabits any 
one discourse, and no discourse is fully sufficient to any subject. 
The terms of the post-colonial obsession with identity therefore need 
to be problematised, so that the issue is not seen as one of the dismantling 
of false imposed identities in favour of true natural or essential identities. 
Rather, it is the crisis of identity as a concept, one which functions in 
complicity with the politics of both patriarchy and imperialism, and which 
has informed conceptions of even the post-colonial nation. 
1. V. The Interplay of Place and Placelessness in the Subject of Post-
colonial Fiction. 
Jhe emphasis in this chap~ter so far has k~en on subjectivity as a 
psychical process. However, the articulation of subjectivity through the 
I 
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'self' r¢quires an operation of power upon the body. It is the body which, 
through the mirror stage, is unified against difference, before subjectivity 
alienates it as difference, when it is inscribed in language and in the socio-
symbolic order. Meaning thus separates from being, or unmediated 
plenitude. Identity, as has been shown, is spatial and relational, and 
resistance to interpellations by ideology into pre-designated places or 
positions within the Symbolic, similarly takes the form of bodily, or spatial 
transgressions. Using the notion of the productive dialectic between place 
(the determined subject) and placelessness (subjectivity in process), I 
consider a selection of texts from the mid-1980s which illustrate some of 
these situations and problems of post-colonial identity. These include Kate 
Grenville's Lilian's Story,28S Sally Morgan's My Place,286 and Aritha Van 
Herk's No Fixed Address.287 
Lilian's Story can be read as a post-colonial questioning of Australian 
identity through its exp'osure of the complicity between the discourses of 
nation and patriarchy. Post-colonial literature frequently demonstrates the 
problematisation of nation and gender constructs in former colonies, but 
Lilian's Story links the two by showing nation as a gendered concept, while 
gender structures the body as 'nation'.288 The text begins with the 
coincidence of two en-gendering events: the legal beginnings of 
nationhood through Federation, and the apocalyptic birth of a child. The 
wild appearance of the words on the page suggests the initial fragmentary 
body which becomes formed during the mirror stage, or in national terms, 
through federation which effects both unification and repression. That the 
child is a girl is unexpected, but does not halt completely the military 
march of patriarchal national history. She is appropriately named Lilian 
Una, which through the common association of lily and white, and una 
and one, or unification, does not require too great an effort to be recognised 
as an allegorical naming. This is the first indication that body and nation 
are to be read simultaneously as social constructs, and as co-inciding 
within Lilian. Moreover, we learn that she has been engendered by 
Albion, whose name is the archaic appellation for Britain, and perhaps 
also suggests an association with the Latin Albus, meaning white. Thus 
we have further evidence for a reading of Lilian's life as an alternative 
national narrative, beginning with the imposition of Britain, or imperial 
patriarchy on a silent mother-land. It has been shown earlier how Nation 
has been constructed as Self. Now, on the other hand, the process whereby 
Lilian is gendered female and submitted to the laws of social division, 
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categorisation and position, constitutes her body as nation. Just as nations 
are defined by boundaries that are militarily effected and protected, and 
which function to construct 'national' notions of 'same' and 'different' 
within identitarian thinking, gender structures the body according to 
socially and ideologically read and sanctioned boundaries which similarly 
divide according to notions of 'same' and 'different'. In other words, the 
engendering of the subject is inseparable from the subject's assumption of 
a sexual identity. Lilian is interpellated into a complex of both mutually 
supporting and cross-cutting discourses, some of which she inhabits and 
others which she resists or rewrites. These constructor attempt to 
construct her place within social formations such as the family, the social 
class, her age group and her gender. 
The text is somewhat ironically structured around gender-age 
colligations, the sections being called respectively "A Girl," "A Young 
Lady," and "A Woman." However, within these structuring categories she 
narrates an on-going struggle between the expectations of familial and 
social forces that she will fully and coherently inhabit each of these 
positions in its proper progression, and her own conscious and unconsious 
refusals to be so interpellated. In her earliest narrated memory, Lilian is 
told by her mother, "Alma is a maid . ... And I am a lady. You will be a 
lady one day, but now you are a little girl."289 Here and throughout the 
text, subject positions within social class and gender constructs are asserted 
and reasserted, and assume the plenitude of identity through thei~ 
adherence to the illusion of singular coherence. Strategies for ensuring 
their coherence and order include holding up the following stage as a 
model to which to aspire, so that as a little girl she is expected to behave as 
a lady, and as a "young lady," her choices and actions are determined by 
her father's beliefs about appropriate ones for a "woman" (see 75). So these 
identities are not merely descriptive in function; rather, they serve as 
short-hand for acceptable and expected social behaviour, parallelling the 
discourse of development to maturity within which nations have been 
contained. In other words, they are ideologically pre-determined 
articulations of, as well as forms of, subjectivity. Lilian's early tendency to 
transgress acceptable codes of behaviour for her gender and social position 
result in frequent reprovals and reassertions of social propriety: "Lilian, do 
not bang your feet like that, Mother exclaimed. What do you think you are 
doing? I tried explaining, I am being Father, Mother, but she did not hear, 
only said, A lady glides, Lilian" (5). And later she is told, "A lady does not 
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hurtle, Iilian dear" (15). Clearly it is not simply codes of social propriety 
Lilian transgresses, but the boundaries of gender definition itself, which 
define and restrict patterns of behaviour or ideologically 'available' 
positions . .Apart from "being Father," she is labelled a tomboy by one of 
her mother's friends (9) when she displays a pebble she found in the bay. 
In school, she angers her teacher by drawing a woman wearing trousers, 
something Lilian has encountered in spying on the eccentric and socially 
marginalised Miss Gash, but so outlandish a notion that the teacher cannot 
recognise it for what it is (52). 
The 'nation' of gender places boundaries or borders around definitions 
of self and behaviour, keeping 'self' and 'same' within its proper place. 
But from childhood on, Lilian breaks these boundaries, in her refusal to 
remain contained within the spaces designated for her. As a small child, 
she enters her father's study, sacrosanct domain of male control of the 
signifier, and an institutionalisation of the function of language, within 
patriarchy, of determining and locating the female body as outside. 
However, Lilian wants to insert her body into language. When she is a 
young lady her father d,eclares that "Women do not need education . ... 
Women's aptitudes lie in other directions" (75); she then makes use of the 
fact that "it was easy to convince father that I was not much of a 
woman"(7S) to validate her entry into another supposedly male domain. 
As a growing young girl and a young woman she cannot be contained in 
her bedroom, and makes nightly escapes to walk through the countryside. 
At tennis parties she spends the time up a tree with Duncan, another 
outsider, who regards her as a mate and preferable for not being "one of 
the pretty ones" (88). As an adult, she rejects the material security that 
would have been available to someone of her class, and wanders the 
streets and public transport system, quoting Shakespeare for a shilling to 
the public, and sleeping under a bridge with her old friend, F.J. Stroud, 
now also one of the placeless people. However, the spatial transgression 
that remains consistent throughout childhood and into adulthood, and is 
scarcely attributable to conscious resistance of class and gender discourses, 
is the breaking of the boundaries of normal, or at least normally attractive 
physical size. 
With Alma's complicity, Lilian eats insatiably, increasing in size until 
she can at last tell herself "I am a fat girl" (17). She remains fat throughout 
adolescence and into adulthood, though she is almost always physically 
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strong, and is, sometimes even admired for her impressive bulk. 
Similarly, while it is not clear that she consciously sets out to become fat, it 
is clear that she rejects offers from Ursula and her aunt Kitty to help her 
lose the fat and attain a body more in keeping with normal expectations. 
"You are a good friend", she tells Ursula, "but this is what I have chosen" 
(78). This is because Lilian's body is the site of struggles for recognition 
and power. Her bulk prevents her from submitting to the status of 
unimportance available to her as female in patriarchal ideology. She 
r~jects Ursula's offer to help her lose weight with the explanation that 
then she would be "mediocre", and she is "too arrogant to be mediocre" 
(78). Thus Lilian's body represents a challenge to phallocentric denial of 
its desires and multiplicities, and to patriarchal discourse as dis-embodied. 
Throughout her childhood and adult life Lilian says and does things to 
attract attention, assuring her 'self' through the recognition of others, 
reassuring, herself by assuring others that they will always remember her. 
Yet the impulse to do this, to resist feminine oblivion, is something even 
she does not necessarily consciously understand or enact. When her father 
has died, she tells her brother, "He hated me . ... He did not hate you, John 
said, wiser than me after so long. He just thought you did not matter" 
(171). 
At the same time as her body is caught up in these psycho-social power 
structures, it is through her body that her, father exercises more directly 
physical power over her. When the attempts to restrict the freedom and 
range of her movement fail she receives beatings; but it is also through her 
body that she 'resists'. Specifically, her fat serves as a protection, covering 
or insulating her against her uncertain place within the Symbolic. She 
grows so large that there is too much of her for her father (18). When 
eventually he can no longer cope with her size, his rage cannot conceal his 
fear (128). Thus in terms of the pa'rent-child relationship which sanctions 
control through punishment, he is disarmed. 
Though it is the locus of the exercise of power, the body is an 
ambivalent site from which to mount resistance. This is because power 
constructs the body, and it is never outside of the exercise of power which 
unifies and fragments it, holding it within systems of meaning which are 
ideologically determined. Thus there can be no resistance predicated on 
the liberation of the body from ideology. While Lilian allows her body to 
become larger and larger to resist patriarchal attempts at containment, a 
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celebratory gesture of resistance, she locates her resistance to that extent in 
the very object of patriarchal oppression. Her body is the site of difference, 
that which in terms of the specular economy of phallogocentrism, 
constitutes her as other, the unspeakable unspoken of phallocentric 
subjectivity. Lilian's sexuality cannot even be spoken within patriarchal 
discourse other than in relation to the masculine norm. Even her mother, 
attempting to explain the facts of life, only manages to say, "Your brother is 
a boy, and girls are not like boys" (97). Thus Lilian is the 'self-constituting 
other' of patriarchy, the negation or the no-sex of masculine sexuality, . 
whose discourse interpellates her, into the function of mirror through 
which her father can recognise himself by forcing her recognition of him. 
It is through her status as a woman that her father can now force her 
recognition of him through his exercise of power over her. He has 
increasingly relished signs of her sexual maturity, lugubriously warning 
her of the attentions of other men, and chastising her in sexual terms. 
Sexuality and punishment converge, ultimately serving the purpose of 
forcing Lilian to recognise her father's manhood and mastery: 
You are a tight little vixen, Father said as if his teeth were clenched on 
the words. A tight and seamy vixen. I sat staring at the wood grain 
and at my hand lying on it, hearing Father breathe above my head 
and feeling the heat of his body against the side of my arm as he stood 
over me. His nearness for such a long time made me itch but I could 
not move, and sat feeling the blood pound in my face, and a great 
heat and congestion radiating from Father with his dark hidden 
trousers at eye level. (113) 
Having hidden to avoid accompanying her father and John to the 
Agricultural Show, where she could expect to see for herself her father's 
information that "a pig has an organ of generation that ~s curved, and as 
sharp as a knife," and where they are exhorted to "remember the animal in 
us," Lilian returns to explore the empty house room by room, barred only 
from her father's solidly locked study. During her exploration, she 
examines the different images of herself in various mirrors, as well as her 
image in a photograph of rare beauty in a pocket in one of her father's 
suits. However, she replaces it, and in front of one of the mirrors, Lilian 
takes off her clothes. But while gazing at her body she is interrupted by her 
father, whom she had believed still to be out. In an act for which Lilian is 
never able to find the words, her father shatters the ecstasy of narcissistic 
plenitude she imagines she has attained in relation to her mirror image by 
imposing himself sexually upon her. Her body is reduced by the rape to an 
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object in her father's field, her inability to articulate the experience 
confirming her lack of an active place in the patriarchal Symbolic order of 
language. However, the separation from her body which she experiences 
as a violation also provides her with the means of resistance. She 
rationalises, "Whatever had happened ... had happened to a mass of flesh 
called Lilian, not to me" (121). The refusal to identify body and self also 
amounts to a refusal to recognise her father's power. She retains the 
fragmentation of the body which locates her outside of language and 
outside of identity. Further, when he has her incarcerated in a mental 
institution, Lilian discovers the liberation that an absence of mirrors can 
mean: "Without a mirror it is possible to be anyone" (151-2). Thus she is 
able to continue experiencing the body's ,multiplicity repressed by the 
structures of phallocentric subjectivity, although she is inevitably still 
contained within patriarchy's institutions. Lilian's identity has been 
experienced by her, within the interpellations ideologically available to a 
woman within patriarchy, as oppressive. Therefore, whether or not she 
ever comes to understand what he did to her, Lilian's life-long assertions 
of her virginity constitute ambivalent acts of resistance, as do her refusals 
of subsequent sexual relationships. Lilian therefore uses and refuses 
discursive representations and fixations of self. 
Language can now be seen as the site of struggles for power and the 
process through which resistance may be enacted.29o It is in fact 
fore grounded in the text as the commodity over which Albion claims sole 
right, naming and defining the world as he will. And it is this patriarchal -
- and colonising -- assumption that Lilian's bodily transgressions resist. 
But Lilian's body, constituted in discourse, cannot provide an unmediated 
site of resistance. Freed from patriarchy, Lilian's body would be no less 
subject to what Althusser would term 'ideology in general'.291 It would 
simply be some other form of ideology. However, Lilian's negotiation of 
language and the body's transgressions of it, demonstrate that women 
cannot opt simply for being/body rather than meaning/subjectivity! and 
pivotally, language, but must continue to disrupt meaning and its 
constitution of the body in identity from within. From early in the text it 
is clear that Albion's mastery over and through language is in crisis. His 
hollow facts echo unanchored to any meaning. N or can he make them 
signify in the supposed writing of his book. As his facts proliferate they are 
clearly beyond Albion's control. While they silence his family, this silence 
is a measure of his decreasing rather than increasing power. John attempts 
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to drown out his father's facts at mealtimes by eating only raw and very 
noisy food. Similarly, his discursive silence and aspirations to deafness 
constitute further acts of resistance to his own interpellation into 
patriarchal dominance of the signifier. Even when he is overtly hailed by 
his father with the words "Now that you are a man" (135), John remains 
sublimely blank. The burden of Albion's facts finally overwhelms even 
him and he becomes an absent invalid: Norah, his passive, largely 
inarticulate wife exists in a general state of silence in relation to her 
husband, broken only by fragmented or incomplete sentences attempting 
resistance to his demands -- "Too unwell. Later, please, Albion" (15) --, and 
in defence of her children, resistance to his bullying -- "Gently, Albion, she 
did not mean" (16). Normally, her speech in his presence is drowned out 
or ignored. However, during the time of his (discursive) absence, Norah 
gains markedly in strength and articulateness, while John resumes a 
normal diet. 
Before the 'incident' of her father's sexual imposition (of his mastery), 
Lilian has always tried to meet and challenge her father on discursive 
ground. Her fascination with his study and her love of recitation are her 
early attempts to assert a legitimate place for herself within the Symbolic 
realm of discourse. Her father's attempts to silence her include turning his 
study into the place of punishment for her, reinforcing the association of 
language and control, and later 'drowning' the book of Shakespeare from 
which she recites. But just as this gesture occurs too late to be effective, 
Lilian has also already learned to use the tool of language in both defence 
and attack. She very specifically turns Albion's own weapon against him 
when she points out that his declaration that she is "no daughter of mine" 
(128), carries the logical implication "Then you are a cuckold"(128), 
evoking the transgression of paternal Law by maternal desire. 
Ultimately then, Lilian resists discursive interpellation into her proper 
place as a woman within patriarchy, joining the other 'placeless' women --
Miss Gash who lives on the- borderlines of traditional definitions of male 
and female (see 61), assigned to social marginality and emblemising her 
wish not to be fixed but to keep moving in her postage stamp dress; and 
Aunt Kitty, the "happy widow" (10), considered by her brother to be, like 
all women, the work of the devil. But gender is not the only patriarchal 
nation Lilian refuses. At the beginning of the discussion I referred to 
Lilian's Story as a rewriting of Australian national identity, the version of 
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national identity deriving from the values of British imperialism. 
Throughout the text one can trace the weakening of the powers of the 
British Empire over the colonial nation. Miss Vine, the schoolteacher 
born in England, glorifies Imperial history and the idealised lives of the 
kings and queens only to be faced with the deflatingly tangential or 
marginal (marginalising) questions of Lilian and the other Australian 
schoolchildren. At the same time, Miss Vine's hatred of the sounds of 
Australian birds' laughter evokes a kind of paranoia regarding not merely 
her superiority but indeed her place in the land and landscape to which 
she cannot adjust (30). Later, as a young woman going to picture theatres, 
Lilian resents hearing "someone else's National Anthem" and other 
"foreign bombast" (139). But the fortunes of British imperialism in 
Australia are most strikingly embodied in Albion, whose military bearing 
and violent behaviour represent another fundamental mode of 
imperialism, and the forging of the new nation out of it. Throughout the 
text, he too is increasingly challenged and seen as irrelevant, while his 
perception of his decreasing power also manifests itself in paranoia, in 
which having placed himself as the centre of consciousness, others exist 
only in relation to him, a relation with externally-located difference which 
is intrinsically threatening to the sovereignty of the self. This expresses 
itself in personal terms, when he regards Kitty's behaviour as a direct 
slight against him (16), and in racial or cultural terms, when Lilian's state 
represents to him "an example of the degeneracy of the white races" (167). 
But as his powers decline, Lilian comes to recognise the emptiness of such 
phrases (169), and the advent of the Depression in Australia is narratively 
associated with Lilian's recognition of the need to "invent reality anew" 
(169). The ideological discourse concerning Australia's relationship with 
Britain is thrown into crisis along with that of the relationship between 
Lilian and Albion. Lilian's solution is to invent a "lack of connection" 
with her father (169). But this lack of connection is, precisely, an 
invention. Although war breaks out after the death of her father, there is 
another narrative parallel in the account of Australia's military and 
domestic aid to Britain, reacknowledging the relationship, and Lilian's 
acknowledgement of her own ties to her father (171). She has found that 
"With Father gone the world lacked edges and went on, grey forever into 
the distance" (170). 
Thus we come to the ambivalence of the project of regendering nation. 
Nation and gender are isomorphic as patriarchal constructs, and so to 
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replace one gender with another in constructing nation does not change 
the essentially patriarchal way of thinking nation. What then of the 
argument that Lilian rewrites nation through the female body? Again the 
body can only be discursively read, and it is not possible, and even less 
helpful, to posit an essentially female body liberated from all ideological 
and discursive mediation. But Lilian's resistance to specifically patriarchal 
values in her bodily refusal to be contained, without the positing of an 
essential femininity as counter-discourse culminates in a clearly resisting 
strategy. Lilian's body can be read as the creation of a way of thinking 
nation with permeable and unfixed boundaries, celebratory of the 
difference not without but within. However, just as the historical ties with 
British imperialism cannot be denied, there is a need to recognise that any 
rewriting of nation is a rewriting within the ideological mediation of 
discourse, and that any assertion of identity is only a provisional construct, 
a temporary suture in the dialectic of place and placelessness. 
Lilian chooses placelessness most importantly in living her life as a 
constant recreation of herself in language, effecting a continual dialectic 
between the Imaginary and Symbolic functions in the constructing of 
identity. In other words, she rejects identity as a fixity or a truth, and 
constantly creates it as process. However, the politics of this strategy must 
be recognised, and through the encounter with the absent voice of the 
aboriginal people, we will see that such politics can be challenged by those 
who assert another place from which to resist imperialism. Such a 
challenge is articulated in Sally Morgan's My Place. While Lilian's Story 
foregrounded the notion of place as primarily restrictive, thus positing 
placelessness as the appropriate site of resistance, My Place demonstrates 
placelessness as one of the principal conditions of Aboriginal oppression. 
It is therefore necessary to retrieve a sense of place in order to restore the 
productive dialectic of identity as process. 
By means of the presentation of multiple perspectives through a 
number of generations, the individual stories which make up this 
collective autobiography combine to historicise the fact of oppression and 
displacement, at the same time historicising forms of resistance and 
complicity, so that the ambivalence of any 'position' is emphasised. The 
ambivalence is embodied, through the Milroys and their relations, in the 
particular placelessness of the half-caste or mixed blood Aborigines. Sally 
grows up on the edge of both worlds, and experiences, though she does not 
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understand, conflicting interpellations into conflicting subject positions 
and social orders. The Imaginary plenitude (or lack of difference) Sally has 
experienced within her family is disturbed and then shattered upon wider 
social contact through school. Thus through school she acceeds to a 
position as subject within the social order in which she has already been 
pre-constituted, with its articulations of identity and difference. However, 
as she becomes increasingly aware, the opposition is not simply between 
home-as-same and school-as-different. Rather, her position in both places 
comes to consist of contradictions and conflicts, so that difference and its 
disavowal strategically define her place. Homi Bhabha, whose work draws 
on psychoanalytic formulations of subjectivity, has described colonial 
discourse as "an apparatus that draws on the recognition and disavowal of 
racial! cultural/historical differences. "292 This is reflected in Sally's 
experience. While complying with a teacher's request that the class draw 
pictures of their mothers and fathers, Sally, having drawn hers naked, 
finds that her perception of reality or normality is not that taken for 
granted by the teacher or the others in the class (19). She is expected here, 
and much later when in art class she is ridiculed for the lack of 
'perspective', horizon and proportion in her drawing (97), to conform to 
the dominant view of reality. The destruction of her childhood drawing 
and the verbal destruction of her later art represent a call for the 
obliteration of difference. 
At the same time, her difference is repeatedly asserted from the point of 
view of the valorised dominant culture. At school she is prejudicially 
singled out as the student who will definitely fail (109), and the sort of 
pupil of whom unacceptable behaviour can be expected (88). Similarly, 
while being expected to accept the beliefs and practices of Christianity, 
something with which Sally complies willingly and sincerely, she is forced 
to recognise her immutable difference and inadequacy in relation to a 
white Christian friend. That friend's father, a deacon of the church, asks 
Sally not to continue mixing with her because, she is told -- as if this were 
an understanding they share -- "You're a bad influence, you must realise 
that" (103). At home, though, things are no less confusing. After starting 
school, perceptions of difference gradually infiltrate Sally's vision, though 
the 'value' of this difference is not consistent. She does not initially have 
any sense or understanding of this difference in terms of her own 
disadvantage or inferiority. On the contrary, it is she who feels sorry for 
other children who do not share her environment (23), and she takes the 
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observation that her family is different amusedly as a compliment. 
However, after a humiliating accident in class she says "I felt different 
from the other children in my class. They were the spick-and-span brigade, 
and I, the grubby offender" (26). Later though, her grade three perception 
that she "came from the rough-and-tumble part" of Manning (37) does not 
amount to an awareness of disadvantage. She feels privileged by the 
family closeness borne of economic necessity (38). 
Through her grandmother Daisy, Sally has learned a respect for wildlife 
and a love of the bush (32; 56). However, the values and practices of her 
grandmother differ and increasingly conflict with those from school, and 
more generally the dominant culture of the society in which she lives. 
Thus her study of science causes Sally to question her grandmother's 
understandings of natural phenomena such as the weather (60), and ways 
of dealing with germs and illness (85). 'Yet Sally's position is influenced 
not only by her attempts to be "rational" (85), consistent with her study of 
science, and its role in the construction of rational SUbject-citizens in the 
modern nation-state, but by a refusal to hear her grandmother's 
explanations in the face of her desire to identify with the social pratices and 
norms of her schoolfriends. Thus her refusal to have onions placed in her 
bedroom to prevent illness is expressed in the objection that "'Steph's 
room doesn't stink the way mine does'" (85). They clash frequently, with 
Sally's mother Gladys always on the border between them. Sally is often 
mystified by her grandmother's actions and utterances, and with no 
obvious paradigm within which to locate and explain these differences, 
Sally initially dismisses them (67). Later she attributes them to her 
grandmother's age (78), and even a certain deliberate inter-generational 
antagonism. At the same time, the expectation that Sally and her brothers 
and sisters not only conform but succeed in white society is one held by her 
family as much as by that society. Thus the experiences of Sally's early life 
demonstrate the ambivalent placement of the colonial subject in discourse, 
where the disavowal of difference is in constant tension with the 
production of difference. And difference itself is less a term with inherent 
and predictable meaning than an articulation which attains meaning in its 
specific application from specific positions, whether in the ambivalent 
imposition of the colonising gaze, or the ambivalent strategies of 
resis tance. 
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Sally is a locus of difference in a dominant culture which valorises 
identity, and though she is not consciously aware of it, identity becomes 
her object of desire. As a very young child, she is impressed by her 
teacher's manner of stressing and lingering on the word 'I' in her every 
utterance, emphasising the strength and security of the teacher's sense of 
identity (25). At the same time, Sally perceives herself as a "non-descript 
brown face" in the class (25), with nothing to distinguish or secure her 
identity. Ironically, she unconsciously and almost indiscernibly passes 
over the very construct which will dominate the question of her identity. 
As Bhabha says of colonial power and its operation through discourse, 
"The difference of the object of discrimination is at once visible and 
natural -- colour as the cultural/political sign of inferiority or degeneracy, 
skin as its natural 'identity."'293 
Sally does not at this time see any significance in having a brown face. 
But schoolchildren begin to ask what country Sally comes from, puzzling 
Sally who had always thought "we were the same as them." The options 
considered by the children are Italian, Greek and Indian, and when told by 
her mother to say they are Indian, Sally is satisfied, even excited at the 
"exotic" sound (38). She reflects, "It was good finally to have an answer 
and it satisfied our playmates. They could quite believe we were Indian, . , 
they just didn't want us pretending we were Aussies when we weren't" 
(39). The range of nationalities suggested in opposition to the 'Aussie' 
identity demonstrates how deeply the Aboriginal 'other' has been 
repressed in the constitution of Australian nationhood. However, one day 
Sally returns from school to find her grandmother crying and saying "You 
bloody kids don't want me, you want a bloody white grandmother, I'm 
black. Do you hear, black, black, black!" (97). Sally realises that this is the 
first time she has been conscious of her grandmother's colour, and that 
logically, she must be black too. For Sally, colour was not something she 
was conscious of; it had to be, in Bhabha's words, produced or processed as 
visible. 294 As she learns from her personal history, and from what she 
uncovers in her explorations of the past, colour is a pervasive yet again 
ambivalent measure of difference, simultaneously and arbitrarily defining 
and denying identity. 
Initially dislocated by the information that they are Aboriginal -- being-
self alienated by knowledge of self -- Sally and her sister Jill can only 
articulate their race in terms of received ideas and attitudes, abusive labels 
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and stereotypes. Their personal ambiguity and ambivalence is 
demonstrated when Jill asks, "'Can you tell me one good thing about being 
an Abo?'" Sally answers, "'Well I don't know much about them'" (98). 
And persisting in the third person, she makes an ambivalent 
identification: "'They like animals, don't they? We like animals'" (98). 
Jill's disidentification is more persistent and clearly pragmatic. "'It's a 
terrible thing to be Aboriginal. Nobody wants to know you. You can be 
Indian, Dutch, Italian, anything, but not Aboriginal'" (98). 
However, it is important to understand that oppression does not 
construct singular subjects. This is illustrated in My Place through 
differences between family members in degree and type of interpellation by 
white and Aboriginal traditions, or the balance between conformity and 
rebellion. Thus Jill concedes to Sally, "'1 suppose it's all right for someone 
like you, you don't care what people think. You don't need anyone, but I 
do!'" (98). Sally's efforts to suture the split ,between her perceiving and her 
perceived selves are predicated on a form of strategic acceptance of the 
identity of difference producing her within the dominant discourse in 
order to effect a resistant rewriting of the terms. from another place. My 
Place is the resultant record of identity in process, that process taking Sally, 
and her family, pack both geographically and historically into the lives of 
her Uncle Arthur, her mother Gladys, and eventually her grandmother 
Daisy. There follows a trans-generational and complex unfolding of the 
ambivalence of historical forms of colonial recognition and disavowal of 
difference, the resistant strategies and complicities, the effects of 
identification and disidentification. These differences are partly 
explainable in terms of the different material forms that colonial 
discrimination and oppression have taken through time. 
Much of the initial difficulty Sally faces in finding out about the past 
relates to the secrecy maintained by her mother, and particularly her 
grandmother, about it. In different ways, each has disidentified with her 
Aboriginality. Daisy in many ways complies with colonialist policies and 
practices of assimilation when she 'whites herself out'295 into invisibility. 
Although eventually found to be ,able, she never speaks her native 
language, and refuses to allow Arthur to call her by her Aboriginal name. 
She physically absents herself during visits to the house, particularly visits 
by anyone in authority. Thus she attempts to escape the discriminatory 
gaze which constitutes her as black, as Aboriginal. Gladys's resistance is 
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more a matter of mimicry, wearing the white mask ambivalently proffered 
by colonisation's "civilising mission," so that, as Bhabha puts it, she is 
"almost the same but not quite/almost the same but not white."296 Her 
desire for her children to do well, to have a doctor in the family, is her 
desire to overcome the discriminatory production of material oppres~jon. 
But this is in constant tension with her lived relations to the cultural gaze 
which produces her as a visibly colonial subject -- the "not quite." 
In making both physical and discursive returns to the land from which 
her grandmother and mother came, Sally traces the condition of 
placelessness -- invisibility, not quite/white -- back to the impact of the 
colonial "production" of half-caste children (including Arthur, Daisy and 
Gladys) by white station owners or station hands. Such children were 
defined by their paternity as sufficiently white to be taken from their 
Aboriginal mothers,297 but by their maternity as sufficiently black never to 
have a place in white society beyond servant or farm-hand status, and 
usually they were sent away altogether. Families were split because of the 
practices and policies of colonial white government and society, and 
placelessness was a real material condition for many. But, perniciously, 
families were split also because of the fetishisation of skin colour, so that 
"light" and "dark" Aborigines received different treatment, and 
recognising this, pragmatically valorised lightness. 
Daisy and Gladys have been offered historical, geographical, cultural 
and racial placelessness by the Law of the Father represented by colonial 
power and within colonial discourse. Yet to an extent they use this by 
attempting to effect their own invisibility to the colonial gaze to resist its 
defining and circumscribing power. But in My Place, Sally experiences 
then comes to understand the cost of this, and strategically re-identifies 
with her Aboriginal heritage to recuperate a sense of place.298 Focusing on 
journeys and questions, and answers which raise more questions, the 
meaning of Aboriginal as racial or cultural identity is never fixed or 
settled. No ahistorical or unhistoricised claims about Aboriginal identity 
are made, but through historicisation, the productive interplay of place 
and placelessness is restored. In textualising her search for place, Sally uses 
the means available to her as an educated post-colonial w,oman, 
countering the very invisibility and silence which left her the object but 
not the subject of identity. Yet because there is no 'I' other than in relation 
to, or in interplay with the regard of the other -- the system of social and 
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familial structures that surround her -- she articulates a search for identity 
that is never specified, but remains implicit in the collective stories of 
family, past and place. Textually, the cost and the benefit of the 
maintenance of productive dialectic is the refusal, in fact the impossibility 
of both origin and closure. There is a circularity in that many of the 
questions and observations with which Sally's quest has ostensibly begun 
have only been made possible by the process of the text itself. Just as her 
"blackness" had to be produced as visible, so were many other issues of 
history and identity relocated into her past after the process of their 
construction. Similarly, the bird-call at the end of the text marks a 
beginning rather than 'the end that the' death of her grandmother might 
suggest. Her identity, and that of her family, will continue to evolve, the 
process/text marking both a post-colonial discursive and active resistance 
to the arrested, fixated form of identity available in the stereotypes of 
colonial discourse. 
Therefore, while Lilian's Story focused on placelessness as the strategic 
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escape of and challenge to the fixities of place which attempt to interpellate 
her as a white, post-federation woman, My Place recounts the historical 
and cultural placelessness of Aboriginal people within colonial society and 
colonial discourse, and offers the recuperation of place as a necessary 
element in the interplay, not with placelessness determined as colonial 
fixity, but redefined as post-colonial process. 
Aritha Van Herk's No Fixed Address is a narrative of complex inter-
relations between place and placelessness. Indeed the text itself enacts that 
continual tension. On the one hand it narrates, or contains in narrative, 
Arachne Manteia's life as a series of transgressions of, or resistances to, 
networks of social containment and interpellations into proffered subject-
positions. On the other hand, Arachne escapes containment in and by that 
very narrative. It is, in fact, her absence which founds and motivates the 
text. Arachne's transgressions are predominantly spatial, emphasising the 
idea that she is not there -- in any place or position -- with the fixity that 
the socio-symbolic order desires. Yet she is not simply 'outside' the social. 
Without some relation to its institutions of psychical, social, and bodily 
containment, she could not effect her refusals. 
From an early age, Arachne resists the bodily containments of home 
and family. One of her earliest memories is when, as a toddler, she climbs 
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out of'her crib, knowing it is "Bad. She wasn't supposed to climb out."299 
She grows to understand that she shares her mother's dread of 
entrapment, a realisation prompted by her mother's "lock[ing] her in the 
high-fenced backyard while she went off to Bingo or to a shoe sale" (41). 
For Lanie, it was the dread of being "stuck at home with [a] brat" (56), while 
Arachne, at the age of three "climbed the fence" (41), and began a regular 
pattern of escape, only refining it by -- confining it within -- her growing 
sense of the limited time available to effect the gesture before she must 
return home to avdid punishment, but also to enable the gesture to be 
repeated. In other words, without acknowledging 'horne', her 'running 
away' would have no meaning. 
However, the horne, and family shape and control not only the body's 
spheres of movement: the family serves a socialising function which also 
determines identity within the social order, functioning to ensure an 
ideological continuity from one generation to the next to effect the 
preservation of that order. Nevertheless, the ability of the subject to be 
entirely determined by the Symbolic through interpellations into 
Imaginary (ideolog,ical) identifications is compromised and occasionally 
thwarted by the functioning of the unconscious, the constitutive split 
which both holds and activates residues of the particular subject'S lived 
relation to the Symbolic, in other words, the subject's history. In 
Arachne's case, for example, her relation to her mother is a negative one: 
"Lanie's small obsessions have had their influence on Arachne; she 
refuses to carry a purse, she refuse's to wear a nightgown, she refuses to 
thin her rather shaggy eyebrows. She refuses and refuses all the 
impositions of childhood and mothers" (40). Importantly, such refusals do 
not place her outside the institution of the family or the effects of 
influence, but transgresses their acknowledged determinations. 
Arachne cannot be contained within the confines of her 'proper' 
gender. As a child, she was "a snot-nosed kid running around the 
neighbourhood after dark .... kicking over garbage cans [in] a fight that is 
still neighbourhood legend" (78). When refused a paper-round because 
she is a girl, Toto takes her to a barber who "cut her hair short at the sides 
with a cowlick in front" (178), a change that delights Arachne, and Toto 
tells her "'You're a boy and you're twelve years old, got it'" (178). As a bus 
driver, "Arachne wishes that she looked like a man. Indeed, Arachne 
wishes that she were a man. Driving seems so much easier for them, 
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reaching, turning the wheel" (67-8). Even working as a sales 
representative she finds herself an unexpected 'imposter' in a male world. 
Attending the Ladies' Comfort sales conferences, she finds that "Her fellow 
sales representatives are what one expects panty salesmen to be like -- not 
crude, but crass. Middle-aged men who look like drummers, who carry 
Ladies' Comfort panties along with other saleable items: Scotch tape and 
candy bars" (212). 
Her act of 'liberating' the old man Josef, whose tyrannical daughter 
Anna treated him like a child, controlling whom he should and should 
not see, and whether, when, and where he should go out, is largely an act 
of identification. She reflects that "her sympathy for Josef is more like a 
recognition, an indication of what she might become, a reminder of the 
ragged child that Raki was" (197). Josef's own transgressions of his place in 
relation to his family and to his social position, a loss of meaning with old 
age which earns him the label "senile" from his dispassionate teenage 
grandson, result in his placement in a home. As the grandson explains to 
Arachne, "Mom couldn't keep track of him anymore. If she turned her 
back he'd be gone, wandering down the street" (224). Arachne's sexual 
encounters with Josef liberate his body from the socially defined 
restrictions which paradoxically infantilise him and regard 'sexuality as 
inappropriate because of his old age. Later, she liberates him from the old 
people's home where, he tells her, "They tie Il'\e at night. Like a baby's crib, 
the sides" (226). 
The social institution of class interpellates the subject into a position 
which shapes the sense of self and constrains the choices and movements 
of that self both within and beyond the family sphere. Arachne "knows 
she is working-class. She has never thought of her narrow life as disabled.' 
She is concerned with survival, self-protection" (76). Yet she becomes 
aware of another world, which fragments the unity of self and place she 
has experienced in relation to class to the extent that she regards it as "'the 
real world', certainly the respectable world, in which she is an imposter" 
(103). One of the first experiences of this sense of being an outsider in 
relation to the valorised middle-class world occurs in her traumatic 
attempt to buy a bra. She gives up "attempting to negotiate the wilderness 
of lingerie in a large department store" (121), and tries a small shop staffed 
by "a hostile-looking teenager" and clerks who "ignored her, not the kind 
of client they wanted" (121). Arachne confronts, through the gaze of the 
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clerk who eventually serves her, an alienating image of herself as 
profoundly out of place. The clerk's "disdainful tone confirmed Arachne's 
worst fears about herself. She knew she was hopelessly scrubby, hopelessly 
coarse, and she did not want this contemptuous clerk to see her round 
breasts constrained by the too-small, puckered child's bra" (122). 
However, despite the 'knowledge' of her place, or perhaps because of it, 
Arachne's interpellation is ambivalent. She is drawn to Thomas with ~'a 
sharp gnaw of discontent, a sense of something graspable brushing past. If 
only she can force her hands into the right shape, she can have it too" (77). 
This image of having to force her body into shape in order to attain what 
she wants is an early suggestion of the ambivalence of her wanting, the 
inconsistency of her 'self' and her 'place', her self and her desire: 
" 
This idea is insidious as disease. What does she think? That she can 
become middle-class, respectable, a wife, a mother, a keeper of clean 
tea towels and hot casseroles? With her inclinations? With her 
background? 
N ow she is mooning after the back of an ordinary man wearing a 
suit and tie, attending an office from eight to five, all the respectable 
trappings she knows she does not want. (77) 
Just as she is aware that Thomas, or what Thomas represents, is 
graspable only be forcing her hands into the right shape, her sense of 
belonging in Thomas's world, particularly in relation to his family, 
appears dependent upon moulding her body, behaviour and feelings into 
the valorised middle-class norm. It is a norm which is sustained, 
perpetuated and transmitted through its own self-certitude. It is not 
simply a sense of place, but in structural terms is place, against which 
difference must be defined as placelessness. Thomas's parents know that 
"he will settle down and marry soon. They are only waiting for the proper 
woman to appear" (120; my emphasis). Thomas's confidence, or sense of 
self, is such that Arachne's difference does not threaten him. Indeed, it 
reinforces her position as his self-constituting other. When dinner with 
his family exposes her (as) difference, it is Arachne who experiences it as 
traumatic and alienating. In her perception, "[h]er hands are paws," and 
her pain cannot be alleviated by indignation at a visible, nameable 
injustice perpetrated by the family. They commit no failure of social grace 
which could expose a gap between the fami! y's 'self' and its certainty of 
social place: "The Telfers are kind and considerate but every concession 
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they ~ake only emphasizes the pit between them .... She knows they will 
suppress their scorn until she is gone; the aristocracy do not criticize 
lowlife to their faces" (131). 
Thomas's attempt to make her feel better both patronises her and 
unintentionall y further highlights their differences. He characterises these 
differences as mere trappings, superficial in importance and in acquisition. 
It is with Arachne's scepticism that they embark upon the project of 
shaping her into the mould of "a respectable woman, or at least the 
appearance of one. He promises not to make her wear deodorant or shave 
her legs" (137). Once again, an ambivalent combination of purpose, or 
conscious agency -- her agreement, her limitations -- and submission to an 
external determination -- it is seen as Thomas's act -- evokes her 
transgression of the recognised structures of class and its containing 
function. Although her "natural inclination to dissemble helps a great 
deal" (141), she is still a "double-agent," and retains active positions in two 
incompatible 'places'. She does not become middle-class, but travels 
through this 'place', arriving only simultaneously with leaving. 
Arachne's relationship with Thomas breaks not only class boundaries, 
but the boundaries imposed by the code of monogamy. Her desire cannot 
be contained by patriarchal Law. This is no reflection on Thomas, an 
implication which presupposes that her desire exists in necessary relation 
to him. It is not because he is a bad lover: "he's a wonderful lover" (174). 
She tells Thena that her road pick-ups "make him look good by 
comparison" (174). She is only able to explain her behaviour by 
rationalising that "I'm happy with Thomas but I'm not used to things 
coming to me so easily. If I gamble a little, maybe I'll deserve him more" 
(174-5). Thus, "Arachne is not unkind to Thomas. She is only consistently 
unfaithful" (62). Yet even the consistency of her unfaithfulness is, in a 
sense, inconsistent: "Arachne's greatest consistency has always been her 
faithlessness. Thomas knows but does not reproach her. He watches, 
waits, knowing it's fear of love that gnaws at the roots of her sleep. He is 
more than a benefactor, he is her rock. In life she betrays him a hundred 
times, but in secret, never" (211) .. Her physical faithlessness does not 
amount to an emotional rejection of him. 
Thomas represents 'place' for Arachne. He has given her a home, 
provided some order and structure to her life, and in this way "Arachne is 
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not wrong to credit Thomas with saving her" (103). He is necessary to 
Arachne, and it is because of her need for Thomas's stability that "She is 
inclined to return home" (62), but at the same time, home and stability are 
the very things which require her always to be leaving, to keep moving, 
and to keep picking up 'road-jockeys'. She finds that "They are neither 
possessive nor promiscuous .... More important, unlike other men, they 
are able to make love to a woman without in some minuscule but 
thwarted way subduing her. Pleasure with them is exactly that, not 
something won or held back" '(27). She includes Thomas in this 
description, but perhaps only because Thomas is only one of them. He 
does not represent the fixity of arrival. The opposite of her ideal is 
marriage, the ultimate containment of desire and the body by (patriarchal) 
Law. With regard to marriage, Arachne "can think of no faster way to 
achieve frigidity. To her the true exchange of hearts within the bonds of 
holy matrimony speaks death to the life of th~ body" (220; my emphasis). 
The Law which contains and retains women's bodies in relation to 
men's desire functions not only through the overtly institutional bonds of 
marriage, but before and after that through the institutions and 
technologies which literally construct,.and reconstruct women's bodies as 
desirable to men. The researcher-narratpr explains (at) the outset of the 
text that 
the fashionable woman's shape has always been in a state of constant 
change .... At any given moment the garments covering it have 
determined the contours of the body; but the final appearance of the 
outer costume was inevitably controlled by a supporting apparatus 
beneath . .. . [Tlhe goal, it is important to remember, [isl to aid physical 
attractiveness, a standard inevitably decided by men. (9) 
It is literally against this background, and also her own personal trauma 
associating women's underwear with a rigidity of place which defined her 
as an outsider, that Arachne refuses underwear. She is consistent in her 
need for bodily freedom; however it is a further mark of her constitutive 
inconsistency -- a truer freedom? -- that she is a travelling sales 
representative for a women's underwear company. If she were consistent 
to a principle, she would no more sell underwear than wear it, but this 
would simply locate her in a position, in a counter-ideology, probably 
feminism. Rather, she is as inconsistent in principle as she is in practice, a 
fact which differentiates her from her feminist friend, Thena. 
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Thena's principles are shown to cause her to be unaccepting of 
difference, even the difference within herself. Her bitter tirades against 
men appear more as a disavowal of her own thwarted desire. She declares 
that "she's through with the bastards. 'They're too much trouble for too 
little return,'" (26) but at the same time she tells Arachne of Thomas, 
"'You hang onto him Arachne. J'here's damn few of them in the world'" 
(143-4). Thena despairs that her own daughters, whom she has "enrolled . 
. . in self-defense courses" and for whom she has insisted on soccer and 
assertiveness training" abandon these 'advantages' for "ballet lessons and 
miniskirts, bras and high heels" (143). As far as she is concerned, f'They're 
trying to kill me" (143). Of course, from one perspective, it is not 
'difference' that Thena cannot accept, but 'identity' drawn in patriarchal 
terms. Arachne realises that 
Thena's daughters are teenagers, fourteen and sixteen. They are 
normal teenagers; they do not want their mother's bitterness. They 
want to be like everyone else. Arachne remembers that desire. She 
had it too but she learned very quickly its impossibility, that she was 
not the same, would never be the same. There was nothing she could 
do about her difference, nothing to do but exploit it, call attention to 
the fact that she was crossing every boundary. It was her way of 
declaring herself, of drawing a line. She knew where she stood. 
Outside. (143) 
However, Thena's own difference from the patriarchal norm has solidified 
into a counter-norm -- feminism -- inverting the values and vilifying 
difference from another 'place'. Constantly challenging patriarchy in its 
ideological manifestation, she has unwittingly reinscribed the structures of 
phallocentric subjectivity. Arachne, on the other hand, continually crosses 
boundaries, not into another 'place' or ideology, but into a no-place, 
outside. 
Arachne is an out-law. Like her name-sake, arachnid -- the spider --, 
she is a rogue (see 83). Images of penal constraint and escape pervade 
Arachne's view of her life. School "was prison, hemmed in by a teacher's 
voice more insistent than Lanie's," and where she "was not even allowed 
to look out of the windows" (165). But like a real prison, school enables 
her to learn from fellow-inmates more than from the institution of 
constraint and correction. She learned to lie, and with the help of Mitch, 
"a derisive but useful companion," she became street-wise. Despite school, 
"If there was any knowledge to be gained, Arachne got it from him" (166). 
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Domesticity is similarly a prison. Arachne is capable of, but hates 
housework. "Thomas usually takes care of that angle of life, but when he's 
not around, Arachne can experiment, refresh her sense of the horror of 
what she calls house arrest" (38). Eventually, however, the image gives 
way to reality. As an adolescent she has had a probation officer, then 
following her 'liberation' of Josef she is arrested on charges of 
"kidnapping, transportation out of the province and intent to extort" (234). 
But she is not contained for long, as "Thomas bails her out and she 
vani~hes" (241). 
Arachne's life is driven by the imperative of movement, the dread of 
the finality of arrival. Her paper-round, bus-driving job and then sales 
travelling enable her to keep moving. As a traveller, places are important 
to her, and their names appear in the text as litanies: "Arachne pushes· 
herself through Acme, Carbon, Twining, Linden, Swalwell, Sunnyslope, 
and Allingham, all in one day" (106). She travels through "Rumsey, 
Rowley, Craigmyle, Delia, Michichi, Munson, Morrin Bridge, Ghost Pine 
Creek, towns like their names, isolated, hopeful, doomed" (112). But they 
must be travelled through. Her need to stop, to spend time in any place, 
even home, is invariably followed by the need and the relief to be on the 
road again, to give herself up to the "multifarious seduction of 
movement" (163-4). Just as marriage spelt death to the life of the body, so 
arrival is a kind of death. Travelling on the ferry crossing the· Strait of 
Georgia, after the fugu-eating episode, she fantasises an escape over the 
side into the sea, and the announcement over the intercom: 
'COULD THE OWNER OF VEHICLE LICENSE NUMBER DOA 000 
PLEASE PROCEED TO THE CAR DECK IMMEDIATELY. REPEAT, 
PLEASE PROCEED TO THE CAR DECK IMMEDIATELY.' (286) 
So far the discussion of Arachne's constitutive dialectic of place and 
placelessness has suggested that as a subject, Arachne is not there. 
However, the emphasis can be changed to show that the text also enacts 
her placelessness in the sense that Arachne is not there. It was noted at the 
outset that the text is founded upon, and structured in terms of, her 
absence. Indeed, she is 'placed' in the text as the object of re-search, the 
narrator having embarked upon a "search" (9) for "Arachne's past," "the 
present . .. maybe even the future," driven by questions such as "With a 
past like that, what chance does she have?" (183). The text therefore 
constitutes an attempt to contain Arachne within a teleology (the effect of 
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the past on the future), and within linear, closed time (the achievement of 
a (re)solution): "For here you are, taking stock of her life, and if eternity is 
comprised of all moments gathered into one, where can you put Arachne 
now, at what point in that momentum will she stop?" (183). The 
researcher's reflections on the search (in social science terms, the 'problem' 
and the methodology), and the results of the research are textually 
separated, the separation of subject and object required by conventional 
social science epistemology, the former appearing in italics and entitled 
"Notebook on a missing person." 
Arachne's subjectivity continually evades the certainty of identity. She 
opens the question of origins that phallocentrism disavows. Upon 
meeting her mother at the airport, she wonders "What would we think if 
we were not supposed to be mother and daughter?" (40), and the intrusion 
of an element of doubt, a fictional conspiracy, in the 'supposed to be' is 
solidified in her conviction that she '''was either adopted or stolen'" (114). 
She explains this common childhood fantasy of escape from parental 
determination to Thomas: 
'When I was little and growing up the way I did, I figured out that I 
was adopted. It was the only possible answer. I knew I couldn't 
belong where I was, Lanie and Toto weren't really my parents, I was a 
baby who ended up there by accident, and someday somebody was 
going to find out about the mistake and fix it.' (135) 
She is despondent to have been re-placed within the determination of her 
parents by the recognition of her difference from Thomas's family. Their 
gaze fixes her in place, thwarting her psychical disidentification: '"I 
believed it right up until tonight. And then, when your sister came in and 
at supper, I knew I hadn't been adopted at all. I belong where I am. It's no 
accident. There's no mistake. I'm nobody except an East End kid who 
can't do anything right, I'm Lanie and Toto's kid. Isn't that funny?"' (135). 
However, the serious crime against patriarchal disavowal of the anxiety 
of origins is her questioning of her paternity, and the legitimacy of her 
inheritance of the Name of the Father which amounts to the fit of name 
and_ identity. During an argument, she asks Toto of Gabriel, "'Don't you 
know why he hung around? He used to come before I was born! Are you 
sure he's not my father?"' (158). In questioning the Name of the Father, 
she has questioned her 'place', and in retaliation is literally rendered 
placeless, Toto throwing her out on the street. 
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It has been shown in earlier discussion tha t a prerequisite of 
subjectivity is the unification, during the mirror stage, of the body into a 
whole and unique structure, differentiated from the other. Arachne's 
encounter with her doppelganger compromises both the uniqueness of the 
self and the identity with the mirror image. Having disguised herself after 
skipping bail by having her hair dyed blond, Arachne finds ·herself 
stopping the Mercedes to pick up a passenger on the side of the highway. 
The fact that she cannot account for her reasons for stopping for this 
partic\.!.lar passenger suggests the decentring of a consciousness able to 
account for its motivations and actions. The hitchhiker is a woman 
described as "short" and "chunky" (272), accompanied by a bear.30o The 
woman turns out also to be a sales representative, dealing in another 
'concealed product' -- snoose -- and in her spiel, Arachne "recognizes some 
of her own passion" (273). A further association is suggested when the 
woman with the bear, hitchhiking to save on her travel allowance, points 
out to Arachne of her Mercedes that "This beast must cost you something" 
(274), the term 'beast' serving also to entangle the two women in the 
reader's mind. Sharing not only a hotel room but a double bed, in which 
"she and the woman [are] entangled arms and hair and toes within the 
thrashed sheets" (276), Arachne watches the woman and finds that "She 
resembles someone, yet Arachne cannot lay a hand on that furtive 
recollection" (276). Having evoked something like a distant, barely 
conscious memory, in an event which recalls the formative function of 
the mirror stage, "there, in the steamy mirror, she sees that the face on the 
other body is hers, if she hadn't dyed her hair this awful brassy blond, she 
would look exactly like the woman. No the woman would look exactly 
like her" (277). This moment captures a fundamental subversion of the 
movement of the mirror stage. Through the identification of the two 
women, perceiver and perceived merge into inter-changeability, thwarting 
the necessary perception of difference and distance between self and image. 
However, at the same time, the identity of the self produced by the mirror 
~ reflection is also undermined by Arachne's dyed hair. The reflection 
demonstrates that Arachne is not identical with herself. She escapes 
unified identity. But the encounter constitutes a brush with identity 
which is just too close, and after they leave the hotel, "Arachne flees" (277). 
Finally, Arachne cheats the closure of death, submitting to no finality 
of place. Instead she must meet death, and undergo many small deaths in 
order to resist them and emerge each time doubtfully alive. In the fugu-
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eating episode in a sushi bar in the city where she was born, she 
encounters a 'death' caused by eating the poisonous fish. Having eaten it, 
"her arms and legs feel distant, lethargic .... Her fingers move around the 
cup but cannot lift it to her lips" (283). As well as the usual paralysis, she 
enters a nirvana-like state of heightened, "exquisite" awareness. Then she 
"feels her breathing catch" (284). Importantly, the chef has cut the fugu 
into "a spider sitting in the middle of its web. Each narrow piece of fish 
etches a filament, while the spider's eight legs are made of tiny, splayed-
out s!ivers of dark skin" (283). If 'self' as place, or arrival, corresponds to 
death, then Arachne -- the spider -- consumes that death(-ly identity), just 
as Gabriel has told Lanie that "Spiders are rogues. They eat each other 
when there's nothing else to catch" (83). 
Arachne 'loses' three months, next finding herself on the ferry, where 
she initially doubts that she is alive. But the presence of a man on the deck 
confirms her as 'alive': "She can feel him. That is a surprise. She's 
supposed to be dead, only visible to herself, and she can feel him quite 
plainly" (286). However, she must free herself from this other, and this 
requires his death. She "jabs the hatpin into his chest, deep into his heart . 
. . . She disentangles herself and straightens her clothes, steps over his 
body" (287). Although she is 'alive', images of death intensify in her 
consciousness. She "finds herself dead tired," but she is unsure about 
sleeping, wondering "will she wake up or will she be truly dead?" As she 
drives, "pine needles deaden motion" (288). The next day, she reaches a 
town by the sea, edged with "dead seaweed" (293). The endless motion of 
Arachne's life loses its meaning without the stillness against which it 
asserts itself. She finds that "She is desirous of peace; the last three months 
of oblivion have left her longing to return, not to be out here in the world 
again, driving, endlessly impelled by motion" (294). 
Further mysterious encounters with death include the ghost-story-like 
account of meeting the airforce man who emerges from the sea, having 
swum despite its being forbidden since two of his 'buddies' drowned there 
in July (296-7). His use of the word "automobile" seems old-fashioned, and 
he is described as having a "chilly hand," and appearing as a "white shape 
in the whiter moonlight" (298). Later~ Arachne reads in a pamphlet in her 
room that "'In 1944 ... several men drowned while swimming at night. 
Subsequently, air force men were forbidden to swim at Long Beach'" (299). 
Later, in her encounter with Bear Glacier, she is not prepared for it 
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"spearing the darkness" (307). In the face of "that terrifying blue," Arachne 
"sinks to her knees. It is the last thing she sees, blue" (307). This incident 
is related through imagery of ice and blue to the episode in the sushi bar, 
where the fugu spider "hangs, trembling in its new-spun web, above the 
celestial blue" of the plate (283), while slivers of fish "shimmer in the pink 
light, fine as hoarfrost on a branch" (283). Although the account of 
Arachne's life ends with the statement that "She watches the roadless 
world below her, knowing she has arrived" (310), Arachne's 'arrival' does 
not en.d, nor can she finally be held within, the text. 
The researcher began the previous notebook section describing the 
uncertainty over the question of Arachne's 'death'. Thena confuses 
matters by telling the researcher, who is asking what became of Arachne 
after the kidnapping, to "'Let the dead bury the dead'" (237). However, 
some time later, Thena describes her expectation that Arachne will 
reappear. The researcher notes: 
You look at her with shock. You thought she was dead. 
'Dead?' Thena screeches. 'Where'd you get that idea? She's as alive 
as I am'. 
You read in the paper she was dead. 
'The paper'. Thena sniffs. 'Pack of lies.' (239) 
The final extract from the 'Notebook on a missing person' instantiates 
lack of closure on a number of levels. The researcher's attempts to track 
down at least some information about Arachne from townsfolk is 
continually diverted into their memories of a "comet, its glowing blue tail 
spread wide across the sky, so wide and so low its hissing that some 
thought it was the northern lights come late or early, some thought it was 
a cloud, or the end of the world" (315). However, the imagery of blue, and 
the insistence of this apocalyptic event in their minds suggests that it is not 
as distant from the subject of Arachne Manteia as the researcher believes. 
In trying to steer them back to the topic of Arachne, "They speak of death 
Y and deliverance' (316), which may refer precisely to Arachne. Another 
closure that is thwarted is that defining and differentiating subject and 
object. Arachne cannot be contained in place by the research, nor indeed by 
the researcher, whose own boundaries disappear, merging the one into the 
other. It is now the researcher who drives relentlessly north, who has 
"fallen off the edge" (317): "Although you know you must turn back, you 
continue, no longer on a quest for an ill-defined traveler but for the 
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infinite anguish of uncivilized territory. You've lit out and now you can't 
stop" (317). Following a trail of Ladies' Comfort panties down the road 
where no-one ever comes back, the researcher-narrator and Arachne have 
both fallen off the edge of the text, denying it definition and closure: 
"There is no end to the panties; there will be no end to this road" (319). 
Arachne is the site of mediation between the place of self and, rather 
than a counter-place or consistent ideology of resistance, a continual 
crossing of boundaries into disruptive placelessness. She instantiates the 
problem of identity through her constitutive absence, the absence which 
founds the text through which she travels in permanent evasion of the 
mastery of narrative. 
All three novels address questions of identity and subjectivity in 
relation to forms of mirror encounter and passage through the mirror-
stage. Similarly, while the ambivalences and instabilities of subjectivity 
characterise both masculine and feminine subjects, these novels focus on 
the particular difficulties of passage into subjectivity for those positioned 
by phallocentrism as 'feminine' -- women, and the racial! cultural! class 
'others' of the privileged masculine, white, middle-class subject of the 
dominant National Symbolic. Lilian's Story and My Place describe the 
fragmenting of Imaginary wholeness by the intrusive intervention of the 
Law of the Father, and both illustrate the consequent positioning of 
characters as Self-constituting others in relation to patriarchy and to white 
Australia. In Lilian's case, it is literally her father who shatters the 
plenitude of her encounter with her self-as-image, her body-unity, in order 
to impose the form of his Law. In the case of Sally, her contact with school 
teachers and friends constitutes the intrusion of the Other of dominant 
white Australian society into the (unarticulated) 'security' of her identity. 
However, Daisy and Gladys have already undergone the fragmentation of 
family-identity in relation to the miscegenations and splitting of families 
which were common strategies of colonial-National power. The absence 
of the Name of the Father is compensated by the presence of the state in 
the paternal function. Unlike the masculine subject who accedes to the 
Father's place (in language), subjectivity is denied to feminine 'others' 
such as Lilian and Sally; they remain 'silenced' in themselves, fixed in 
their place behind the phallocentric mirror. Contestatory subjectivity is 
thus necessarily a matter of 'borrowing' the Father's (place in) language, 
while strategically 'escaping' its determinations and fixities. In other 
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words, it involves a continual passage back and forth through the mirror, 
straining the stability of its very structure. 
Escape is also Arachne's principal mode in No Fixed Address. 
Temporary pleasure in mirror-image encounters and identifications, such 
as those with Josef who represents for Arachne a projection of her future 
self, and the woman hitchhiker with the bear, in whom she sees an image 
of her present self, gives way to the refusal of mirror-images as 
constraining. She refuses the stability of the image, the fixity of that place 
or (discursive) position, even of difference. Uncertainty over Arachne's 
paternity, and the socially 'marginal' status of both contenders, casts 
Thomas more securely into the paternal function. Arachne's earlier 
securities, even within her 'otherness', are alienated by Thomas's obvious 
proprietorship of, ~nd propriety in, the Symbolic. Thus, while he offers 
her a 'place' (in the .Symbolic), in doing so, he reinforces its status as an 
inauthentic, borrowed place. And while Arachne is drawn to Thomas, and 
needs him, she is also constitutively required continually to leave him. 
Like Lilian, and the characters in My Place, she muct continually traverse 
back and forth through the mirror: places are important, but only in 
relation to travelling to them and leaving them. 
This Chapter has traced processes of subject-constitution and the 
decentring of consciousness both in relation to the 'individual' subject of 
desires and resistances, and to the form(ation) of social structures such as 
Nation and culture. The three novels discussed at the end similarly 
demonstrate narrative parallels between the trials of subject-constitution 
in relation to phallocentrism within the familial and the more broadly 
socio-political structures in which they are inserted. In the next Chapter I 
shall begin to explore these ambivalences and insecurities of subjectivity in 
relation to the 'feminine' status of post-colonial discourses, as they 
traverse positions in the Imaginary and the Symbolic, constantly moving 
~ 'outsiders' in relation to the security of dominant discourses isomorphic 
with the National-Symbolic. 
115 
Notes. 
1 While most commentators would agree that the earliest literary production of a colony 
could be termed 'colonial literature, this description is not always seen as unified or 
monolithic in form or content. For example, in his "Versions of the Dream: Literature 
and the Search for Identity," in David Novitz and Bill Willmott (eds), Culture and Identity 
in New Zealand (Wellington: GP Books, 1989), Lawrence Jones argues that New Zealand 
literature moved (though the implication is also that it developed) from. 'Early colonial' to 
'Late colonial' phases. Abdul JanMohamed utilised the developmental paradigm in 
discussion of African fiction of the 'dominant' and 'hegemonic' phases of colonialism (see 
"The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist 
Literature," Critical Inquiry, 12 [1985], pp. 59-87). In these and other cases, the differences 
are related to changes in the political and cultural factors implied in the terms. 
2 See for example Simon During, "Postmodernism or Postcolonialism?" Landfall 39, No. 
3 (1985), p. 369; Simon During, "Postmodernism or postcolonialism today," Textual 
Practice, 1, No.1 (1987), p. 43; Mark Williams, "Looking Sideways: English Studies, 
Tradition and Cross-cultural Comparisons," SPAN 28 (1989), p. 25. 
3 The linear model has been rejected similarly by Diana Brydon, who argues in 
"Australian Literature and the Canadian Comparison," Meanjin, 38, No.2 (1979), that "It 
may be more useful to underplay theories which identify artifical stages of development, 
looking instead at the recurrent tensions underlying colonial experience and the changes 
in their relationships over time," (p. 156); and by David Walker, who points out that "The 
changing character of national aspirations over time, the often intricate elements in 
nationalist thinking and the many variations upon national emotions in anyone period 
all detract from attempts to explain the emergence of a 'national culture' in terms of a 
steady ascent from colonial backwardness to national maturity," in his Dream and 
Disillusion: A Search for Australian Cultural Identity [Canberra: Australian National 
Univ. Press, 1976], p. 211). 
4 While there are many important feature of convergence between the sense of post-
colonial as it is situated here, and the term 'post-national' which has been applied to post-
modernism, retaining the term post-colonial addresses the specific nationalisms which 
were/ are legacies of colonialism itself. For a discussion of post-modernism as post-
nationalism, see Leonard Wilcox, "Postmodernism or Anti-modernism?" Landfall, 39, 
No.3 (1985), pp. 344-364. 
5 Suzanne Zeller, Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and the Idea of a 
Transcontinental Nation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 7. 
6 Zeller, p. 111; citing Geoffrey Best, Honour Among Men and Nations (The 1981 Joanne 
Goodman Lectures; Toronto 1982), p. 44. 
7 Tim Rowse, Australian Liberalism and National Character (Melbourne: Kibble Books, 
1978), pp. 63,64. 
8 Rowse defines 'liberalism' as a system of conceiving society as "an ensemble of atomistic 
individuals, and the state's actions are taken to be a pursuit of the 'collective interest' of 
that social ensemble. The two important concepts ... are 'the individual' and the various 
conceptual equivalents of the social totality: 'state', 'collective interest', 'common 
purpose'. Any individual's membership of any social group or class is regarded as 
secondary to its membership of the total society" (p. 15). 
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), p. 131. 
10 Anderson, p. 131. 
11 Anika Rifflet-Lemaire, Jacques Lacan (trans.) David Macey, (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 178. 
12 Fredric Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic 
Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject", p. 353. 
116 
13 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, (trans.) Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1977; rpt. 
1989), p. 4. 
14 Anthony Wilden, The Language of the Self (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1974), p. 161. 
15 JanMohamed, p. 305. 
16 Anderson, p. 133. 
17 If it were, the fundamental falsification effected by considering, for example, only 
English Canada, as if it and French Canada were historically and in other ways totally 
discrete, would be indefensible. There will be other 'simplifications' which will falsify the 
account if it is read in that way. 
18 By 1900, the Maori population of New Zealand was the lowest ever recorded, and many 
European New Zealanders (Pakeha) foresaw the extinction of the Maori. Most New 
Zealanders saw themselves as British, and the lack of contradiction perceived in this 
identity reflected the pre-eminence of the race. See Malcolm McKinnon, "Nationalism in 
New Zealand," Meanjin, 44, No.3 (1985), p. 366. 
19 "New Zealanders' became a term that applied to Pakehas rather than Maoris" 
(McKinnon, 365). 
20 Luce lrigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (trans.) Gillian C. Gill (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 81. 
21 Cited in Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (Rev. ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1969), p. 281. 
22 Norman Macdonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonisation: 1841-1903 (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, 1966), p. 3. 
23 Sinclair, p. 61. 
24 Cited in Richard White, Inventing Australia (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 
34. 
25 Sinclair, p. 97. 
26 Sinclair, p. 213. Richard White has pointed to the allegorical representation of 
Australia as 'Minerva' and claimed that "'Minerva' too was a dutiful daughter" (121). 
27 George R. Parkin, "The Reorganisation of the British Empire," The Century, 37 (Dec. 
1888), pp. 190-1; cited in Paul Bennett and Cornelius Jaenan,Emerging Identities: Selected 
Problems and Interpretations in Canadian History (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 
p.303. 
117 
28 Arthur Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (1946; Longmans, 1964), p. 314. 
29 Lower, p. 264. 
30 Eleanor Dark, No Barrier (Sydney: Collins, 1953), pp. 28-9. 
31 McKinnon, p. 365-67. The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the 
dependence on the British market of New Zealand exports of meat, butter, and cheese 
following the 1890s depression and the collapse of the primary export market based on 
timber, wool and gold. However the Depression of the 1930s played a role in changing this 
in uncovering a lack of mutuality in the economic relationship between Britain and New 
Zealand. Eventually the need for New Zealand economic independence from Britain was 
effected by Britain's entry into the European Economic Community in 1973. 
32 Northrop Frye, "National Consciousness in Canadian Culture," in his Divisions on a 
Ground: Essays on Canadian Culture (ed.) James Polk (Toronto: Anansi, 1982), p. 44 
33 W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972), p. 35. 
34 J.D.B. Miller, "'an Empire that don't care what you do ... "', in A.F. Madden and W.H. 
Morris-Jones, (eds) Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship (London: 
Frank Cass & Co., and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Univ. Of London, 1980), p. 
99. 
35 Richard Rosencrance, "The Radical Culture of Australia," in Louis Hartz, The 
Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, 
South Africa, Canada and Australia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc, 1964), p. 
295. 
36 White, p. 50. 
37 Donald R. Beer, "Responsible Government in the 1980s: A Survey of Recent Literature 
of the Introduction of Colonial Self-Government in British North America," Australian-
Canadian Studies, 8, No.1 (1990), p. 80. 
38 Lower, 182. 
39 Frederick Philip Grove, "Nationhood" in his It Needs to Be Said (Ottawa: The 
Tecumseh Press, 1982), p. 146. 
40 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, p. 31. 
41 Norman Macdonald, Canada: 1763-1841: Immigration and Settlement: the 
Administration of the Imperial Land Regulations (1939;rpt. London, New York and 
Toronto: Longmans Green and Co, 1959), p. 464. 
42 Lower, p. 193. 
43 Grove, p. 147. 
44 Norman Harper, "A Historical Perspective," in Norman Harper (ed.) Pacific Orbit: 
Australian-American Relations sinc~ 1942 (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire; Anglo-American 
Association, 1962), pp. 180-181. 
45 White, p. 50. 
46 Sinclair, p. 59. 
47 Sinclair, p. 98. 
48 White, p. 56. 
49 Sinclair, p. 98. 
118 
50 Cited in Jock Phillips, A Man's Country? The Image of the Pakeha Male -- A History 
(Auc~and: Penguin, 1987), p. 24. 
51 See White, p. 47. 
52 White, p. 27. 
53 Sinclair, p. 231. 
54 J.D.B. Miller, in Madden & Morris-Jones (eds), p. 98. 
55 White, p. 73. Paul Spoonley, in his The Politics of Nostalgia: Racism and the Extreme 
Right in New Zealand (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1987), observes a similar 
conflation of Empire and race informing the beliefs of right wing political groupings in 
New Zealand from the 1890s to the 1930s: "The dominance of political colonial links saw 
explicit ideologies concerning ruler and ruled ... in the New Zealand context. Typically 
they encompassed notions about the suitability of the British to rule over others, the 
inherent superiority of British customs and institutions and the necessity of preserving 
these advantages by maintaining 'racial purity'. These beliefs were part of the desire of 
New Zealand governments to create their own version of a colonial empire in the Pacific 
from the 1890s," (p. 51). H. Blair Neatby has described a form of Canadian imperialism 
grounded in a consciousness of belonging to Empire and of being indebted to England: 
"This was the imperialism based on a respect for the principles, and especially the political 
principles, which Great Britain seemed to represent. To such imperialists, pride in the 
Empire was based on the belief that the British Empire was the bulwark of liberty and 
justice in the world. This might be described as intellectual imperialism rather than racial 
or emotional imperialism. Being a reasoned rather than emotional attachment to 
England, it was the most moderate form of imperialism, but it was nonetheless 
significant" (See H. Blair Neatby, ""Laurier and Imperialism" in Carl Berger (ed) Imperial 
Relations in the Age of Laurier, Canadian Historical Readings Series (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 1-2,5. 
56 Sinclair, pp 216-218. 
57 Sinclair, p. 214. 
58 A. Grenfell Price, Australia Comes of Age: A Study of Growth to Nationhood and of 
External Relations (Melbourne, 1945), pp. 139-40; cited in White, p. 152. 
59 Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-
1914 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1970), pp. 9-10. 
60 J.D.B. Miller, in Madden and Morris-Jones (eds), pp 96-7. 
61 Morton, p. 58. 
62 Morton, p. 86. 
63 Morton, p. 47. 
64 Morton, p. 47. 
65 Zelman Cowen, ''Two Federations," in Harper (ed.), p.187. 
66 Morton, p. 39. 
67 Morton, p. 58-9. 
68 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1989), p. 115. 
69 White, p. 52. 
70 McKinnon, p. 365. 
71 Frye, "Sharing the Continent," in Divisions, p. 66. 
72 Sinclair, p. 226. 
119 
73 Sinclair, p. 222. Sinclair has also differentiated Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
against each other in arguing that "In the nineteen-twenties ... the Canadians -- and South 
Africans -- were to feel the need to remove all anachronistic vestiges of Britain's old 
power; the New Zealanders -- and Australians -- were by then satisfied with their position" 
(p.222). 
74 Grosz, pp. 126-7. 
75 Phillips, p. 141; my emphasis. 
76 Sinclair, p. 232. Jock Phillips similarly cites Leo Fanning's 1916 claim that "'the story of 
New Zealand's camps is the story of New Zealand's rapid growth to sturdy manhood as a 
member of the British Imperial Family" (p. 163). With regard to the claim that Gallipoli 
saw the attainment of New Zealand nationhood Phillips argues that it was an 
extraordinary claim, "since the landing was conducted at the behest of the Imperial Mother 
and as part of an Anzac force which was predominantly Australian" (p. 164). 
77 Phillips, p. 152. 
78 White, p. 73. 
79 Jock Phillips, ''War and National Identity," in Novtiz and Willmott (eds), p. 100. This 
statement expresses a form of sibling rivalry, competition for the mother's body. 
80 White, p. 72. 
81 Phillips, A Man's Country? p. 112. 
82 Anderson, p. 16. 
120 
83 Lacan locates the possible beginning of the mirror stage at the age of six months, when 
"Unable as yet to walk, or even to stand up, and held tightly as he is by some support, 
human or artifical ... he nevertheless overcomes ... the obstructions of his support and, 
fixing his attitude in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, 
brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image" (Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 1-2). 
84 Grosz, p. 48. 
85 Grosz, p. 115. 
86 Anderson, p. 26. 
87 Grosz, p. 118. 
88 Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One (trans.) Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 111. 
89 Anderson, p. 26. 
90 McKinnon, p. 364. 
91 Ernest G~llner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1. Both 
definitions are at this point necessarily brief and simple, but more detailed analysis is 
required before discussion of some of the more complex understandings of nationalism. 
92 This term is used as a derivation from the philosophical 'materialist' position 
described by Tim Rowse as one which "relates human behaviour to the objective 
circumstances of people's lives," in Rowse, p. 43. It is opposed to the 'idealist' position 
which "understands will, human ideas etc, as being more important causally than the 
material circumstances of people's lives" (p. 42). 
93 Gellner, p. 55. 
94 McKinnon differentiates between the nationalism which associated with the 
revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century, "brought into the public domain a set of 
notions about the rights of people to organise their own political, social and economic 
lives" from "the older face of nationalism, seeking not so much liberation from external 
oppression as power to impose uniformity and homogeneity within" (p. 364). In 
"National Identity," Quadrant 25, (Aug, 1981), HW. Arndt refers to nationalism both as 
"exclusiveness, xenophobia, hostility to enemies without" which "has its uses for political 
elites who, for good or ill, seek to mobilise national energies in their cause" (p. 27), and to 
"leaders of national liberation movements" whose sense of national identity "refuses any 
longer to tolerate foreign rulers" (p. 28). 
95 Germaine Warkentin, cited in Margaret Atwood, Survival: A Thematic Guide to 
Canadian Literature (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1972), p. 9. 
96 Northrop Frye, ~'Conclusion," in Carl F. Klinck (ed.) Literary History of Canada: 
Canadian Literature in English (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 835. 
97 David Novitz, "On Culture and Cultural Identity," in Novitz and Willmott (eds), p. 
279. 
98 Novitz, p. 279; my emphases. 
99 Frye, "Conclusion," p. 826. 
100 Ian Wedde, "Checking Out the Foundations: Editing the Penguin Book of New 
Zealand Verse," Meanjin 44, No.3 (1985), p. 342. 
101 See Morton, p. 71; also p. 83: "Canadian destiny is an evolution in progress" 
121 
102 A.B. McKillop, The Contours of Canadian Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1987), p. 5. 
103 Novitz, pp. 277, 278; my emphases. 
104 White, p. viii. 
105 White, p. ix. 
106 Arndt, p. 28; my emphasis. 
107 Zeller, p. 240. 
108 Zeller, p. 240. Zeller cite$ PAC, Sandford Fleming Papers, 93, Folder 3, 'The Canadian 
Flag,' (1895); 15, Folder 109, J. Fletcher to Fleming, 18 June 1895. Janet Carnochan, 'The 
Origin of the Maple Leaf as the Emblem of Canada,' OHS, Papers and Records 7 (1906): 141-
3. 
109 In his Introduction to the selection of Baudrillard's writings, Mark Poster explains 
that "In a commodity the relation of word, image or meaning, and referent is broken and 
restructured so that its force is directed, not to the referent of use value or utility, but to 
desire" (Mark Poster (ed.), Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Stanford University Press/ 
Polity Press, with Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 1). 
110 White, p. 103. See also Russel Ward, The Australian Legend (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), p. 211. 
111 Phillips, pp. 266, 268. 
112 White, p. 77. 
113 Alexander Harris, Settlers and Convicts (1847); cited in Dennis Altman, "The Myth of 
Mateship," Meanjin, 46, No.2 (1987), p. 165. 
114 Altman, p. 166. Canada's history bears closer resemblance to the general North 
American situation, as Beryl Donaldson Langer points out in the contrast between 
"Canada where individual families on small land-holdings were able to achieve economic 
independence, [while] Australian conditions favoured the large-scale pastoralist with 
capital", and thus the "economic centrality of the pastoral industry gave ... the 'nomad 
tribesman' -- an itinerant rural proletariat, overwhelmingly masculine in composition 
and outlook -- a central place in the nation's image of itself" (See Beryl Donaldson Langer, 
"Women and Literary Production," in Russel McDougall and Gillian Whitlock (eds), 
Australian-Canadian Literatures in English: Comparative Perspectives (North Ryde: 
Methuen, 1987), pp. 144, 145). 
115 Altman, p. 166. 
122 
116 Zeller, p. 241; cit. CAg 13/11 (1 June 1861): 350; see also [David Boyle], 'The Origin of 
Our Maple Leaf Emblem,' OHS, Papers and Records 5 (1904): 22-6. 
117 Walker, p. 99. Walker is referring to an article by Frederick Sinclaire, entitled "The 
Two Australias". In a similar vein, it has been argued by Chester Martin that "it is possible 
that the remedy for the glaring contrasts in size and resources among the Canadian 
provinces is to be found in the spirit rather than in the statistics of Canadian nationhood", 
in his The Foundations of Canadian Nationhood (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1955), p. 403. 
118 Phillips, A Man's Country? p. 266. 
119 Langer, p. 145. 
120 Zeller, p. 176, [my emphases]; citing. Morris, Nova Britannia (Montreal, 1858), 49 
121 Bruce Nesbitt, "Canada and New Zealand: The Literary Origins of Identity," in 
Reginald Berry and James Acheson (eds), Regionalism and National Identity: Multi-
Disciplinary Essays on Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Christchurch: Assoc. for 
Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand, 1985), p. 83. 
122 Janet Morchain and Mason Wade, Search for a Nation: French-English Relations in 
Canada Since 1759 (Canada: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1967), p. 5. 
123 Morchain and Wade, p.6. 
124 Phillips, p. 165. 
125 Ward, p. 106. My emphasis. 
126 Altman, pp. 165, 166, 170, 171. 
127 See Altman, p. 163. 
128 White, pp. 82, 83; my emphases. 
129 Langer, p. 147. 
130 Langer, p. 147. 
131 Langer, p. 147. The implications of this extremely important point about Canada will 
be expanded upon in section 1. III. (ii) of this chapter, "Neo-Imperialism as Threat to 
Sovereignty." In a footnote, she points out that Australian 'opposition' to Britain was 
contradictory, and in general not a political, but a cultural opposition in the sense of its 
function in determining 'national character'. 
132 Phillips, p. vii. 
133 Phillips, p. 111; my emphases. 
134 A.D. Hope, cited in Vincent Buckley, "Towards an Australian Literature," Meanjin, 
18, No.1 (1959), p. 65. 
135 Rowse, p. 21. 
123 
136 Atwood, Survival, pp 15-16. While in empiricist terms Atwood's formulation could 
be regarded as 'sexist', there is a certain felicity in her evocation of the male in front of the 
mirror. Grosz argues that for Irigaray, "the mirror reflects only an image placed in front of 
it: the (implicitly) masculine being. The specular relation is thus composed of man and 
his self-reflecting other .... This speculative mirror in which his world, his experiences, 
his position(s) are projected onto the other must be traversed ... .for women to become the 
subjects looking." (p. 130) 
137 Anderson links the "vernacularizing thrust" of capitalism, and the dissemination of 
printed matter to large new reading publics, enabling political mobilisation, which dates 
back to the printing in German translation of Martin Luther's theses; he refers to the 
"half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive 
relations (capitalism), [and] a technology of communications (print)." It was print which 
enabled diverse and even mutually incomprehensible dialects to be represented as unified 
languages able to be understood by reading, and thus creating a sense of community among 
those whose speech dialects had previously isolated them. Print-capitalism established a 
fixity to language which enabled the image of antiquity central to the subjective idea of 
nation. And print-capitalism gave rise to languages-of-power, privileged dialects 
ostensibly closer to the written form, marginalising others, including what Anderson 
refers to as 'sub-nationalities', whose twentieth-century struggles to emerge into print 
themselves, to attain sovereign or national recognition through emergence into literature 
in the post-colonial context constitute the project addressed by this thesis. See Anderson, 
pp. 47, 48. 
138 Gellner explains that, with the rise of nationalism, "For the first time in human 
history, explicit and reasonably precise communication becomes generally, pervasively 
used and important. In the closed local communities of the agrarian or tribal worlds, 
when it came to communication, context, tone, gesture, personality and situation were 
everything. Communication, such as it was, took place without the benefit of precise 
formulation" ( p. 33). The function of culture under the new order is no longer merely 
that of "the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also 
sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary sacred 
medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which 
alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce .... Moreover, it 
must now be a great or high (literate, training-sustained) culture" (pp. 37-8). 
139 Timothy Brennan, Salman Rushdie and the Third World: Myths of the Nation 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press, 1989), p. 8. 
140 David Lloyd "Writing in the Shit: Beckett, Nationalism and the Colonial Subject," 
Modern Fiction Studies, 35, No.1 (1989), p. 74; citing the view of Daniel Corkery in Synge 
and Anglo-Irish Literature (Cork: Cork UP, 1931). 
141 Buckley, p. 60. 
142 Buckley, p. 63. 
143 Buckley, p. 63. 
144 Buckley, p. 61. 
145 Buckley, p. 62. 
146 Frye, "Conclusion," p. 827. 
147 Frye, "Across the River and Out of the Trees," in Divisions, p. 30; my emphasis. 
148 Leonie Kramer, "Introduction" to Kramer (ed.), The Oxford History of Australian 
Literature (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 12. 
149 Walker, p. 194; my emphasis. 
150 Buckley, p. 64; my emphasis. 
151 Atwood, Survival, p. 13. 
124 
152 Atwood, p. 13. In her "Eleven Years of Alphabet," Canadian Literature, No. 49 (1971), 
Atwood describes the Canadian habit of mind, contrasting it with the English and the 
American: "Give the same poem to a model American, a model Englishman and a model 
Canadian critic: the American will say 'This is how it works'; the Englishman 'How good, 
how true to life (or How boring, tasteless and trite'); the Canadian will say 'This is where it 
fits into the entire universe'" (pp. 62-3). 
153 David Lloyd, pp. 73-4. 
154 Atwood, Survival, p. 12. 
155 Coral Ann Howells, Private and Fictional Words: Canadian Women Novelists of the 
1970s and 1980s (London and New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 21. 
156 Brydon, p. 160; my emphasis. 
157 cited in Walker, p. 202. 
158 Walker, p. 1. 
159 Adrian Mitchell, "Fiction" in Kramer (ed.), p. 68. 
160 Kramer, p. 12. 
161 Walker, p. 1; my emphasis. These four men were Vance Palmer (1885-1959), Louis 
Esson (1875-1943), Frank Wilmot (1881-1942), and Frederick Sinclaire (1881-1954). 
162 Chris Prentice and Elizabeth Thomas, "Institutionalising New Zealand Literature," 
Antithesis, I, No.1 (1987), p. 43. 
163 Prentice and Thomas, p. 45; citing. Ruth Harley, ''Politics and Public Themes in New 
Zealand Literature 1930-1950: With Special Attention to Mulgan, Sargeson, Mason, 
Fairburn, Curnow," PhD Thesis U. of Auckland, 1980, 109-29; and Bill Pearson, "Fretful 
Sleepers: A Sketch of New Zealand Behaviour and its Implications for the Artist," ed. 
Charles Brasch Landfall Country: Work from Landfall 1947-61 (Christchurch: The Caxton 
Press, 1962),330-72. 
164 Rowse, p. 231. 
165 Rowse. p. 231. 
166 Walker, p. 99. 
167 Tim Rowse, p. 3. 
125 
168 Prentice and Thomas, pp 43, 44. Thomas further points out the possibility that the 
'maleness' of this name (Hyde's real name was Iris Wilkinson), was an attempt to disguise 
her gender. 
169 Prentice and Thomas, p. 44. 
170 Susan Sheridan, '''Temper Romantic; Bias Offensively Feminine': Australian Women 
Writers and Literary Nationalism," Kunapipi, 7, No. 2/3 (1985), p. 49. Sheridan refers 
particularly to responses to the so-called 'Lady Novelists' Ada Cambridge, Rosa Praed and 
'Tasma'. 
171 Sheridan, p. 54. Note that Miles Franklin is another 'male' pseudonym for a female 
writer of this nationalist period. 
172 Sheridan, pp. 49-50. 
173 This is perhaps evoked by a "homely parable" cited by Martin in The Foundations of 
Canadian Nationhood, in which "An Australian, a South African, and a couple of 
Canadians were congratulating a New' Zealander upon the harmony which seemed to 
prevail in that idyllic community." The New Zealander in turn complimented the 
achievements of Canadian politics: "The truth is, he concluded modestly, we have not 
enough difference of opinion in New Zealand to engender energetic statesmanship" (pp. 
403-4). 
174 Howells, p. 25; my emphasis. 
175 Howells, p. 3. 
176 Barry Cameron, "Lacan: Implications of Psychoanalysis and Canadian Discourse" in 
ed. John Moss, Future Indicative: Literary Theory and Canadian Literature (University of 
Ottawa Press, 1987), p. 139. 
177Cameron, p. 139. 
178 Cameron, p. 142. 
179 Cameron, p. 139. 
180 Cameron, p. 140 
181 Cameron, p. 146. 
182 Gellner, p. 57. 
183 Gellner, p. 127. 
184 Gellner, p. 42. 
185 Gellner, p. 42. 
186 Lloyd, p. 79. 
187 Lloyd, p. 84. 
188 Uoyd, p. 79. 
189 Uoyd, p. 83. 
190 Lower, p. 411-2. 
126 
191 Dennis Lee, "Cadence, Country, Silence: Writing in Colonial Space," boundary 2, 3, 
No.1 (1974), p. 156. 
192 Rowse, p. 255. 
193 Max. Harris, The Angry Eye (Potts Point: Pergamon Press, 1973), p. 4. 
194 Rowse, p. 258. 
195 Rowse, p. 258. 
196 Lee, p. 156. 
197 Frye, "Conclusion," p. 826. 
198 cited in Peter Crabb, 'Regionalism and National Identity: Canada and Australia," in 
Berry and Acheson (eds), p. 20-1. 
199 Lee, p. 157. 
200 Cameron, p. 2. He contrasts this with "hysteric interrogation," the implications of 
which will be elaborated later in this chapter, and throughout the thesis. 
201 The weakening of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand ties with Britain has been 
put in an international context which takes account of the relative decline of Britain in 
power and world trade, and, especially since World War II, the diversification of economic 
and defence relationships for these ex-colonies. After the Second World War, Canadians 
turned to the United Nations, rather than the Commonwealth, as the body in which 
Commonwealth nations would find their "natural orbits." The United States was both a 
member of, and exercising leadership within, the United Nations (Morton, p. 55). Indeed, 
the influence of the United States has not been been limited either to Canada in scope, or 
to colonial history in relevance. From the 1950s countries other than Britain were of 
greater relative economic significance to Australia. The 1960s saw the rapid economic 
growth of Japan, and the liberalisation of imports from the United States. By the second 
half of the 1960s, the United States was the largest single source of Australian imports, 
while Japan was the largest export market (J.ON. Perkins, p. 181). The Second World War 
has also been seen as the origin of the closeness of Australian-American political ties. The 
decline in British power was accompanied by a United States military Containment policy 
which catered to American "eager[ness] to expand its empire to encompass every area of 
strategic importance across the Pacific and along the rimlands of Asia" (Camilleri, p. 1). In 
1951, the formal alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) 
was signed in response to the communist launChing of war by Korea. It has been argued 
that since 1951, the Australian-American military partnership has been "directly related to 
the threat of communism" (Miller, p. 27). It has also been from the 1950s that New 
Zealand political leadership has accepted that its interests lay as much with the United 
States as with Britain (McKinnon, p. 368). 
202Rowse, p. 139; describing the analysis of C. Hartley Grattan in Introducing Australia 
(1942). 
203Rowse, p. 139. 
204 Grosz, p. 119. 
205 Grosz, p. 108. 
127 
206 W. Levi, American-Australian Relations (Minneapolis, 1947), p. 82; cited in Harper, p. 
186. 
207 Lee, p. 155. The elisions are nearly all specifications of the effects on Canadian writing, 
but I believe that the point is both applicable and vital in a much broader cultural context. 
A similar point is made by Alan Lawson, who argues that "Political imperialism was 
brought to an end in Australia relatively early and surprisingly easily ... but cultural 
imperialism is never easy to resist" (in Madden and Morris, p. 135). 
208 Ronald Sutherland, "A Uterary Perspective: The Development of a National 
Consciousness," in Understanding Canada, p. 409; my emphasis. Northrop Frye has also 
dismissed the idea of a filial relationship between Canada and the United States: 
"Canadians have never thought of the United States as a parental figure, like Britain, and 
analogies of youthful revolt and the like would be absurd" ("Conclusion," in Divisions, p. 
75). However, the argument that the two nations can be seen as 'parallel' overlooks much 
less structurally overt but all the more difficult power imbalances between them. 
209 Gerald M. Craig, "A Historical Perspective: The Evolution of a Nation," in 
Understanding Canada, p. 131; my emphasis. 
210 Craig, p. 132; my emphasis. 
211 Roger Frank Swanson, "An International Perspective: The Foreign Policy of 
Adjustment," in Understanding Canada, p. 555-6; my emphasis. The notion of intimacy is 
also suggested in Donald Horne's looking forward, for Australia, to a "'quite massive 
relationship with America (White, p. 162). 
212 Swanson, p. 556. 
213 Baudrillard asks "Is it seducing, or being seduced, that is seductive?" He argues, 
however, that "being seduced is still the best way of seducing. It is an endless strophe. 
There is no active or passive in seduction, no subject or object .... No one can seduce 
another if they have not been seduced themselves" (Mark Poster (ed) Jean Baudrillard: 
Selected Writings [Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press in assoc. with Basil Blackwell, 1988], 
p.160. 
214 Cited in Rowse, p. 138. 
215 Rowse, p. 139; my emphasis. 
216 White, p. 121. 
217 White, p. 143; my emphasis. 
218 White, p. 165; my emphasis. 
219 Willmott, p. 19; my emphasis. 
220 Willmott, p. 2. 
128 
221 Willmott, p. 19. 
222 Gellner, p. 48; his emphasis. 
223 Stephen Shortus, "Now and Then: The Nation-State and Nationalism, 1888-1988," 
Meanjin, 47, No.2 (1988), p. 196; his emphasis. 
224 Shortus, p. 196. 
225 Shortus, p. 196. 
226 Smith, pp. 77, 79. 
227 Shortus, p. 195. 
228 During, "Postmodernism or Postcolonialism?" p. 370. 
229 Lloyd, p. 82. 
230 ''The symbolic is 'erected' only on the basis of the repression of the maternal. As 
Freud argued, what is repressed is the feminine," (Grosz, p. 49). 
231 Cameron has described the unconscious as "the site of another set of signifiers, 
elements whose entry into the Symbolic order is barred -- barred in the sense of being 
blocked and in the sense of being signified by virtue of the bar of repression, traces only 
present in their absence and through their differences" (p. 6). . 
232 Since the use of the term 'unconscious' in relation to nation is metaphorical, it must 
be read as entirely different from Jung's theory of the 'collective unconscious'. 
233 Novitz and Willmott (eds), p. ix. 
234 David Elkins, 'Western Alienation in Canada: Regional Variations in National 
Identity," in Berry and Acheson (eds), p. 465. 
235 Willmott, p. 12. 
236 Willmott, p. 12; my emphasis. 
237 Paul Bennett and Cornelius Jaenan refer to "Unity in Diversity" as "a hopeful phrase 
which has been widely applied to Canada since the heady days of Expo '67 and the 
centennial celebrations," although the mid-1980s have been characterisd as much by 
division as by unity. See Paul Bennett and Cornelius Jaenan (eds), Emerging Identities, p. 
524. 
238 Elkins, p. 466; my emphasis. 
239 Willmott, p. 14. 
240 Chapters Two and Three focus on precisely this textual mediation of belonging (place 
and ownership) in post-colonialism. 
241 Smith, p. 81. 
129 
242 Smith, p. 81. 
243 Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language, Power and 
Meaning," in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 7, no. 31 (1982), p. 612. 
244 Andrew McCann, "Demarcating the Post-colonial Subject," Antithesis, 3 (1989), p. 79. 
245 The term 'Maori' means 'normal' or 'ordinary', and has only been used to designate 
the indigenous people of New Zealand since colonisation. Before colonisation, identities 
were expressed sub-tribally or tribally. The term Inuit (singular - Inuk) means something 
like 'the people'. The use of the term 'Aboriginal' or 'Aborigine' for indigenous 
Australians, while common, has been challenged. James Miller explains his use of the 
name 'Koori': "The word Aboriginal is a Latin-derived English word. The term 
Aboriginal did not give my people a separate identity. Furthermore, Aboriginal always has 
derogatory connotations .... The word Koori, however, is a generic term that was used by 
my ancestors and other peoples of the central coast of New South Wales to identify 
themselves ... '. I would also like to see this word become a term of national identification 
for all Kooris living in Australia today" (James Miller, Koori: A Will To Win [North Ryde 
and London: Angus and Robertson, 1985; second ed. 1986], p. vii). Although the claim to 
name indigenous Australians nationally is founded on respect for the memories of those 
who "first felt the full impact of white settlement" (ibid.), it is entirely predictable that 
there have been other, competing claims to the right to name the people from those of 
different descent. The problem is clearly one inherent to the impulse to confer a post-
colonial unity on to pre-colonial differences. 
246 Sharon Alston wrote that "Moving gradually away from Gay Liberation towards the 
feminist perspective was essential to our growing awareness of ourselves as women and 
our awareness of specifically lesbian issues. The transition also enabled us to put pressure 
on the Women's Movement. We needed to be seen, to be heard, to invite participation. 
To be reckoned with" ("Looking Back at the Seventies," Broadsheet, No. 77 (March, 1980» 
Similarly, Canadian feminist Amy Gottlieb refers to the advent of lesbian visibility out of a 
gay movement which "has rarely integrated an understanding of the female aspect of our 
oppression," while "The role of lesbians in the women's movement has changed 
dramatically since the lesbian/straight debates of the early 1970s" ("Mothers, Sisters, 
Lovers, Listen," in Still Ain't Satisfied, p. 236, 237). There are many examples of the 
historical and discursive construction of groups. See, for example, David Grylls, Guardians 
and Angels: Parents and Children in Nineteenth Century Literature (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1978), pp. 20-1; p. 32. 
247 McCann, p. 79. 
248 McCann, p. 79. 
249 Evelyn Kallen, "Multiculturalism: Ideology, Policy and Reality," Journal of Canadian 
Studies, 17, No.1 (1982), pp. 60, 61, 62. 
250 Donna Awatere, Maori Sovereignty (Auckland: Broadsheet, 1984), p. 10. 
251 Awatere, p. 32. Anthropologists R.M. and C.H. Berndt have identified similar calls 
among Australian Aboriginal activists, in the form of "demands that people of Aboriginal 
descent should be able to decide their own affairs -- and the corollory, insisted on by some 
of them, that nobody else should be allowed to do so" (The World of the First Australians: 
Aboriginal Traditional Life: Past and Present [Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1988], p. 
528). 
252 Awatere, p. 13. 
253 Poananga, Part. 2, p. 25. 
254 Awatere, p. 83. 
255 Awatere, p. 105. 
130 
256 Poananga, Part. 2, p. 25. Such unificatory projects are alluded to by the Berndts with 
regard to Australian Aboriginal "concern for cultural preservation and Aboriginal revival. 
A wave of feeling for 'Aboriginal' identity, pointing toward pan-Aboriginality, seeks to 
establish a common socio-cultural heritage .... [Focusing on] Aboriginal religious features 
[and] re-inforced through the nation-wide demand for rights to land .... [t]he significance 
of Aboriginal identity is of considerable importance, because it defines persons of 
Aboriginal descent in contrast to non-Aborigines .... That identity, whatever its outward 
manifestations, has political implications" (p. 528; my emphases). 
257 Richard Terdiman, Discourse/Counter-Discourse: The Theory and Practice of 
Symbolic Resistance in Ninetheenth Century France (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), p. 57. 
258 Michael King, Being Pakeha (Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 7. 
259 King, pp. 18,19. 
260 Awatere, p. 10. 
261 Carroll Wall, "Te Pakeha: The Search for White Identity," Metro, 6, No. 65, (Nov. 
1986), pp. 34-48. 
262 Wall narrates the story of "the Pakeha and well-meaning Wellington group who went 
to see Te Maori. 'Isn't is glorious', one gushed. 'The whole concept moved me 
emotionally and spiritually.' What they didn't realise until later was that they had taken 
the wrong turning -- what they had just seen wasn't Te Maori at all but merely the 
standard Maori exhibition on display at the museum next door' (Metro, p. 36). 
263 Simon During, "What was the West?" p. 79-80; citing Carol O'Biso, First Light 
(London: Heinemann, 1987), p. 75. 
264 'Aotearoa' is the Maori name for New Zealand, and is used when a specifically Maori 
perspective is evoked. 
265 Paul Smith, p. 72. 
266 Smith, p. 25. 
267 Smith, p. 73. 
268 Smith, p. xxxiii. 
269 John Mowitt, "Foreword: The Resistance in Theory," in Smith, p. xiv. 
270 Grosz, pp. 106-7. 
271 Kristeva, "Woman Can Never Be Defined," in Marks and de Courtivron, p. 137. 
272 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, p. 4. 
273 Catherine Clement, The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan (trans.) Arthur 
Goldhammer (Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 90, 91. 
274 Kristeva, "Women's Time," in Toril Moi (ed.), The Kristeva Reader (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), p. 193. 
275 
"Women's Time," p. 194. 
276 "Women's Time," p. 194. 
277 "Women's Time," p. 194. 
278 
"Women's Time," p. 195. 
279 
"Women's Time," p. 208. 
280 
"Women's Time," p. 209. 
281 "Women's Time," p. 210. 
282 Anika Rifflet-Lemaire, Jacques Lacan (trans. ) David Macey (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 178; see also Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, p. 2. 
283 Lloyd, p. 77. 
284 Smith, p. 40. 
285 Kate Grenville, Lilian's Story (1985; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986). 
286 Sally Morgan, My Place (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1987). 
287 Aritha Van Herk, No Fixed Address (1986; London: Virago Press, 1989). 
288 For another discussion of nation as a gendered discussion, see Smaro Kamboureli, 
"Susan Swan's The Biggest Modern Woman in [sic] the World: Canada as Absent 
Spouse," Australian-Canadian Studies, 6, No.1 (1988), pp. 103-111. 
131 
289 Grenville, p. 5. Subsequent citations will be followed by page numbers in brackets in 
the text. 
290 See also Gerry Turcotte, "'The Ultimate Oppression': Discourse Politics in Kate 
Grenville's Fiction," World Literature Written in English, 29, No.1 (1989), pp 64-85, for 
detailed discussion of this and other aspects of language, power, patriarchy and 
imperialism discussed in this chapter. 
291 Althusser distinguishes between particular ideologies and ideology in general in 
"Lenin and Philosophy" and Other Essays (trans.) Ben Brewster (N.Y.: Monthly Review 
Press, 1971), p. 161. 
292 Homi Bhabha, "The other question: difference, discrimination and the discourse of 
colonialism," in Francis Barker et.al. (eds) Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers from the 
Essex Conference, 1976-84 (London: Methuen, 1986), p. 154. 
293 Bhabha, "The other question," p. 167. 
294 Bhabha, "The other question," p. 167. 
132 
295 Gary Boire uses this term in "Canadian (Tw)ink: Surviving the White-Outs," Essays 
in Canadian Writing, 35 (1987), pp. 1-16. 
296 Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," 
October, 28 (1984), pp. 126,130. 
297 Morgan states in a footnote to her text that "Mr A.O. Neville, Child Protector of 
Natives, Western Australia, 1915-1940" was "widely credited as a principal advocate and 
force behind an active policy of miscegenation in Western Australia through the 1930s. 
The legal removal of 'half-caste' Aboriginal children from their mothers was part of this 
policy," p. 211. 
298 The complex question of identity in relation to paternity will be addressed in Chapter 
Five. 
299 Aritha Van Herk, No Fixed Address (1986; rpt. London: Virago, 1989), p.39. 
300 This recalls two other Canadian novels: Marian Engel's Bear (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1976), and Robert Kroetsch's Badlands (Toronto: new press, 1975). The former is 
also almost explicitly referred to in Van Herk's The Tent Peg. See Chapter Three. 
SECTION II 
ARTICULATING 'SELF' AND 'OTHER' 
THROUGH QUESTIONS OF 
AUTHORITY AND AUTHENTICITY 
2. I. Introduction. 
CHAPTER TWO 
WRITING (INTO) THE LAND 
133 
The previous chapter illustrated the dialectic of place and placelessness 
as constitutive of subjectivity, and explored the implications of this in 
relation to texts of cultural commentary and in a selection of post-colonial 
fictional texts. While the emphasis was on the spatial characteristics of 
subjectivity in Chapter One, in Chapter Two it shifts to the 'subjective' 
constitution of spatiality. This shift is consistent with the focus, in Section 
II of the thesis, on discourses of thematic centrality to settler post-
colonialism, and the reading of subject-position through these. 
Specifically, a similar dialectic of place and placelessness characterises the 
ambivalent, and I argue, inter-textual relationship to the land in post-
colonial space. Writing constitutes that relationship, but also renders it an 
alienated one. Therefore, this chapter explores the textual constitution of 
relationships to the land both in the sense of the 'authority' it confers 
upon the claims of the post-colonisers, and the grounds of critique of 
colonisation it has provided for the post-colonised. 
2. II. Mapping the Land(scape) in Discourse. 
The relationship to, or sense of belonging in the new land is a 
prominent feature of colonial texts, texts invariably written by explorers or 
settlers, and ranging from maps to journals and diaries, to imaginative 
literature such as poetry and fiction. The focus is on the physical 
relationship to the land, some of it intended to facilitate either real or 
imaginative access to the land, some of it describing the process of 
familiarising or 'taming' the land into landscapes conducive to 
settlement.1 
The landis also a feature of literary texts of the nationalistic stage of the 
settler society. However, in such texts, the physical and psychical processes 
of adaption to the landscape have largely been accomplished, and although 
the land may constitute the site of ~conomic struggles for survival, the 
place of land in such texts tends to be as repository of nationalist myths of 
the Outback, the Bush, the North and so on. Referring to the 'geographical 
fallacy' of measuring national identity by images from the geography or 
landscape of a country, Diana Brydon points out of the Canadian context 
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that "The image itself is less important than its function. Canoes and 
horses ... are used to show human beings working in harmony with their 
new landscapes and forging a new sense of national identity." Similarly, 
making a comparison with the Australian context she argues that "the 
North and the Outback fulfill similar functions, often as civilisation's 
shadow, its suppressed self, and therefore to come to terms with the North 
or with the Outback is to come to terms with oneself and with one's life in 
that country."2 Therefore, in its naturalising function, this construction of 
national myth serves to locate outside of history, and certainly outside of 
any need to confront history, the relationship between the nation and its 
emergence on colonised land. 
Post-colonial texts which take the land as focus can be seen to 
problematise the settler relationship to the land, not in the physical sense 
found in colonial texts, but in political, cultural and ethical terms. On the 
other hand, the indigenous relationship to the land is represented as one 
of physical dispossession and dislocation while the cultural and ethical 
position is correspondingly strengthened. During's differentiation of 
'post-coloniser' and 'post-colonised,'3 while acknowledging that anyone 
individual may feel the impulses of both at various times, is a useful point 
in settler societies where nationalism does not sp~ak for colonised 
indigenes. It is therefore a useful basis for analysis of responses to the 
colonial legacy. However, the allusion to the problems of division into 
two clearly demarcated 'sides' on the basis of racial or cultural heritage 
alone requires further emphasis. While understanding 'post-coloniser' 
and 'post-colonised' as discursive subject positions, rather than essential 
identities, it is important to remember that in the post-colonial context, 
discourse can never be purely anything. Only hybrid discourses exist, and 
such discourses, as shown in the previous chapter, speak symptomatically 
of the fractures which have generated them. Thus their force is less in 
their 'authenticity' in any sense that calls upon origins, than in their 
contestatory stance. These points will be elaborated and illustrated 
throughout this chapter in relation to discourses of the land. 
2. II. (i) Taking the Place of the Other. In the Introduction to Eight 
Voices of the Eighties, Gillian Whitlock states that "Elizabeth Jolley has 
dubbed the 1980s a 'moment of glory' for the woman writer ... when 
women writers and readers have entered the mainstream. Thea Astley 
takes a more general view when she typifies it as a 'decade of the 
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minorities."'4 Whitlock locates their coincidence in a broad social move 
from homogeneity to heterogeneity, and specifies 'national mythologies' 
as undermined by these changes. As the previous chapter showed, such 
phenomena may usefully be understood as so many facets of the advent of 
post-colonialism, in which the dominant discourse of nationalism is 
challenged by those whose voices have been suppressed in privileged 
constructions of national identity. Clearly the most fundamental 
suppression was that of the indigenous peoples who were dispossessed and 
displaced by British imperialism, and the colonial order of Australian, 
Canadian and New Zealand society out of which nationalism grew. 
However, post-colonialism in these settler societies is more complex than 
a 'post-coloniser - post-colonised' opposition because of the differential 
structures and levels of privilege among the white settlers themselves and 
the descendants of their cultural order. Therefore, while post-colonialism 
is characterised by the land claims and various political and cultural 
programmes of indigenous peoples, it also acknowledges the effects of a 
cultural history of dislocation for the descendants of the settlers, who 
while increasingly regarding themselves as indigenous Australians, 
Canadians and New Zealanders, both generate and experience the various 
failures of 'fit' between a European cultural inheritance, and a land whose 
features, climate, flora and fauna disrupt the continuity of that inheritance. 
However, post-colonialism further names the critique of dominant 
discourses of nationalism by those descendants of white settlers 
marginalised on account of gender, sexuality, class, age and national or 
cultural origins: in short, nationalism's 'Others'. 
Post-colonialism in settler societies therefore comprises discourses 
which contest and fracture the fabric of nationalism. Further, in naming 
and addressing their colonial historical legacy, post-colonial discourses, 
while offering many and simultaneous sites of contestation, tend to 
privilege the indigenous subject position. Indeed, this is the era marked by 
the textual appearance of indigenous discourse, enabling the inter-textual 
dialogue which is not possible even in sympathetic representations of the 
indigene by the settlers and their descendants. However, as will be shown, 
there is a great difference between. privileging the indigenous subject 
position, and politically privileging the indigene. 
An historical, cultural and social ambivalence of 'place' or belonging in 
post-colonial society is often expressed in cultural and literary texts and 
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commentary in terms of relationships to the land and perceptions of the 
landscape. The differentiation of these terms often turns upon the 
opposition between historicised and unhistoricised concepts. For example, 
Susan Keogh cites Ken Gelder as referring to the difference between 
historicising and dehistoricising impulses in "land as it is owned and used, 
and landscape with its less historically specific connotations," while she 
herself refers to "an opposition between landscape -- between land as it is 
and land as it is seen and used by humans."s On the other hand, David 
Tacey claims that "It is apparent that our English word 'landscape' is 
wholly inadequate to describe what Aboriginals actually mean when they 
refer to 'land'. Land for them is the living spirit, a kind of collective 
unconscious which holds the memories, dreams and reflections of an 
entire people." He goes on to cite Judith Wright's objection to the term 
'landscape', specifically that it "'involves ... an irreconcilable difference of 
viewpoint. ... It is a painter's term, implying an outside view, a 
separation, even a basis of criticism. We cannot set it against the reality of 
the earth-sky-water-tree-spirit-human complex existing in spacetime, 
which is the Aboriginal world. "'6 However, post-colonialism requires 
among but perhaps above other things, the historicisation of all claims to 
knowledge or truth (including the indigenous), concomitant with the 
abandonment of universals. Therefore, any notion of an untouched 
environment, whether represented in 'land' or the primarily perceptual 
construct of 'landscape' poses certain ideological dangers, and particularly 
so in the post-colonial context. One such danger is overlooking the 
impossibility of perceiving land or landscape as such without perceptually 
shaping it in these terms, or imposing a reading practice upon it. It has 
been demonstrated, for example, that Australian Aboriginals in 'pre-
colonial' times 'read' and 'wrote' the land and its signs within their own 
cultural framework.7 Thus the imposition of Western textuality upon the 
land with colonisation was not the bringing of writing to an unwritten 
land (a view of colonisation held for instance by anthropologist Levi-
Strauss),8 but a writing out, or a writing over, rendering the colonised 
land(scape) something more like a palimpsest. However, as will be shown, 
with the return of/to a textuality which is produced as an indigenous land 
ethic, or relationship between humanity and the land which must be 
understood as being constructed as reading/writing practices, the post-
colonial relationship to the land is usefully understood as an inter-textual 
relationship. A second danger, related to that of characterising the 'pre-
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colonial' land as unwritten and unread, is important in its implications for 
discursive politics: it is the danger of historical elision or misprision, of 
classifying as 'untouched' land which has been lived on, shaped and used 
by indigenous peoples. Such a view underlies the many colonial, and 
even some post-colonial assertions of the silence or the emptiness of the 
land. Therefore in this chapter, 'land' refers to the material or physical 
entity which may be occupied, bought, worked upon, or sold, and is an 
economic or material resource, while 'landscape' refers to the physically 
cultivated and perceptually shaped land. Although neither of these 
represents an idealised 'natural' state outside of human discourse, their 
separation is an idealist gesture, and must always be read as a convenient 
and provisional fiction. 
Whether from the subject position of indigene or settler, post-colonised 
or post-coloniser, it can be argued that the land is only deceptively 
'present' in even those post-colonial texts which treat land as more than a 
passive background to a discrete world of human action: rather, it stands 
as political, cultural, and ethical currency in transactions centred on 
belonging and authenticity. Indeed, in textualising land, it becomes part of 
an exchange economy. 'Textuality' names both the body of cultural and 
ideological practices in relation to land which constituted 'Australia', 
'Canada' and 'New Zealand' in material ways as material realities, as well 
as the specific 'texts' in the more common sense governing physical access 
to land in these '(post-) colonised' nations -- maps, titles, contracts, 
advertisements, and even money as the 'sign' (of the possibility of 
ownership) which is exchanged for the 'thing',9 Of course it could be 
argued that the 'thing' is simply another 'sign', but the important point is 
the fact of exchange or exchangeability in constituting textuality. When 
land is present as language or discourse, it is language or discourse which 
is being exchanged, and in that exchange, land is symbolic of the real object 
of purchase, which in post-colonial society is belonging and authenticity. 
It is in the post-colonial context that the ambiguity of the term 
'belonging' is most pervasive in understanding relationships to land. The 
dominance of the settler subject position in colonial and national 
discourse resulted in the unproblematic dominance of notions of 
belonging in the sense of land ownership, Belonging in a more psychical 
way was held to be the 'natural' result of time and the imaginative or 
aes~hetic appropriation of the land in accordance with the forms of 
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Western cultural production -- literature, landscaping, both forms of 
writing on or into the land. However, with the emergence of contestatory 
indigenous voices, the legitimacy of the actual historical transactions 
effecting land ownership and the ethics of property relations as the basis of 
access to land has been problematised. Along with this has been a 
problematisation of belonging in the associative sense for the descendants 
of the settlers. Authenticity is the new object of purchase, the term of an 
inviolable relation to the land. Further, the failure of the 'post-colonisers' 
to develop a legitimising discourse in relation to place, a basis of 
authenticity which does not profoundly question the whole basis of access 
to land and belonging to place which has been established from the time of 
colonisation, has meant that the entry of 'indigenous' discourse into the 
general cultural context, has been relatively smooth. 
On the other hand, this has resulted in mixed success for the 'post-
colonised' in terms of real political power. Their discourses have entered 
the 'market', been disseminated, and are in fact most likely to be 'bought' 
by those with the greatest purchasing power, the post-colonisers looking 
for authentication and indigenising identification. However, the process 
of entering the discursive market-place also involves modification by and 
submission to, the dominant market forces. In a situation analogous to 
the tourist-oriented marketing of indigenous cultures, or the workings of 
the publication industry, those with the buying power can choose 
attractive or amenable features of a discourse or a culture to appropriate, 
while others (of a more fundamentally threatening nature) languish as 
unmarketable. Thus a double paradox occurs, whereby the dominant 
culture seeks indigenous cultural products precisely as 'exotic' features 
with which to adorn itself, a decorative gesture which leaves the 
institutional power structures intact, while at the same time absorbing the 
'other' into itself, such that it merely expands and in the process 
neutralises the otherness of the other.1o On the other hand, in 'post-
colonised' indigenous discourse, land is inextricably bound up with 'Land 
Rights', a concept whose meaning and whose application is inextricable 
from Western notions of justice and Western legal practices, the very 
practices whose failures and shortcomings generate the necessity of return 
to them. Post-colonised indigenes find themselves in the position of 
having to 'buy back' the land in accordance with legal processes utterly 
alien to traditional practices of land acquisition and access, and indeed on 
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terms far removed from traditional cultural norms. As Ian Palmer points 
out with regard to the Australian context: 
the relationship of traditional Aborigines to their land is inconsistent 
with, or contradictory to the capitalist mode of production in 
Australia. Under the capitalist mode of production land is primarily 
a commodity contributing to the conditions of capitalist 
accumulation .... For traditional Aboriginal society, land is not a 
commodity. An Aborigine does not own the land but is rather of the 
land. An Aborigine's spiritual identity is linked to particular areas of 
land through the conception of the Dreaming.!l 
However, he goes on to refer to a perverse appropriation of this difference 
in the 1971 legal decision concerning the Aborigines at Gove in the 
Northern Territory's Arnhem Land, which used precisely this difference 
in significance of the land to disqualify Aboriginal land claims as 
inconsistent with the principles of dominant capitalist institutions and 
criteria. However, this is not to argue for the return to 'pre-colonial' 
traditions, but merely to point out that the hybridity of discourse 
compromises the unproblematic discernment of post-colonised and post-
colonising discourses. Indeed, the importance of land rights has come to 
consist also in its symbolic status as "a symbolic demand for political 
recognition of Aborigines' dispossession of their lands," a recognition 
which has served to destabilise ideologically the whole white-dominated 
basis of land-ownership in Australia: 
This ideological conflict operates in two ways. First it questions the 
assumption that Australia was a settled rather than a conquered 
country, since the demand for land is a demand for the return of 
land. Second, the question of land ownership is further complicated 
because any land given back -- without Aborigines participating in 
the Australian economic system by working and paying for the land -
- questions the way in which others in Australian society have to 
purchase land.!2 
Similarly, the concept of Land Rights has generated a proliferation of 
texts from both 'post-colonised' and 'post-coloniser' perspectives. In 
seeking to uncover the truth of the past, its rights and wrongs, and to posit 
just redresses and solutions for present and· future, such texts demonstrate 
a basic trust in the ability of that very textuality which generated 
misunderstandings and injustices, to redress its own unreliability. Claudia 
Orange's The Treaty of Waitangi was published in 1987, sold out in its first 
print run almost immediately, and has gone into several reprints, winning 
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the Goodman Fielder Wattie Award in 1988.13 It has been claimed that 
"'Without Claudia's book, we'd be clawing each other's faces instead of 
sitting down calmly discussing what was intended and what was meant [at 
the time of signing]."'14 Further, in a side article entitled "Treaty Treatises: 
A Growth Industry," a further seven treaty-related books and collections of 
essays recently or soon to be published are listed,15 while it has similarly 
been claimed of the Canadian context that "the area of Native rights has 
itself become a minor growth industry within academe".1 6 The 
proliferation of texts may suggest the belief that truth lies in numbers, 
whether in the combined force of numbers, or in the higher probability of 
its discovery in anyone or few texts. It may also be a measure of the 
anxiety of place which can only be addressed through discourse. 
Nevertheless, a truly authentic or original discourse of relationship to the 
land cannot exist: it can only be an evocation of that relation from within 
the post-colonial context. While the former certainties of nationalism 
have been questioned, post-colonising discourses have shown a notable 
ability to appropriate and adapt at leisure from the post-colonised while 
retaining, and in fact thus strengthening their basis in institutional power. 
Similarly, to the extent that indigenous peoples are successful in 
reclaiming ownership of and physical access to lands of which they were 
dispossessed, this is on the basis of evidence of moral priority, a right to the 
return of their land. 
2. II. (ii). Land as Currency in Post-Colonial Discourse. The functioning 
of land as discursive currency can be illustrated by examining the cultural 
discursive context of post-colonial settler societies such as Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand. However, it is necessary first to address the 
question of the balance of discursive power between post-colonised and 
post-coloniser in each society. So far, my discussion has tended to derive 
largely from the New Zealand situation. There have been reasons for this, 
as well as reasons why this must now be addressed before proceeding. 
During has noted that New Zealand can be "characterised by the 
equilibrium of its postcolonising and postcolonial forces. In no other 
country are they so equally balanced." He is careful to distinguish the 
discursive politics to which this description applies from the political and 
economic power which is still dominated by the Pakeha. New Zealand is 
specifically differentiated from Australia, which he claims has "no 
effective postcolonised discourse" and therefore suffers "a crisis of 
[intellectual and discursive] emptiness" which is filled by "'import 
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rhetoric."'17 During may wish to modify his view of Australia since this 
statement which was made in 1985, and particularly in the wake of the 
1988 Bicentenary of white settlement and its discursive legacy. 
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly still true that New Zealand is more 
discursively balanced and thus complex, and for this reason, many features 
of post-colonial discourse are most clearly addressed in relation to this 
context.18 On the other hand, the study of post-colonial literature has 
produced few if any lessons more important to a decolonised reading ethic 
than the necessity to respect the specifities of place, and the avoidance and 
rejection of totalising schemas which replicate the movement of 
imperialist discourse across the globe. Therefore, some of the factors 
differentiating the discursive communities of Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand should be elucidated. 
Writing of the politics of language in relation to national identity 
formations, Mark Williams differentiates Australia and New Zealand in 
the following terms: 
The politics of language in Australia are generally uncomplicated by 
an identification with the indigenous peoples, and this is because the 
white Australians, by continuing to define themselves by reference to 
the historical wrong that saw the transportation of their forebears, by 
clinging so tenaciously to the rhetoric of the oppressed, have 
continued to deny the prior claims to injustice of the indigenous 
peoples.19 
The. important point here is that identification of, let alone with the 
'victimhood' of the indigenous peoples, and with a 'colonialist' identity is 
compromised or inhibited by another available victim-position, which 
identifies Britain as the oppressor, and white Australian nationalism as its 
heroic decolonisation. There is no doubt entertained in such discourse 
that the status of victim is morally or ethically superior, however; simply 
the existence of such a position which, having been institutionalised in 
myth, resulted in an aggressive nationalism which effaced the "prior 
claims to injustice of the indigenous peoples." Similarly, as the previous 
chapter showed, the ideologies of liberalism and democracy which so 
strongly underlay Australian nationalist discourse gave rise to another 
available victim-position for the settlers and ethical exoneration for their 
descendants. This is the pitting of a working-class ethos against the 
systems of class privilege which again are associated with Britain. One 
specific focus of this ideology was the opposition of small land-holders to 
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the squatters, or large land-holders, who were more closely associated with 
the pernicious structures of British privilege. However, the difficulty faced 
by the Aboriginal people in countering a post-colonising with a post-
colonised discourse is more complex than this. To cite Williams again: 
The Aborigines are 'invisible' in Australia because their presence has 
failed to impress on the minds of their dispossessors the 
discomforting consciousness of being other, and this is not true of the 
Maori in New Zealand. Hence the lack of any Australian equivalents 
in common use of words like Aotearoa, the Maori name for New 
Zealand, or Pakeha, meaning non-Maori, which are used by both 
main racial groups in the country. Again, there is no Australian 
equivalent in general use of the Maori term, tangata whenua.2o 
It is correct to point to the impact of indigenous terms of identity (and in 
the context of this chapter, particularly of relationship to the land) as 
important factors in penetrating' post-colonising consciousness and 
discourse. However, the lack of Australian equivalents is not clearly 
enough explained here. It works more as a cause than an effect of 
Aboriginal 'invisibility', the latter implied in the term 'hence', and it 
relates in significant part to the many Aboriginal languages and even 
cultures, and the resultant difficulties of constructing a unified discourse of 
'Aboriginality' against Australia's post-colonising culture(s). A similar 
situation exists in Canada, where many different Indian and Inuit 
languages and cultures militate against a unified post-colonised discourse 
of difference, strong enough and pervasive enough to penetrate national 
consciousness, other than in English -- the language of the coloniser. On 
the other hand, it could be argued that regional consciousness of 
indigenous discourses is more relevant and more likely. By contrast, 
Maori society, although comprising important tribal cultural specificities, 
is relatively more unified, and apart from distinctions of dialect, 
monolingual. This is not to argue that an effective post-colonised 
discourse is impossible in Australia and Canada, only that its construction 
is fraught with more problems and with a more compromised status as 
'authentic' or 'original' than that illusorily so judged in New Zealand. 
Indeed, the relative unity of the Maori language helps to mask the very 
inauthenticity of a unified Maori identity or discursive position as one 
necessarily post-colonially constructed. 
The varying linguistic situations of each of the three societies has 
implications for a difficulty in terminology in a discussion of the three 
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together. Although it is not a unanimous preference, it is both possible 
and generally agreed to speak of Maori and Pakeha, the latter referring 
most often to New Zealanders of British descent, although technically 
referring to anyone not Maori. However, Polynesian, Asian and other 
immigrants and their descendants tend to be specified within the context 
of acknowledging New Zealand as a bi-cultural society. By contrast, there 
is no one self-endowed term of identity for Australian Aborigines or for 
Canadian Indians (Inuit is a culturally 'authentic' term, as is Maori, albeit 
in both cases terms of identification developed in response to the presence 
of 'others'). Their own terms are tribally or regionally specific. However, 
of even greater difficulty is establishing a term by which the post-colonial 
descendants of British settlers can be known. In Australia they have been 
known as 'white Australians' and as 'Euro-Australians', and Canadians 
have tended to be identified as 'English-Canadians', largely in distinction 
from French Canadians. In the current political climate, reference to 
colour is generally agreed to be at least anachronistic, at most politically 
offensive, with the concern for the inaccuracy of references to 'black' and 
'white' somewhere in the middle. 'Euro-Australians' is also problematic 
both from the point of view of those Australians who are not Aboriginal 
but are also emphatically not of European background or descent, and 
those who may be of 'European' descent (and some point out even this 
inaccuracy or vagueness when it is specifically English descent which is 
referred to), but who are any number of generations removed from the 
reality of Europe/Britain, and identify solely as Australians. 'English-
Canadian', a term which perhaps relates more to the language spoken than 
to the racial or national origins of its bearer, similarly effaces not only the 
specificities of Canada's more multi-cultural society, but even among those 
of British descent, hides the reality of the Scottish and Irish settlers 
subsumed under the label 'English'. This rehearsal of points already well 
made in other places relates to the very problema tics of post-colonial 
identity in relation to place, post-colonial place in relation to the land. In 
this chapter, no one solution will be posited; the post-colonial condition 
could be argued to be more accurately evoked in the instability of its 
naming. ~s appropriate, reference will be made to settlers and indigenes, 
or to 'post-colonisers' and 'post-colonised'; post-colonial terms of 
indigenous identity will be used; and the term for the 'post-coloniser' 
employed in the specific texts under discussion will be employed. 
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Further distinctions can be made between the cultural contexts and 
discursive politics of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The more 
vigorous nationalisms of Australia and New Zealand have provided not 
only available victim-positions for the post-colonisers, but also a stronger 
image of what is being contested by the discourses of post-colonialism. 
Canada's more insecure nationalism and stronger agenda of countering 
United States cultural and economic neo-imperialism have served to cast 
Canada itself as post-colonised, its 'post-colonial' discourses partaking of a 
multiplicity of subject-positions -- women, immigrants, as well as 
indigenes -- in gestures more redemptive than critical of nationalism. 
To dismantle the terms 'post-coloniser' and 'post-colonised' used so far 
as suggestive of monolithic discourses or subject-positions would reveal 
the many supporting and cross-cutting positions which comprise them. 
Just as the discourse of nationalism has valorised male, white, 
heterosexual, secular or mainstream religious discourses, the post-colonial 
discursive context is just as much characterised by the emergence of 
multiple contestatory discourses of women, immigrants, sexual and 
religious minorities, as the indigenous position itself. Class is a more 
ambivalent positioning in relation to nationalism, particularly in 
Australia and New Zealand whose national ethos was founded on a 
democratic, egalitarian ethos, and perpetuated in a contempt for social 
privilege, frequently directly associated with the British class-system. 
Nevertheless, real social and economic privilege has always existed in both 
countries, and the effects of class deprivation have been strongly 
overdetermined by racial difference.21 More to the point, white women, 
for example, who identify as oppressed by patriarchy have tended to qualify 
their 'post-coloniser' identification by positing a greater innocence in the 
face of the history of male colonisation, supported by their greater real 
(economic) problems of access to land ownership and other signs of 
material wealth. They articulate their oppression by a patriarchy which 
pervades both white and indigenous cultures; on the other hand, women 
who speak on behalf of indigenous movements have warned against 
regarding white women as allies against their oppression, finding their 
racial and historical origins more pertinent than their gender in contesting 
an oppressive society, and argue that even white women who do not own 
land, or who have no obvious connection to perpetrators of historical 
wrongs in relation to the land, have nevertheless benefited by the British 
colonisa tion of these lands, and the dispossession of their indigenous 
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inhabitants. 22 Immigrants also have available discursive identifications 
with other lands, histories and cultures, which may exonerate them from 
the colonial histories of their land of adoption; on the other hand they 
may be implicated in that history either in terms of having, like 'women', 
indirectly benefited from the dispossession of the indigenous peoples, or in 
indigenous discourses which characterise all arrivals to the land since 
colonisation, and their descendants, as 'immigrants'. Awatere refers to 
"the immigrants who invaded us," and argues that "All immigrants to 
[Aotearoa/New Zealand] are guests of the tangata whenua .... It matters 
not what generation born New Zealanders they are. Every white is an 
intruder who remains only by dint of force. "23 Thus they are guilty by 
linguistic association. 
Despite the discursive complexity of post-colonialism, an earlier point 
is worth re-iterating. There tends to be an underlying privileging of the 
indigenous subject position; and other discourses of contestation, as well as 
those which comprise 'post-coloniser'-dominated nationalism, 
increasingly make use of elements of the indigenous contestation in their 
own (re)affirmation of place or belonging. In this (re)affirmation, itself an 
index of the anxiety attendant upon its subjection to ethical and discursive 
challenge, the land occupies a key position as a symbol of originality, 
authenticity and, by implication, belonging. The preceding discussion has 
been intended to show the variations in post-colonial discursive context 
among Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and in particular aspects 
influencing the respective balances of 'post-colonised' and 'post-
colonising' elements. It is, of course, almost impossible to evaluate this 
balance of discursive power without immersion in each cultural context, 
and in particular, without vigilant attention to all facets of the media, as 
well as educational trends and legal and political records. However, in the 
context of the following illustration of the existence of post-colonising 
anxiety in relation to a legitimate place on the land, it is not a 
demonstration of discursive balance that is important in establishing the 
presence of such anxiety, but more simply a matter of demonstrating the 
existence of a post-colonised discourse whose terms both generate and 
determine the expressions of this anxiety. In this way, a discursive 'battle' 
can be posited, although on the surface it may look less like a battle and 
more like an attempt to conform even more strongly with the 'opposing' 
discourse than the 'opposition' does itself. Yet what is this competition, if 
not a war of inauthentic authenticities? Although it is not the complete 
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picture, it is a valid part of it to derive the terms of the debate from cultural 
and literary commentary in recently published texts and major journals. 
Although these may not be forums available to or chosen by discourses 
whose contestation is positioned outside existing power structures, they 
are the sources most accessible to those in positions of educational, social 
and political influence, and whose influence shapes the visible signs of the 
discursive struggles for authentic belonging in relation to the land. 
Further, they form a basis for an inter-textual reading of post-colonial 
fiction to follow. 
For example, the participation in cultural and critical debate of the 
once-secure post-colonising voice is witness to insecurities and anxieties of 
legitimacy and ethical place in post-colonised space which is expressed in 
frequent assertions of that place in terms of the purchase of authenticity 
granted the Maori, and specifically the 'traditional' Maori relation to the 
land. In the 1972 essay, "Home," Bill Pearson differentiates ·his enjoyment 
of Australia from his sense of place in New Zealand, saying that "to use 
Maori terms, here I am tangata whenua, a native, and I hope I have 
turangawaewae, my native earth beneath me and the right to stand 
forward and speak. "24 However, his subsequent reflection on the state of 
race relations in that country is followed by the more insecure question, 
"What right have I to claim turangawaewae in this place?",25 a question re-
iterated by Michael Neill in 1985.26 
There are common features of such projects of self-examination. 
Metaphors of the landscape are used to evoke the cultural and political 
inheritances of colonialism for the descendants of the settlers. Neill refers 
to "those discomforts and anxieties produced by living on that historical 
and geographical 'fault-line,"' and states that "a fault-line runs between 
my two senses of the past."27 He recounts "the discovery of a landscape 
which to me seemed frighteningly trackless and unmarked," and variously 
describes aspects of the post-colonial condition as "complex displacement," 
a "sense ()f exile," and a "sense of dislocation."28 This sense of 'dislocation' 
is invoked by David Tacey, who describes as necessary the process of 
"sending down life-sustaining tap-roots into our soil,"29 a metaphor 
echoed but problematised in Peter Beatson's reference to the Pakeha 
perception of the function of the. Maori to "act as soil for our rootless 
behaviour .... to be soul-manure for the white parasite. "30 It is not only 
the physical but the psychological and discursive sense of identity or 
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dislocation which is 'landscaped'. Beatson characterises culture and 
discourse as politically determined and demarcated land, claiming "I have 
no wish and no expertise to trespass into the domain of uniquely Maori 
culture. "31 Similarly, Peter Simpson refers to his "mental landscape," and 
recalls an earlier "subterranean existence as a New Zealander," and the 
need at this time for a "decolonisation of my thinking. "32 
Deference and doubt is evoked in the vocabulary, the syntax, and even 
the punctuation of claims of their land of residence as 'home'. Neill refers 
to the "problematic right to belong,"33 while Tacey argues that "In the deep 
outback ... the very landscape, the backyard, the dirt sidewalk itself, tells 
the white man that he is intruding and that his European culture is puny 
or out-of-place."34 Beatson expresses doubt and deference more personally, 
evoking it in self-conscious references to the function of language in 
articulating place. He recalls, "When I returned to 'my' country, I was 
shocked out of my complacent assumptions concerning my right to that 
possessive pronoun."35 He goes 'on to describe the "confrontation of a 
European New Zealander with a country he had mistakenly believed to be 
familiar," and concludes that "I as a person of purely British descent am 
forced to rethink the meaning of my presence in the South Pacific. "36 
Michael King refers to the same questioning when he argues that "The 
confidence with which many Maori have been able to say who they are 
and where they come from has led many Pakeha to ask precis~ly the same 
questions about themselves."37 
On the other hand, the narratives frequently contain a 'home-coming' 
passage, or denote a home-coming movement, 'home' being a revitalised, 
'decolonised' expression of the relation to the land of residence. Beatson's 
'home-coming' after an absence of fourteen years from New Zealand is 
accompanied by the description of a more 'authentic' view of his place 
formed, ironically, in terms of an overseas situation. Calling on the 
situation of the Pied Noirs, the white Algerians of several generations 
. driven into exile in France, he claims that "If I am to,.remain in this 
country it is as a British Pied Noir. The difference is that here the 
Europeans have not been driven out and it is therefore the Maori who live 
in exile on their own soil."38 However, the other central aspect of his 
'home-coming' is "the act of reading -- of being confronted by -- Maori 
literature."39 Neill's 'home-coming' is similarly double-edged. New 
Zealand's ambiguous place as 'home' at a time when even born and raised 
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residents of that country referred, and returned, to England as 'home', is 
the context for the description of his childhood arrival in -- or return to, if 
it is 'home' -- New Zealand. However, in contrast to the "city ... naively 
persuaded of its essential Englishness,"40 his authentic home-coming, to a 
sense of self, a sense of the past, and a sense of place, occurs as the title of 
the article suggests, in his involvement in teaching post-colonial 
literature, a course in which the texts are "from twelve countries, three 
continents, and two oceans; but all ... are 'about' New Zealand."41 
Simpson's similarly plural -- and plurivalent -- homecomings are begun 
discursively with an account of a "rare and memorable return to my point 
of origin, especially appropriate perhaps in this year of revisiting our 
national origins. "42 His )ocation of both in Golden Bay constitutes a 
discursive authentication of his place, his 'right to belong'. However, 
Simpson's account also includes an earlier and pivotal return from 
overseas. While in Canada he had discovered "deep similarities between 
New Zealand and Canadian cultural experience with regard to the 
dilemma of divided consciousness and other features of the post-colonial 
condition. "43 The eventual personal crisis he describes is focused on 
literary dislocation and division, in which he was "sick of being a New 
Zealander teaching English literature to the Canadians."44 Upon returning 
to New Zealand and complementing his interest in New Zealand culture, 
especially art and literature, with involvement in the Australian, 
Canadian, African, West Indian and Pacific literatures, he exemplifies once 
again the experience of 'home' for the post-coloniser being more 
authentically perceived through the similarities to and differences from 
the cultures and literatures of elsewhere. 
Finally, there are frequent assertions of a special, deep relationship with 
the land that appropriates an approximation of the indigenous relation 
conditioned by spirituality, ancestry and familiarity. Michael King 
describes in sensuous detail the memory of childhood pleasure when he 
"liked to get up before dawn and make [his] way down to the beach 
through the macrocarpas and pines .... [T]he sun would be lighting the 
crests of the hills around the harbour, and they seemed to hang on the 
sharp clean air. "45 Then, as an adult, he invokes a spiritual or psychic, 
rather than simply sensuous response: "When I go to a new place, or visit 
a familiar one, I instinctively look first for the shapes on the land and the 
middens that indicate where the first inhabitants of that place chose to 
make their home and gather food. I am drawn to and comforted by the 
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psychic residue of their presence."46 He finds, in a further gesture of 
identification, that "the exploration of roots has led to a deeper 
understanding of my genetic inheritance; and -- perhaps paradoxieally -- to 
a deeper feeling of sympathy for and identification with the tangata 
whenua of New Zealand in their post-colonial travail."47 Tacey similarly 
describes his own attunement to the "spirit of place which challenges the 
Euro-Australian [which] is an almost physical sensation in central 
Australia .... I felt this sensation as liberating, not threatening."48 Indeed, 
the assertion of attunement, which can be understood as being generated 
by an underlying anxiety -- what exactly is it a 'liberation' from? -- is 
suggestively grounded in that anxiety when he recalls that his Aboriginal 
school-mates "saw the landscape through non-Western eyes .... Their eyes 
surveyed an animated, rhythmic landscape, one from which I felt 
annoyingly exc1uded."49 Simpson's assertion of attunement to the 
landscape evokes identification with the spirit of place through an 
indigenisation which marks him as, in Bhabha's words, "almost the same 
but not quite," as knowledge and instinct, the consciousness of something 
special and unconscious identification, compete with and set up mutual 
disturbances in each other: 
Largely because of attitudes passed on by my parents, I grew up with a 
reverence for the indigenous plant and bird life of New Zealand. I 
could identify virtually every bird and tree to be found in the bush, 
and knew many of them by their Maori names. I grew up with the 
feeling that there was something special and precious about things 
that were native to this land, with which I instinctively identified 
myself. When I later learned about the reverence for the land of the 
tangata whenua, the people of the land, I felt a strong and immediate 
empathy.SO . 
However, it is necessary to examine the content of such discourse for 
the political gestures it effects. The tone of such discourse is frequently 
'confessional' and Foucault has shown the role of confession as a 
technology of power in the production of 'truth'. However, the apparently 
liberating effect on the subject of this production of 'truth'. effaces its basis 
in power, both the power exerted on the subject to produce the confession, 
and the power that the confession itself has in the general circulation of 
discourses to be accepted as truth (and deriving from its basis in religious 
institutions, absolution): 
the obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different 
points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as 
150 
the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us 
that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, "demands" only to 
surface; that is it fails to do so, this is because of a constraint that holds 
it in place.51 
It can be argued that the pressure to 'confess' is central to the post-colonial 
cultural and historical context of anxiety and 'guilt'. Similarly, there is 
also a tendency to express close relationships to the land in terms of 
childhood reminiscences, a gesture which putatively minimises the part of 
culture in its maximisation of 'the natural' and 'innocence' (children 
being believed to be less acculturated than adults, and therefore 'naturally' 
closer to nature). This gesture is highly problematic in its elision of the 
centrality of culture in relationships to the land, the inescapability of 
learned reading practices in any culture's construction of a land ethic. On 
the other hand, this discourse is characterised by expressions of sincerity 
and disavowals of the intention to appropriate indigeneity.52 However, 
the textual dissemination of discourses makes it inevitable that 
appropriation will occur. -
2. n. (iii). Textual Mediation of Relationships to the Land. The 
analyses of textuality in Derrida's science of grammatology, as effected in 
the practice of deconstruction, have considerable relevance to this aspect of 
analysis of the post-colonial condition. As Norris notes, "It is the 'tension 
between gesture and statement' ... which 'liberates the future of a general 
grammatology."'53 Nevertheless, a truly deconstructive stance cannot 
hold 'gesture' and 'statement' in discrete opposition. In liberating the 
"'free play' or element of undecidability"54 within a statement, the 
suppressed "'force' or animating pressure of intent which exceeds all the 
bounds of structure,"55 and which constitutes its textuality frequently by 
the exposure of a root metaphor of that very term that is suppressed, there 
is a danger- that the metaphor of the suppressed term (the gesture) will be 
privileged over the surface content of the utterance (the statement), or 
what is 'done' over what is 'said'. This gesture/statement distinction is 
analogous to the speech/writing one, and risks privileging the speech-like 
'self-presence' and activity of gesture over the absence and 'promiscuity' of 
language. Actions appear to 'speak' not only louder but truer that words! 
However, even the 'speaking' of actions, or gesture, is discursive in the 
broadest sense, and similarly in the broadest sense, textual. Therefore, 
priority cannot be attributed to gesture in the discursive quest for 'truth', 
but contradiction can be noted. Specifically, rather than discrediting such 
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assertions of sincerity in gestures doomed, in the larger political context, to 
work against intention, it is enough merely to point out the contradiction, ' 
while holding that the intention not to appropriate is as 'true' as the 
inevitability of appropriation. It is inevitable because once an 'authentic' 
indigenous connection to the land is articulated in discourse, it is subject to 
the condition of textuality. In its dissemination, its free-floating existence, 
it lacks anything other than a 'legal' tie to the originating subject(-
position), a tie which as the last chapter showed, is constituted by the very 
doubts that produce it, or make it necessary. 
It is worth considering why land is valorised in the attempt to re-affirm 
the certainty of place in the post-colonial context. As noted earlier, it is not 
a reflection of a real crisis of access for the 'post-colonisers'. It can be 
argued that land serves as a symbol of authenticity and belonging because 
of its centrality to post-colonised contestatory discourse, perhaps even 
further because of a sublimated equation of indigenes and the land. The 
first of these is not difficult to demonstrate. Awatere has described as 
central to the project of Maori sovereignty "the Maori ability to determine 
our own destiny . . . from the basis of our land and fisheries. . . . [It] seeks 
nothing less than the acknowledgement that New Zealand is Maori land, 
and further seeks the return of that land.'" Of Aboriginal politics and 
discourse, Bruce McGuiness similarly argues that "with everything that 
happens throughout Australia, there is always a component of Aboriginal 
involvement. This usually has to do with land," and that "All our 
struggles aim towards that one area of ultimately achieving the land back 
s,? that we can become truly economically independent, so that we can 
achieve our own ends. "56 Clearly, land is the basis 'of tra,ditional 
indigenous economy, spirituality, and social order, as well as of cultural 
mythologies of origins and identity. However, the 'post-colonising' 
equation of the indigene and the land, such that indigenous identification 
is a fortuitous rewriting into the land, a reconstruction of the origin in 
order to place the post-colonial self already there, elides, as mentioned 
earlier, precisely these elements of culture in an evocation"of a pre-cultural 
innocence. The emphasis is therefore on spirituality, a move which 
further elides the embarrassments not only of history, but of the inequities 
in the post-colonial political and economic orders. 
But it would be politically naive to attribute the longing for an 
approximation for an indigenous relationship to the land to the strength 
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of post-colonised discourse in its politically contestatory moment. There is 
yet another reason why the emphasis on spirituality as a basis of 
connection to land is attractive to post-colonising discourse. Such 
discourse arises in a national and international context of urbanisation, 
industrialisation, and an increasingly crisis-ridden capitalism, and caters to 
a nostalgia for permanence and for a direct relation to the processes of 
productivity alienated by industrial capitalism. The gesture of post-
colonised discourses in pointing to the spiritual emptiness of post-colonial 
society, has served to provide a focus for post-colonising discursive 
appropriation and legitimation. But it also serves to allow the latter to 
conflate the indigenous relationship to the land and spirituality in a 
manner exclusive of economic and cultural considerations.57 Thus a series 
of binary oppositions arises: indigene/settler; spiritual/material; 
nature/ culture; land/urbanism. Deployed by 'post-colonisers' who enjoy 
greater material wealth and political power, it is a relatively easy, indeed 
satisfying gesture to supplement the sense of spiritual emptiness deriving 
from the alienations effected by urban industrial culture, with an 
appropriated spirituality, closeness to nature, and belonging to the land, 
thus indigenising and legitimising (although the latter is no longer 
necessary if the indigenous identification has been complete) the post-
colonising place. The structures of urban industrial capitalist society 
remain intact, as do the advantages of modernisation, and importantly, the 
systems of distribution of the advantages, power and wealth. Spirituality 
is conceived as something radically other than, and sealed from the effects 
of economic, political and cultural matters, which are necessities to be 
'suffered', a suffering made easier by spiritual supplementation. Post-
colonised discourse is complicit in this construction in its positing of an 
unsullied spirituality as surviving to differentiate the indigenous 
relationship to the land from that of the post-colonisers.58 
It is within this post-colonial discursive context that the fictional texts 
discussed in this chapter have been produced. The writers have entered 
into post-colonial discursive constructions of the land, and in the process 
of turning the land into language, or reading and writing the land, 
exemplify many of the features of the hybridity of post-colonial discourse. 
It would be fatuous to make assertions of direct correspondence between 
the writers discussed and their own degree of anxiety (even that anxiety 
masquerading as certainty, but disclosing the need to assert certainty borne 
of doubt)59 regarding their place in relation to the land. However, some 
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texts and some of their immediate inter-textualities -- interviews, essays by 
the writers -- are suggestive of this. Such interviews and essays are a valid 
part of the discursive context within which the fictions are placed. 
For example, the particular ambivalences effected by the mediation of 
the text in Elizabeth Jolley's fiction can perhaps be illustrated by way of 
briefly focusing on Jolley herself. Information about Jolley from 
interviews, and biographical and autobiographical articles, suggests many 
points of similarity between her life and aspects of characters and settings 
in her novels and stories.60 Too numerous to list comprehensively here, 
they include the fact that like Weekly in The Newspaper of Claremont 
Street,61 she was originally from the industrial Black Country of the 
English Midlands. Also like Weekly, and Mother in "The Last Crop"62 and 
"A Gentleman's Agreement,"63 she has worked as a cleaner. She has spent 
time in boarding-school and nursing institutions, settings which figure in 
Miss Peabody's Inheritance ,64 Mr Scobie's Riddle,65 My Father's Moon,66 
and Cabin Fever,67 and she has conducted creative writing classes, which 
Miss Porch's activities in Foxybaby 68could loosely be termed, while other 
aspects of that experience have been captured in "The Long Distance 
Lecture" .69 Indeed, like her, many of her characters are novelists or story 
writers: Miss Porch, Diana Hopewell, Miss Hailey, and Jasmine in the 
story "Woman in a Lampshade. "70 The strong Viennese aspect of her 
background from her mother is worked into the many German-speaking 
characters, and those whose tastes in and knowledge of food, music and 
literature, derive from that part of Europe. Such characters can be found in 
Palomino,71 Milk and Honey,n and others. Further, and perhaps most 
clearly germane to the topic of this chapter, her Western Australian 
landscape includes the wheatbelt, and like many of her characters, she has 
bought a five-acre piece of land, and cultivates a goose farm and an 
orchard. These details combine to suggest that Jolley's oeuvre constitutes a 
process of writing herself into the land as she writes about characters who 
attempt to do the same. Indeed, the centrality of the specific Western 
Australian landscape to her writing suggests two things. She does not 
universalise the idea of Australia or land, but remains specific to the 
region which, as a region, COUld. also be seen as one of nationalism's 
contestatory 'Others', Yet this contestation could itself be seen as 
compromised by the fact that her literary challenge to the notion that 
Australia is on the eastern sea-bord, while she inhabits a region in the 
West, has been explained both in terms of a belief and a pride in the 
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necessity of 'regionalism' for all Australia -- a decentring gesture -- and in 
her reference to "a country like Western Australia," which could be seen 
as a redrawing of the circle, and a recentring of self and place. 
The process of centring herself in Western Australia has involved the 
constant 'close reading' and writing of that land, evident in her many 
detailed descriptions of landscapes. Given the dominant notion, in 
Western metaphysics, of a, centred subjectivity, it follows that any subject 
who reads and writes the land, reads and writes the self into the land. 
While such close readings constitute a response to the post-colonial 
problem of belonging or connection to the land in the context of the 
historical and cultural pull of Europe, and the lack of 'fit' with Eurocentric 
perceptions, their authenticity is constantly compromised by the very fact 
of their textuality, the exchange of the 'sign' for the 'thing'. This is most 
clearly demonstrated in the fact that Jolley appropriates and shapes the 
land for literary purposes. In a radio interview, she pointed out that her 
fictional landscapes have been composed of fragments taken from different 
places, and combined into an imaginative whole which she sees very 
clearly.73 For example, the road bridge, the dog-leg of land, and the 
shepherd's cottage which figure in The Well,74 have all been taken from 
different places. However, as in all of her writing, while the combination 
is imaginative, it is governed by a concern for the integrity of geographical 
possibility. In the same interview she pointed out that "Anybody coming 
to my farm, for example, hoping to see the landscape of Palomino won't 
see it exactly," and yet readers have clearly been convinced by the evocative 
detail of her descriptions such that this is exactly what they expect to do: 
"One or two people have come up to the orchard and they've looked 
around and they've said, 'Oh, but this should be a bit steeper here .... '" 
Such examples only underline further the dominance of textually 
mediated relationships to the land: the ambivalent authority and 
in authenticity of the text. 
Whereas Jolley'S writing produces something like fictionalised 
versions of herself, writing through them aspects of her own relationship 
to, and feelings for, the land, Rudy Wiebe takes an historical character and 
're-places' him both in history and a literary and cultural tradition, and 
through these, on the land. Wiebe has declared, for example, that "The 
Indian ... must become our central, not our fringe figure ... i he must 
become the center of serious fiction as other groups have."75 As will be 
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shown, the question of who 'our' refers to in relation to literary figures 
begins to problematise the project of placing, even 'centring' Big Bear. 
Further, on closer scrutiny, the distance between Jolley's 'invented' 
characters -- read, at least by those with some literary sophistication, 
unproblematically as literary constructs -- and Wiebe's 'real person in 
history' is not so great. The Big Bear Wiebe produces is indeed an 
historical 'figure' or 'character', a literary and even fictionalised construct, 
a 'body' of language whose place is precisely in the narrative of history. 
Wiebe acknowledges Big Bear's ambivalent status when he describes Big 
Bear as "an ideal novel subject because he is a great and wise man who 
lives a tragic life."76 Big Bear did not therefore precede the narrativei he 
was constructed to suit the narrative's (epic) purpose. Further, the 
narrative did not simply reflect history's eventsi it was constructed to be 
part of a pre-conceived tradition. 
It is therefore necessary to place at the beginning (not the origin) of the 
process Rudy Wiebe himself, that is, the discursive constructions of Rudy 
Wiebe in essays and interviews, and his inter-textual relationship to this 
project of literary placement. Characterising Wiebe's writing of Big Bear 
back into the land as "something resembling a cultural crusade," W.J. 
Keith shows that it has been generated very much out of Wiebe's 
ambiguous personal relationship to the land, a mixture of belonging, such 
that "Wiebe first became attracted to Big Bear ... for what might loosely be 
called sentimental motives, the fact that his own birthplace lay in the area 
in which Big Bear and the remnants of his band of Plains Cree had 
wandered half a century before,"77 and alien-ness in Wiebe's position as "a 
Canadian at two removes from the Canadian land, separated not only by 
the traditions and beliefs of his [Mennonite] people, but also by their 
language (he did not begin to speak English until he went to school)."78 
Wiebe inherited both a spiritual tradition of closeness to the land, a 
"religious vision, a seriousness of purpose, and a painful experience as a 
minority group living close to the land," and an 'acculturated' distance, 
including his school education which, Wiebe claims, forced him to 
"'discover the past of my place on my own as an adult, [and] . 
inadvertently roused an anger in me which has ever since given an 
impetus to my writing."'79 
Wiebe's writing of The Temptations of Big Bear80 took him on 
journeys characterised in land-reading terms as following "on the trail of 
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Big Bear." Yet this journey into the land was inextricable from, and 
generated by writing, in numerous senses. Not only was the writing of the 
novel his motivation to travel, but, he notes, "One of the most enjoyable 
experiences of writing the novel was visiting every place where it was 
recorded Big Bear had been."81 Thus Big Bear's tracks on the land were 
written records, and evidence that the trail had been followed before. 
Further, as well as textuality taking Wiebe into the land, the land became, 
both through Wiebe's literary purpose which differentiated it in terms of 
relevance and irrelevance to that purpose, and through his perceptual 
gaze, landscape, in Wiebe's transformation of it into text and inter-text: 
"As we travelled this world, we took such pictures of it as we could, and 
sometimes I would look at them again as I was writing."82 
The frequent use of archaeological metaphors both by Wiebe's 
commentators and Wiebe himself to describe the process of his research 
also links writing and land. He is described as "delving into the past of the 
Canadian land,"83 and, referring to Big Bear's story, he asks himself, "Can I 
dig it out? Will I be dare to look at it once I have, if I dare, unearthed it?"84 
Such archaeological metaphors suggest the solid integrity of the story: it is' 
there, in its physical (albeit fractured or incomplete) form, only waiting to 
be found and recognised for what it is. In literary terms, it is a metaphor 
(ironically) predicated upon the assumption that language is transparent to 
reality; it merely reflects reality in complete fidelity to truth. However, 
archaeological metaphors also betray their own historicity, and the 
centrality, not of the 'discovery', but of the archaeologist who 'recognises' 
its significance, status and meaning as a discovery. Similarly, the 
archaeologist's relationship to the land is one that is determined by the 
prior burial of what is discovered, generally by the erasure from the surface 
of the land of one culture, and its replacement by an imposed other: in 
short, colonisation in its cultural genocide moment. Wiebe would 
presumably not disagree with this: his repeated allusion to 'daring' to face 
his discovery suggests some sort of moral crisis in relation to the past it 
represents. Further, it is precisely the burial of the Indian tradition which 
causes him to ask "'Why was Canada called a 'young'country? White 
men reckoned places young or old as they had time to re-mould them to 
their own satisfaction. As often, to ruin."'85 But what is the 
archaeologist's place in relation to this process? Is it not precisely 
archaeologists who participate, along with geologists, in the 'dating' of 
artifacts and the cultures from which they derive? Is not the 
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archaeologist's presence dependent on the prior absence of an earlier 
culture? Even more telling is Wiebe's description of his researches as "like 
finding a bone, a petrified bone down by the creek and then I, find the rest 
of it, and then I piece together the pieces that make the dinosaur."86 The 
implication of finding pieces of the extinct dinosaur as an analogy to the 
story of Big Bear is clearly seen when it is remembered that such remains 
find their way into museums, to be seen at leisure by those who regard 
them as curiosities profoundly separate from the realities of their own 
lives. In other words, Wiebe's gesture of writing Big Bear back into the 
land actually writes him out of the land, and substitutes for him Wiebe's 
own intentional gaze,87 his own journey, contained within his own post-
colonial discourse. 
Thus Wiebe's evocation of Big Bear's presence is both predicated on, 
and takes the form of, his radical absence. In ways which will be explored 
later in the chapter, Wiebe's presence on and in the land is deeply 
connected to Big Bear's absence. However, even recognition of this, and 
resultant feelings of a guilty heritage which must be atoned for or rectified, 
implicates the post-colonial subject in moral and ethical complexities. The 
impulse to atone by sympathetic identification with Big Bear appears to 
underlie Wiebe's assertion that for him, "the most important people who 
are going to read that book are Indian people. To see how they respond to 
it and whether they feel genuine things are happening is a lot more 
important than certain kinds of white response."88 Wiebe seeks Indian 
'approval' and affirmation, but one must ask what the implications of 
such approval might be, both for him -- for post-colonisers --, and for 
Indian people -- the post-colonised. Speaking of the trial speeches of Big 
Bear that Wiebe admits he had to invent because of the lack of 
documentation of his words at this point, Indian writer Maria Campbell is 
cited as stating that she did not believe it was Wiebe, but rather Big Bear's 
spirit speaking through Wiebe, which was responsible for the speeches.89 
On the one hand, such an assertion increases Big Bear's textual 'presence', 
to some extent writing Big Bear out of his own text. On the other hand, it 
confers Big Bear's spirit in Wiebe, effecting, even in his mediating 
function, his spiritual indigenisation. It goes some way towards justifying 
statements such as that "Through creative understanding, he has become a 
spiritual descendant of Dumont, Big Bear, and Wandering Spirit; he has 
made the history of Western Canada his own."90 As a spiritual descendant 
of victims of colonisation, has he not produced a victimhood for himself 
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which exonerates him from the 'guilty' history of the colonisers? He has 
written himself into the Western Canadian land. 
A final semantic duplicity, an element of textual undecidability, 
illustrating the post-colonial crisis of legitimacy, occurs when Eli Mandel 
attempts to evoke something even closer than the effect of Wiebe's 
sympathetic identification with Big Bear. He tells Wiebe, "that great 
speech of Big Bear's" was "as if you'd invested yourself in the Indian 
character in some way."91 But even if the meaning of 'invested' is derived 
from the Latin word for clothing, and suggests the Christian sense of 
clothing onself in or with something, the word also invokes the 
terminology of capitalism. The latter sense is ironically appropriate in the 
context of the capitalist moment of colonisation, but misfiring in intent by 
suggesting instead Wiebe's profiting by Big Bear's alienation. If this seems 
like focusing unfairly on the infelicities of language and semantics, the 
point is not to hold Wiebe responsible -- to suggest his subjective mastery -
- but on the contrary it is an illustration of the pervasiveness of an 
economic ethos throughout post-colonial discourse, including cultural 
discourse. There is a similarly ambiguous moment towards the end of this 
interview with Mandel. One reading would be consistent with the' notion 
of investing oneself in another's character; however, another possible 
reading relates to the notion of post-colonising appropriation and even 
exploitation of the indigene's history of alienation from the land: 
Mandel: "Edward Bond ... says in the preface to [Bingo], 'Every man 
writes in another man's blood'. Do you think that's so?" 
Wiebe: "I don't know whose blood I'm working in." 
Mandel: "Well, Big Bear's, I suppose. What the question means to 
me is that there is a moral problem. What do you see as the moral 
concern of the Canadian writer?".92 
At the very point that the crucial issue is approached, it is as if it is judged 
just in time to be too personal, perhaps tactless, and Wiebe is 'let off the 
hook' in favour of a diluted question about the moral concerns of 
Canadian writers. Yet it was neither necessary, nor even appropriate that 
the question be regarded as personal. Rudy Wiebe is a product of his 
cultural context. Keith points out that Wiebe: 
grew up at a time when the cultural heritage of those who belonged 
neither to the English- nor the French-Canadian peoples was just 
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beginning to make its mark on imaginative writing. It was also a 
time when the history of native peoples was arousing interest as a 
new generation began to scrutinize its national inheritance.93 
Similarly, Dick Harrison places Wiebe within a cultural context which is 
vaguely sensed, but sensed before Wiebe's reinforcement of its validity: 
"The impression that contemporary novelists are attracted to the Indian as 
a link with the land they have been alienated from is reinforced by the fact 
that the most thorough exploration of Indian culture is carried out by 
Rudy Wiebe."94 
A greater understanding of context, a questioning of its characteristics, 
is more valuable than attributing personal blame for sincere gestures 
whose actual implications and results are more complex than can be 
controlled; in short, which are embroiled in textuality. More importantly, 
this chapter seeks to place these texts as participants within the overall 
cultural and discursive context, not only as 'utterances' but as 'gesture', 
and it is the tensions among these which are explicated. This explication 
seeks out the reading and writing strategies which position the text in 
relation to the land, or the land in relation to language. It will 
demonstrate the writing in the Derridean sense which obtrudes in such 
forms as metaphor to betray the suppressed values of the texts 
constructions of "langscape."95 
2. III. Post-colonial Critiques of Colonisation. 
One feature of post-colonial discourse regarding the land and human 
relationships to it is the critique of the effects of colonisation in 
dispossessing the indigenous inhabitants in order to effect the settlement 
of the colonisers. However, when produced from a 'post-colonising' 
subject position there is a tendency to idealise and to contain the 
dispossessed culture, and by implication the colonising ethos, within 
structures of binary oppositions such as nature/culture, innocence/guilt, 
spirituality /materialism~ land/urbanism, authenticity /inauthenticity. 
(The term 'ethos' has been used because the idea of a colonising culture is 
somewhat reductive, since many 'cultures' participated in colonisation; 
similarly, it is necessary to avoid the implication that a particular culture is 
inherently a colonising one. At the same time, the notion of a colonising 
culture is pre-emptive, since what would become a more coherent or 
cohesive colon ial culture is the effect' rather than the cause of 
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colonisation.) On the other hand it could be argued that there is also a 
tendency for texts from a 'post-colonised' position to idealise their own 
cultural past. Because what is represented is inevitably a culture 
reconstructed in relation to colonial disruption, it is therefore also 
inevitably a redemptive representation. In a context in which indigenous 
culture is selectively espoused by the dominant culture (the idealised, 
'picturesque' elements valorised in colonising and post-colonising texts), it 
is an understandable move on the part of the post-colonised to remove 
those elements bound to be unacceptable and therefore politically 
inhibiting. While this may simply perpetuate the museumification of the 
culture, and thus compromise a political agenda of total cultural freedom, 
it may also be argued that to reach even post-colonised subjects as readers, 
those whose cultural conditioning has been so largely affected and even 
effected by the dominant post-colonising culture, such 'accessible' and 
'attractive' features are of most use, whatever the full origins and 
implications of their attractiveness to the culture which displaced their 
own. 
The Temptations of Big Bear comprises, among other things, a post-
colonial critique of colonisation and its impact both on the land and on the 
order of human relationships to the land. It is a critique which is 
predicated on the understanding of colonisation as the bringing of writing 
to the land, instituting a Manichean conflict of oppositions. On the 
immediate level these oppositions are founded on the pervasive conflict 
between speech and writing; however these can be seen to align with the 
underlying opposition of presence and absence, the former terms 
associated with Big Bear and the Indian people, while the latter are 
associated with the white colonisers. 
Through his use of imagery in descriptions of the land and both Indian 
and white responses to it, Wiebe suggests the unwritten, undifferentiated 
character of the land in traditional Indian habitation which allows 
unrestricted movement. Yet colonisation is well underway, and apart 
from white references to "unmapped wilderness" (325), land which always 
lies beyond the point of view of subjective presence, such a landscape is 
more often represented through Big Bear's contrasting of a time when his 
people "'once were great and rode wherever their eyes touched land'" 
(350), and a new order of 'written' land. This is land written on, as evoked 
in imagery of lines and angles suggesting 'lifeless' geometric abstraction, 
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but conveying the 'lifelessness' precisely through the use of 
anthropomorphising imagery which characterises as 'dead' something that 
has never been 'alive'. However, what is evoked is Big Bear's cultural 
view of nature and the land, in which any presence on the land can only 
be understood in terms of it having been a living part of the land: 
He saw then that straight lines had squared up the land at right 
angles, broad lines of stark bleached bones had been spread straight, 
pressed and flattened into the earth for him to ride over, and sliced 
into the hills as if that broad thong of bone could knuckle them 
down, those immovable hills. Wherever he looked the world was 
slit open with unending lines, squares, rectangles, of bone and 
. between the strange trees gleamed straight lines of, he comprehended 
it suddenly, white buildings. Square inedible mushrooms burst up 
under poplars overnight; but square. (409) 
As colonisation spreads, the land is written across, the lines dividing the 
land serving to unite the white settlements in communication, with 
"Surveyors sticking poles with wires and government agents sending 
messages and missionaries talking talking to stop stop stop" (101). The 
forward movement of this passage echoes the progress of colonisation 
across the land, while the staccato repetition of "talking" and "stop" 
simultaneouly evokes the relentless imposition of the missionaries' 
message of Christian prohibitions and the mechanical communication by 
telegraph. Writing thus effected cultural and geographical boundaries, 
defining an 'inside' and an 'outside', and defining as a result, the Indian 
place on the land: 
Big Bear: 'I have always lived on the Earth with my people, I have 
always moved as far as I wished to see. We take what the earth gives 
us when we need anything, and we leave the rest for those who 
follow us. What can it mean that I and my family will have a 
'reserve of one square mile'? What is that?' 
James McKay: 'Since you are a chief and have a large family, you will 
receive land in proportion. All your band can receive land in one 
place'. (29) 
Pivotal to the novel's representation of the colonisation of the land is 
the writing of the land into treaties, whose dual function is the writing in 
of the whites and the writing out of the Indians. At the opening of the 
novel, we read the reflections of Governor Morris as he recognises the full 
meaning and power of Sweetgrass's and Seenum's signing of the treaty: 
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Once he would have thought that those twenty-seven His X Marks 
under Sweetgrass and James Seenum made little difference, but no 
longer. Not after the several hundred thousand square miles to 
which he had finally and forever extinguished, as the Prime Minister 
liked to say it, all native rights. (9) 
Indeed the white relationship to the land and landscape is characterised as 
writing on the one hand in the epistemological need attributed to them to 
write/right it into meaning -- to confer propriety by way of property (rights) 
-- such that, "it can drive a small man to madness, this incomprehensible 
unending at any point seemly unresisting and unchecked space. To 
control, to humanize, to structure and package such a continent under two 
steel lines would bring any engineer headier joy than the lyric prospects of 
heaven" (114). The imagery and implications of commodification as a 
colonising relation to the land are clear here, and similar imagery will be 
shown to be used to characterise such discourse in discussion of Patricia 
Grace's Potiki. 96 On the other hand, the white relationship to the 
landscape is 'writing' in the sense that from the Indian point of view, one 
consistently associated with 'nature', whites themselves are representative 
of the characterlessness or lifelessness of writing, shown when Big Bear 
sees "the tiny straight lines of police who all looked exactly alike as a bird 
would see, a hawk soaring," while by contrast the Indian women and 
children appear "like a variegated lake folded over the hills" (189). Not 
only are the whites seen as 'writing', but the difference is emphasised in 
that the point of view adopted by Big Bear is the natural one of a soaring 
hawk. The description of the police foreshadows an episode towards the 
end of the novel, when Kitty McLean, a young white girl differentiated 
from almost all other whites in the novel by her closeness to and 
understanding of Big Bear, is sitting in the courtroom at Big Bear's trial: 
"the black sleeve of Mr Richardson's arm was moving a pen across more 
paper ... she couldn't read a word, more words slurred goose tracks over 
white paper" (383). The illegibility of the writing, and the association of 
her point of view with that of Big Bear are inter-dependent. 
Another opposition characterising the respective relationships to the 
land of the Indian and the white people is that of life and lifelessness, or 
life and death. The novel represents the Indian world view as one in 
which the land is alive through Wiebe's use of personifying imagery to 
'embody' the landscape, attributed to the Indian point of view. Indeed, 
there is a sensuality evoked in the relationship between them, emphasised 
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by the prevalence of female imagery for the land: "The two men lay 
spreadeagled against the ground and looked into a slight breath of air, 
down across a hollow that opened wide towards the west as if once 
scrapped by some giant, hard river. The lips of its banks curved to level 
away north and south" (124). Clouds have "rounded bellies" (134), or 
combine into "one sagging belly" (331). Features of the landscape include 
the land's "black shoulders" (155), 'the naked river," and "a nipple of the 
south hills" (162). Natural elements are even given points of view, such 
that Big Bear wonders "How often ... had Sun had to look down upon 
what they saw that summer?" (134), and an ethical subjectivity, evoked in 
the suggestion of its betrayal, when "There was no accusation in [Big 
Bear's] tone but the chiefs were staring above him into nothing, as if they 
could not face the ground" (197).97 
This attribution is consistent with the many images that conversely 
represent the Indians as part of the land(scape). However, this perception 
is shared by both whites and the Indians themselves. To the Governor, 
'the Indians circled before him seemed not so much human as 
innumerable mounds the earth had thrust up since morning" (17, see also 
141), but Big Bear also sees his family as "mounds in the dark lodge" (217), 
and the "chiefs and councillors of the one thousand six hundred and 
seventy-eight Indians" as "like motionless rocks" (205). The most 
important to this point, and probably the most well-known passage in the 
novel, is the description of Big Bear's returning to the earth -- the sand 
hills -- on death: 
He felt the granular sand joined by snow running together, against 
and over him in delicate streams. It sifted over the crevices of his lips 
and eyes, between the folds of his face and hair and hands, legs; 
gradually rounded him over until there was a tiny mound on the 
sand hill almost imperceptible on the level horizon. Slowly, slowly, 
all changed continually into indistinguishable, as it seemed, and 
everlasting, unchanging rock. (415) 
Although Wiebe presents the identification of the Indians with the land 
from an Indian and a white point of view, in each case the implications are 
quite different. For the Indians, it represents a view of the inter-
connectedness of all living things· in nature; for the whites, it represents 
the location of the Indians in a state of nature before -- and requiring -- the 
supplement of culture. Indeed, as the passage from the Governor's point 
of view illustrates, the Indians are associated with the land in a gesture of 
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de-humanisation, which is quite different from linking the human and 
the land. Thus they are colonised along with, as part of, the land. The 
implications of this rationale are referred to by Wiebe in an essay, "Bear 
Spirit in a Strange Land [All that's Left of Big Bear]": "White men are very 
resourceful; once they have forced you to give up the land, there is not 
much they cannot legally arrange to do with you, one way or another."98 
The sinister tone of this statement is conveyed in Big Bear through 
imagery of land-murder, associated with the Indian perceptioI1 of the 
impact of white colonisation. A principal agent of this murder is the 
railroad that '''strangles the land'" (204), always imaged from the Indian 
point of view, not outside of, but as an evil perversion of, nature. 
Miserable Man, watching a train, ponders that "sometimes it shuddered 
horribly, as if it would tear itself to pieces snorting black smoke in the air, 
shrieking as it scraped itself over the steel. There seemed to be some 
burning devil in it" (137). Later, Big Bear tells his people of "'the Iron 
Horse on its track, choking the Earth, throwing sparks to set the prairie 
burning and it of course has no concern since it can outrun any fire'" (202). 
There is no suggestion that it has no concern because it has no subjectivity. 
The perversion of nature is constantly linked to the associations of 
lifelessness or actual death in the artifical constructions of the whites. The 
train is a perversion because it is an Iron Horse. Similarly, the 
impermanence and insubstantiality of paper is contrasted with the 
permanence of the land. Big Bear's observation that "'Land was not like 
paper; wind did not blow it away nor water rot it" (72) underlies his view 
of the unreliability of the treaty, the "'promises in it that I can't find 
between my fingers'" (202). Piapot similarly casts aspersion on the 
permanence or reliability of the treaty, pointing out that "'The treaty is 
paper .... Paper burns in any fire'" (148-9). 
An important symbol of the association of white technology and death 
to the Indian way of life is the scaffold, which constitutes a line of imagery 
used throughout the novel. It suggests the constructions (in both senses) 
placed on the land, in the building of white settlements. Linking the senses 
of the physical constructions and mental constructs placed on the 
landscape by colonisation, is the view that "Between this stone and the 
fading shore rose stubby blackish and purple columns, sheathed in 
changing grey on their inner curves, interlaced bars and beams like an 
immense neglected scaffold hurled over the water" (329). Similarly, in Big 
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Bear's mind, the sight of the train constructed a vision such that "those 
memories scaffolded together something he could not lose even in the 
astonished laughter of his women (131). However, the scaffold represents 
death in a more obvious way, one which is represented as both a 'real' 
threat to Big Bear's own life -- when he stands trial, on pain of hanging, for 
treason -- and in a figurative way, though not understood as such by the 
white authorities, as the death of a whole way of life. Big Bear's 
"scaffolded" memories generated by the sight of the train are referred to in 
the text immediately after he has admitted, "'I may have fallen asleep, 
though I wish I hadn't. I didn't feel a rope'" (131). And early in the novel 
he has told of his apprehensions for his people and their way of life in 
terms of his own neck: '''There is something that I dread. To feel the rope 
around my neck'" (25). 
However, the oppositions of nature and life, speech and presence, to 
culture and death, writing and absence which appear to pervade the text's 
critique of white colonisation of the land, are at many points and in many 
important ways unsustainable as the basis of post-colonial representation 
of that history. For example, the passage describing Big Bear's last buffalo 
hunt demonstrates that death is part of nature, part of life. Big Bear is 
concerned for the well-being of the herd: "'Poor mus-toos-wuk,' said Big 
Bear. 'Just sixteen .... One calf. The cows are barren, there's something 
with them. And when do they feed together so quietly in summer,no bull 
sniffing around or bellowing?'" (124-5). Yet, he believes in the necessity 
for, and enjoys, the hunt. He prays (in a manner suggestive of an earlier 
Christian missionary presence): 
'Our Father, The Main One, I have to name you first. All things 
belong to you. Look on our hunting .... Forgive us for being hungry, 
I thank you that you have let us see food again. I ask you for a good 
running, that we can kill all the eleven cows and the four bulls and 
the calf also which I think is female. I cannot ask more now because 
it is time to hunt'. (126-7) 
Once the hunt is underway, he is caught up in "the total consuming 
unconscious joy of the one more run merging with mus-toos-wuk given 
once more to the River People" (127), and at its conclusion, he prays: 
"asking forgiveness of the Great Buffalo Spirit, thanking for what had been 
given, for the tongue, for the blood, for fat and bone and meat and hide, for 
sinews and the hollow cups of her hooves. In the circle of sun and sky and 
earth and death he stood complete" (129). The irony of Big Bear's 
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acceptance of the circle of life and death in a discursive context in which 
the Indians are located on the pole of life and the whites on the pole of 
death is increased when one notes Wiebe's own admission of his 
difficulties in writing the passage: "I have never killed an animal in my 
life. So I have to recreate Big Bear's last buffalo hunt as a man who truly 
loved it. A lot of that stuff is totally inimical to my own way of looking at 
the world."99 
It is also apparent that the nature-culture opposition does not 
unproblematically characterise the Indian and white worlds. A key aspect 
of white culture's relationship to the land has been shown to be the 
mediation of writing, opposed to the freedom of the Indian from such 
constraining textuality. However, Wiebe includes descriptions of the 
Indians 'reading', or attempting in the context of colonisation's erasures, 
to read the land, a gesture which implies its prior status as text, and an 
Indian point of view in relation to it which confers upon it the cultural 
differentiations of landscape: "Kingbird's tracks were sifted over in the 
time it took to study the land" (81). They also write on the land, 
exemplified when the excited Kingbird "stooped and drew lines on the 
dust" showing barricades "'each side, here and here .... Here's the slough 
and the willows here and the little ravine comes at it here ... .''' (179). 
Similarly, the Indian gaze on the landscape 'writes' it through metaphor, 
into spatial plays of meaning. Big Bear prescribes a necessary response to 
the dangers posed by colonisation in terms of an analogy to a familiar 
occurrence on the land: "'Who stirs in his sleep when a single buffalo 
runs? But when a herd moves, ahhh -- we too must shake the ground, we 
must speak with one thundering voice'" (203). Similarly, the imagery of 
perverse but animate creatures attributed to the Indians' perception of the 
railroad is not simply a 'innoc~nt' failure of cognition. There is a passage 
in which such terminology forms the basis of some self-conscious and 
ribald mirth among the young men with Big Bear: 
the head of the worm had already crawled behind a shoulder of the 
land to the wes t. 
'I shot it in the penis,' Kingbird was saying . 
. . . 'That slippery thing near the ground going in and out, just like a 
man doing it'. 
'Yeh, I saw that, but there wasn't any --' Miserable Man's big face 
turned slackly from one to the other, 'To itself?' 
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Big Bear said quickly, 'The bullet didn't stop it.' Everyone craned 
about to stare as if they had not remembered him. 'White skins can 
do anything, even to themselves.' 
Miserable Man clutched himself, almost fell from his horse in his 
howling laughter. The endless ribald variations that they flung at 
each other riding lasted all the way back. (136) 
Such humour is dependent upon the play of language and meaning, 
evidence of a cultural order of the appropriate and the inappropriate, and 
the 'writing' which allows the suppressed latter, in its suppressed st~tus, to 
be provisionally privileged. In other words, the land and its inhabitants 
are not undifferentiated to the Indian eye in a way suggestive of the 'pre-
cultural'. Indeed, it is a white, Edgar Dewdney, who writes of experiencing 
it in such terms. Instead, nature is ordered and differentiated into systems 
of cultural value. Not all nature is equal, or equally valued. For example, 
Big Bear notices "the trees that grew in short clusters everywhere. They--
hadn't been there when he hunted buffalo and now the wind used them 
to wait behind and gather itself and slam him with steel doors" (405). The 
malevolent and alien character of these trees is further underlined by the 
earlier vision of "whites crowded like tall black trees around him" (354). 
Thus, whites are associated with (unwelcome) nature, from the point of 
view of cultural practices of relating to and moving across the land, 
purposes to which this alien 'nature' is a barrier. Even Kitty McLean's 
description of the translation of Big Bear's words compared with the 
quality of his voice as "wind rubbing willow branches of a winter night" 
compared with "sun ... all golden" (278), further underlines both the 
negative associations of trees, and the cultural hierarchisation of nature 
according to principles of value and appropriateness, or belonging. 
Therefore, colonisation did not bring writing to an unwritten, that is, 
empty and meaningless land. However, although Keith is correct is his 
observation that 
For Wiebe ... the prairie unrest that came to a head at Frog Lake and 
Batoche is not so much a struggle for power between two opposed 
forces or even a moral conflict between right and wrong, justice and 
injustice. More fundamentally, it is a tragic (because unavoidable) 
clash between two irreconcilable ways of looking at human beings 
and their environment,lOO ' 
he does oversimplify when he differentiates them as, "Stated bluntly. 
[that] the white viewpoint was primarily commercial and economic ... 
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while that of the Indians was fundamentally religious. "101 To place these 
terms in opposition betrays the very moral and spiritual crisis of post-
colonialism underlying a text which clearly privileges the Indian moral 
claim. It elides the Indian economic relationship to the land as the source 
of shelter and sustenance, bound up as this is in spiritually informed 
systems of exchange and value -- prayers of forgiveness and thanks in 
exchange for the right to kill and eat. Both Indians and whites take from 
the land in order to live and eat. The difference lies more accurately in the 
imposition of capitalism as the system which transformed relationships to 
the land, including its in-built requirement to erase the Indians in the 
establishment of white property relations and a profit-centred economy, as 
compared with the Indian system of taking "what the earth gives us when 
we need anything, and ... leav[ing] the rest for those who follow us" (29). 
The post-colonial desire to re-privilege the Indian relationship to the 
land as spiritual, and based on a non-exploitative, subsistence-ethic, 
embroils the post-colonial writer in numerous paradoxes. The Indian 
relationship to the land is held to be characterised by qualities which 
require and determine a relationship of presence to the land as opposed to 
the mediations and alienations of capitalism: workers from their labour 
and its productivity, the consumer from the source and process of 
production, and the Indian from the land. The insistence on the qualities 
of 'presence' that define Big Bear's place on the land privileges as "more 
enduring," and "all that is essential and permanent in his world,"102 the 
very values which have indeed passed away and been erased from the 
land. It is their very absence which generates the representation of their 
presence, conferring them, in representation, with a further absence -- that 
of textuality. At the end of Big Bear's trial there is a conflation of 
originating absences -- absences at the origin -- which profoundly 
problematise Big Bear's authenticity. His request that '''the court ... print 
my words and scatter them among White People. That is my defence'" 
(400) reverses the status of print from an instrument of his prosecution to 
that of his defence; its ability to be scattered, and to lose truth and meaning 
in proportion to its distance from the source, is revalorised as its ability to 
cover the land in truth; and yet the apparent failure of his request to be 
honoured -- for the text to be produced -- sets in place the absence of that 
very request so that Wiebe must invent it, and (re)place Big Bear's request 
within it. Indeed, the absence is the very space which Wiebe's novel fills, 
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once more effecting the textual erasure of the Indian and the privilege of 
the text. 
My Place103 is another text which constitutes a critique of colonisation 
and its impact on the land and human relationships to the land. 
However, unlike The Temptations of Big Bear, this is not explicitly 
represented as a critique of writing; nevertheless, writing pervades the 
terms of critique, and the construction of an Aboriginal contestatory 
subjectivity. The text produces an account of the hybridisation, or inter-
textuality, of post-colonial Aboriginal identity, and by implication, 
relationship to the land. 
Another difference from The Temptations of Big' Bear is that the 
present of the text's narrative is the post-colonial 1980s, a difference with 
many implications for the critique of colonisation. It enables a standpoint 
of Aboriginal survival, adaptation and recuperation not suggested in the 
depiction by Wiebe of the disappearance of a culture, reinforced by the fact 
that it is by someone not of that culture. However, it further enables an 
analysis of colonisation as still happening, as opposed to an era that is 
contained in, and ended at the latest point of, the period retrospectively 
named 'colonialism' by white history. Admittedly, The Temptations of 
Big Bear is set after Confederation, and thus associates the unification of 
Canada into a 'nation' -- or Nation, as it is informed by imperial culture --
with the colonisation of the land; on the other hand, the greater strength 
and mythologisation of Australian nationalism provides an even stronger 
counterpoint between the 'heroic' discourse of that mythology and its 
'progressive' notion of history, and the analysis of the perpetuation of 
colonialism as the order of Aboriginal placement on the land. In other 
words, the Aboriginal relation to 'post-colonialism' means something 
very different from that of the post-colonisers. From the indigenous point 
of view, historical progress from colonialism to nationalism to post-
colonialism has largely meant the continuation -- albeit in different ways --
of colonisation, profoundly problematising linear notions of historical 
progress. However, this is a post-colonial problematisation: it is the 
product of Aboriginal discourse as political analysis in a cultural context 
which provides, in fact is defined by, a space for that discourse where it did 
not exist in 'colonial' and 'nationalist' contexts. Further, as will be shown, 
the Aboriginal discourse itself is post-colonial. 
i 
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It is from this standpoint that the Aboriginal relationship to the land in 
'colonial-nationalist' days is reconstructed by the characters in My Place. 
Daisy reminisces, "I been a hard worker all my life. When I was little, I 
picked the grubs off the caulies and the cabbages at the back of the garden. I 
got a boiled sweet for that. Now the blackfellas weren't allowed to pick any 
vegetables from the garden. You got a whipping if you were caught" (329). 
Sally, having "read up on" Aborigines in a history library, tells her mother: 
'You know, the pastoral industry was built on the backs of slave 
labour. Aboriginal people were forced to work, if they didn't, the 
station owners called the police in. I always thought Australia was 
different to America, Mum, but we had slavery here, too. The people 
might not have been sold on the blocks like the American Negroes 
were, but they were owned, just the same.' (151) 
It is from Arthur's story that personal memories of the place of the 
Aborigine in the pastoral industry are added to this analysis. His account 
focuses on the contradiction between the extent of Aboriginal labour and 
the white accrual of wealth and profits from that labour. His 'odyssey' of 
exploitative employment culminates in this description of heroic 
perseverance 'rewarded' with financial reticence. The impact, and many 
important aspects of the description, are only conveyed with lengthy 
citation: 
The year was 1916, it was the middle of winter and there was a flood 
on. After a while, [Hancock] said, 'Marble, you clear that forty acres of 
land I been wantin' cleared and I'll give you twelve pounds, no more, 
no less!' 
Now he'd tried to get all sorts of people to clear that land. Nobody 
could do it. It was covered with big logs and stumps, and with the 
flood on, it was worth more like one hundred pounds, not twelve 
pounds! Trouble was, I knew he had me, and he knew, too. Where 
could I go, I had no money, no home .... 
I don't think he believed I'd clear the land. He thought he'd have 
me there three more years, doing his work for him, building his 
house. He didn't know me. I worked from three hours before 
sunrise to sunset, clearing and burning. During that time the flood 
got worse and the railway line was nearly washed away. Every day, I 
was soaking wet. My feet were blocks of ice .... I wasn't going to give 
up, it was my only way out. The job took me three weeks. I cleared 
the land by myself when no other man would, or could. 
I showed Hancock the land, then I asked him for my money .... He 
didn't give me the money right away, but he kept me waiting, 
waiting, hoping I'd forget about it. He knew I'd leave as soon as he 
gave me the money. I kept asking him for my pay. In the end, he 
went to Perth and got the money from the bank. Then, he took out 
--
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fifteen shillings a week board for the three weeks it had taken me to 
clear the land. (197) 
Arthur's narrative positions him ambivalently in relation to the racially 
overdetermined capitalism he describes. As a 'worker' he is already 
inevitably a participant in industrialised agriculture. His resistance is not 
presented here in terms of his own attempts to reinstitute for himself a 
traditional relationship to the land based on an Aboriginal land efhic. 
Instead, he counters Hancock's evaluation of the value of his labour with 
his own, but recognises that it is an 'employers' market', and attempts to 
'cut his losses' by working so hard that the inadequate pay for the work is 
earned in a shorter than expected period of time. Ultimately, however, 
Hancock the employer determines whether, when and how much 
payment is made, and in a gesture typical of a centralised, mediated 
capitalist economy, deducts living expenses. 
Arthur's critique focuses on ethical questions of honesty and 
'humanitarianism', and he makes frequent references to his own prowess 
and his uniqueness in the ability to do the work. This uniqueness is a 
telling foreshadowing of his unusual position as eventual owner of land, 
suggestive of the ideology more common to oppressive groups in response 
to claims of systematic oppression and hardship, that individual hard 
work is the requirement for economic and social success. Admittedly, 
Arthur's Aboriginality remains the principal factor complicating his 
endeavour. He recalls that "When I should have had sheep, they 
wouldn't give me any because my colour wasn't right" (207). 
Nevertheless, he remains a selective participant in textually-mediated land 
relations. He recalls a devastating hailstorm, and reflects, "I think God 
must have been looking after me. Something told me to get insured that 
year. I had never been insured before" (199). Yet even as a land owner, he 
balances his place, in relation to the land, between worker and employer: 
"I was on my own, a black man with no one to help him. I done all the 
fencing myself, bought everything, the dam, too. Paid money to men to 
clear the land. I chopped all the fence posts, dug out the holes and, when 
there was nothing else to do, helped clear the land" (207). However, 
despite his gratitude for the availability of insurance, he rejects the bank's 
mediation of his place on the land: "I made sure lowed no one. I didn't 
want no mortgage. You mortgage a place and you're beat. They've got you 
then, just over a lousy little bit of money" (207). This concern is as 
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reminiscent of the insecurities of white land owners in a Depression as it is 
of Aboriginal rejection of white institutional mediation. However, even 
the sale of his land is presented as an example of financial exploitation and 
deception: 
We sold the farm bare for four thousand pounds. He told me he 
wanted to rent it for so many years till he got his money together. So 
he gave me four hundred pounds the first year, and said he couldn't 
give me any more till he'd made some more money out of my farm 
so he could pay for it. There was no stipulation in our agreement that 
my horses and machinery went with the land, but soon I found out 
he was takin' my horses and machinery and workin' his other farms 
with them as well as mine. 
-.... [T]he following year, The Depression hit and he said he 
couldn't go through with the sale. (208) 
With the Depression, Arthur is once again required to work for other men 
in order to supplement his own land's poor return. Again, despite the fact 
that he would "do anything to make a few bob," he reflects that "By gee, 
some men were mean, then, they'd pinch my roots and my charcoaL I was 
doin' the work and they was gettin' the profits" (208). 
The term 'odyssey' to describe Arthur's account of his experiences was 
chosen to evoke the literary construction and inter-textuality of that 
account. Arthur's already mentioned self-declared prowess places him 
within a narrative tradition he himself invokes, and within which he 
places himself: "In three years, I was head stockman and mustering cattle 
all over the district. It was pioneer days then" (191). Having referred to 
"pioneer days," he calls upon his participation in the pioneer era, and the 
heroism popularly associated with it, to propose his due of respect and fair 
treatment. Describing the mortgagee sale of his land and stock, he adds, 
"Can you tell me that was fair, for all my pioneering days, to be treated like 
that?" (209). When he later refers to the ethic mythologised as the basis of 
relations between men deriving from this time, his inter-textual reading of 
his place on the land is most evident. When one of his white neighbours, 
objecting to his presence as a 'blackfella', attempts to conspire with another 
man to have him driven from his land, Arthur explains, "You see, he 
thought he was going to turn this man against me, but this man was my 
friend. I'd helped him when things went wrong .... He was my mate" 
(209-10). 
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The Bible is another important element in this inter-textuality. 
Paradoxically, considering its function in the European colonisation of 
most settler societies, it is used by Arthur to critique colonisation more 
than it is perceived as an agent of it. Arthur confers upon God the status of 
"the best mate a man could have" (213). He then explicitly turns the 
message of the Bible against those who brought it, asserting the priority of 
the message over the messenger: "Take the white people in Australia, 
they brought the religion here with them and the Commandment, 'Thou 
Shalt Not Steal', and yet they stole this country. They took it from the 
innocent. You see, they twisted the religion. That's not the way it's 
supposed to be" (213) It is a significant aspect of the complexities of the 
post-colonial context of discursive appropriation and hybridity, that the 
appropriator / copy should posit its own more authentic status than the 
'original' . 
White appropriation of the land effected the displacement of 
Aboriginals in the very authority over, and determination of, their social 
and geographical place. Social displacement is fundamentally connected to 
the fracturing of both their belonging to, and their freedom to traverse the 
land. When she visits Alice Drake-Brockman, wife of the owner of 
Corunna Downs station on which her grandmother and mother were 
born, Sally learns of the 'colonial' social ethos of the early twentieth 
century, and it implications for Aboriginal people: 
In talking to Alice, it dawned on me how different Australian society 
must have been in those days. There would have been a strong 
English tradition amongst the upper classes, I could understand the 
effects these attitudes could have had on someone like Nan. She 
must have felt terribly out of place. At the same time, I was aware 
that it would be unfair of me to judge Alice's attitudes from my 
standpoint in the nineteen eighties. (170) 
The ironic position of an indigenous person being "out of place" in the 
land from which she has been displaced by a social order deriving from 
'out of the place', is evident here. The colonial social context is contested 
not so much on moral grounds as on grounds of alien inauthenticity, 
being strongly associated with Britain and its (not Australia'S) class system. 
Further, the unwillingness to "judge" Alice is somewhat puzzling given 
the text's overall illustration of the survival of such attitudes into the 
nineteen eighties, but it constitutes an avoidance of seeing the problem as 
one of individual morality or guilt in favour of locating it within a social 
174 
system which constructs racist and colonialist subjectivities into which 
individuals are interpellated without entirely free choice. 
Sally's mother also recounts, from the point of view of adult 
understanding, her childhood experience of separation from her mother 
and home, the imposition of white law determining and restricting 
Aboriginal movement. The failure of Daisy to visit her in hospital after an 
operation is later learned to be "because of the curfew, which prevented 
Aboriginal people travelling after dark." She explains: 
Aboriginal people had to get permits to travel. ... 
Each time Mum came and saw me, she always had a bit of paper 
with her that said she was allowed to travel. A policeman could stop 
her at any time and ask to look at that paper, if she didn't have it on 
her, she was in big trouble. (250). 
Certainly Aboriginal society is shown as having its own laws of access to, 
or legitimate place on, the land. Arthur refers in his account to two friends 
he called Aunty and Uncle, explaining, "I wasn't in my home country and 
I thought if other natives asked who I was, it would give me some 
protection" (195). Although this is clearly an account of the transgression 
of that law, from a post-colonisation perspective which refers to the 
rightful inhabitants of the land not by their name, but as 'natives',104 much 
of the text's critique of colonisation in its historical and post-colonial forms 
comprises a contrasting of white (capitalist) and Aboriginal land ethics. 
As Arthur puts it, for example, "You don't see the black man diggin' up 
the land, scarin' it. The white man got no sense" (148). However, as a 
function of the institutional economic and social power of the colonisers, 
and the long history of Aboriginal separation from the land on which their 
ethic was established and perpetuated, this post-colonial account of an 
Aboriginal land ethic is a hybrid of adaptation and tradition. This is well 
illustrated in the following account of Aboriginal mining given by one of 
the people Sally and her family meet in their journey North: 
'my family, we started off most of the tin-mining in this area. We 
would go through and strip the country, and all that old Corunna 
mob would come behind and yandy off the leftovers. I think they did 
well out of it. We were happy for them to have whatever they found, 
because they were the people tribally belonging to that area. It was 
like an unwritten agreement between them and us. Now and then, 
others would try and muscle in, but we wouldn't have any of that, it 
belonged to that mob only. We let them come in and carryon 
175 
straight behind the bulldozers. It gave them a living. We were 
careful about sacred sites and burial grounds, too, not like some 
others I could mention. The old men knew this. Sometimes, they 
would walk up to us and say, 'One of our people is buried there'. So 
we would bulldoze around it and leave the area intact'. (225) 
One important point to be drawn from this passage is the refusal to 
fetishise tradition, but instead to enact the possibility ofa compatibility 
between economic and traditional and spiritual values. Secondly, this 
adaptation provides a standpoint of survival and strength from which to 
contest the white radical separation of economics and spirituality as 
ordained by capitalism. This ultimately serves to 'underwrite' Aboriginal 
counter-discourse, insuring it against charges of impracticality in the 
economic context of the late twentieth century. Arthur, too, is able to 
combine 'white' practicality and Aboriginal respect for the land and all its 
inhabitants. There was, on his farm at Mukinbudin, "a part of his land 
that he kept uncleared so the wildlife could prosper in peace" (148). 
Despite the adaptations made in the interests of securing a livelihood 
from the land in an 'industrial' agriculture, and the eventual reality of an 
urban rather than a rural way of life for many Aboriginal people, the 
continued inheritance of a spiritual affinity with 'wildlife' is expressed. 
Each narrating character recounts a special affinity with the creatures of the 
land, water and sky. Significantly, the description tends to relate the 
childhood experience of that affinity first or foremost, a priority which is 
overdetermined. This association of childhood with a state closer to 
nature -- less acculturated -- has been referred to in relation to Kitty 
McLean in The Temptations of Big Bear. While this is one way of reading 
the text's valorisation of childhood, as a reflection of properties inherent 
in childhood (according to Rousseauian principles), there is also a sense in 
which the placement of 'nature' in each narrative logically precedes the 
account of historical removal from the land and the fracture of that 
relationship. The text contains numerous examples of the removal of 
Aboriginal children from their homes and parents, and adult Aboriginal 
insecurity and impermanence of place as a result of being denied the 
power to make decisions regarding movement. On another less explicit 
level, the contemporary prevalence of urban living for Aboriginal people 
contributes to the sense of a cultural 'Fall' constructed in the narrative, 
and in whose terms nature, childhood and innocence are implied 
associated antecedents. Yet each character necessarily recounts that 
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relationship with nature from a position outside of it -- specifically from 
the distance of adulthood -- and thus there is often interpolation of adult 
commentary, explanation or self-consciousness of the process of teaching 
and learning about the swamp, the bush, and their inhabitants. There is 
therefore emphasis placed on the transmission of cultural values between 
generations within a family, and even, in the frequent context of broken 
families, between individuals. 
Gladys'S account from her childhood in a Church of England children's 
home emphasises more than the others a solitary relationship with 
nature; however it is presented from a standpoint of adult evaluation and 
knowledge: "We'd come across all sorts of snakes, green ones, brown, 
black. We used to pick the green ones up and flick them. I wouldn't pick 
them up now"(248). Arthur's language also expresses pleasure in the 
natural environment of his childhood, but even more clearly than 
Gladys'S, positions it as a state of harmony from the standpoint of 
disruption through which that harmony could be known. However, it is 
not simply adulthood which is the source of knowledge, but the legacy of 
colonisation's changes to the land: "There were no insecticides then to kill 
the birds. That's why the blackfellas want their own land, with no white 
man messin' about destroyin' it" (181). Arthur's reminiscence highlights 
the natural world as a source of information about weather and the land's 
prosperity, raising the question of how such messages are 'read' -- in other 
words, the status of the land as 'text' for even traditional Aboriginal 
society. Daisy's teaching role as the transmitter of cultural values and 
knowledge about the land is clear throughout the text. Indeed, Sally's first 
childhood memories of the natural world around her centre precisely on 
Daisy's teaching of knowledge, influence over values, and concern for the 
wildlife of garden, bush and swamp: 
The early morning was Nan's favourite time of the day, when she 
always made some new discovery in the garden. A fat bobtail goanna, 
snake tracks, crickets with unusual feelers, myriads of creatures who 
had, for their own unique reasons, chosen our particular yard to 
reside in . 
. . . . I'd heard the bullfrog yesterday, it was one of Nan's favourite 
creatures. She dug up a smaller, motley brown frog as well, and, after 
I inspected it, she buried it back safe in the earth. (14) 
This link between Sally and her grandmother, and its placement 
towards the beginning of the text is, in another sense, the end-point of 
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Sally's narrative: it could only have been placed at the beginning from a 
position of hindsight, following a process of discovery which revealed 
Daisy's many influences over their lives. lOS However, given Sally's 
position as an almost solely urban Aboriginal whose childhood is largely 
spent in ignorance, not of her difference, but of her Aboriginality (her 
belonging), it is also a link necessary to the post-colonial positing of the 
survival of an Aboriginal land ethic. Sally's relationship to the land is 
subject to the influences of 'white' schooling, something she at various 
times both repudiates and accepts. Of characters in her early reading books, 
she recalls "I felt sorry for them. None of them lived near a swamp, and 
there was no mention of wild birds, snakes or goannas" (23). However, 
Sally's narrative increasingly suggests a disjunction between 
'authoritative' sources of knowledge, and her grandmother's retention of 
traditional habits (see 59-60). Well into her schooling, Sally's 'centre' of 
normality has changed, and she values the rational discourse of school 
science over her grandmother's 'eccentric' methods of combating germs 
(see 85). 
While it is shown that teaching the ability to read the land's signs is an 
integral part of the preservation of the Aboriginal land ethic, the text does 
not avoid the suggestion of special spiritual powers of communication 
with nature transmitted by virtue of Aboriginality. As Daisy argues, 
"Blackfellas know all 'bout spirits. We brought up with them. That's 
where the white man's stupid. He only believes what he can see. He 
needs to get educated. He's only livin' half a life" (344). She tells Sally: 
You and David are a lot alike, Sal. . . . you both got a feel for the 
spiritual side of things .... Your mother was like that, and me, too, I 
s'pose. You see, you never know what's gunna get passed down. Our 
people was strong in the spirit. ... You kids loved the bush, you got 
things passed down to you from Gladdie and me. Things that you 
only got 'cause we was black. (348)106 
A very important discursive shift has occurred here, one that is 
characteristic of post-colonised discourse, and one which works 
ambivalently for post-colonised peoples. A narrative which has been so 
powerfully one of Aboriginal dislocation and dispossession, exploitation 
and oppression, changes focus from this explicit and implied critique by 
the voice of victimhood and truth of white political, moral and ethical 
practices -- in short from the claim 'we are oppressed by you. It is unlucky 
to be Aboriginal' -- to one which expounds the privileges of being 
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Aboriginal which are denied to the white oppressors, or 'we are lucky to be 
Aboriginal. You are unlucky to be white'.107 This provides for the post-
colonised the sense that they have, on some level deeper than the reach of 
the colonising culture, retained the very traditions they are struggling to 
revive or preserve. On the one hand, this serves as an optimistic rallying 
point for cultural pride, but it also posits the spiritual 'essence' of 
Aboriginality as somehow sealed from the effects of the colonising culture, 
while the Aboriginals themselves are subject to it. Further, in reversing 
the message of cultural privilege from the European 'bestowal' of the 
benefits of Christianity, literacy, and so on, to specification of the 'poverty' 
of white culture, Aboriginal culture is placed in a position to be 
(selectively) appropriated in order to supplement the "half a life" whites 
are living, in the very conditions which make them susceptible to and able 
to 'afford' such messages. 
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the emergence of post-
colonised discourses of the importance of land and their own special 
spiritual connection to it, have simply evolved from the standpoint of 
oppressed victim to spiritual heir. Just as Daisy follows her description of 
the spiritual privileges of Aboriginality with the deflating conclusion, "'I 
been treated rotten, real rotten .... I been treated like a beast. Just like a 
beast of the field. And now, here I am ... old. Just a dirty old blackfella'" 
(352), each character's discourse balances both positive and contestatory 
positions. Having described childhood closeness to nature, each narrative 
also contains, and importantly, concludes with post-colonial questions of 
land issues. The ambiguous reality of their relationship to their cultural 
heritage is evoked, for example, in Sally's account of how she and her 
husband "became fed up with city life", and, in the manner of a (white) 
consumerist approach to 'lifestyle', "thought we'd try the country for a 
while" (146), an option which eventually proves economically 
unsustainable. This stands in marked contrast with Arthur's declaration 
that "'I'm going back to Mucka .... I got a yearning for that place. My own 
home, my land. I been away too long'" (166), a motivation more closely 
echoing the post-colonised re-seeking of their traditional lands. Yet even 
Arthur has, in his narrative, echoed white consumerist discourse -- that of 
tourism. He recounts that as a young man, he "just liked riding around, 
looking at the land and the bush. It was what you'd call my 
entertainment" (196). 
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The ambivalence of the post-colonised Aboriginal place on the land is 
perhaps best evoked in the two meanings of the word 'owning' as it is 
used throughout the text. There is the meaning of possession or property, 
whose force is to alienate the Aboriginal people from the land, illustrated 
when, having heard Sally's idea of returning to Corunna Downs, Arthur's, 
Daisy's and Gladys'S birthplace, Gladys asks, '''What if they won't let us on 
the station? We don't know who owns it now, they mightn't like 
strangers going out there'" (216). The concern itself, and the use of the 
term 'strangers', illustrates the profound difference between this sense of 
owning, and the sense of acknowledgement of ties. While the relationship 
between white station owners and the Aboriginal people is described as 
having been one of ownership in the possessive sense, the human 
relationships sought by the latter in the particular context of the 
relationship between the white station owners and hands, and their half-
Aboriginal children is that of acknowledgement. The import of such 
references is almost solely to the lack of such owning. However, it is a 
meaning which underlies the desire of Sally and her family to return to 
the land and people of their heritage, and as one Aboriginal woman puts 
it, to "'own'" them (229). 
Post-colonial Land Rights discourse is inevitably enmeshed in both 
senses of the word 'own'. In My Place, this discourse illustrates the balance 
of political and spiritual concerns, the recognition of history's legacy, and 
tradition, as the stand-point of contestation. Arthur acknowledges the 
need for, and validity of a multi-faceted resistance, offers an analysis of 
political and resource inequalities which invariably disadvantage the 
Aboriginal, and describes remarkable and idealised harmony and co-
operation between the Aboriginal and the land within traditional 
Aboriginal land ethics and practices (see 212). Gladys is more 
philosophical, and emphasises the transcendence of the spiritual over the 
physical, contesting the stereotypical basis of identification in 'physical 
features' and 'colour' as if these were natural and not produced; and over 
the historical, thereby positing Aboriginality as eternal and essential both 
to identity and to the land itself. Yet a moment of anxiety or doubt 
pervades even the final assertion of belonging (see 306). Finally, Daisy's 
ambivalence points to a recognition and disavowal of post-colonialism's 
very construction of possible discourses of the land. Beginning with an 
analysis which underlies 'land rights' discourse, she rejects that very term, 
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as if there were some other basis outside of that (or any) discourse for 
positing the Aboriginal relation to the land: 
I'm wonderin' if they'll give the blackfellas land. If it's one thing I've 
learnt in this world it's this, you can't trust the government. They'll 
give the blackfellas the dirt and the mining companies'll get the gold. 
That's the way of it. 
I don't like this word Land Rights, people are gettin' upset about it. 
I dunno what this word means. I've heard it on the news. (349) 
Her almost life-long public disavowal of her Aboriginality has, to some 
extent, in forcing her out of public life to maintain freedom from that 
identification, sealed her Aboriginality from the effects of hybridity. This is 
emphasised by Arthur's more participatory position vis-a.-vis white 
values, and a consequently more individualistic attitude towards his story 
(as the possible source of fame). Daisy, however, is closer to a traditional 
relationship to the land in her very rejection as incomprehensible and 
problematic, of the current concept of Land Rights. Nevertheless, it is 
unavoidably the term with discursive currency, and thus My Place is as 
much 'about' Land Rights as it is a personal quest. 
Like My Place, Patricia Grace's Potiki represents a post-colonised 
analysis of colonisation as still occurring, in this case for the Maori people. 
Like My Place, the narrative present of Potiki is also in the 1980s. In 
Morgan's text, the very awareness of, and pride in, being Aboriginal is 
presented as the principal victim of the history of dislocation from land 
and family, and the implication of urban white cultural norms; however, 
the characters of Potiki in the novel's present still live on their ancestral 
land. Although there have been fractures of the connection between the 
people and the land, and the healing is an important part of the novel's 
'quest' or journey motif, the immediate struggle is one of the preservation 
of their sense of who they are and the centrality of the land to their lives 
and identity, against the attempts of land developers to 'buy' -- or if 
necessary physically force -- them off their land to establish a multi-million 
dollar tourist recreational facility. Thus it is shown to be a struggle of 
broad cultl:lral significance for the Maori people, including spiritual, 
historical, economic and social aspects. Inevitably, therefore, in the face of 
the power of Pakeha capitalism, assertions of identity as the standpoint of 
contestation are mixed with anxiety about identity as the object of 
contestation, as their hold over their land is recognised as tenuous. 
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It is not simply the current strength of "money and power" which 
threatens them. As Roimata reflects: 
money and power were not a new threat. Money and power, at 
different times and in many different ways, had broken our tribes and 
our backs, and made us slaves, filled our mouths with stones, 
hollowed the insides of us, set us at the edge and beyond the edge, and 
watched our children die. (132) 
Both the recognition of a history of colonisation threatening the security of 
their land, as well as some strength to resist it, are derived by the 
Tamihana family from the experiences of the Te Ope people during the 
First World War. The recounting of these experiences also serves in the 
novel as a contextualisation of the current land struggle, not against an 
historical era known in 'settlement' terms as 'colonial', but against a 
strongly nationalist era, one in which colonisation is assumed to be 
complete. However, it is within this historical context that the dislocation 
from and dispossession of the Te Ope people's land is placed. Having 
'willingl y' agreed to allow their land to be used for war purposes -- their 
participation in the war effort evidence of their interpellation into the 
discourse of nationalism ("the country wanted more than Te Ope's young 
men. They wanted the land for purposes of war" [72]) -- they later discover 
this was to mean the demolition of their houses, including their wharenui 
[meeting housel. They are told that "the land could not be used as a 
landing field if it had houses on it" (72). However, no landing field 
eventuates, and it is found, i'before the second war ... that the land had 
been made into a playing field by men on relief work" (77). In the 
meantime, the Te Ope people have been forced from their own houses on 
their own land, into urban rental accommodation. 
The interweaving of this background with the struggle of the novel's 
present demonstrates, as was somewhat differently demonstrated in My 
Place, the meaning of the dominant construction of nationalism in New 
Zealand as yet another face of colonisation for the 'post-colonised' Maori. 
The Tamihana people learn, along with those of Te Ope, about 
official/unofficial deception. It is suggested that the taking of the Te Ope 
land for a landing field was "an excuse to scatter the people, destroy their 
homes, and take the land" (72). They also learn about bureaucratic 
protective anonymity. However, strength is gained through the shared 
experience much later of reviving this suppressed history and contesting it 
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in the courts: "The land still belonged to the people just as Reuben and his 
family knew it did. And at last the court of enquiry showed it too" (83). 
Strength is also gained by the Tamihana family when the support they 
offered to the people of Te Ope is returned. 
The novel's treatment of the post-colonial inter-relation of land and 
textuality once again consists in an apparent opposition between an 
'immediate' and 'authentic' indigenous relation to the land, as opposed to 
a mediated and abstracted or alienated post-colonising relation. The 
former is represented in terms of living directly on and from the produce 
of the land and sea, people's needs and nature's movements in harmony, 
conveyed in sensuous descriptions of, for example, fishing: 
The water was a soft orange colour ... and litle herrings put their 
mouths to the water's skin making sharp circles which widened and 
widened on the surface of the water. 
My father and brother and sister pulled the lines about over the 
surface of the water, and the herrings popped onto them time after 
time .... 
Soon the light went off the water and then the sea was only a sound 
-- a soft sucking sound and a fish splash sound; (48) 
descriptions of work on the land (87-88), lists of the past bountiful produce 
of the land, sharing the work of harvest and selling the excess (69), and 
finally, food preparation and eating. The preparation of the special fish 
caught by Toko is described in a mass of detail drawing in the senses of 
sight, smell, and taste: 
First of all they buried the head of the fish and the insides of the fish 
at the roots of the passionfruit vine. Then we all went up back into 
the bush to get green manuka brush for the smoke fire. Hemi started 
the sweet-smell fire in the smoke drum and we took the eel pieces 
out of the brine and dabbed the wetness away from them with a cloth . 
. . . The eel flesh was goldy and smelled of the sea and the trees. (52-
3) 
By contrast, capitalism, presented as colonisation's principal agent in 
late twentieth-century New Zealand, is embodied, even allegorised, in the 
figure of Mr Dolman, the land developer. He is renamed the "Dollarman" 
by silent consensus among the Tamihana people, although the 
implications for the people of being driven from the land into urban 
living include high unemployment, suggesting an equally valid rendering 
of his name as Mr Dole-man. In the superlative-laden discourse of land 
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development, Mr Dolman proposes "'development, opportunity .... First 
class accommodation, top restaurants, night club, recreation centre with its 
own golf links -- eventually, covered parking facilities'" (88). In this 
discourse, the sea becomes "'water amenities [which] will be the best in the 
country and will attract people from all over the world ... launch trips, 
fishing excursions, jet boating, every type of water and boating activity that 
is possible'" (88). The creatures of the sea would be contained in '''marine 
life areas ... your shark tanks ... / ... 'trained whales and seals etcetera III 
(88). There is the relentless suggestion, in the bustling activity and urgency 
of the Dollarman's discourse, the financial need to '''get in and out [of the 
land] quickly'" (91), of the imposition of Pakeha-capitalist constructions on 
the 'natural', unwritten landscape, where there would be "no movement 
or sound except for that which came from the quiet sliding, sidling of the 
sea" (87), and where, without the advent of "marine life areas", '''The 
dolphins come every second summer .... Close enough to be believed'" 
(92). Further, along with the packaging and commodification of "marine 
life," it is suggested -- in a perversion of the Maori assertion of one-ness 
with the land -- that their own 'culture' has a place in this scheme. But, as 
Toko narrates, "when a letter came telling us ... how we could dress up 
and dance and sing twice a day and cook food in the ground, we wrote 
angrily in reply. Our singing and dancing was not for sale, we said, nor 
was our food cooked on stones" (97). 
The capitalist gaze produces the landscape as ''' ... a much needed 
amenity ... this great potential you see, and this million-dollar view to be 
capitalised on'" (89). But the Tamihana people point out, ironically 
adopting the Dollarman's discourse, that just like the '''Prime amenities of 
land and sea and people''', the '''million-dollar view'" in fact '''Costs 
nothing'" (92). Indeed, the Dollarman's "'you see'" is not simply wrong --
what he sees is not what the Tamihana family see -- it is a form of 
discursive colonisation in presuming to tell them that they do, or should, 
see the land like this. But unlike the Dollarman discourse which is 
centred on the urgency of the present, and a conception of progress in the 
future ('''It's a great little spot. But maybe you have not seen its full 
potential'" [92]), which also presumes to tell the people what they do not 
see, the Tamihana family point out that for them, "The past is the future" 
(94), that "'what we're doing is important. To us. To us that's progress'" 
(90). Uncle Stan tells Mr Dolman, '''There's no lack of foresight, as you put 
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it. It's because we have foresight that we will not ever, not ever, let the 
land go. Take away the heart, the soul, and the body crumbles'" (97). 
The interwoven wholeness and one-ness of people and the land, the 
body and the spirit suggested in the Maori discourse contrasts with the 
vandalism and destruction of the land (and its inhabitants) perpetrated by 
Pakeha-capitalist interests. For example, when the land confiscated for 
"war purposes" is much later occupied by 'land protestors', the protestors 
make a garden "in a place which did not cause trouble to the people using 
the park. ... But the garden caused a lot of anger. There were angry people . 
. . who called the garden destruction and wilful vandalism. But the little 
garden ... was beautiful" (80-1). Instead, the vandalism is in the very 
destruction of this garden: "Several times the camp was attacked by angry 
people. A tent was torn down in the middle of the night, plants were 
pulled from the gardens and scattered. Rubbish was tipped at the tent 
openings, a bottle thrown, glass was scattered on the ground" (81). Having 
failed to 'buy' their way into the Tamihana land, the developers move in 
and try to force them off with violent tactics. These tactics are aimed a t the 
people through the land itself. The Tamihana famil.y wake one morning 
after heavy rain to find water "surrounding our houses and entering some 
of them, and water spread like a lake where the gardens had been. We 
discovered later in the morning that one side of the urupa had begun to 
slide away" (114). Toko realises that the sea, which had become "silted and 
yellow" was "the colour of broken hills" (115), and they soon found that 
"At the back of the land where the creek runs around the base of the hills 
the people found the rock and chunks of concrete and bitumen that had 
been piled up in the creek bed" (116). 
The consistent discursive construction of oppositions between Pakeha-
capitalist interests and those of Maori people raises the question of the role 
of textuality in understandings and discourse of the land in the noveL It 
has been shown that the mediating function of textuality is associated with 
Pakeha capitalism and contrasted with a discourse of unmediated one-ness 
with the land. However, the role of textuality is, in other ways, 
ambivalent. It is recognised as both complicit in colonisation and an 
important tool of resistance. The education system 'administers' 
conceptions of the land in the abstracted terms of 'writing', symbolic 
representations in lines, circles, and as the following passage shows, 
arbitrary available objects: 
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James's school stories were about the earth and the universe. The 
school earth was divided by lines -- latitude, longitude and equator. 
The people of this school earth lived in countries which were in 
continents, oceans and hemispheres. Some of the people in some of 
the school countries lived in eggshells on paper snow, some lived in 
matchstick villages by a paint sea crowded with dot-eyed fish. Others 
sat by cellophane fires with silver chocolate-wrap feathers in their 
hair, and others had cardboard homes behind a paper wall that could 
not be climbed by the sea. 
It was the charted rainfall, the sun, the hurricanes, the monsoons, 
the typhoons and snow, and it was the cross-sections of mountains, 
rivers, land and soil that told people what their lives would be. 
The school earth was an orange -- tilted, and squeezed top and 
bottom -- which took a whole day to turn, and a whole year to 
circumnavigate the tennis-ball sun. And it slotted into a universe 
which could be viewed through a peep-hole in a cardboard box, paper 
planets dangling from threads against navy-blue space, and light 
coming in through the cellophaned cutout in the box's lid. (39-40) 
The unmarked passage from 'scientific' to children's 'inauthentic' 
representations serves to undermine the rationality or 'truth' of science's 
discourse of the earth and the universe. The culturally obvious 
symbolism of the children's representations reflects science and mapping 
as equally abstracted constructs.108 It is as a result of writing's 'abstractions' 
-- alienations from the plenitude of the real -- that land is administered 
and access governed in terms of sections, identifying the land in terms 
such as "Block J136 ... J480 to 489" (89), maps planning road access for the 
developers (see p. 100), and even, in Pakeha hands, the ability to define 
centrality against marginality, so that it is argued that the Tamihana 
meeting house "could be shifted nearer to town, to a more central place" 
(100).109 
The account of the Te Ope dispossession and protests made at the time 
illustrates the ability of 'selective' textuality -- the losing or hiding of 
documentation -- to suppress discourses of contestation (see 82). Indeed, 
the political comfort accorded the Pakeha capitalists by paper is symbolised 
in its use as a source of physical comfort, as at the hearing of objectors to 
the land development scheme, "the chambers were full of people and 
noise, and the suit men were fanning themselves with envelopes and 
papers" (98). 
On the other hand, letter-writing is shown to have been an important 
tool of resistance, as the letters written by Rupena years before, "setting out 
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all that had been promised and all that had been done, and what the 
people wanted" (73) are eventually found, so that his grandson Reuban 
"began to learn the things that he wanted to learn" (76), and copies of the 
letters are shared so that the information could be made known, 
strengthening their claim in the court of enquiry. These copies of· the 
letters are preserved, as "Roimata and Manu and [Toko] made little books 
with them and read them and told them over and over.! And we made a 
big book from the newspaper cuttings that our Aunty had saved too" (78). 
Ho~ever, this passage alludes to an important difference posited 
between Maori and Pakeha textuality. There is still a positing of 
abstraction, alienation, or absence of authenticity in the Pakeha textual 
relationship to the land, while Maori land-related textuality is closer to the 
'reality' of the land, and constitutes a closer, more 'authentic' relation. 
This can be illustrated by comparing two letters relating to the Te Ope land. 
In the first, the markers of 'presence' of the Te Ope people to their text and 
their land are underlined: 
... we the people of Te Ope ask you if it was a right thing to do to take 
down these houses belonging to us. We think it would be right to 
talk of these matters first so that we can give our explanations to you 
and you can give your explanations to us. We write to say why have 
you done this? We have come to see you but you have only told us it 
is necessary and quickly gone away leaving us to look at each other ... 
I will tell you that the meeting-house was blessed in a Christian 
manner in the name of God who is above all men .... 
. . . Our land will come back to us and then we must build our 
houses again, but our money is going away to pay our rent. 
These are our thoughts and what do you reply to all of us ... .' (76) 
Markers of presence include specification of identity in relation to the land, 
appeals to morality, declarations of self-scrutiny and sincerity, assertions of 
physical approaches, direct rather than indirect phrasing of questions, and 
collectivity. By contrast, the letter they receive in reply is an illustration of 
markers of absence: 
'As has already been explained the houses of which you speak were 
demolished because the land is required for a landing field. Since the 
houses of which you write were substandard I am sure you must 
agree that there has been no great loss to you. You must appreciate 
that the homes that have been allotted to you have been given at a 
very low rental. 
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I note that in your letter you have mentioned a meeting-house. 
There was no building on the land that could in any way fit such a 
description. I suggest that you keep strictly to the facts if in future you 
feel you need to make further representation to this office'. (77) 
Absence is marked by the use of passive constructions, the authoritative 
singular pronoun and employment of imperatives, anonymity, and the 
positing of the impersonal "office" as transmitter and recipient of the 
letters. 
It is a characteristically post-colonial paradox that the epistemology of 
presence which is the nature of Potiki's articulation of a land-based 
epistemology, suppresses the differance of Maori discourse in its 
construction and function as a positivist, oppositional discourse. Indeed, 
not only are its own differences suppressed, but so are the differences 
between it and Pakeha discourse, as it is constructed in terms of what it 
opposes, and is thus a hybrid, symptomatic discursive image of Maori 
discourse, powerful and inauthentic in its very appeals to originality. 
For example, those aspects of Maori relationship to the land 
represented as 'immediate' are mediated precisely by representation, 
reflections of authenticity which position them in relation to the mirror-
effect of colonisation's fracture of the plenitude of immediacy._ In short, 
~t~~y are the culturally 'written' meanings of the land. The meanings are 
articulated in imagery which evokes the absence of difference between the 
people and the land, such that "both people and wood [are] parented by 
earth and sky so that the tree and the people are one, people being whanau 
[family, related] to the tree" (177). There is also imagery which describes 
the land in human terms, as em-bodied, when "the sea gashed its forehead 
on the rocks" (27), and when "At the stomach of the marae we stopped" 
(27). Land is portrayed as vulnerable to injury, when the developers "'bled 
the land'" (160), and it is recognised that "The hills will be scarred for some 
time .... But the scars will heal as growth returns, because the forest is 
there always, coiled in the body of the land" (169). The land is conferred 
with a subjectivity so that on the marae, the visitors "greet you, ground 
that we traversed" (28), and the gifts of light and dark are things "known to 
the earth as well as the sky" (174). 
These things known to the earth and the sky are known by the people 
in mythologies which comprise systems of meaning by which people live 
on the land. Roimata, returning to the Tamihana family land after time in 
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the city understands the need to return in terms of a reference to the story 
of Rona, the sky-dweller: 
Rona was a lonely figure up there in her moon-house, holding on to 
her little tree and her calabashes. Had she grasped a more sturdy tree, 
she could perhaps have stood against the anger of the moon .... 
'I felt as though I was floating', I said, 'As though there was nothing 
... important' . 
. . . I need at least a toe-hold'. (31) 
People are linked to the land by ancestry, the lines drawn from one 
generation to another according to culturally defined principles of 
lineality, and whose lines are the lines of history (see 10). Further, the 
presence of ancestors, buried in the land, defines that land as sacred (see 
91), and subject to the mediation of cultural protocol. When the children 
visited the urupa, Granny Tamihana "would give them the special 
containers that she kept under the shed and instructions on what was 
allowed and what was not allowed, and instructions on what needed to be 
done" (121). Even the meaning of land as livelihood is mediated by a 
process of learning, so that as a young girl, Granny Tamihana "had learned 
the use of plants, and known the trees and birds that lived there, while 
Hemi's "apprenticeship": 
his own education, had been on the land, and after his father had died 
Grandfather Tamihana had taught him everything to do with 
planting, tending, gathering, storing and marketing. He'd been 
taught about the weather and seasons, the moon phases and rituals to 
do with growing. At the same time he was made aware that he was 
being given knowledge on behalf of a people, and that they all trusted 
him with that knowledge. It wasn't only for him but for the family. 
(59) 
Such an education clearly shapes and mediates Hemi's relationship to the 
land as one of knowledge, as well as placing that knowledge within a 
cultural system that posits a collective rather than singular subject and 
Hemi's own mediating status as representative. 
The most direct acknowledgement of the cultural reading and writing 
of the land is, however, made in the discourse of post-colonial hybridity, 
emphasising the legacy of imposed cultural mediation, and thus not 
simply a textual but an inter-textual relation to land and landscape: 
The land and the sea and the shores are a book . . . and we found 
ourselves there. They were our science and our sustenance. And 
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they are our own universe about which there are stories of great 
deeds and relationships and magic and imaginings, love and terror, 
heroes, heroines, villains and fools. (104) 
This land is the basis of their epistemology, their source and guarantee 
of truth (see 160), and the recipient of their own innermost truths (see 
120). This is, however, a discursive construction made possible only by the 
history of colonisation and fracture against which it must be defined. This 
is not to argue that the relationship was, before colonisation, unmediated 
or prediscursive; only that the original relationship is forever un-
knowable, barred by post-colonial inter-textual discourse. Its evocation is 
therefore not authentic in terms of origins, but in terms of the 
construction of a contestatory counter-discourse to Pakeha, capitalist neo-
colonialism. 
Chapter Two has considered, through discourses which thematise 
'belonging' to the land, the location of land within a textual economy to 
which 'post-colonisers' have privileged access. I have illustrated strategies 
of discursive appropriation of the (discursive-subjective) place of the other, 
facilitating the appropriation of an 'authentic' belonging in the colonised 
land for the 'post-colonisers'. The chapter concludes with an exploration 
of fictional texts which articulate the effects, through the complicity of 
colonisation and textuality, of the alienation and dislocation of indigenous 
peoples. Chapter Three continues the thematic concern with the land and 
with questions of 'belonging', but does so in relation to the counter-
discourses of identity and authenticity articulated from the position of the 
'other', addressing both their 'appropriated' authority and their 
ambivalence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE POST-COLONIAL PROBLEMATISATION OF BELONGING 
3. I. Introduction. 
In Chapter Two I addressed the complicity of textuality in effecting the 
'belonging' of the (post-)colonisers through the alienation and dislocation 
of indigenous peoples, and the efficacy of textuality in mounting critiques 
of colonisation and land-based resistance on the part of those peoples. In 
Chapter Three I now consider discourses, not from that 'authoritative' 
subject-position 'within' the Symbolic, but located in the Imaginary terms 
of identity and identification with the 'others' of the dominant discourses 
of land ownership. Rather than imposing their identities on to the land, 
these 'others' seek their identity in relation to it. 
However, interacting with 'posFcolonised' discourses of identity and 
belonging, and their critiques of colonisation, are concomitant anxieties 
informing 'post-colonising' discourses regarding the validity and 
inauthenticity of belonging in relation to that historical legacy of 
colonisation. In the context of the 'presence' of identity inyoked by the 
post-colonised as indigenous, the post-colonisers face an absence in the 
space corresponding to that post-colonised identity. This failure to 
constitute a convincing post-colonising 'identity' gives rise to discourses 
which break down the notion of such a monolithic post-colonising 
identity into available 'presences': 'woman' as identity, 'immigrant' as 
identity, 'working-class' as identity, 'lesbian' as identity, and so on. These 
not only correspond to 'Maori', 'Aboriginal', 'Indian' and 'Inuit' as 
seemingly natural truths~ natural and therefore truthful discursive stand-
points or centred subjectivities, but they have the added attractiveness of 
serving as victim-positions within post-colonising societies. Texts written 
from such subject positions therefore demonstrate alternative social 
victim-positions with concomitant variation in economic access to land, 
however seeking moral basis for such access in terms of a greater depth of 
identification with the land. Thus they effect a double identification with 
the indigene: they are isomorphic subjectivities, and they share the 
condi tion of oppression. 
Another effect, or even strategy, of this identification comprises the 
critique of textuality as an inauthentic and insecure basis of relationship to 
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the land. Therefore, the chapter goes on to suggest the implications of this 
discourse of identity for the security of post-colonisers' textually-based and 
mediated relationship to the land. 
3. II. Land and Identity. 
The entry, into the post-colonial discursive context, of discourse from 
an indigenous 'post-colonised' subject position has often taken the form of 
texts which assert, from that position, a relationship between land and 
both cultural and subjective identity. This chapter places special emphasis 
on the post-colonised discursive link between individual! cultural identity 
and land. Discussion of The Temptations of Big Bear demonstrated the 
construction of cultural identity and differentiation through landscape 
imagery, and at the same time the identity of the land through imagery of 
cultural conceptions of the human. It is not possible for me to determine 
the degree of 'authenticity' reflected in these constructionsi indeed, it is 
only necessary to demonstrate their status and implications as 
constructions. Both Patricia Grace's Potiki and Sally Morgan's My Place are 
further texts of post-colonised discourse which associate the human and 
the landscape in terms of a similar crossing over of imagery. However, 
each does this within the context of a particular focus for the issues of 
identity and textuality specific to their overall texts. 
As has already been stated, assertions of identity in Potiki are mixed 
with anxieties about identity in the characters' recognition of their tenuous 
hold over their land in the face of capitalist development interests. The 
centrality of the land to the lives of the characters of Potiki is represented 
as the centred-ness of individual and collective identity. That identity is 
most 'centred' when characters are close to the land, and the land provides 
, the defining terms of identity. Roimata identifies her children's characters 
in terms of the landscape, particularly as it was at the time of each of their 
births, suggesting a natural transference and a permanent bond to place: 
"James is like his father ~- quiet and sure, and with the patience the earth 
has .... His cries caused no earth tremble or sky rumble" (15). By contrast, 
Tangimoana, named for the sounds of pained crying that the sea made, is 
"as sharp-edged as the sea rocks" (15). Adults are also identified in relation 
to landscape or closeness to the land. Roimata describes her husband 
Hemi as "rooted to the land as a tree is" (23; 175), while she is a "patient 
watcher of the skies" (25; 152;174). The identification of people and land is 
F 
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made both in terms of traditional knowledge passed down in oral form, 
such as when "Granny began to chant a waiata ... linking the earth that we 
are to the sky that we are" (130),1 and in terms of new narratives arising 
from specific understandings of the identification. In a humorous account 
of the children's memories of the burial of an uncle: 
Manu said that Uncle Pere had been as big as a mountain .... Then 
Tangimoana remembered that there really was something about a 
mountain because the diggers had taken hours and hours to dig the 
hole .... 
But the earth dug out from the deep hole had made a big pile, like a 
mountain. (121-2) 
However, it is not only individual identities which are linked to the 
land, but also the collective identity of the people. Toko narrates, linking 
life and land in struggle and sharing, that "for some years we had little 
contact with other people as we struggled for our lives and our land", but 
now it was good having others there "sharing our land and our lives" 
(145). Collective identities are constructed in terms of the land to which 
the people belong, as shown in the letters which specified "we the people 
of Te Ope," while land is identified in terms of the people living on it, 
such as "the family land of the Tamihanas" (15). By contrast, in a cultural 
setting alienated from the land, individual and collective identity is also 
alienated. Reuben finds that what he learns at school is merely "that I'm 
not somebody, that my ancestors were rubbish and so I'm rubbish too. 
T~at's all I learn from the newspapers, that I'm nobody, or I'm bad and I 
belong in jail" (74). As mentioned in the previous section, it is when he 
becomes involved in the fight to get the Te Ope land back that Reuben's 
sense of himself and where he belongs is restored. Indeed, more generally, 
Hemi notes that instead of accepting rootless, drifting lives of urban 
unemployment, "people were looking to their land again. They knew that 
they belonged to the land, had known all along that there had to be a 
foothold otherwise you were dust blowing here and there and anywhere --
you were lost, gone" (61). This centring in the land and their own culture 
linked to it is described as necessary in a collective sense "if they didn't 
want to be wiped off the face of the earth," (60) emphasising the centrality 
of the land to the cultural survival of the Maori people. 
Just as the people's return to the land is their return to themselves, the 
destruction of the land amounts to the destruction of the people. 
Following the flood of the land;, and then the burning of the wharenui by 
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the land developers, Toko remembers that "Our bodies moved, our hands 
moved, doing the familiar things, but our thoughts, our spirits were in 
ruin, fallen to broken earth" (139). However, early in the novel, Toko's 
'special insight' foreshadows these very events in terms which evoke a 
past as well as the present of dispossession of their lands and identity, and 
the need to fight to retain or regain these. Thus the inter-relation of land 
and identity and the threat of their mutual loss is suggested in Toko's 
attempt to explain the children's mysterious war games to Roimata: 
'What are the wars about, Toko?' I asked. 
'Fighting,' he said. 
'But fighting who?' 
'Just enemies.' 
'And who are they? Who is the enemy?' 
'We don't know yet, but they have stolen from us.' 
'What have they stolen?' 
'We don't know yet but it's something to do with our lives.' 
'And where? What place, what country?' 
'No place, or just wherever you are, because it's not good to have 
your life taken out.' 
'Well what is it then, the life that's being stolen?' 
'We don't know yet, but it might be something like a glowing heart of 
all special colours, pink, green, brown, blue, purple and silver.' 
'And where? Is it on the moon, or out in space, in the desert, out at 
sea?' 
'It's just an ordinary place. It's where you are.' (46) 
The historical past of the 1860s land wars is evoked as the context for the 
recent past of fraudulent dispossession of the Te Ope people, and the 
contemporary post-colonial struggle of Maori people to regain their land. 
However, the land is not specifically mentioned. The object of struggle is 
described in terms of something intangible, even mystical, the 'spiritual' 
essence of one's self, and it is this -- irreducible identity -- which is 
reconnected to the land issue and imagery through its description as a 
place. The past of dislocation and urban living has also simultaneously 
fractured people from the land and from themselves. Acknowledging the 
destructiveness not simply of urban culture in itself, but of the loss of 
continuity with the land, and with the handing down of teachings about 
the land, the return is not one of merging again with an intact land ethic 
preserved in some timeless repository of cultural practices and knowledge, 
or an essence of Maori-ness sealed from the effects of physical and spiritual 
dislocation. Although they are drifting back to the land, Hemi wonders: 
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Could the young ones stick it out on the land, the ones there now, 
because some had gone already. Come, gone. When the jobs had got 
tight they'd come home, a lot of them. Tried to stick with it, but they 
were too ... broken, to make a go of it. Had already had the stuffing 
taken out of them, and couldn't last it out. (149) 
However, the land is also shown to heal not only its own scars with 
time (169), but to heal the spirits and the wholeness of the people, 
individually, and together. A number of characters are described as 
turning their feelings of loss towards the land. Roimata says that Hemi, 
"as rooted to the land as a tree, turns in his pain to the soil" (175), and 
Hemi also acknowledges, "I spend a lot of time looking at the soil but don't 
think I'm turning my back. It's a way of making the pain less" (176). 
Roimata reflects that "'In a time of solid dark ... I went down to the 
shore'" (174). However, Tangimoana "wouldn't agree with driving 
feelings into the soil, digging over the loss and hurt" (148). Roimata notes, 
after the land developers' violent sabotage of the land and the lives of the 
Tamihana family, that "We were living under the machines, and under a 
changing landscape, which can change you, shift the insides of you" (151). 
And with a changing landscape comes adaptation to the acceptance of new 
as well as old ways of fighting for one's survival. Roimata describes 
Tangimoana's response in terms which link the response of the people to 
the response of the land: "She did not agree with our acceptance of a 
situation, which was not a deep-down acceptance, but only a waiting one. 
She saw the strength of a bending branch to be not in its resilience, but in 
its ability to spring back and strike" (152). 
In My Place, the relationship between land and identity is played out in 
terms of the motif of the journey:2 the journeys into each character's past 
which comprise the text are, in either the psychical or the physical sense, 
bound up with journeys back to the land. The spatial representation of 
time is illustrated when, having returned to Corunna, Sally remarks: 
There were no Aboriginal people on Corunna now. It seemed sad, 
somehow. Mum and I sat down on part of the old fence and looked 
across to the distant horizon. We were trying to imagine what it 
would have been like for the people in the old days .... We easily 
imagined Nan, Arthur, Rosie, Lily and Albert, sitting exactly as we 
were now, looking off into the horizon at the end of the day. 
Dreaming, thinking. (229) 
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On another level, the text enacts the journey to reconstruct the self 
through its use of 'bildungsroman' narratives. Within these narratives, 
links between self and land are made, culminating in the 'attainment' of 
an identity along with a re-connection to the land of the family history. 
They amass into a collective and cultural self of 'Aboriginal' identity. 
My emphasis on the literary aspect of this construction is deliberate. In 
accounting for the relationship to land as both a determinant and a 
product of the relationship to the knowledge of Aboriginal identity, inter-
textuality plays a significant role in defining the terms of each. Sally's pre-
school and early childhood immersion in her grandmother's Aboriginal 
cultural assumptions is represented as something whose implications 
Sally neither recognises nor understands (though clearly, from the adult 
retrospective point of view, there is the teleological suggestion that there is 
something to be recognised and understood). Specifically, Sally's 
relationship to her Aboriginality is not one of knowledge: she does not 
know she is Aboriginal. Ironically, though, Sally is aware on some level of 
her difference, and it is through an 'alien' text that she gains a sense of her 
own place in White Australia: "Our teacher began reading stories about 
Winnie the Pooh every Wednesday .... In a way, discovering Pooh was 
my salvation. He made me feel more normal. I suppose I saw something 
of myself in him" (45). To add to the irony of her 'alien' identification 
(from without and within), it is this very identification which provides an 
early understanding of her 'spirituality', as she notes that "Pooh lived in a 
world of his own and he believed in magic, the same as me" (45), and it 
allows her to contextualise her own enjoyment of, and ability in, the 
'traditional' practice of drawing on the earth: "[W]hile Pooh was obsessed 
with honey, I was obsessed with drawing./When I could find any paper or 
pencils, I would fish pieces of charcoal from the fire,. and tear strips off the 
paperbark tree in our yard. I drew in the sand, on the footpath, the road .. 
. " (45). Much later, in terms of the narrative structure, this drawing ability 
is revealed as an individual and cultural inheritance (328). Even Sally's 
adult reminiscence of the significance of the land to her in childhood 
("The swamp behind our place had become an important place for me. It 
was now part of me, part of what I was as a person" [59]), is produced in 
terms of received children's literary tradition, emphasising the 
imaginative interpolation of the subject into the narrative's 'adventure': 
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When I was in the swamp, I lost all track of time. I wallowed in the 
small, muddish brown creek that meandered through on its way to 
join the Canning River. I caught gilgies by hanging over an old 
stormwater drain and wriggling my fingers in the water. As soon as 
the gilgies latched on, it required only a quick flick of the wrist to land 
them, gasping, on the bank. I imagined myself as an adventurer, 
always curious to know what was around the next bend, or behind 
the clump of taller gums that I glimpsed in the distance. 
I loved to think of the swamp as a very wild place. (59) 
However, following the 'discovery' of her Aboriginality, and her 
. identification as Aboriginal, the burden of proof is placed on her to show 
that this was not simply a pragmatic and false appropriation for personal 
gain in the form of an Aboriginal scholarship.3 In this context, it is 
precisely her inter-textual relationship to the land that causes her doubt 
and anxiety about the authenticity of her identity. 
I turned my face to the window and stared at the passing bitumen. 
Had I been dishonest with myself? What did it really mean to be 
Aboriginal? I'd never lived off the land and been a hunter and a 
gatherer. I'd never participated in corroborees or heard stories of the 
Dreamtime. I'd lived all my life in suburbia. (141) 
While Sally's Aboriginal identity is challenged by white authority 
(when it promises some benefit to her), for others it is problematic when it 
is conferred. Daisy, Arthur, and Gladys share the last name Corunna, 
associating them with Corunna Downs, the station to which they 
'belonged', in the possessive perhaps more than the associative sense. 
However, although their legal identity was linked to the land, this name 
revealed the relationship to the land effected by colonisation rather than as 
a part of indigenous heritage. This is pointedly evident in the station-
owner's conferral of the same name on his "big black horse" (177), 
associating them more with the livestock than with the idea of family. 
Indeed, he specifically fails to confer the name -- and acknowledge his 
paternity in the process -- of Drake-Brockman, which his white children 
received. Further, the name Corunna not only legally effaced their 
Aboriginal names (although these were used, unofficially, among 
themselves), but it was the product of another 'alien' text. Alice Drake-
Brockman, wife of the station owner, explains: "'Corunna Downs was 
named by my husband. There is a poem, "Corunna". He was reading a 
book at the time with the natives, and it was a poem about Corunna, I 
think it was in Spain'" (168). 
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Sally's curiosity about her family's past eventually leads to the point 
where "We were suddenly much more aware of how little we knew ... 
. / After much thought, I decided that our best course was to return to Nan 
and Arthur's birthplace, Corunna Downs" (214). This aspect of the journey 
for their 'selves' is expressed in terms of seeking knowledge, the 
settlement of factual gaps and contradictions. At the suggestion, Daisy's 
and Gladys's scepticism is expressed in terms of the pointlessness of the 
endeavour; specifically that, as Daisy disgustedly puts it: "'You're like your 
mother, you like to throw money away. All you'll be lookin' at is dirt. 
Dirt and scrub'" (214). This characterisation of the land and its lack of 
significance, however, constitutes Daisy's disavowal of her Aboriginal 
identity, both in the negative associations of the description, and in the 
refusal to acknowledge a meaning beneath that surface, relating to her own 
origins and identity.4 
Nevertheless, while Daisy refuses to go, Gladys relents, admitting 
"wistfully" -- a suggestion of some enigmatic pull -- that she has "'always 
had a hankering to go North'" (215). Sally's children, subjected to Daisy's 
stories of "giant snakes and huge crocodiles every step of the way" (217), 
and their own 'reading' (of books or films), comprise a new post-colonial 
generation approaching the journey inter-textually: "The children were 
convinced that going North was as adventurous as exploring deepest, 
darkest Africa" (217). 
In a way, the 'bildungsroman' works as an 'unbildungsroman' before 
the 'bildung' is possible. Sally's description of the effect of the journey 
suggests a process of decolonising themselves, by way of a retrieval of sense 
of place, back to an Aboriginal identity which can then be built upon. She 
reflects that "What had begun as a tentative search for knowledge had 
grown into a spiritual and emotional pilgrimage. We had an A1JOriginai 
consciousness now, and were proud of it" (233). 
The circle of age and youth, past and future, is resealed by way of a link 
between land and text: "Every night [Sally's daughter] Amber read Nan a 
bedtime story. The stories were about Aboriginal children in the Western 
Desert. Nan loved to listen to them, and when Amber had finished 
reading, she'd tell about some of the things she'd done as a child" (318). 
Daisy's new-found willingness to speak, her acceptance of her Aboriginal 
r 
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identity as a source of pride, signals the combined power of land and text to 
. articulate a post-colonised, and even decolonised identity. 
3. III. Women and the Land. 
'Woman' is one of the identities of 'presence' available (differentially) 
to 'post-colonised' and 'post-coloniser', and in the context of post-colonial 
patriarchal social organisation, it offers as well as a real position of 
contestation of patriarchy itself, a victim-position of identification for the 
'post-colonisers' with the 'post-colonised' on a gender axis. Some 
feminisms adopt what could also be seen as the patriarchal myth of 
women's closer relation to nature, in order to posit women as having 
greater empathy, even a spiritual connection with the land. At the same 
time there is a critique of patriarchal land ethics based on property, and a 
conflation of land and women in patriarchal relations of ownership. 
Instead, women's 'access' to land is founded on identification with the 
land. 
Aritha Van Herk's The Tent PegS posits at the outset the problem of 
women's access to the land within patriarchal society. However, this 
problem is not addressed as one of women's access to property rights over 
the land; indeed the property-relation is, as will be shown, critiqued. 
Rather, the problem is located primarily in the discourses which define 
and control the meanings of land, showing them in many ways to be 
identical to, or at least isomorphic with, the discourses which construct 
and define the meanings, or place, of women. The landscape of The Tent 
Peg is the "wilderness" of the Canadian North, the Wernecke Mountains 
in the Yukon, at a uranium prospecting camp. 
From the beginning, J.L.'s 'place' is problematic. Because of the 
prevalence of assumptions about geology as "a man's field" (27), and even 
more so mining camps as places where "Women just don't belong" (29), 
assumptions she is aware of even before applying for the position of camp 
cook, J.L. gains initial access -- literally -- through the use of her initials 
only on the application form. She correctly guesses she will be presumed 
male (23). Secondly, taking advantage of her build, she successfully 
disguises herself as a young man and fools MacKenzie, the camp leader, 
although he finds J.L. puzzling (18). However, before the crew set out for 
the camp, a series of events forces J.L. to disclose her gender. Although she 
expects to be fired, she has already impressed MacKenzie, and while he is 
---
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humiliated at his mistake, he allows her to stay on the basis of her cooking 
and catering abilities. J.L.'s access to the land is therefore ambivalent. She 
assumes masculine privilege, and MacKenzie presumes masculine 
identity. However, although eventual access is gained in terms of her true 
gender, it is nevertheless granted by MacKenzie who could just as easily 
have refused it. In terms of J.L.'s (and the novel's) critique of such 
patriarchal power, this is one of many contradictions the novel cannot 
resolve, contradictions which are symptomatic of the problem of women's 
relation to the land under patriarchy. 
Indeed, having gained physical access, J.L. is even more enmeshed in 
the assumptions and objections of the other men: "'You can't have a girl 
in camp. She won't be able to stand the isolation, she'll be nothing but 
trouble' .... 'One girl and a bunch of men? You've gone crazy'" (28). 
However, it is not simply expressions of explicit objection which define 
J.L.'s (lack of) place in the camp. Each of the principal 'characters'6 is 
linked to a discursive pattern which defines the meaning of the land and 
landscape as the meaning of femininity. In positing the identity of 
'woman' and land, and doing so in terms of patriarchal myths of 
femininity, women's relationship to the land is problematised.7 For 
example, thinking about J.L., MacKenzie reflects that she carries "the 
mystery that is only there in women. Because women are so mysterious" 
(145), and Franklin ponders "J.L. mystery" (168). Women, like the land in 
the discourse of exploration, are a problem or a mystery to be solved, 
placing the male problem-solving consciousness at the centre of 
experience. To emphasise this link, the main male characters, those who 
are part of the mining camp, are named after explorers from Canadian 
history, as well as fur-traders, map-makers, and others who helped 'solve' 
the problem of the land that would become Canada. The one apparent 
exception is Jerome, who has not been traced to any historical figure. The 
significance of his exceptional status will be elaborated through the 
discussion of the novel. 8 
MacKenzie attributes another popular myth of femininity to the land 
when he describes the land from th~ aeroplane: "It's that kind of country, 
changes her mind the minute your back is turned. I like the fickleness of 
it; it keeps you guessing" (11). Further, such discourses of woman and the 
land tend to be highly dichotomised between idealisation and derogation. 
At the centre of this dichotomy is the male subject. The dichotomy can be 
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conceived, in one of its manifestations, in terms of the 'domestic ideal' 
and the 'wild(er)ness'. It should also be pointed out that the novel's 
illustration of these discursive paradigms makes little differentiation in 
attribution between characters regarded in simple terms as 
'sympathetically' portrayed, and those whose portrayal is more clearly 
'unsympathetic'. Therefore, the problem is located not with individual 
men as 'good' or 'bad', but with culturally dominant and pervasive 
discursive structures. 
Milton, a young Mennonite man, exemplifies this very dichotomy of 
domestic ideal and wilderness in his view of women and the land. His 
attraction to the Yukon was as a safe place from carnal temptation: "I 
figured you could get closer to God up here, but He feels farther away. That 
girl" (63). However, having opposed the sin of the body or mind, projected 
on to J.L., to the feelings of purity in isolation attributed to the mountains, 
he finds that neither J.L., nor indeed the landscape, conform to his basically 
domestic ideal of safety (101). Similarly, J.L. is "not the way a girl should 
be .... / I never seen a girl like her before. She is hard and angry instead of 
soft and still and holding inside the way a girl should be" (82). Milton 
locates the problem with J.L., and with the landscape, not in his own gaze 
which is both literally the source of his problem -- he cannot stop looking 
at J.L. -- and his analysis. 
MacKenzie similarly dichotomises the domestic ideal and the 
wilderness, however for him the land is the safe refuge, while suburban 
life is incomprehensible. The land is like the wife-mother of the domestic 
ideal, selfless, comforting, nurturing and all-absorbing. For him, "Once 
you're out there, in amongst the moss and the occasional outcrop you melt 
right down into the barrens. Not a dot of anyone anywhere. And I like it 
that way" (10). While the unexpected departure of his wife is discursively 
placed on the arbitrary and unmapped side of the wilderness, in the 
mountains he is "in control as surely as he seems awkward and 
unassuming in town" (56). MacKenzie's presence in the mountains is 
described in the imagery of a home-coming: "I open my jacket and stretch 
out my arms, let the wind bell it around me. A man could rest here, could 
press himself into the moss- and let the mountain grow around him" (83). 
Hudson places J.L. and the Yukon on the side of wilderness in relation 
to his civilised England, using colonial discourse of 'primitiveness' and 
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'savagery' which places J.L. in the position of the 'colonised': "I've never 
felt so far from the world. It's damn primitive. I thought the cook would 
help, be a softening influence, but she's as savage as they are" (103). 
Hudson's attitude demonstrates the emergence of another discursive 
dichotomy, that of nature and culture. In one formulation of this, women 
are posited as civilising 'culture' to man's essential 'nature', Ivan, the 
helicopter pilot, when he is aware that J.L. will be the only woman in 
camp, reflects that "it seems like camps that have women in them are 
more relaxed, easygoing. Guys don't get so hostile, so foul-mouthed, as 
they do if they see nothing but men for three months" (45). While he 
idealises women as 'culture', Franklin idealises both women and the land 
as 'nature', passive background to his active 'culture', his creative 
'consciousness', He casts the landscape in the traditionally feminine role 
of muse, source and inspiration for male creativity: "It's when I'm up on 
the mountain that I can meditate best, ' . that I can find words for the 
poems. High as the eagles, that's when I know my soul is purest. ... 
Geology is a way to seek out the wilderness" (80). However J.L. notes that 
"he seems to have no connection to the rocks at all" (138). Franklin places 
J.L. in this role of poetic inspiration along with the land. He remarks, "I've 
started a sequence of poems about her" (80), and his narratives begin and 
end with portentous and pretentious 'poetic' homages to her (80; 81; 168). 
However to Jerome, who represents the violence of patriarchy, both 
women and the landscape represent wild, unruly elements which must be 
tamed into submission. An aggressive bravado characterises his relation 
not only to women, but to the landscape and its inhabitants. If his superior 
knowledge does not tame them, violence will. When he hears about the 
bear J.L. has been seen with, he reasons, "Bears aren't interested in messing 
with humans. And if the old sow is, we'll see how she feels about my 
Magnum. I hope I run into her out on the slopes, I'll finish her off quick" 
(115). Similarly, J.L.'s refusal one morning to cook him bacon causes him 
to decide "'It's time somebody started nailing her down" (142). 
It has already been pointed out that The Tent Peg does not contest 
patriarchal power over access to land in terms of women's equal right to 
land as property. Instead, as well as illustrating the discursive 
constructions which link women and land, and assume the power of the 
male subject to define them, The Tent Peg constitutes a critique of 
patriarchal property relations over both land and women. Indeed, to a 
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large extent the dichotomised discourses of nature and culture, wilderness 
and domestic ideal, posit the possessive subject as centre of definition. As 
has been mentioned, each of the main characters except Jerome has been 
named for an historical explorer. Among the discourses which circulate 
around the activity of exploration are those of 'discovery', 'naming' 
'recording', and 'claiming' lands; The Tent Peg shows these also to be 
central to those latter-day explorers, geologists. Even those characters 
generally represented in sympathetic terms tend to conceptualise their 
place on the land in such discourses of priority and possession, evoking 
the first term of an underlying 'virgin-whore' dichotomy. 
Thompson describes the appeal of geology as "'The barrens. Going to 
places where nobody's been. The possibility of finding a mine'" (157). 
MacKenzie is protective of, and secretive about his program, sure of 
finding a mine as he did with Meteor Ridge, the find that made his 'name' 
in geology (12). He acknowledges the excitement he feels at staking a 
claim, claiming a find as his own, significantly in terms suggestive of 
sexual arousal: "I still get that prickle in my blood when I think of staking 
what I know is a good property, hammering it into two-post markings so 
that you know it's yours, you've got it" (163). The desire for priority and 
exclusivity -- property -- obviously leads to competition, and when he 
hears that the plans are to be changed and he will be sent to check a 
uranium prospector's report in the Wernecke Mountains instead, 
MacKenzie is panic-stricken: "Somebody else will find my mine. And 
suddenly I'm mad. 'You're not giving it to Jerome?'" (34). For his part, 
Jerome believes "I've been out ten years, it should be my program, I know 
far more than he does about uranium, far more than he does about the 
area" (26). Such notions of property and competition form both the 
discursive context of their ostensible activity in the mountains and, in 
what is the actual focus of the text, the nature of men's attitudes towards 
women, and J.L. in particular. Jerome's assumptions about the function of 
a husband to "control" his wife are perhaps most aggressively expressed, 
but are little different in essence from Thompson's need to marry Katie 
because then he could be "sure of her". As he tells J.L., "'At least I would 
know she belonged to me'" (158). 
J.L. has sought the isolation of the mountains precisely to escape the 
"countless fetters" (23) of possessive demand made on her by lovers, ex-
lovers and would-be lovers. However, as Zeke, a Dene bouncer in 
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Yellowknife, observes before they leave for the mountains, "MacKenzie's 
got himself a bear trap" (22), among whose meanings, which will be 
elaborated as appropriate throughout the discussion, is a reference to "the 
mounting sexual desire of the men in the camp for J.L."9 MacKenzie's 
discovery of J.L.'s gender is closely followed by the observation that "I 
haven't had a woman for three years" (30). The same implication that J.L. 
represents an object of consumption occurs in Roy's observation that "Cap 
looks at her like she's a melting ice-cream cone" (104). Hearne wants to 
claim and possess J.L. in a different but no lesser way: "If I could only talk 
J.L. into letting me take a few shots of her" (147). 
Jerome gives expression to his own assumptions about J.L.'s 
availability and accessibility when he complains that "anyone of those 
guys can easily sneak into the cook's tent" (54). However, although most 
of the men do try to impose themselves on her, not all do so in quite the 
crude way that Jerome implies, accuses them of, and finally attempts 
himself. Certainly, sexual tensions pervade the camp, and J.L. is held 
responsible. Milton persistently and paranoically holds J.L. responsible for 
his own sexual tension, and his resultant moral and spiritual crisis. He 
tells himself "She looks at me, she dares me .... She makes me feel all 
scratchy and bad, like I've done a sin just looking at her" (148). Yet even in 
his naivete he articulates the root of the all-pervasive tension. Describing 
the fight between Jerome and Hudson after Jerome has seen Hudson leave 
J.L.'s tent one night, and has made offensive accusations, Milton wonders 
"why are they fighting when they're both after the same thing in the end" 
(178). Again the responsibility is laid with J.L.: "Wherever girls are they 
do that, they start men off" (178). 
Nevertheless, a number of the men are more determined to impose 
their subjectivity upon her in a manner which defines her more as a 
mirror than a receptacle. Hudson seeks her out to talk about his 
unhappiness, his homesickness, and his problem with Jerome (169). 
Franklin wants to "make her understand" his poetry and philosophy (80), 
and well into the summer notes "I'm still trying to get her to listen to me. 
If she would let me talk to her for half an hour I could convince her" (168). 
Milton wants to ask her how you kiss a girl (199), and MacKenzie believes 
that she could "explain what Janice wanted" (145), while Thompson 
realises he wants to "tell J.L. all about [Katie]" (152), and soon he is 
a 
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"leaning toward her spilling everything, Katie dancing, Katie needing me .. 
. " (157). 
Through J. L.' s consciousness these attitudes are critiqued, and she 
directly challenges each of the men on his assumptions and presumptions. 
She is just as perturbed at their presumptuous invasion of her solitude. 
She writes to her friend: 
Ah Deborah, it's started. They're coming to me one by one, pouring 
their pestilence into my ears, trying to rid themselves of the poison. I 
can't blame them, the goddess knows they need to tell somebody, but 
oh, the weight of those words. They suck at me like quicksand but I 
have to listen. (172) 
However, J.L.'s resistance is necessarily ambivalent. She finds there is no 
position outside of patriarchy from which to contest its constructions and 
placement of women. As she is told in her spiritual communication with 
Deborah through the she-bear, "'You thought you'd leave all that behind? 
There isn't a place ,in the world without it. You can try to escape, but it's 
better to face it head on'" (111). 
Not only does she compromise her own separation from patriarchal 
discourse as she becomes a listener, a reflector, a mother in relation to 
whom they can become menlO -- an earth-mother -- but a critique of 
patriarchal discourses which equate women and land as problem and/or 
property becomes a valorisation of the connection between women and 
land as 'natural', intuitive and spiritual. Another dichotomy is 
established: that of men's relationship to land as possession or property, 
perceived by the rational gaze, and that of a spiritual, intuitive connection. 
The men are placed on the former pole of the opposition (including 
Milton, whose institutionalised, church- and text-based Christianity is 
differentiated from the 'immediacy' of spirituality). At the opening of the 
novel, the entry of the aeroplane into the peaceful landscape of the tundra 
is presented in imagery of intrusion: "the plane thuds. [It is] as if the 
ground flings the reverberation of our passing back at us" (7). However, 
imagery also links J.L. to the landscape, indeed identifies her with it. 
Passing over the "cracked and wrinkled face of the tundra, expressionless 
white but for a few black lines of water .... white snow and black water a 
striated spectrum", J.L. is "mesmerized, frozen here looking down" (7; my 
emphasis). 
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Later, Hudson laments that "There's a faint smell of spice in here, a 
smell I sometimes catch when I'm walking, trudging behind Jerome, but of 
course I never have time to stop and find out what it is, what kind of plant 
or flower it comes from" (169-70). In effect, this constitutes a critique of the 
suppressed teleology, enslavement to the Western colonising gaze, of 
mapping, in which: 
the apparent coherence of cartographic discourse is historically 
associated with the desire to stabilize the foundations of a self-
privileging Western culture .... [however] contradicted by what 
Rabasa calls 'blind spots' in the map which, brought to light in a 
rigorous deconstructive reading, identify the map's supposedly 
'universal' mode of representation as a set of rhetorical strategies 
which reinforce the prelocated authority of its European makers. 
Furthermore, these blind spots reveal flaws in the overall 
presentation of the map which allow it to be read in alternative, 'non-
European' modes.11 
The smell of the moss represents a blind spot in the knowledge of the 
landscape gained through the activity of geology, rendering its textuality, 
suggested in the maps poured over by MacKenzie, the lists that he makes, 
and even the certainty of what it is they expect or hope to find, as 
incomplete. On the contrary, J.L., as well as cooking, quietly and secretly 
gathers the spicy moss and sews it into samples as small but symbolic gifts 
for the men. On a flight, Ivan sees her "toward the base of the mountain .. 
. . stooped over, looking at the ground", until she "straightened up and put 
something in a little bag" (93). Neither he, nor Thompson who also sees 
her, can imagine what she is doing. 
It is on another flight, this time with J.L., that Ivan also sees "far below 
us on the grayish tundra ... a huge brown spot that seems to be moving. 
And sure enough, it's running, lumbering along" (95). However, the 
interaction that occurs between J.L. and the bear is clearly even then some 
form of spiritual communication. Even with J.L. in the helicopter they 
recognise each other, as slowly the bear "raises herself on her hind legs and 
stands there, immense, reaching for the helicopter as if she will pull us out 
of the sky with her raking claws", while J.L. breathes "'God, ... That's her. 
She's incredible'" (95). This is only the prelude to direct communication 
between J.L. and the bear. Cap observes: 
J.L. stands behind the cooktent, perfectly relaxed and easy, and facing 
her, twenty feet away and reared up on her hind legs, is a huge 
goddamn grizzly bear. J.L.'s face is tilted up and the she-bear's face is 
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tilted down and they're looking at each other like they've met before. 
And then J.L. sweeps off her hat and bows at the same instant that the 
bear seems to shrug and drops to her feet. For a moment they stand 
there as if in conversation, then they both turn. J.L. goes back into the 
.cooktent and the bear lumbers away down the valley. (108) 
J.L. refers to the men as "Men with no ears, men with no connection to 
the earth" (121). By contrast, even at the height of potential annihilation 
by an enormous rockslide through which they all slept, she does not 
move, but remains fixed to, or "planted in" the earth, an image which 
evokes the naturalness of her place on and in the land(scape): 
I felt the mountain rumble, I felt it stir and I was instantly awake, 
listening with every bone arched .... I move to balance myself so that 
my feet are planted firmly, take a deep breath. Silently I call, the 
invocation blossoming from my skin, my sorrow, the very spaces in 
my bones .... Then through the soles of my feet I feel again that 
spasm, the earth gathering herself. . . . I stand there, rooted to the 
sound of the cataract, hear it growing huge and loud until I can see 
that gray wall of stone rushing down to fling itself against the gentle 
curve of the cirque. But it doesn't stop, it carries itself down the 
cirque toward me, its thunder crashing in my ears, so close I cry out in 
terror, hold my palms against it roaring over me, my body ground by 
rocks. It rumbles itself still then, the slow echo of an enormous 
letting go. I hear a stone roll not ten feet away, and in the after-silence 
I finally dare to open my eyes. My feet are still planted steady in the 
moss .... I kneel then, press myself down and whisper, rock myself 
and whisper softly until the earth and I grow still, calm ourselves. 
(121) 
Although J.L. is in spiritual and intuitive communication with the 
mountain from the beginning, by the end of the description of the 
landslide, J.L. and the mountain are spiritually and emotionally identified, 
or identical. Indeed, she corrects Thompson's automatic placement of 
himself as the centre of even a mountain's activity, when he declares, 
"'Boy, I'd rather sleep through it than see it coming for me'" (123).· As she 
points out, '''It wasn't coming for me'" (123). 
J.L.'s spiritual communication with the land, whether the mountain or 
embodied in the she-bear, emphasises, along with the refutation of the 
human centre of consciousness, that the land exists independently of that 
consciousness, that the impositions of patriarchal discourses are at best 
merely superfluous supplements, at worst, falsifications. J.L. plays a 
mediating role in pointing the men grounded in patriarchal property 
relations towards acknowledgement of a spiritual and subjective integrity 
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of the land, and of women. This is suggested in the echo of MacKenzie's 
sensuous handling of rocks in the description of his sensual encounter 
with J.L.: 
I can walk, move from outcrop to outcrop, draw the contours on my 
map, feel the grain of the rock in my hand. (62) 
He touches her, takes the narrow bone cage of her body and turns it 
between his hands, carefully, exploring, holds her and smooths her 
and shapes her between his calloused hands like a forming vase, like 
a shape becoming. (211-2) 
However, the overall movement of the novel serves to eclipse the role 
of the land with the contestation of patriarchy. As the focus is placed more 
on the interactions between the men and J.L., the land becomes more and 
more the literal and metaphorical background against which these 
interactions occur. Although in many ways J.L.'s relationship to the land 
is contrasted with that of the men, primarily as oppositions of materiality 
and spirituality, violence and non-violence, these oppositions are not 
sustained to the resolution of the novel. Despite the description of the 
noisy intrusion of aircraft into the mountains, J.L. enjoys the helicopter 
rides to the extent that she wants to learn to fly: "'Isn't it something? 
Riding over the mountain tops like that. I wish I could fly one of those 
things'./ .... 'I love it' .... 'Swinging over the valleys. Almost as if you're 
in a cradle that some enormous hand is carrying through the sky'" (117). 
However, more problematic still is the participation of J.L. in the claim 
staking after the discovery of gold. This is not simply her participation in, 
and extension of, property rights, but it is described in terms which add a 
puzzling element to the otherwise consistent 'tent peg' imagery 
throughout the text, which is associated with the violence of patriarchy 
against women and against the land, as well as with J.L.'s symbolic 
challenge to, or encounter with, patria!chy. However, the imagery is used 
in descriptions of J.L.'s claim staking. Thompson says, "And she does it, 
she stakes eight claims. Pounds the post into the ground .... She is 
hammering the last post" (208). Even more explicitly, Hearne describes 
J.L.: 
standing over that stake, leariing herself and the hammer into the 
ground until she becomes a movement of striking, driving that post 
deep into the temple of the earth .... For a moment it is as if she is 
hammering that stake into everything I have ever known or 
photographed, hammering the very pulse of life. (210) 
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It is therefore necessary to read the land not simply as a symbol of the 
female or the feminine: if it were, J.L.'s hammering would have the same 
violent meaning as the men's. Indeed, J.L. does not eschew violence 
altogether. As she reflects: 
I know we're supposed to change them with non-violence, we're 
supposed to show them by example, turn an oblique cheek until they 
wear themselves out. That's the slow way. I can think of a few 
methods to bring quicker peace. All we need is the daring, the nerve. 
Of course we'll be condemned for acting, we'll be forever traitors and 
bitches, have broken all the rules of hospitality, but we'll have gotten 
what we want. To hell with the historians and analysts. They always 
decide against us anyway. (190-1) 
The land, rather, is used in the novel as a symbol of female autonomy .. 
The nature of the men's relationships both to the land and to women has 
been shown to be informed by a belief in their status as property or 
possession, as their staking of claims on the mountain is paralleled by their 
attempts to stake claims to J.L. and the other women they relate to. Thus 
the violence is ultimately less physical than psychical or social, effected by 
possessiveness. Against this, J.L. struggles to preserve her freedom from 
the men's claims, just as she points out their presumption in believing 
they can claim, name, or have a hold over, women in general as 
possession. J.L.'s driving the stake into the mountain therefore represents 
her staking a claim to female autonomy, and presents at least the threat of 
violence as a vaild strategy for the attainment and preservation of that 
autonomy. 
Paradoxically, the positing and valorisation of a special relationship 
closeness between the land and women, using images of inter-connection 
and wholeness of all living things by way of an omnipresent spirit of place, 
is undermined by this very notion of female autonomy. As Plumwood 
argues: 
Feminist philosophy has ... developed a critique of the conception of 
the self as autonomous and lacking essential connection to others or 
to nature, pointing to its links to masculinity. They have also ... 
challenged the account in which the human is defined against and in 
opposition to the natural (and the feminine), just as traditional 
masculinity is defined against and in opposition to the inferiorized 
feminine,12 
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Therefore, the feminist autonomous self, disavowing its inter-
connectedness with masculinity, is in fact isomorphic with the masculine 
conception of the self. 
In Palomino 13 Jolley uses landscape to serve the literary function of 
metaphor for women protagonists' emotions, fears and desires. Laura is a 
relatively privileged woman with the means to own land in her own 
right, and her security of place is reflected in her relationship to the land as 
a refuge: "When I go through the gate and am actually on the land I feel 
no harm can ever come to me" (19). It contrasts with the perception of Mrs 
Murphy, the tenant, whose economic alienation from the land is reflected 
in her alienated perception of it: '''Terrible cold in winter real frost up 
here .... Clouds come up ... but no rain ever falls when you want it. 
Your creek's salt and so is your soil .... and up on the slope nothing'll 
grow" (23). However, the landscape represents more than Laura's security; 
it is also a metaphor for her love and sexual desire for women, and her 
wish to live free from social, and particularly male, intrusion. Thus her 
land is described in terms which evoke the sensuality and contours of 
women's bodies. She lives "hidden away in the secret folds of a narrow 
valley where the land is mine and no-one else can come there without my 
asking them to come" (19). Once a gynaecologist, her research interest had 
been "The tender beauty of the pregnant woman ... the soft rich skin of 
the breasts, the smooth white thighs and tender expression in the eyes ... " 
(175). Now that she has been de-registered, she laments her inability to 
publish gynaecological texts, and even considers it presumptuous to read 
the British Medical Journal. Instead, she begins to read the landscape of 
her secluded farm: "[N]ow my interest is in the experience of trying to 
understand the sky and knowing which clouds will bring rain. It is the 
harvest which concerns me now, my land and my trees and what can be 
produced from them" (15). However, both 'texts' are read not simply in 
terms of fertility, but of sexuality itself. 
When Andrea arrives to stay with Laura, the relationship between 
Laura and the land parallels that between Laura and Andrea, as Laura 
tends, cares for, and nurtures both. However, she also writes herself on to 
both as she moulds them to her desires. The shaping and cultivation of 
the land is a kind of substitute for publication. She refers to her grape 
vines and fruit trees as '''Just a small cultivation in a lot of land! ... These 
are the small changes a person on her own can make on the land" (69). 
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The notion of Laura writing (and publishing) the land is re-inforced by her 
positioning of herself as performing subject on the land. Andrea notices 
Laura's "rotting tins and tubs of plants, rosemary and mint and other 
herbs, she has them on planks of wood resting on oil drums in tiers like an 
outdoor theatre" (69), and later she asks Laura, '''Have you watered your 
audience?'" (112). Laura herself, working on the land, notices that "All 
along the top paddock birds rise suddenly, tawny flight of doves flying up 
with a clapping of wings, a tiny scattered applause" (106). Gynaecology is 
not the only source of inter-texts for Laura's reading of the land. Her 
perceptions are themselves (already) 'written' in the poetic descriptions 
which liken the landscape to those of the Russian countryside in Tolstoy's 
writing (24). 
Laura's repeated assertions of her possession of the land parallel the 
smothering possessiveness she comes to exert over Andrea. Just as she 
refers to "coming home to my house and my land" (36), to "this land 
which is mine" (48), and to "My vineyard" and "My orchard" (69), she is 
more jealous than shocked when she learns of Andrea's incestuous 
relationship with her brother, and her pregnancy. Similarly, descriptions 
of features of the landscape parallel both the changing emotions of the 
women, and the state of their relationship. As Laura 'reads' her land, 
"learning about the secret flesh of sweet fruit whitening beneath the glow 
of fragrant ripening" (15), the descriptions of the fertility of the orchard 
intensify with, and parallel her growing awareness of Andrea's pregnancy. 
However, when Laura feels the relationship to be threatened she reflects 
that "The morning was endowed with that promise of summer which for 
me holds something of menace. The warm fragrance is intense. The earth 
... shimmers with eucalyptus vapour" (196). Similarly, Andrea's feeling 
of claustrophobia -- entrapped by her pregnancy, by the presence of the 
visitors, and now also by Laura's hold over her -- is both objectified and 
magnified in her perceptions of the lack of air and the bitterness of the 
water. The beginning and end of their relationship is symbolised by the 
honeysuckle. When their love was fresh, the perfume was associated with 
their love-making (129), however, the imminent end of the relationship is 
signified by Laura's comment that the rotting smell is "'the honeysuckle, 
its time is over'" (227). 
The relationship between the women, and the basis for their place on 
the land, is also shaped by a complex inter-textuality. Laura's love for Dr 
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Esme Gollanberg has been kindled by her reading of Dr Gollanberg's 
research papers, and her construction of an idealised image of Gollanberg 
through them, and it is to this image of her that Laura sends letters 
professing her admiration and devotion. This image is shattered when Dr 
Gollanberg arrives and is found by Laura to be elderly and ailing: "I looked 
for someone graceful, kind and clever ... ./1 first saw you, small, thick set 
and stout, an animal stranded from its hole in the night" (178). Unable to 
tolerate the discrepancy between the textual construction and the 'reality' --
and unable to see this discrepancy located in her own reading, both of the 
texts and the 'reality'. -- Laura 'kills' the ailing Dr Gollanberg. Having been 
de-registered from the medical profession, Laura now lives isolated and 
friendless on her land (52). Andrea's remaining on the land is also to 
some extent governed by the letters and diaries Laura leaves for her to read 
as she disappears for entire days to work on her land. These texts divulge 
those aspects of Laura's past she is most afraid will drive Andrea away. 
However, by the end of the novel, Laura has learned that the 
relationship cannot remain authentic if it is governed by the notion of 
possession, and she must let Andrea go. Similarly, in a gesture which 
acknowledges the dangers of reading and writing as informing one's 
reality, dangers which were fully realised in the relationship between 
Laura and Esme Gollanberg, there is a repudiation of textuality as an 
authentic basis for the relationship between them in Laura's forbidding of 
any letters (252). As she wrote to Dr Gollanberg, never able to tell her, "If 
you were stout and noisy and ugly it is my fault, not yours. It is my way of 
seeing you which was at fault" (184). 
The Newspaper of Claremont Street 14 combines a number of motifs of 
social marginality, and received and imposed texts of place or belonging, in 
what could be read as an allegory of post-colonial acknowledgeI11ent and 
subversion of Europe. Margarite Morris, or 'Weekly' as she is known, is a 
working-class cleaning woman. She is also a migrant to Australia from 
the industrial Black Country of England, where "nothing would grow 
except thin carrots and a few sun-flowers. '.' [All] around the place where 
they lived the slag-heaps smoked and smouldered and hot cinders often 
fell on the paths" (58). Once in Australia Weekly harbours a secret desire 
"just for a few acres to be her own land" (62), and she has a particular 
valley in mind. However, her ambition is an ambivalent one, coloured by 
the inheritance of class and cultural barriers to its realisation. She finds it 
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"a strain ... thinking about the valley when she felt she had no right to go 
looking at land" (57). For Weekly, "the thought of possessing land seemed 
more of an impertinence than a possibility" (58). 
However, money is largely able to neutralise differential access to 
property, and the money she has carefully saved is linked to land in 
dreams and fantasies which metaphorically translate the 'textuality' of 
money into land itself. For example, her thoughts linger "on the shining 
slopes of her money mountain" (30). Her knowledge of the land, and the 
basis of her access to it, have been gained through reading advertisements. 
However, as she visits the properties advertised, she finds their textual 
representation often misleading: 
An abundance of water, as written in the advertisements, seemed to 
Weekly to present moss trimmed troughs ... with paths of washed 
pebbles alongside. She seemed to see the clear water flowing over, 
from one deep trough to the next, all down the hillsides. The water 
was clean and bright and cold and there was plenty, so much that it 
overflowed and washed the sides of the troughs, cleaning the moss 
and cooling the feet of those who went there .... She never saw water 
like this .... More often the ground was damp and swampy. (61) 
Yet when she finds the five acre section described by the land agent, the 
inaccuracy of its textual representation is quite different: "It was like the 
things she had read about, only far more beautiful because of the stillness 
and fragrance. These things are not put into the advertisements" (85). 
Nevertheless, despite her material ability to own land in Australia, 
Weekly faces much more difficult ideological barriers. These are 
symbolically represented in the presence of Nastasya, a once aristocratic 
and now dispossessed Russian refugee whose house she cleans and who 
constitutes an exploitative emotional and physical dependence on Weekly. 
Nastasya represents the ideological class violence inherited from Europe, 
and expressed in a dream of her late husband's ("I have dream ... I beat 
my lazy servant" [67] ), and this is figured in her function as a physical 
barrier preventing Weekly from assuming a place on her land. Weekly 
finds that in her constant presence and never-ending demands, "She had 
become an obstacle, a kind of wall which Weekly would have to climb 
over every day before she could do anything" (67). 
Unable to abandon Nastasya in the city, however, she takes her to the 
land. During the planting of a pear tree in the clay soil far from the house, 
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Nastasya, wearing Weekly's boots, begins to sink into the earth, while 
Weekly returns to the house and her new-found freedom. Some time 
la ter, when the new owner of the neighbouring property visits her, he 
notices that "Next to the pear tree was a curious earth covered mound 
about the size of a man bent double" (115). Weekly explains, "'In a coupla 
hundred years there should be a interesting fossil here. In the interests of 
science, you see'" (115). Thus, a dependence on the texts of inherited 
European ideology and its systems of privilege and marginalisation cannot 
remain unchallenged within post-colonial Australia, but nor is it now 
possible to efface Europe completely from the land and its history. 
3. IV. The Ambivalent Authority and Inauthenticity of the Text. 
If it is accepted that on an important level the landscape has slipped 
from the ostensible focus of the narrative to become simply the point of 
reference in the contestation of colonising and patriarchal discourses, it is 
relevant to ask not only how and why this apparent slippage has occurred, 
but also how and why the landscape is employed in this function at all. In 
other words, that the landscape is used to reflect problematic relations 
between men and women may suggest an underlying anxiety about 
relationships to the land. 
The post-colonial availability of indigenous discourses of presence, as 
has been shown, has supported -- in an undecidable discourse/counter-
discourse relation -- the formation of post-colonising discourses of 
presence to specific identity constructs. The former also both contrast and 
are inter-dependent with, and even shape perceptions of the alienations of 
capitalism, producing characterisations of the industrialised landscape as 
'fallen' compared to a posited 'pre-colonial' state of 'innocence'. The 
Christian terms of this opposition demonstrate post-colonial susceptibility 
to the 'spiritual' content and force of indigenous discourse. - It is also 
within this context that there is an easy slippage from an 'innocence-
fallen' opposition to that of 'innocence-guilt'. There is no inevitable link 
between spirituality and morality, but it is an important Christian 
assumption. Thus 'fallen' post-colonial society is also 'guilty', implying 
that 'innocent' indigenous tradition is also morally 'innocent'. The post-
colonial guilt complex has produced an anxiety of post-colonising 
legitimacy and belonging on the land, an anxiety which is often focused 
upon the legitimacy of the texts or textuality that authorised that 
belonging. A number of post-colonial texts therefore address the 
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ambivalent authority and inauthenticity of Western textuality in 
determining relationships to the land in post-colonial societies and 
economies. Such questioning may be found as the problematisation of 
associative relation to the land, belonging in the sense of authentic 
habitation, including psychical or perceptual habitation (where it is 
precisely Western literary practices which are problematised), or in the 
possessive relation which positions land as object of exchange. In the latter 
case, the "element of undecidability" inherent in textuality is evoked in 
situations where putative ownership is revealed as illusory. 
In The Temptations of Big Bear, this sense of colonising and post-
colonising guilt is demonstrated in the critique of the 'fairness' of the 
terms of white accession to the land. This critique is always informed by 
the lack of equality of the terms of, and participants in, the exchange of the 
land for 'payment'. In other words, it is a critique fully informed by 
Western notions of justice and value in an exchange economy. The 
conditions under which treaty signatures are secured are alluded to as ones 
of duress. As Governor Alexander Morris ponders the beauty of the 
landscape, he asks himself, "Who would sign away such land? As if they 
had a choice" (11). A constituent of that duress, even deception, is the 
inequality of understanding of the power and the implications of the 
treaties. This is demonstrated in terms of their imposition of another law 
over the extant Indian laws of freedom and restriction, illustrated in Big 
Bear's complaint that "'All I see is the little piece of land I must choose and 
then never leave unless some Farm Instructor says I can go. What is that, 
when I must have the mark of such a thing on paper to walk on the land 
they have borrowed?'" (199). It is also demonstrated in the appearance of 
unexplained and unexpected implications of the treaties. Again, Big Bear: 
ttlAbout the papers they must sign before we can go visit our friends? 
There is nothing in any treaty about such papers. Did you ever sign one? I 
will never ask anyone if I can go somewhere'" (204). 
The inequality of value of items exchanged or payments made for the 
value of land (also posited with reference to a white system of value), is 
also suggested. Shortly after Sweetgrass has signed the treaty, the 
Governor observes that the assembled chiefs "wore the coats and huge 
medals they had received on signing the treaty; a few sported beavers, one 
a woman's floppy hat" (18). The valuelessness of this is an ironic 
foreshadowing of the later imagery of throwing sticks at the Queen's hat as 
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the nearest available translation (exchange) for the crime of treason. The 
land that had provided sustenance is exchanged for 'payment' that goes no 
way towards the same end. As Big Bear argues against signing, "it was 
obvious to anyone watching the traders who appeared at the payments like 
leaves in spring that the papers the People received at treaty provided 
almost nothing. Twelve together might get one gun, two one bag of flour, 
one almost a blanket" (72). Indeed, payment at all is shown to be 
unreliable at the very point that its assurances are taken to be protection 
against famine. At Crowfoot's refusal to fight the white police, Sitting Bull 
protests, "'But your children are crying with hunger.'" At this, Crowfoot 
points out that "'The treaty says we will be fed when there is famine,'" 
while Sitting Bull's retort generates uncertainty as to the source or the 
'naturalness' of the famine: 
'The treaty!' Sitting Bull spat. 'I have seen treaties signed by 
commissioners in the name of Whiteskin government that said they 
would give rations every day, not just in famine. And they would 
build everyone houses, food and houses is what the treaties said'. 
And he spat again, violently into the dark emptiness of the lodge. 
(103) 
However, as well as problematising the equality of the terms of 
exchange, there is a critique of the capitalist ethos itself. In discourse 
curiously reminiscent of (or anachronistically foreshadowing) Marxism, 
and in the context suggesting the idealisation of indigenous traditions in 
terms of 'natural socialism', Big Bear is reported by Robert Jefferson as 
accusing that "You keep numbers of every hoe and seed, you dole out food 
that is ours by treaty a pound at a time, exactly measured to how little a 
man can get a still survive to work as you say" (175). And more 
fundamentally, white legitimacy in the act and the inheritance of 
colonisation is problematised in the critique of the very notion of land 
ownership, the validity of a property-relation to the land. The terms of 
this critique are drawn from the principle of the living presence of the land 
and the spiritual order of which it is a part -- terms to which, as we have 
seen, post-colonising society is particularly susceptible. When Big Bear is 
urged to choose a reserve, he protests that "'No one can choose for only 
himself a piece of the Mother Earth; She is. And she is for all that live 
alike'" (28). Notions of the human giving and receiving of land are 
foreign to Big Bear's understanding: "'Who can receive land? And from 
whom would he receive it?'" (29). Yet he does understand it as 
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fundamental to the white land-ethic. He assures the Governor: '''We 
don't fight with any whites, and I don't want the young men to keep their 
branded horses because I know with whites that is stealing'" (143), and he 
questions the justice of well established practices of white-dominated and 
white-profiting property relations: 
'Years before the treaty we heard that the Hudson's Bay Company had 
sold the land to the Government. When, from whom had they ever 
received it? I know that they sold what was not theirs for more 
money than all the People have ever received after eight years of 
treaty, and besides that the Company still has more land than all of 
our reserves together.' (204) 
However, the Indian land ethic is shown not to be devoid of any 
notion of 'belonging'. Land is 'given' to them, as evident in Big Bear's 
reference to "'the land. .. The First One gave me"', but that does not 
equate with personal property. As he continues, "'I have never for myself 
wanted the Earth; he takes more from me than I can ever take from him'" 
(196). Big Bear's meaning is mistaken by the court when he tells it that: 
'This land belonged to me. When I had it I never needed your flour 
and pork. ... I was free, and the smallest Person in my band was as 
free as I because the Master of Life had given us our place on the earth 
and that was enough for us. But you have taken our inheritance, our 
strength.''' (98) 
It is not a possession to which he refers, but an equal relationship between 
People and land. This eludes the judge, who tells him that: "'on one 
point you must be corrected. This land never belonged to you. This land 
was and is the Queen's. She has allowed you to use it .... Your people can 
live there because the Queen has graciously given it to them. The land 
belongs to the Queen'" (399). In this case, 'belonging' refers only to the 
securing of land as property by way of (a token of) payment. However, 
even the legitimacy of white property rights in these terms is 
compromised by a profusion and confusion of terms in the process of 
Indian 'pacification'. When the Governor explains that "'We are not 
coming to buy your land. It is a big thing, it is impossible for a man to buy 
the whole country, we came here to make certain it is kept for you"', Big 
Bear responds, "'We therefore understand the land is only borrowed, not 
bought'" (199). 
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Thus the anxiety of belonging is in significant part a function of even 
white uncertainty as to whether the land is bought, borrowed, or merely 
forcibly occupied; if it is bought, there is the question of the validity of that 
relation, and the adequacy of payment; and if not, there is the moral legacy 
of guilt. These questions turn on the ambivalent authority and 
inauthenticity of the (white) text as the mediation of the land and its 
human inhabitants. The Queen, the '''Whiteskin than whom there is 
none higher'" (197), is the authority invoked by the treaties. Yet the 
personal relationship implied by the use of the title "the Grandmother," 
and assumed by Seenum, who claims, '''The treaty is good. The Governor 
will give it to the Queen Mother and she'll see my mark, and know me'" 
(61), is' belied by white acceptance of the principle of representation, a 
principle inseparable from the absence in writing, that "it was impossible 
for the Queen to negotiate with one chief alone. The law is one law: the 
Queen's" (118). To the Indians, the centre of white authority seems 
endlessly deferred, and in the absence of that centre, inauthentic. Big Bear 
argues: 
'What I see is this: I speak out to one white man, and there is always 
one higher. I speak for my band as a chief speaks for his people when 
they have decided, but the Whiteskin I speak to isn't like that. Even 
the Governor, or the one who came talking so loud and fast from 
Ottawa and left before the first snow would freeze his shining skin, 
there is always one higher whom I never see.' (197) 
However, the essence of the inauthenticity of the Queen's law is perceived 
and expressed by Big Bear early in the novel, in response to Governor 
Morris's assertion that "'The law is the same for red and white,''' that 
"'itself, it is only white'" (31). 
Western writing is both undermined as a valid basis of law --
unreliable and inauthentic -- and even in its literary form, rid~culed as 
frivolous and irrelevant as a source of knowledge or the basis of an 
epistemology relevant to the Canadian land. Western literary 
constructions of the Indian are discredited through the ironic mode of 
their representation. Of the Mounties, for example, a post-colonisation 
icon of Canadian identity, Wiebe writes: "they had already performed 
most of the unprecedented acts of bravery which would eventually .make 
them almost as useful to adventure romance as the Texas Rangers (never 
quite, for in ten years they had not yet actually shot and killed a single 
Indian)" (151). The final phrase echoes an elliptical reference to a cliche of 
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United States fiction of the 'Wild West', when a white captain returns to 
his men in battle: "He cuts open a bundle but it is a warrior, not a prisoner 
as we feared. His friends must have returned for a hasty funeral. ... [W]e 
think of the Frog Lake settlers and are glad; he is a good Indian now" (321). 
'Imported' literature is ridiculed as a source of understanding, 
recognition, or coping with the Canadian colonial landscape (see 272). 
However, Wiebe's use of language in the novel privileges the Indian 
world view by way of rich and sensuous imagery, rhythmic and tonal 
variation, and the 'transgressive' narrative techniques -- such as stream-of-
consciousness, as evocations of subjective presence over the law -- which 
are the privilege of literary language. It is contrasted with the dry, 
pedantic, lifeless language of the courtroom (though this too is expressed 
through images of dryness, suffocation and darkness!). The post-colonial 
inheritances of white colonisation are problematised as writing, but in a 
now familiar irony, they are problematised inevitably in writing. 
The language of The Tent Peg posits the text of the land itself as source 
of truth and knowledge, at the same time as enacting the literary 'writing 
in' of the characters. The land is used as a metaphorical emotional and 
spiritual barometer, registering the presence of the camp and the many 
social and perceptual shifts that will occur, as on the first night MacKenzie 
lies awake "hearing the mountain shift" (61). Later, after J.L.'s reluctant 
shooting lesson, and Jerome's mockery of her failed first attempt, 
MacKenzie perceives "the force of her anger so strong I thought she would 
evoke the whole mountain down on us" (84). Not only does the landscape 
imagery describe J.L.'s emotions, it foreshadows the very eventuality of the 
rockslide, after which emotional tensions and upheavals are described in 
its terms. Roy comments soon after it that "Every week the camp seems 
less stable" (128), and Ivan reflects that "After the slide, everything goes 
downhill" (131). MacKenzie's particular inability to comprehend the 
unregulated or undefined is evoked in his contemplation of "Slide: the 
descent of a mass of earth or rock down a hill or mountainside. I 
remember the definition so well, but I've never had one practically rush 
over me" (122). Significantly, the rockslide becomes the reference point for 
MacKenzie's understanding of the meaning of his wife's leaving. He 
decides that "it must have been like a rockslide to her, the suddenness, the 
enormity of it. One small trickle of pebbles taking half a lifetime with it ... 
. That is the hardest thing to face, the rockslide of her intention" (131). 
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Much later, Thompson describes the beginning of the violent encounter 
between Jerome and Hudson, noting the hostility of the men, and, as if in 
reflection of this atmosphere, that "Behind Jerome, the gray rubble of the 
rockslide forms an ominous backdrop" (174). Such imagery rallies the 
authority of the coherent, imagistically cohesive text in establishing the 
sense of belong'ing to the land, and does so by employing the land to 
guarantee its own authenticity, its own presence. Yet the land is 
simultaneously used to enact its own inauthenticity in its very alienation 
in language. It is therefore only language which is present, while the 
authentic landscape remains absent from/in discourse, and even its 
discursive placement is largely as backdrop to the action and metaphor for 
the emotions of the camp. The cultural anxiety generated by the 
inauthenticity of the discursive belonging to land and landscape -- the 
inauthenticity of the text -- is acknowledged and confronted by The Tent 
Peg in its identification and critique of the founding 'texts' of Canada. 
The use in The Tent Peg of the names of historical explorers has 
already been remarked. This provides a link to history's access to the land 
in colonisation. It is also a link to the source of mythologies which 
surround the land and human relationships to it, including the 
mythologies of wilderness referred to in the last section, and mythologies 
of heroism. However, the fictionalisation of the characters to whom the 
. names are attached suggests a post-colonial reinvention of the past which 
amounts to a reinvention of the basis of the place of 'Canada' on the land, 
and the systems "of exclusion and privilege within Canada. The Tent Peg is 
less critical of the activities of exploration, or its contemporary equivalent 
in geology per se, than of the imposition of alien discourses, the texts that 
'authorised' colonisation. However, these are shown to be inseparable. 
Zeke, the Dene bouncer in Yellowknife, occupies an ambivalent 
position in this post-colonial contestation of the discourses of colonisation. 
He is conscious of his status as the reversal of a stereotype, although this in 
itself does not release him from stereotypical positioning: one pole of an 
opposition is just as implicated in the opposition as the other. He states, 
"They don't trust me, maybe because I'm Dene, maybe because I never 
drink" (21). Similarly, in his role as bouncer he is in the position to bar or 
eject undesirable patrons, a power that was not held by his historical 
forebears. However, he occupies a somewhat traditional discursive place 
--
227 
as 'native guide',lS not in the physical sense, but in the sense that he, 
unlike MacKenzie, intuits J.L.'s sex: 
I'm on my way to check the can -- maybe it's on fire -- when out 
comes the funny-looking little guy in the felt hat [MacKenzie's] been 
drinking with. I grab his arm and he turns and snarls at me without a 
word, and I'm damned if sure enough it's not a girl. Only women 
can look mad like that. (21) 
Similarly, his reference to J.L. as a bear-trap has multiple significance in 
terms of the text. Apart from the simple meaning of 'woman', with a 
biological implication contained in folkloric belief about the scent of 
menstruating women attracting male bears,16 and the insight into the 
sexual tensions that will emerge in the camp, perhaps suggested when 
Zeke asks MacKenzie, "'You gonna bait it or spring it?"'(41), it is a clear 
foreshadowing of J.L.'s encounters with the she-bear. Yet unlike the 
'native guide', Zeke does not accompany the geologist-explorers into the 
landscape. Just as he only has one narrative of his own, towards the 
beginning of the text, his physical presence in the text/on the landscape 
fades out with the beginning of the geologists' mission: "Zeke snorts and 
claps one huge hand on MacKenzie's shoulder before he turns back to the 
post at the door. 'Have a good summer,' he says before even he becomes a 
blur" (41). Although it has been argued that Zeke "stands for the Dene 
spiritual presence, which is part of the Northwest Territories 'even if you 
go out there al)d you ignore it"', and that he also stands for "Dene social 
and phy~ical presence,"17 this overlooks the problematic status of 
colonising and post-colonising representation of the indigene as predicated 
on his/her absence. Similarly, there is an idealist positing of spiritual 
presence outside of, and therefore sealed from the effects of 
(colonising/ post-colonising) consciousness, which is just as fortuitous for 
post-colonising rationalisation of, or complicity in, the social and political 
marginalisation of the indigene as it is for the redemptive positing of 
indigenous wholeness and authenticity. 
Each character can be linked to a discursive element of colonisation, to 
discursive cargo brought to the land, a way of not reading the land, but 
fitting the land into their own 'texts'. MacKenzie's absorption in, and 
reliance on, maps characterises not only his way of relating to the land, but 
of finding a course through life. He is commonly seen "hunched over his 
spread maps, studying them as if they could reveal something, as if they 
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might protect him" (38). His seemingly endless work "on the maps and 
airphotos, [getting] the stratigraphy straight in [his] head" (15) can, 
however, only prepare him for the expected. Even as he charts and thereby 
fixes 'new' pathways, inscribing land presumed blank of previous 
inscription, "moving from outcrop to outcrop, draw[ing] the contours on 
my map" (62), he excludes the unexpected, unknown otherness of reality, 
the reality of otherness.18 
Journalistic, artistic and literary recording also 'wrote' the land, and 
wrote the European into the land. In the novel, Hearne the photographer 
and Franklin the 'poet' represent these discursive functions. Hearne's 
photography is the only way he can relate to reality. As J.L. notes, "he can 
see things only if he fixes them forever in a photograph" (138). 
Significantly, the object of the photograph is not simply the recording of 
reality, but the fixing of it to his own point of view and his own pre-
determined judgements. J.L.'s refusal to pose for him represents her 
refusal to submit to the ordering and placement of his gaze, and a critique 
of his limited and fixed focus on the landscape. Franklin's poetry does 
with words what Hearne's photography does with film; it structures reality 
and places others within it according to his own governing subjectivity, 
producing nothing more than a mirror into his own consciousness. It 
could be argued that the structuring 'gaze' is inescapable, that words 
cannot reflect reality, only structure it according to the gaze of the 
perceiving subject. To a large extent, this is precisely what The Tent Peg 
argues. Wherever the subject travels, his or her interpellation into, or 
resistance to the dominant discourses of his or her culture accompany that 
subject. The novel's ridicule of Franklin's pretentious poetry is less the 
ridicule of his individual lack of talent than of the inadequacy and 
irrelevance of his cliched and formulaic responses to a landscape he has 
never before encountered. Thus J.L. could wonder not only "what kind of 
a geologist he is", but what kind of poet he is, who has "no connection to 
the rocks at all" (138), or in other words, no connection to place. 
Hudson represents an aspect of the ambivalence of the imperial-
colonial encounter. He embodies the ambivalent hierarchical discourse of 
the imperial centre over the colonies, in which the 'superiority' of the 
culture of the metropolitan centre over the colonies is troubled by the 
nostalgic sense of reality as being elsewhere, somewhere more 'natural'; 
and he represents the ambivalent imperial cultural centrality and power as 
229 
well as metropolitan decadence, conferred by the 'colonies' in their mix of 
paranoia, deference to, and mockery of England and the English. For his 
part, Hudson's perceptions are culturally and geographically Eurocentric. 
His first utterance in the text is "Where in colonial hell are we?" (66). He 
has arrived perceptually unequipped for what he sees, and can only 
respond to the mountains in relation to his familiar England: "Bare, gray, 
no trees, no grass. They surround you, they press you down, they laugh at 
you like teeth" (66). While England remains his 'centre', he feels "so far 
from the world. It's damn primitive .... / .... No civilisation, nothing" 
(103). Even the geology, incomprehensible to him, is described as "unreal, 
so complex it's almost impossible to figure out. The age references do 
nothing but confuse me. These rocks have mineral compositions that I've 
never seen in England" (103). However, Hudson is not the only one with 
prejudiced and paranoid perceptions. Hearne remarks, "Trust Jerome to 
hire a Brit for an assistant, they're taking over geology" (53), while even 
J.L. describes him in terms of a cultural stereotype, with his "Typical long 
nose, long face, long teeth. Upper-class British prep school, impeccable 
accent and manners" (138). The breaking down of the authority of the texts 
of imperial-colonial relations and the texts -- assumptions, prejudices, 
blindnesses -- which authorise them, occurs with the unexpected actions 
and success of Hudson (177), and with the unexpected, even if hoped for, 
success of finding the gold deposit in the mountains, causing Hudson to 
exclaim, "Incredible. A gold deposit. Wait until I tell this story at home!" 
(204). The reversal of the expected movement of discourse from 'centre' to 
'periphery', into the flow from 'periphery' to 'centre' destabilises the very 
conception of the relationship, and is anticipated earlier in the novel, 
where the texts of Europe are seen as vulnerable to reshaping out of 
recognition or legibility to imperial eyes. Hudson complains, "Even the 
airmail letters from home are crumpled and torn by the time they get out 
here; sometimes I can hardly read them" (103). 
One of the texts that did travel from imperial centre to colonial 
periphery was the Bible, and Milton has similarly taken his Bible into the 
mountains. Although he is largely private about his faith, he nevertheless 
imposes it upon the landscape in the sense that he uses it to make sense of 
his reality. At the beginning of the summer, his reliance on and the 
centrality of "'the true word'" unshaken, Milton's inarticulacy evokes the 
little room that a faith of the absolute truth leaves for his own discourse. 
At this time, he regards the mountains as "'an example of God's glory'" 
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(66). However "'God's glory'" begins to conflict with his more secular, 
pragmatic evaluation of the landscape, which, unlike the land at home, is 
"only dirt" (101), and the rigidity of the "'true word'" gives way to more 
flexible perception. He becomes more articulate, and his descriptions of 
the mountain landscape demonstrate variation from the "eerie ... solid 
darkness" of night (148), to the "distant splash of the lake" (211) and 
"sinking springy in the moss" (212). Finally, watching MacKenzie and J.L., 
Milton discovers, "That is how you do it./ .... That is how you make a 
kiss" (212). This discovery, significantly, leaves him "rooted to the ground, 
... hammered into the moss" (211). Therefore, a relaxation of his and the 
Bible's mutual hold over each other has both been the result and the cause 
of a stronger connection to the land, and by implication, to reality. 
The discourse of patriarchy represented by Jerome is another 
constituent of the discourse of colonisation. Although this has already 
been discussed in the previous section, it is worth reiterating his 
compulsion to impose his own view of social order upon the camp. He is 
critical of MacKenzie because he "hasn't learned to let the assistants do the 
shitwork" (26), and he ignores Thompson's enthusiasm for J.L. because 
"his opinion doesn't count" (28). He is scandalised that the crew are 
drinking before he arrives, and declares "There's no way they're going to 
get any more, not if I have anything to say about it" (54). He despairs that: 
The Jutland's set up facing the lake so the wind will hit that tent 
square every night. The Storm Havens aren't in a row, they're just 
any old way ... ./ .... The garbage pit's too close and the shitter is too 
far away. Somebody's decided to build a shower. I've never been in a 
camp that needed a shower before. (54) 
As has been shown, underlying his objections are the presence and 
convenience of J.L. Similarly, he is eager to impose his mastery over the 
landscape and its inhabitants. He believes that if it were under his control 
he could "save the program!" (115), and is just as keen to use his Magnum 
against the bear (115) and J.L. (218). The violence of his misreading of the 
landscape can only be repudiated, and having smugly dismissed 
MacKenzie's find as "Fool's gold for a fool" (179), Jerome leaves the camp, 
and as a result does not participate in the staking of claims. It is he who is 
finally made to look a fool (216-218). 
Discussion of The Temptations of Big Bear showed how travel and 
communications technology furthered the colonisation of the Canadian 
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West, and symbolically 'wrote' the settlers on and into the land. In The 
Tent Peg, access to the mountains is gained by aeroplane and helicopter, 
while radio communications function to keep the camp supplied with 
survival requisites. Cap is responsible for communications, logistics, and 
is camp expediter. However, his function in the novel is to serve as 
metaphor for the limitations of a static and formulaic interaction with his 
surroundings. His discursive isolation, or remoteness from other realities, 
is emphasised in his self-organised ability to carry out his radio schedule 
without leaving his tent (85). Indeed, in terms of the larger landscape, he 
is unique among the men in that he remains in the campi he does not go 
anywhere. His relationship to the landscape is purely textual, suggested in 
his closest contact with geological activity being "sitting in the cooktent 
making a list of the soil samples" (192). The limitations of Cap's relation 
to the landscape and other subjectivities is signalled in the frequency with 
which he describes what he encounters as "Hard to believe. Impossible to 
believe" (109i 70i 125). Predictably, like the other men, Cap is unaware of 
the rockslide, and just as predictably finds it "Unbelievable" (125). 
Ivan, the helicopter pilot also has a relationship to the landscape 
mediated by technology. However, like Cap, the technological means that 
provides access to the land also effects his separation from it. It is clear 
from his approach to the camp area that his reading of the landscape is 
technologically shaped and limited. He deduces that because "Half the 
crew and the equipment fly out in a Twin Otter", that there must be a lake 
there (46). As he flies in himself, he is grateful for Thompson's accurate 
navigation: "I would've gotten lost, those damn lakes all look the same" 
(46). During the camp, he remains remote from the landscape, above it or 
in his machine. His fear of making contact with the landscape is paralleled 
by his feeling of safety in distance from other people. J.L. is safe to talk to, 
"Maybe because it's like she doesn't listen. Does what she's doing and pays 
no attention" (93). He finds that having her in the helicopter also makes 
him feel safe, as if she brings him luck (162). However, J.L. forces him to 
confront the fears within himself which cause him to seek security in 
rules, patterns, knowledge, and mostly avoidance. 
It is more difficult to define the textuality of Thompson's relationship 
to the landscape. He is happy to be where he is, does not long for 
somewhere else: "MacKenzie is not happy about this place, but I am. We 
are camped on a cirque beside a lake, the perfect loca tion, too high for bugs. 
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... the outcrops here are so much better than on the barrenlands" (48). He 
is enthusiastic about 'active' geology, wanting to "get out on 
reconnaissance. Smash some boulders" (100), and his responses to the 
landscape are sensuous. He notes that "Sitting on that spongy moss with 
the fire wavering across my face, I feel again that quiet" (151). However, 
contrary to those who seek to avoid their contact with the landscape 
through a longing for, or reference to, some other place, Thompson's 
hubris consists in believing that reality is only where he is; in other words, 
he represents the centred Western humanist subject, for whom there is 
nothing outside of his own consciousness. This is suggested in his 
observation that 
There are trees here, a rustling growth that is absent on the 
mountain, that landscape is so stony bare you come to think it alone 
exists. Even if you can see the trees far down the valleys, you don't 
believe they're real, not until you are among them again. (196) 
J.L. challenges Thompson to accept the reality and validity of otherness, 
other places, other lives, other texts. 
The Tent Peg, therefore, illustrates a number of discourses which 
served to establish the European presence on the land and ways of 
perceiving the landscape. Each, embodied in one of the geologist 
characters, is challenged by J.L., whose own relationship to the land 
represents not the absence of textuality -- this has been shown to be 
impossible -- but the privileging of discourses suppressed by the dominant 
discourses of colonisation. J.L.'s relationship to the land opposes the 
rational empiricism of geology. Her attunement to the mountain's 
movements, and her communication with the she-bear have already been 
described. However, even J.L.'s place on the land is mediated by texts. In 
fact, despite the novel's critique of the colonising function of the Bible, J.L. 
is named after the Biblical Ja-el, while her friend Deborah is named after 
the prophetess. While the novel's relationship to the Biblical story 6f Ja-el 
would make an interesting study, it is more relevant here to indicate the 
unusualness of the story of female victory over male violence. J.L. 
similarly tells stories from an alternative tradition of women's writing and 
writing about women. She tells the. men about Zeus, 10 and Hera (153-5), 
and a story which recalls Marian Engel's Bear (155). Although this is a 
story of sexual love between a woman and a bear, J.L.'s description of it as 
"a very strange and beautiful story about a woman who loved a bear" (155) 
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could also apply to the spiritual relationship between J.L. and the she-bear, 
particularly as J.L. recognises Deborah in the bear, and tells Thompson of 
Deborah, "I love a beautiful singer" (159). 
J.L.'s identification of Deborah in the bear is, in the end, evidence that 
even post-colonial contestations of discourses which wrote, and wrote 
into, the land, are constructed inter-textually, and that the attempt to 
construct an authentic belonging to place grounded in the spirit or 
unmediated 'discourse' of place is barred by language. The bear represents 
less the spirit of place than its appropriation in the positing of this more 
authentic, undifferentiated, indigenised spiritual relationship to the land, 
one which is closer to 'women's' relationship to the land. The Tent Peg 
clearly posits a new ethos of place against the patriarchal, rational, 
empiricist and other discourses which contributed to constituting 
'Canada', but it is ultimately mediated by its own ideological 
hierarchisation of inter-texts, and constitutes its own suppressed voices. 
Further, it is built precisely on the absence of the land from the text. 
Two of Jolley's novels which have used the motif of textual authority 
and in authenticity are Foxybaby and Miss Peabody's Inheritance. Both 
novels focus on writers of fiction, and in each, fictionality is linked to the 
importance of setting in the novels, or to a strong sense of place. In 
Foxybaby, the setting is an institution in the wheatbelt, and in Miss 
Peabody's Inheritance, there is a juxtaposition of European and Australian 
settings. In Foxybaby, the landscape is the site of fictionality. The 
unreliability of text in the inscription of place is amusingly suggested in 
the opening sequence of letters between Miss Porch and Miss Peycroft 
negotiating the arrangements for the summer-school class. The arbitrary 
rendering of addresser and, more particularly, addressee at the tops of the 
letters demonstrates the instability of text which becomes the informing 
motif of the entire novel. However, the landscape is also fictionalised in 
the process of its misreading. A description in authorial voice merges with 
Miss Porch's perceptions as she drives through the wheatbelt, 'misreading' 
the land's signs: 
There are strange things about driving alone on long lonely roads 
through the wheat. Old, grey, bent men and women wait indefinitely 
on green misleading corners, becoming part of the bushy roadside 
undergrowth as soon as the helpful traveller stops to investigate .... 
And, as dusk advances, more gnarled old men march in formation 
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keeping up a remarkable speed, alongside, in the shadowy fringes of 
the saltbush. (13-14) 
It has been claimed that all reading is misreading, and this idea serves 
to establish the link between land as it is (mis)read, and text. It is also now 
axiomatic that the reader does not approach the text, nor does the text exist, 
in isolation from all other texts. Readings are informed by prior texts and 
prior readings, and for the descendants of white settlers in post-colonial 
societies such as Australia, much of this inter-textuality derives from 
Europe. It reaches,back to mythic patterns and narratives which survive in 
the perceptual archetypes informing, for example, children's fairy-tales. A 
clear example of such intertextuality can be found in the description of the 
landscape as Miss Porch passes through Cheathem East. Moving from a 
descriptive reading, to metaphorical comparison, to mythic fictionality, 
and thus following the movement of the novel itself, the high street 
very soon becomes a gravel track which, with many twists and turns 
through endless paddocks of wheat, turns finally and like a river 
without any water reaches the sea. The place where land and water 
meet is sca ttered with enormous rock as if some enormous children, 
the sons and daughters of a pair of happily married giants, suddenly 
tiring of their playthings, have hurled them into the sea. (10) 
The landscape is also the setting for the summer-school's enactment of 
Miss Porch's novel. However it is not simply the background against 
which the drama is played, but is imaginatively incorporated into the 
performance itself: "The faint roar of the wind rushing across the 
paddocks was like the sound of the sea. The loneliness of the seashore and 
the movement of the waves could find a parallel -- the girl could step, 
mincing, between the wheat stubble stalks ... "(53). Like Elizabeth Jolley, 
Miss Porch is conscious of the literary appropriation of the landscape. 
During a dramatic peformance of her novel, her character Dr Steadman 
tells friends that "all the places where he had walked or ridden with Sandy 
were fenced off .... 'D'you see, it was as if the time we'd had together was 
to be for ever unreachable'./'Oh, you scholars!' the psychiatrist laughs, 
'you pedants of literature and drama, you carry symbolism too far!'" (135). 
Finally, the revelation towards the end of the novel that the entire 
sequence of events at the Trinity College summer-school has been dreamt 
by Miss Porch travelling on the bus following her car crash, underlines the 
fictional association of land and text. 
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While Foxybaby showed landscape to be the site of fictionality, in Miss 
Peabody's Inheritance fiction is the site of landscapes. Again, fiction 
figures in the text itself as symbolic of the unreliability and impermanence 
of textual mediations of place, and of the centrality of the imagination in 
constructing perceptions and meanings of land. The novel is structured by 
textual journeys between Australia and Europe. Letters, and fragments of a 
novel written by Diana Hopewell in Australia are sent to and read by Miss 
Peabody in England, whose replies demonstrate an increasing inability to 
distinguish between the fictional and the real world. Indeed, her 
'knowledge' of the real world is drawn in part from fictional texts: "[Miss 
Peabody] tried to imagine the hot dry Australian summer. She knew about 
it from Angels on Horseback because the novelist had written about bald, 
dry earth ... " (46). 
Diana Hopewell and Miss Peabody exchange descriptions and each 
construct images of the other's landscape. Diana tells Miss Peabody: 
I live on the gentle slope of a narrow valley .... I live in a ring of 
trees, very old trees and tall, taller I suspect than your English trees. 
In between the bunched foliage of glittering narrow leaves there are 
spaces of sky. There is just such a clear space between the trees like a 
harbour in the sky directly above my house and shed. (8) 
Clearly, even Diana's letters are 'literary' in their use of imagery and 
metaphorical comparison. Struck by the image of the sky harbour, Miss 
Peabody, negotiating the journey to work in London "thought she would 
look at the sky and learn how to see the shapes of it between buildings. 
This could even be useful in London, to know the sky harbours of the city" 
(9). However, she does not find it possible to translate the reading practices 
suitable to the Australian landscape she imagines to her own in a 
European city: "Looking up at the sky was probably easier on horseback. In 
the city, looking up made her neck ache and she bumped into people"(9). 
Similarly, Diana Hopewell accompanies her descriptions of her Australian 
landscape with questions about Miss Peabody's English one: "Tell me 
about your trees .... I suppose ... the trees over there are not as tall as our 
trees. Our Wandoo and Jarrah trees, the Red Gum -- Marri, they are called 
-- are very old and grow to great heights" (84). It is significant that when 
Miss Peabody attempts to reply to the letter, her own descriptions of 
English trees are both self-consciously textual, and at the same time suggest 
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the prior reading of other texts, perhaps a school textbook, or the caption of 
a pictorial coffee-table book: 
The magnificent oak tree is the monarch of the English forest . .. she 
loved composing fine sentences for her replies. The magnificent oak 
tree is the monarch of the English forest . .. she could hardly wait to 
write it down. She thought of the hedgerow elms in remote places in 
the country. Seen from the railway carriage windows at sunset, yes, 
elms were tall trees. (84) 
In fact, Miss Peabody and Diana Hopewell both contemplate the 
nuances of language and its constructions of landscape. Caring for her sick 
mother, one evening Miss Peabody "said the Lord's Prayer softly and 
sweetly adding a part of the twenty-third psalm which brought to her mind 
images of Diana's farm which was, she was sure, used as landscape and 
setting in Angels on Horseback./'In pastures green ... ' Lovely word 
pasture'" (35). Australian idiom carries the freight of Miss Peabody's 
fantasy constructions of its landscape. She reflects that "Even the word 
'paddock' said far more than either 'field' or meadow'" (7). However, 
throughout Miss Peabody's Inheritance, the focus of perception is Europe. 
While half of the narrative follows Miss Peabody's life in England, the 
other half demonstrates Diana Hopewell's pull to Europe in tracing the 
fortunes of her fictional characters as they travel there. Miss Thorne's 
sensibilities are entirely and affectedly English. Diana describes her 
"indicat[ingl a scrubby corner of a bald paddock known with affection and 
pride throughout the school as 'our meadow'" (2). Diana's focus upon 
Europe as cultural centre -- the reason for the fictional journey -- is 
expressed in descriptions of the 'picturesque' landscape. Initially she 
works these out through her characters' perceptions on their travels: 
"Gwenda, like Miss Thorne, looks out of the window. Mountains and 
more mountains come and go. Even from inside the train there is the 
feeling of knowing the exquisite sensations of the clear air outside" (49). 
However, later descriptions are expressed directly by Diana: 
There is a little mountain, she wrote, the Kahlenberg, near Vienna, 
I'll explain about it .... From the Kahlenberg there is the most 
complete and panoramic view of Vienna. In the twilight, at dusk, it 
is heavenly .... The river Danube is like a misty blue path round the 
city and all round are the famous Vienna woods, the Wiener Waldo 
(66) 
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Yet it is not only Europe which is the object of Diana Hopewell's 
fantasies. Because Australia has largely been an absence in the text, it is 
only towards the end of the novel when, inspired by her textual creation of 
the land, Miss Peabody travels to Australia to visit Diana and the farm, 
that it is revealed that the 'setting' of Diana's life, as inscribed in her 
letters, had been as fictional as her novel. Miss Peabody discovers that 
Diana has recently died in a nursing home, and further, that even when 
she had been alive, the farm had been at most a memory, subject to the 
textual processes of all writers. Diana had written of: 
the fiction which is mounted on truth. Take landscape for example: 
forests are more mysterious, paddocks are lengthened and widened, 
escarpments are pushed to greater heights and brought closer to 
townships. The writer creates the imagined land from fragments of 
the real thing. (137) 
Of course, on another level, these are Elizabeth Jolley's words, evoking the 
ambivalent mix of authority and inauthenticity of the text, describing both 
the process and the theme of her own novel. The novel ends with Miss 
Peabody having found a place which allows the merging of both the 
perceived and the imagined landscape, from and into which she too can 
write. Punning the terminology of writing with land ownership 
(belonging), "All she really needed to enter into her inheritance was a 
title" (157).19 
This line from Jolley's novel summarises the conclusion to be drawn 
from the examination of discourses in this chapter itself; that is, despite the 
affective discourses of presence and authenticity which comprise post-
colonised and 'other' counter-claims to belonging, the post-colonial 
inheritance is one of textuality. In this context, both authority and 
(in)authenticity must be understood as ambivalent. The authority of 
writing as a basis for belonging is problematised by discourses of presence 
and authenticity, but the latter are themselves problematised by their 
articulation in texts. At the same time, the inauthenticity which 
characterises post-colonial textually-mediated relationships to the land 
constitutes the 'authentic' condition of post-colonialism. In the next 
chapter, I examine post-colonising claims to discursive authority through 
representations of the post-colonised other, and the relationship of these to 
strategic appropriations of 'authenticity' through discursive identifications 
with that other. 
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Notes. 
1 This is an evocation of the Maori creation myth which posits Ranginui and 
Papatuanuku, the sky and the earth, as the parents who coupled and produced off-spring. 
Their children forced them apart to let in light and life. 
2 See Helen Tiffin, "New Concepts of Person and Place in The Twyborn Affair and A Bend 
in the River," in Peggy Nightingale (ed.), A Sense of Place in The New Literatures in 
English (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1986), p. 22, for reference to the 
importance of the journey motif in 'new literatures'. 
3 This is the reverse, indeed the mirror-image, of the post-colonised discourse of racial 
privilege. Its 'backlash' status is obvious. 
4 It can also be read precisely as her emotional description of those very origins and 
identity, as the painful secrets she cannot divulge remain attached to the place. 
5 Aritha Van Herk, The Tent Peg (1981; London: Virago, 1989). 
6 As Reingard Nischik points out in "Narrative Technique in Aritha Van Herk's Novels", 
in Robert Kroetsch and Reingard M. Nischik (eds), Gaining Ground: European Critics on 
Canadian Literature (Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1985), a number of them remain flat 
figures, and as I will show, voices for discursive constructions, rather than fully developed, 
realised characters. He differentiates the characters who "achieve some sort of roundness" 
from those "who may each be summed up with one sentence," and a third group who 
"appear either exclusively as adjuncts to J.L. ... or serve as outside observers" (pp. 116-7). 
7 Feminist scholarship has both employed and problematised this identification. Val 
Plumwood points out in "Plato and the Bush: Philosophy and the Environment in 
Australia," Meanjin, 49, No.3 (1990), that "in the traditions of the West women and men 
have always been conceptualized very differently with respect to nature, the traditional 
identification being of women with nature and of men with what opposes it, especialy 
reason. If women are taken to be identified with nature (and with the realm of necessity in 
human life over that of freedom), a masculine identity formed by exclusion of the 
feminine/natural within will also be formed by exclusion of the feminine/natuJ;al 
without," (p. 535). 
8 See Hartrnut Lutz, "'Meat and Bones Don't Matter': Mythology in The Tent Peg," Ariel, 
20, No.2 (1989), pp. 55-56, for elaboration of connections between the names of the novel's 
characters and the names of Canadian explorers. 
9 Lutz, p. 57. 
10 This is supported in J.L.'s description of the men as being "like children" (136). 
11 Graham Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map: Post-Colonialism, Post-Structuralism and 
the Cartographic Connection," Ariel, 20, No.4 (1989), p. 118. 
12 Plum wood, p. 535. 
13 Elizabeth Jolley, Palomino (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984). 
14 Elizabeth Jolley, The Newspaper of Claremont Street (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts 
Centre Press, 1981). 
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15 See Helen Tiffin, in Nightingale (ed.), p. 22, for a reference to the role and function of 
the 'native guide' figure in fiction. 
16 Lutz, p. 57. 
17 Lutz, p. 57. 
18 Maps are also very important in Van Herk's No Fixed Address (1986; London: Virago, 
1989). While Arachne follows maps as she traverses the land in her sales job, she 
ultimately escapes the containment by textuality they represent as at the end she drives 
literally off the map (and out of the story). However, her lover Thomas, a map-maker, is 
similarly obsessed with maps, and this obsession is parallelled by his passion for order in 
other aspects of his life. Signs and sign-writers are also important in this novel in relation 
to the theme of the authority and inauthenticity of the text. 
19 Elizabeth Jolley also writes about characters whose marginalised status within the 
networks of the dominant discourse complicates or denies them access to the status and 
security of land ownership as privileged by that discourse. Such characters frequently 
appropriate and subvert the textuality governing their access to land. "Bill Sprockett's 
Land," in Stories (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1984) pp. 84-89, is a story which 
turns on the authority and inauthenticity of the textual mediation of access to, or a place 
on, the land. Sprockett is a migrant from the English Black Country who lives in a 
suburban boarding house. However, through letters to his father, he textually asserts his 
ownership of a certain piece of land, thus writing himself into it. The inauthenticity of 
this textual relationship to the land consists in the fact that the letters are untrue, while his 
true relationship to the land is constituted by his gaze. This gaze does not merely shape his 
putative ownership of the land, but also his perceptual or emotional connection with it. 
At first, the peacefulness and stillness of the land reflects the inner peace he felt on looking 
at it, and "every time he felt as if he was seeing the land for the first time .... that he was 
the first person to look down his valley, for the first time" (85). Thus he reproduced the 
sense of 'originality' and 'belonging' of the pioneer gaze. However, his father's arrival not 
only exposes the inauthenticity of the letters, but demonstrates the authority that texts 
have in determining the relationship to the land. Now that the land could not be seen as 
his, Bill Sprockett "hardly saw the prettiness" of it (88-9). The shame that both men feel as 
they leave it for the last time is such that, "They did not look down to the place again, of 
course it was nothing to them. Without meaning to ... they crushed the little flowers, 
little clusters of coral and tiny exquisite orchids with their boots" (89). 
In other stories, socially marginalised characters appropriate in order to subvert the 
textual processes of buying and selling land. Uncle Bernard is a migrant from Holland in 
"The Outworks of the Kingdom," in Stories, pp. 161-167. Informed of his imminent 
displacement by a planned six-lane highway through his land, he accepts the "fair words 
and money" (167) he is offered in exchange. However, he mysteriously tells his nephews 
that "'Sometimes is very good for a man to move his earth before some bodies else do it 
for him"'(162), then gradually removes a large proportion of his clay soil and rocks and 
sells them privately for brick-making and land-fill. Apart from resulting in profound 
changes to the landscape, his scheme means that he sells his land not once, but twice, and 
with his share of the profits, returns to Holland. See also other 'Uncle Bernard stories in 
the same volume: "Outink to Uncle's Place", pp. 75-83, and "The Agent in Travelling", pp. 
168-175. 
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Finally, in "A Gentleman's Agreement," in Stories, pp. 18-24, Mother, a cleaning 
woman whose social 'place' is largely other people's places, is eventually in a position to 
sell a small piece of land which had belonged to her recently deceased father. However, at 
the lawyer's office where the sale of the land to a doctor is arranged and the agreement 
drawn up, Mother appeals to the doctor's own love of the land to gain his empathy, saying, 
"'I feel if I could live there just to plant one crop and stay while it matures, my father 
would rest easier in his grave'" (23). To the lawyer's consternation, the doctor disregards 
the written contract and agrees, calling it "'a gentleman's agreement'" (23). The lawyer 
nevertheless makes the necessary changes, writing out "a special clause which they all 
signed" (23). However, despite the renewed consistency of the text with the verbal 
agreement, Mother's plan subverts it precisely in following it. The seedlings that arrive 
are for a jarrah forest which will take years to mature. She may have transgressed of the 
'spirit' of the agreement, but she remains true to the letter: "'Well he can come on his 
land whenever he wants to and have a look at us,' Mother said. 'There's nothing in the 
gentleman's agreement to say he can't'" (24). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OTHERING THE SELF: THE APPROPRIATION OF AUTHENTICITY. 
4. I. Introduction. 
The previous chapter concluded with a discussion of texts in which 
there was posited an ambivalent authority and inauthenticity in textual 
assertions of relationship to the land. Such texts implied the concomitant 
elusiveness and at the same time authenticity of presence to the land in 
the privileged forms of speech and physical connection. In this chapter, a 
number of the issues raised in Chapter Three will be developed, but with a 
reversal of emphasis. Just as physical as well as spiritual connection to 
place was posited as the basis of an authentic relation, Chapter Four focuses 
on the discursive link to an embodied point of view. Similarly, just as 
links were asserted in Chapter Three between the attainment and defence 
of physical territory, and political and cultural self-determination, Chapter 
Four examines the notion of a post-colonial discursive 'terrain', and the 
discursive construction -- or determination -- of a 'self' in contestation or 
resistance. In other words, instead of looking at how land becomes 
discourse, this chapter examines how, in the post-colonial cultural context, 
discourse becomes likened to land, in the sense of demarcated territories 
over which one may have 'rights', and which is vulnerable to trespass, 
occupation, or appropriation.! 
4. II. Discursive Territory: Or, Who Can Represent the Other? 
As Foucault has pointed out, discourses do not circulate freely and 
without limitation, but are subject to systems of control and exclusion, 
such that "we can not simply speak of anything, when we like or where we 
like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of just anything."2 Not all 
discourses have equal centrality or power in any specific social, political, 
economic or cultural context. Some versions of reality are privileged over 
others, and the difference is simultaneously a source and a reflection of the 
difference in social and discursive power. Hegemonic discourses are 
created through marginalisation or exclusion of others. But Richard 
Terdiman warns that the term "dominant discourse" is a rhetorical 
abbreviation which reifies and hypostatises the "moving and flowing 
network of practices and assumptions by which, at any of a series of 
endlessly divisible given moments, social life is structured."3 Recognised 
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instead as a "complex and shifting formation,"4 which as Chapter One 
argues, is only ever partially embodied, and embodied by provisional and 
shifting colligated subject positions, it is possible to see how, for example, 
feminist and indigenous discourses can contest 'it' on different sites of 'its' 
operation, and at the same time can share programmes and strategies of 
contestation. At the same time, despite the constraints on the production 
and circulation of discourses outlined by Foucault, it is therefore important 
to recognise that as a result of the multiple and partial interpellation of 
subjects by discourses, "no dominant discourse is ever fully protected from 
contestation."s 
However, as Chapters Two and Three showed, the particular anxieties 
underpinning belonging and authenticity in settler post-colonial societies 
render 'marginal' discourses vulnerable also, not simply to contestation 
but to appropriation. Their 'difference' from the 'dominant' is 
ambivalent: while their particular discursive struggle is one of retaining 
difference, it could be argued that they are valued as Other in proportion to 
the perception of their sameness. The post-colonial battle of discourses can 
therefore be understood as spatial, such that, provisionally reifying the 
'dominant' and 'marginal' discourses, marginal discourses seek ground 
from which to be spoken, and from which to impinge upon or even enter 
the space of the dominant discourse; on the other hand, the dominant 
discourse may then re-appropriate that space. Such movement is evident 
in the ways in which the notion of 'representation' has been employed in 
literary discourse, effecting the politicisation -- in the strongest sense -- of 
that discourse, and instituting boundary disputes and discursive 
gerrymanders. 
The dominance of a discursive formation is partly dependent on its 
representation of an Other in terms which suit its hegemonic purposes. 
Terry Goldie, in discussion of the constructions of such images, has 
pointed to the ubiquitous references to the indigene as "devil," "fiend," 
and "demon" in nineteenth-century Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand writing. He cites the use of the term "'devilish war-cry'" in 
Richardson's Wacousta; Thomas Bracken, in "The March of Te 
Rauparaha," describing the attacking Maori as "'like fiends unloosed from 
hell"'; and Mitchell, who in his 1839 Three Expeditions description of 
Aborigines, asserted that "their hideous crouching postures, measured 
gestures, and low jumps, all to the tune of a wild song, with the fiendish 
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glare of their countenances, at times all black, but now all eyes and teeth, 
seemed a fitter spectacle for Pandemonium than the light of the bounteous 
sun."'6 However, apart from uses of the indigene to embody principles of 
evil and violence, Goldie also describes the use of such images for 
semiotically self-referential purposes of caricature and parody, and even 
the evocation of popular cultural stereotypes of the past for the 
advertisement of consumer products and services.7 
On the other hand, writing which employs 'images of' the indigene 
does not necessarily employ 'negative' images. Reversing Abdul 
}anMohamed's formulation of the Manichaean aesthetic, Goldie argues 
that "in contemporary texts the opposition is frequently between the 
'putative superiority' of the indigene and the 'supposed inferiority' of the 
white."8 Ne~ertheless, whether the image is positive or negative, it is still 
an image, and as such, a stereotype. Such stereotypes serve functions 
defined by and for the purposes of the dominant discourse; functions 
which define the indigene as the post-coloniser's self-constituting Other: 
"'The 'bad' Other becomes the negative stereotype, the 'good' Other 
becomes the positive stereotype. The former is that which we fear to 
become; the latter, that which we fear we cannot achieve."'9 It is therefore 
necessary to correct the impression that through positive images one can 
speak, not about, but rather on behalf of the Other who is deemed unable 
to represent him/herself. Chapter Three argued that the terms of 
valorisation of the post-colonised serve a primarily post-colonising 
purpose of constructing an accessible Other to the failures and degradations 
of both history and 'progress', redeeming, through naturalisation, settler 
post-colonial nationalism. Therefore, 'images of' literature is not 
necessarily negative; it serves (different) dominant purposes just as well to 
romanticise the figure of the indigene. In either case, the post-colonised, 
written about by the post-coloniser, are rendered radically absent from/in 
literary discourse. The discussion of Wiebe in Chapter Two showed that 
his representation of Big Bear re-inscribed Big Bear's absence, while 
effecting his own "literary land claim."IO 
Beth Brant evokes a kind of double-bind in which any member of the 
dominant group is likely to become enmeshed in attempting to represent a 
minority-group or individual. She argues that "there's a big difference 
between Indian woman as victim and telling the truth ... [T]here's 
romantic images of the Indian woman as the drunk and the slut and all 
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these things that we've been called as squaw. But there is also a truth that 
we are poor, that we often have to exist in substandard ways."l1 In other 
words, while 'negative' images may serve to reinforce prejudicial and 
stereotypical judgements of racial inferiority, even 'positive' images are 
complicit with the effacing of history and its legacies of poverty and 
degradation for the post-colonised. The post-colonising reader avoids 
confrontation with these 'truths' in favour of the comforting images of a 
kind of pre-Iapsarian plenitude. Therefore, masquerading as benevolence 
in relation to the Other, and as effecting the supplementation of the 
dominant discourse, this form of representation no less ensures the 
continued dominance of the dominant discourse -- the discourse with 
ground from which to speak. It is not simply a matter of 'positive' or 
'negative' images being false, but of historicising their complex relation to 
reality. Further, as Barbara Godard points out, "That an 'image of the 
squaw' produced by the dominant culture would become a literary norm 
that would determine the value of all subsequent cultural productions by 
Native women which would be measured against it, is a fear expressed by 
Native writers."12 Such representation "perpetuates the discourse of 
white on red, or white on black, reinforcing the dominant discourse by 
blocking the emergence of an emancipatory discourse of/for red and/or 
black. ... Such discursive practices become oppressive when the group in 
power monopolizes the theoretical scene and there is no counter-
discourse, that is no debate among differing discourses. "13 
Therefore, along with the emergence of voices from the margins has 
come the challenge to, and even rejection of, the validity of speaking for 
the Other. Referring to the major premise of Maoritanga that Maori, not 
Pakeha, "be the proper custodians and managers of knowledge about the 
Maori heritage,"14 Hanson points out that "some advocates of Maoritanga 
have invited Pakeha scholars out of Maori studies. Michael King, a 
Pakeha who has written extensively on Maori topics, observed that in 1971 
Maori radicals insisted that Pakeha historians write more about Maori 
subjects, but by 1983 the demand was that they should not write about 
them at al1."15 Similarly, Jeannette Armstrong protests that "There are a 
lot of non-Indian people out there speaking on our behalf and I resent that 
very much; I don't feel that any non-Indian person could represent our 
point of view adequately."16 
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However, this discursive ground is also conceded by majority-group 
members, frequently in terms of expressions of deference to minority-
group (self-)knowledge. To cite Hanson again, "The Pakeha historian 
Judith Binney acknowedged the premise that Maoris are best equipped to 
understand and write about Maori topics .... [S]he expressed misgivings 
about her grasp of the material and recorded the hope that one day a Maori 
scholar would produce a more authoritative account."17 
4. II. (D. Value-Added Discourse. Two questions which arise out of 
such a position -- a position which has attained something like the 
unquestionable status of ideological correctness -- are, what discursive 
strategies are being employed by the deferent majority-group member and 
what are their effects? and what assumptions underlie the privileging of 
(in this case) indigenous knowledge as truth? These questions may be 
addressed through an analysis of yet another expression of deference in 
relation to minority-group discourse, and its discursive and literary 
context. Barbara Godard has referred to "Discussions by native women 
writers I had been privileged to overhear at the Women and Words 
Conference, Vancouver, July 1983."18 Since she refers to discussions by 
rather than among native women, in the context of a conference, one can 
only assume that the event was an open one, and that their discussions 
were intended for a general audience of conference delegates. Yet Godard 
expresses deference towards these women by considering herself privileged 
to hear them, suggesting some special value inherent in their discourse. 
What could be the source and the nature of this value? Could it be value 
which Godard herself has added, or imbued it with? As Foucault has 
shown, discourse which is valued partakes of, or is invested with, the 
condition of Truth: in short, it has Truth-value. However, in the case of 
this conference, there is an apparent contradiction between the truth-value 
of the Native women's discourse and its contestatory position related to 
their own social marginalisation. After all, Foucault has indicated that the 
political economy of truth in discourse is characterised, among" other traits, 
by its production and transmission, "under the control, dominant if not 
exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses."19 So how, or 
from what Other ground, can the dominant discourse contest itself? Very 
simply, "effects of truth are produced within discourses which in 
themselves are neither true nor false."20 Therefore, the truth resides less 
in what is said in substantive terms than in the discursive strategies and 
forms employed. 
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This can be illustrated with reference to some statements made by the 
Native women at this same conference. Jeannette Armstrong, for 
example, argued that "There are many things that we Indian people 
understand and take for granted .... However, when we start writing about 
those things . . . we find ourselves explaining many things; we find 
ourselves talking in terms that aren't necessary."21 Thus, despite her 
frustration at this very situation, what she claims to offer, along with other 
Native women who write, and speak, is the detailed -- or excess of -- Truth, 
in a discourse whose density is a significant guarantee of its veracity. 
However, as will be shown, the truth-effect of her promise of Truth is also 
produced by its invocation of those things so internal to their being that 
they need retrieval for, and explaining, only to outsiders. Indeed, she 
explicitly contrasts this Truth with White falsity in terms of an inside-
outside opposition: the masks White people build up of themselves in 
their writing, as opposed to the "truth and the centre of things." She 
declares that "Indian writers don't even deal with that mess; they get right 
to the centre of things and sometimes that's hard for non-Indian people to 
accept. "22 Therefore, Armstrong both explicitly promises the truth, and in 
a binary discursive structure, associates the truth with the essentialised 
category of Indian, while the non-Indian is linked with non-truth. The 
reference to the 'centre' of things is a further seductive trope, 
compounding the force of her discourse. In relegating non-Indian 
concerns to the margins, she has reversed, and yet maintained, the binary 
structure of the dominant discourse itself. Further, in referring to the 
excess of information Native women (must) supply for non-Indian 
readers, she describes a powerful truth-effect of discourse. This can be 
explained by substituting the term 'race' for Foucault's reference to 'sex' in 
his insight into the demand for, and production of certain 'truths'. His 
point then aptly describes the post-colonial discursive context. He writes of 
The multiplication of discourses concerning [race] in the field of the 
, exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, 
and to do so more and more, a determination on the part of the 
agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak 
through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated detai1.23 
Therefore, in the "explicit articulation," albeit reluctantly, of "endlessly 
accumulated detail" about the racial self, the truth-effect lies to a significant 
degree in the very fact that it has been solicited by and to the requirements 
of the dominant discourse. 
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Finally, to return to Godard's statement, even within the apparently 
open context of the conference, opened further by the publication of 
proceedings, Godard discursively locates herself as an outsider, one who 
has no 'right' to hear the discourse of the Native women: only the fortune 
-- or bad manners? -- to overhear it. ,At the risk of over-reading, this bears 
further analysis, as it can be shown that her deference serves ambivalent 
ends. In expressing her sense of privilege, she privileges them, and in 
doing so, reinforces their extra-ordinary status or position within the 
institutions of women's and/literary discourse. This is indeed reflected in 
the titles of the published extracts from Native women's discussions: Beth 
Cuthand's "Transmitting Our Identities as Indian Writers"; Jeannette 
Armstrong's "Writing From a Native Women's Perspective"; and Beth 
Brant's "Coming Out as Indian Lesbian Writers."24 It is Lilian Allen, who 
spoke on "Black Women's Writing in Canada" who protests that "when 
other women get up to speak, they get to represent themselves and their 
own point of view, but when I get up to speak or do anything I am 
expected to represent my entire race."25 However, the point is equally 
valid for Native women. For example, Godard elsewhere cites a passage 
from Lee Maracle's novel, I Am Woman, which makes precisely this 
point: 
'No-one makes the mistake of referring to us as women either. 
White women invite us to speak if the issue is racism or Native 
people in general. We are there to 'teach', or to 'sensitize them', or to 
serve them in some other way .... We are not, as a matter of course, 
invited as an integral part of 'their movement' -- the women's 
movement.'26 
However, the term 'overhear' is a useful basis from which to elucidate 
further problems in expressions of cultural deference, and enables points 
from the preceding discussion to be brought together under one 
underlying mechanism for the production of Truth within the context of 
power relations. One reading of the language of Beth Cuthand's passage in 
the proceedings suggests the validity of the common meaning of being an 
unintended interlocutor (which in the context, could still only be a 
discursive strategy). Cuthand's consistent use of the first-person plural 
pronoun creates a discursive group unity among Indian women which 
interpellates those Indian women present and excludes other women. In 
other words, her 'we' could refer, from her perspective, to 'you' and 'me' 
among Indian women. In this case, Godard would be posi tioned as an 
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outsider. Yet even this positioning would refer at the same time to her 
social privilege in not being a member of the minority-group, Indian 
women, thus compromising what could otherwise be a salutory experience 
for majority-group women in being made to feel outsiders within, and 
intruders upon, the discursive situation. However, for reasons not only of 
the fact of the distribution of Cuthand's discussion in publication, but also 
of other features of the language she employs, another reading is more 
useful in discerning the ambivalences of discursive strategy and power 
when Native women speak the Truth to and for non-Indian women. 
Assuming that Godard is addressed by a collective subject -- 'we Indian 
women' -- then in one sense she is outside that discourse, but in another, 
she is vital to its constitution as truth. She is (over)hearing something 
which functions as a racial confession, a point reinforced by the admission 
by Cuthand, as the confessing subject, of a position of ethical responsibility, 
and an avowed project of (racial) redemption or salvation. Both of these 
evoke the religious context and epistemology of the confession. On the 
former point, Cuthand declares, "we feel we have a responsibility to 
encourage as many Indian people as possible to write,"27 and that "we have 
a responsibility to be honest, to transmit our understanding of the world to 
other people." Indeed, this responsibility is described as "much more than 
what could be termed the artist's." On the latter point, she characterises 
such writing as " a healing process" in which "thousands of Indian people 
[are] involved ... in becoming whole, complete human beings again."28 
Foucault has described the relationship of the conventional forms of the 
confession to the production of truth.29 However, he explains that 
The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is 
also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within 
a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence 
(or the virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the 
interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes 
and appreciates it.30 
Clearly, Cuthand's discourse conforms with the description of the speaking 
subject who is also the subject of the statement, but crucially, Godard's 
position in relation to that discourse can be seen to have shifted from 
relative powerlessness within the discursive context, as represented by her, 
to being precisely the more powerful participant. As Foucault argues, "the 
agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is [s]he 
who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing."31 With 
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this in mind, we can return to Jeannette Armstrong's "dilemma" and 
recognise this very power relation, the institutional incitement of her 
discourse: "we find ourselves explaining many things; we find ourselves 
talking in terms that aren't necessary. "32 This can now be understood as 
another facet of the functioning of confession, whose "veracity is . . . 
guaranteed by the bond, the basic intimacy in discourse, between the one 
who speaks and what [s]he is speaking about."33 As has been shown, this 
discourse is so intimately connected with the racial selves of the speakers, 
it could go without saying if it were not for the presence of the outsider for 
whom it is, or must be, produced. It is indeed the truth of themselves, 
supposedly uncontaminated by external influences. 
All that is left to the subjects of the dominant discourse are 
protestations of sincerity, and 'good' rather than exploitative intentions. 
However, these too function as 'confessions', and thereby partake of the 
conventions of truth. Those who have spoken for the Other are prepared 
to confess their own lack of qualifications to do so in return for the ability 
to shift the boundaries to incorporate a common ground of experience. 
Michael King, whose participation in historical research on 'Maori topics' 
has already been noted, produced his selectively autobiographical Being 
Pakeha, a text largely arising from his perception of the need to 'confess' 
and thereby to justify this aspect of his career. He explains, in a passage 
which to some extent has motivated the entire text, that when he came 
upon Maori phenomena he did not understand, he "set out to learn about 
them. And in trying to make them comprehensible to myself, I sought to 
make them intelligible to a wider Pakeha audience. It never occurred to 
me that to do so might be inappropriate, nor that my presence in this role 
might eventually be unwe1come."34 His protestations of innocence and 
good intentions constitute the 'sincerity' of his confession, locating the 
grounds for exoneration not in the external domain of the deed and its 
effects, but the integrity and presence-to-itself of the subjectivity which· 
'preceded' them. Similarly, Canadian Margery Fee, referring to the 
tendency of academics to "discuss their ideas without reference to the 
ideas, opinions and feelings of their 'subjects'" concedes that "I cannot 
believe that my writing is immune."35 However, she argues that "to say I 
can't write about Native writing for fear of automatically and 
inadvertently oppressing them is to fall for another of those impossible 
'choices': shut up or be an oppressor. Silence can be 'oppressive' too. And 
because of my institutional subject position ... I can hope to shift the 
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institutional discourse a little."36 Therefore, Fee also expresses 'good 
intentions' in using her privileged position for the Other, without 
dishonestly denying that privilege or patronisingly deprivileging herself. 
Nevertheless, the project of shifting institutional discursive boundaries 
is an ultimately ambivalent one, even ambiguous, when it is noted that 
boundaries can be shifted for inclusive and exclusive ends. Specifically, 
majority-group members, as already argued, may concede discursive 
ground to the Other while re-defining some of it as 'common territory', or 
locating and thereby validating the position of their own interests in that 
common ground. For example, Michael King declares that the Maori 
presence on the land "has exposed me to concepts ... which I believe have 
universal value and application; and it has revealed to me more of life and 
death . . . than I had encountered in twenty years of purely Pakeha 
existence.! None of which makes me Maori. ... [W]hat I have always been 
interested in is New Zealand history, its Maori and Pakeha components."37 
Claudia Orange, another Pakeha New Zealand historian, is described as 
"[t]hus far in her career ... not [having] encountered any hostility from 
Maori who might see her as an academic poaching in Maori territory."38 
Orange explains, "'That's because I am not dealing with Maori history per 
se but with the relationship between the two races."39 In a similar vein, 
Australian Sue Thomas justifies her 'right' to engage with Aboriginal 
writing, arguing that despite the existence of areas of black experience 
which have been closed to whites, traditions kept 'secret', "the usually 
brutal and sorry history of contact between European and black Australians 
has been a shared one .... Black Australian literature speaks, then, to 
significant areas of common experience. "40 
There is therefore the danger that the specific difference of the Other 
will be lost, subsumed under 'common' concerns. However, there are 
further potential dangers in the majority-group member's adherence to 
such middle ground. Claudia Orange's explanation of her own position 
continues: "As one of the parties to the treaty [of Waitangi] I'm trying to 
make sense of it from both points of view, acknowledging that I can't 
cover the Maori point of view adequately. That's for Maori to do. I would 
never set myself up as an authority there."41 She therefore cannot avoid 
dealing with 'Maori' history, and is left only with admissions of the 
inadequacy of her attempts, and her ethical declaration of innocence of 
exploitative or appropriative intentions. Nevertheless, the basis of her 
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assurance, like King's, is in her supposedly controlling subjectivity, while 
the meaning of her discourse can not be so contained. The likelihood that 
she would be read, particularly by non-Maori, as an authority, is increased 
by her institutional position and credibility to non-Maori, their 
susceptibility to accounts 'familiarised' by Pakeha academic and textual 
conventions, and perhaps even the truth-effect of the 'confessional' tone 
of her disavowal of authority. In the Canadian context, the point has been 
expressed that "Often ... [non-Indian people] are only willing to listen to 
the frivolous kinds of things that turn them on as intellects at universities, 
and they're not willing to listen to the real true understanding that we as 
Indian people have. "42 However, the point is less one of truth or 
falsity / frivolity (although what constitutes the privileged, 'real true' 
nature of knowledge and understanding that the post-colonised claim will 
be examined further into the chapter), or even careful versus limited 
scholarship, but rather the inevitability of different points of view, not 
simply selectively represented, but represented in accordance with, and by 
way of, differential access to the culturally dominant institutions and 
textual forms of authority. As Armstrong argues, "when we start writing . 
. . we find that the way people perceive what we write becomes transferred 
into the dominant cultural mode."43 
Is this inevitable, or can such limits be overcome? How can an 
oppositional discourse avoid being co-opted by what it challenges? Sue 
Thomas posits the solution of 'situated' readings when she points out that 
When black Australian literature enters the public realm it serves 
many constituencies. In the context of Aboriginal nationalism, it 
bears witness to Aboriginality, raising the consciousness of 
Aboriginals; for European Australians and those from other cultures 
it can occasion reflection on and criticism of the history of 
imperialism and neo-colonialism in racial politics and universalising 
in literary criticism.44 
While the notion of 'constituencies' politically and administratively 
situates readers and acknowledges the fundamental principle of discourse 
that it is not its words alone, but its situation which confers its always 
various possibilities of meaning, the ideal posited by Thomas is subject to a 
more complex construction of (divided) subjectivities and 'interests' in 
late twentieth century settler post-colonialism. Following histories of 
oppression on the basis of race, and even policies of assimilation to 
annihilate racial difference, an 'indigenous consciousness' or reading 
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position may be just as likely to be resisted by those post-colonised whose 
resistance to racial oppression has been founded upon disidentification 
with its basic term. This is not to say that such disidentification is 
necessarily completely 'successful' since one is conferred with subjectivity 
in the field -- by the gaze -- of the Other; such disidentification may 
therefore produce a radically split subject whose interests irreconcilably 
conflict. At the same time, while what is offered the indigenous subject in 
Thomas's formulation is a new and redemptive 'consciousness', and what 
is offered the post-coloniser is a legacy of guilt and grounds for a 
fundamental critique of institutional and cultural practices, then whatever 
the justification for, and merit of, the latter, the former will be seen by 
some post-colonisers as the more attractive reading (pro)position. It will 
therefore be susceptible to re-colonisation, as the post-colonising subject 
opts for a reconstructed self on the terms apparently proffered by post-
colonised literary discourse, rather than accepting the challenge of self-
critique. In short, the reading and writing position of the post-colonised is 
subject to appropriation. 
4. III. Authenticating the Author. 
This raises further questions of discursive constituencies and the 
politics of representation: who may speak with authority, and who may 
speak as Other. During the 1980s, a decade securely within the set of social 
and discursive conditions posited in this thesis as characteristic of the 
'post-colonial', there have been debates within the literary and cultural 
communities of Australia, Canada and New Zealand regarding the 
politically appropriate membership of, and production of discourse from 
within, social and cultural categories of Otherness. Godard states that 
recently 
The question of the right to represent individuals or topics belonging 
to a minority culture has been a contentious issue in Canadian 
literary circles .... It was over just this problem that Women's Press 
in Toronto split into two groups over an anthology which included 
narratives about minority groups . . . written by white Canadian 
women.45 
Similarly, there have been two literary-political 'cases' in Australia and 
New Zealand, centred on questions of textual authenticity through the 
authorial figures of B[anumbir] Wongar and Keri Hulme. Both illustrate 
the obsession with the 'credentials' of the authors as to some extent 
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having (dis)placed the texts themselves, or at least supporting readings of 
the text through the figure of the 'author'. However, this is less of a 
forgetfulness than a problematisation of contemporary criticism's refusal 
to "reestablish the ties between an author and his work or to reconstitute 
an author's thought and experience through his works,"46 in the light of 
critical concern in post-colonial cultures with the questions of speaking 
rights and speaking positions. That these are political rather than 
essentialist questions of individual 'talent' is suggested for example by 
Gunew's statement that "In general terms, overseas, 'Wongar's' texts 
appear to be received as the voice of Aboriginal Australia,"47 and an entry 
in Goodwin's A History of Australian Literature which stated that "there 
was ... a misconception for some time that he was an Aboriginal."48 
Therefore, the question of whether the 'voice' was 'convincing' as such is 
only raised on Australia's politicised post-colonial literary terrain, and 
primarily as a territorial rather than an 'artistic' question. Similarly, the 
controversy and debate over Keri Hulme's The Bone People 49 is one 
divided between those who find the text profoundly credible, albeit on a 
variety of sometimes contradictory terms, and those who question and 
even reject its -- largely by way of Hulme's -- credibility, or more precisely 
again, credentials. 50 Indeed, the terms and the strength of the acclamation 
it has received demand a certain courage of dissenting voices, as 
subsequent discussion will demonstrate. Further, the use of the term 
'case' provides an entry into an extended analogy with legal questions and 
concepts, which themselves invoke fundamentally theological principles 
and practices. As will be shown, questions of authorial and textual 
legitimacy /illegitimacy are debated in terms which include accusation, 
evidence, confession, witness, and judgement. There are important 
differences between the 'cases' of B. Wongar and Keri Hulme. 
Nevertheless, considered together and in comparison, they raise a range of 
issues of critical literary and political concern in the settler post:"'colonial 
context. 
Wongar was discovered also -- as opposed to 'really' -- to be Sreten 
Bozic, a Yugoslavian who appears to have been a trained anthropologist.51 
As Foucault has shown in his discussion of the author-function, and the 
functioning of the name of the author in relation to a text or group of texts, 
the names Bozic and Wongar are not isomorphic and do not serve the 
same function;52 Bozic cannot be substituted for Wongar, and certainly not 
in the name of Truth. Bozic refers to the individual in his civic status, 
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including in his profession as an anthropologist, and signifies his 
Yugoslavian ethnicity. On the other hand, Wongar is the name which, 
through its specificity and its link of that specificity to the author-function, 
groups together a number of texts, and ties them to this name. In that way, 
Wongar is the name of the author; it is only 'fictional' in relation to his 
civic status. The problem however cannot lie simply in the use of another 
name which describes him as author and describes the collectivity of his 
works: this has been common practice. Instead, it is in his adoption of an 
'Aboriginal' name, an adoption which cannot be regarded simply as a 
'choice', as presumably the name 'Stipe Bozic' would have been, (although 
if he had chosen 'Miroslav Holub', for example, he again would have 
chosen a name of other than purely denotative value), but as an 
'appropriation'. In terms of a discursively privileged status of Aboriginal 
identity in post-colonial Australia, an Aboriginal name has the value and 
the status of property, and even invokes a kind of propriety as it names 
indigeneity. However, Wongar has been argued to be an improper name. 
The authenticity of the name itself, which "translates roughly as 
'messenger from the spirit world,'" has been questioned not only on 
grounds of "sacrilege,"53 but also on grounds that it reinforces the author 
as "false god[]. The text becomes fixed ... by the improper name of the 
author and is declared illegitimate by a series of displacements."54 His 
(adoption of an) 'Aboriginal' name is therefore 'read' (in relation to one 
set of inter texts) first as signifying his 'Aboriginality', then (in relation to 
another set of intertexts) as a claim to 'Aboriginality', which in the 
contemporary post-colonial context is an act of 'indigenisation' whose 
meaning lies in the appropriation of an authentic belonging to place. 
However, although Wongar, the name attached to the author-function, 
is not a 'fiction', this does not mean that there have not been 
fictionalisations of an identity for the name of Wongar. Indeed that there 
have been is illustration of the perceived need to fix something essentially 
textual into something static and denotative. For example, an ar~icle 
entitled "Solved: The Great B. Wongar Mystery" which appeared in the 
Bulletin Literary Supplement suggests that Won gar emerged into the 
literary world already as a mystery to be solved, as presumably would any 
authorial name to which it could not fix an identity. Yet the proliferation 
of identities under the name of Wongar subverts this very project, 
ultimately preserving its textual status. Indeed, quite apart from the 
reference to the "Wongar Mystery," suggesting its literary origin, Wongar 
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has been described as a '"creation,''' as '''a sort of living novel,'" 
comprising '''layer upon layer of myth, ideas, evasions, truths and identity, 
variations."'55 Further, as Gelder explains, "He wasn't always represented 
as an Aborigine" and in a foreword to Wongar's The Sinners: Stories from 
Vietnam (1972), Alan Marshall, with whom as Sreten Bozic he produced 
Aboriginal Myths (1972), "noted that B. Wongar was 'the pen name of a 
young American of Negro-white blood who served in the American army 
in Vietnam. He fled to the bush when on leave in Australia and made 
north, where his colour and features were similar to those of the 
Aborigines."'56 However, as well as the constellation of intertexts which 
have also produced him as Sreten Bozic, Yugoslavian immigrant 
anthropologist who has assumed anything from merely an 'Aboriginal' 
name to an 'Aboriginal' identity, a more recent source cites him as having 
grown up in Yugoslavia, but also as claiming Aboriginal descent and 
having spent many years living a tribal existence.57 
By contrast, 'Keri Hulme' names both the author of The Bone People 
(and other texts although it is the novel which has focussed the particular 
issues relevant here) and a 'civic' identity, whose increasingly familiar 
private and public personae have, in different but related ways, been 'read', 
and 'read into' her novel. Her 'case', however, has less to do with the 
propriety of her name as such than the way in which that name has been 
inhabited; it is not a question of whether she really is Keri Hulme, or 
someone else, but of the truth of the identity named Keri Hulme. 
Specifically, while she possesses Maori (Kai Tahu) ancestry, or Maori 
'blood', and explicitly and consistently identifies as Maori, the debate has 
centred on her 'right' to do so. By (ideological) extension, this is held to 
determine the credibility of her text as either a 'Maori' or a 'New Zealand' 
novel. Merata Mita describes The Bone People as a novel "written by a 
Maori woman,"58 as does Judith Dale,59 while Stead points out "Of Keri 
Hulme's eight great-grandparents one only was Maori." For Stead, this is 
insufficient to make her truly Maori. Further, he argues, she was not 
brought up speaking the Maori language, although "like many Pakeha 
New Zealanders she has acquired some in adult life." Although this 
indicates, for Stead, the inauthenticity of 'secondary socialisation', 
rendering her "uses of Maori language and mythology ... willed, self-
conscious, not inevitable, not entirely authentic,"6o it could be argued at 
least that it constitutes, as does Wongar's learning of Aboriginal language, 
what Spivak describes as an act of 'deprivileging', learning the language of 
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the oppressed, which challenges the "sanctioned ignorance" of 
imperialism.61 Although I would argue that such a gesture in post-
colonial Australia, Canada and New Zealand is more likely to increase the 
privilege of the post-coloniser, and in no way determines that the post-
colonising subject will experience the real -- economic, legal, social --
conditions of racial oppression, this is quite different from the question of 
whether a language was acquired from infancy or in adulthood. For 
example, Fee acknowledges the validity of Stead's suspicions of what could 
amount to 'advantageous identifications' by post-colonisers with the post-
colonised for the sake of the apparent privileges of political and cultural 
'affirmative action'. However, she demonstrates greater sensitivity to the 
racial, cultural and linguistic ambiguities of the settler post-colonial 
context. Fee argues that the debates over percentages of indigenous or 
minority-race 'blood' are in fact more complex than Stead (among others) 
admits.62 Her argument takes account of the social dislocations effected by 
colonialism and settler-dominated nationalism which resulted, for 
indigenous populations, in mixed ancestry, generations raised in 
(politically determined) ignorance of their ancestry or cultural traditions, 
and the related predominance of those whose first language is English. 
She further points out that Stead performs a curious reversal of the 
traditional grounds of discursive disqualification: "The smallest amount 
of 'impure' blood has frequently been enough to disqualify minority group 
members from acceptance by the majority. Now, the argument is turned 
around on Hulme: unless she has more Maori blood, she can't speak as 
one."63 She cites Colette Guillaumin's argument regarding the distinction 
and definition of minority and majority group membership. Guillaumin 
points out that "'the membership of a majority is based on the latitude to 
deny that one belongs to a minority. It is conceived as a freedom in the 
definition of oneself, a freedom which is never granted to members of 
minorities, and which they are not in a position to give themselves.'"64 
Consistent with this point, Fee argues that "One could dismiss Stead's 
attempt to determine whether Hulme qualifies as Maori quite quickly: to 
impose a definition from outside the minority is in itself oppressive."65 
Thus Fee points to the oppressive gesture of moving from the raising of 
such issues and dangers to the imposition, or denial, of an identity from 
the outside. 
Wongar and Hulme are each responsible for a different degree of 
complicity in the reader's conflation of the author as writing subject with 
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the 'identity' of the text, and the implicit claims to something approaching 
autobiographical authenticity. Gunew has outlined Wongar's subtle 
textual disclaimers, citing epigraphs, a glossary, and a preface which 
variously function to position him as a "tribal outsider," and his texts as 
"an imaginative impersonation [which] . .. does not purport to be an 
unmediated· first-person account, the unproblematic account of a native 
informant."66 However, although biographical information about 
Wongar is sparse and contradictory, the claim to Aboriginal descent and 
tribal existence cited above is one of the more explicit and complicit 
conflations of name with identity. Keri Hulme has been arguably more 
clearly and consistently complicit with an author-centred reading of her 
novel, so that doubts about her authenticity reflect upon the text.67 Despite 
her disclaimers, the choice of the protagonist's name, Kerewin Holmes, 
and her physical description so strongly evoking Hulme's own appearance, 
one which the media attention surrounding the novel made increasingly 
familiar to the general reader, have clearly constituted too strong a 
temptation to such a reading. For example, one commentator describes 
Hulme on appearance as "surprisingly small," and admits that "I find the 
urge to scan her for traces of Kerewin Holmes, the Amazonian hero . . . is 
irresistable," along with the more general observation that "People expect 
Hulme to be a sort of West Coast wild woman with the soul of an artist 
and the muscle of an all-in wrestler. And surely Hulme's personal style 
nudges the myth along a little?"68 Further, as Stead has pointed out, 
Kerewin Holmes's admission of her sexual 'neutrality' closely echoes a 
statement Hulme made about herself in a television interview.69 
Confronted with the perceived similarities, Hulme provides evidence of 
differences, but also admits to some similarities between herself and 
Kerewin Holmes.70 Indeed, the weighted terms of 'evidence' and 
'admission' are intended here to evoke the very different values attached 
to either identification or disidentification, values determined by the 
perceived authenticity of her (self-)representation. However, it would be 
possible to 'read' similarities as simply these: areas in which Hulme is like 
Holmes, rather than concluding that Hulme is Holmes, or vice versa. 
Nevertheless, political and cultural agendas clearly determine the terms in 
which such questions of interpretation are addressed. Further, even 
within the agenda of cultural authenticity, Hulme's complicity consists in 
the employment of seductive interpretive terminology: in the Preface to 
The Bone People, she celebrates the relative success she had in preserving 
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the text from editorial intervention, claiming "The voice of the author 
won through. "71 
Wongar's literary community, and his position within it is somewhat 
different from those of Hulme. There is a stronger discourse of multi-
culturalism in Australia than in New Zealand, which is more concerned 
with the politics of bi-culturalism. As Bozic, a Yugoslavian immigrant, 
had he written as one, he would undoubtedly have been conferred with 
the ambivalent Otherness to the dominant Anglo-Australian culture 
which would have granted him a position from which to speak, even as it 
positioned his discourse within dominant constructions and exclusions of 
that very definition as 'migrant writer'. Thus he -- or more correctly, but 
inadmissably, his institutionally and textually mediated discourse -- would 
have broken through the silence by which "migrants, like women, have 
signalled their oppression. lin Indeed, the fact that he did not inhabit this 
pre-constituted subject-position, within which he could have been both 
heard and contained, could be argued to have transgressed dominant 
phonocentric critical assumptions about the necessity and inevitability of 
the Other speaking as (her/his proper) Other. Bozic, under such a 
dispensation, did not speak as Other: instead, he wrote as (another) Other, 
in terms of similarly phonocentric assumptions that, on the one hand, 
migrant writers speak their own experience in forms which function 
either as sociology or as oral history,73 and on the other, that writing is 
fundamentally unreliable, even dishonest. Thus he is implicitly charged 
with failing to speak as a 'Yugoslavian immigrant'. However, in a literary 
discursive formation marked, as Sneja Gunew notes, by its tendency to 
conflate Aboriginal writing with 'ethnic' writing,74 it is relevant to 
consider why this apparently sanctioned step 'sideways' should have 
aroused the level of debate that it did. Part of the answer is undoubtedly . 
that the post-colonial cultural context has been witness to an increasing 
intolerance of discourses and institutional practices which fail to accord 
priority status to First Peoples, while its 'multi-cultural' moment rejects 
the construction of the monolithic Other.75 However, another part of the 
answer may lie in further 'biographical information' about Wongar 
himself. As already mentioned, as Sreten Bozic he is apparently a trained 
anthropologist. While as 'Bozic the immigrant' he would be conferred 
with another Otherness, as an anthropologist he is situated within a 
profession which has been complicit with the perpetuation of colonial 
discourse. In addition, his professional status is differentiated from the 
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'authenticity' of experience in much the same way that writing is 
differentiated from speech, as a mediated phenomenon. Therefore, Bozic 
is further charged with fraudulently 'speaking as' an Aboriginal. 
Keri Hulme's position within a cultural context in which bi-
culturalism is the more usual discourse of racial politics, is apparently less 
complex: either she is Maori, or she is Pakeha 'cashing in' on the currently 
perceived advantages of Maori 'identification'.76 Indeed, this is the specific 
charge brought by C.K. Stead, who states he believes that "The bone people 
. . . is a novel by a Pakeha which has won an award intended for a 
Maori. "77 However, the structuralist notions underpinning this positing 
of a simple Maori-Pakeha opposition of discrete terms generate an analysis 
whose limitations have already been demonstrated, both in relation to 
post-colonial hybridity and perhaps more fundamentally the 
problematisation of the unified subject of/in discourse. That the latter 
does not constitute an idealist position divorced from questions of power 
and the politics of discourse is already clear in the very existence of these 
cases of uncertain discursive positionality. In addition, the concern over 
possible 'cashing in' constitutes a further area of commonality between 
Hulme and Wongar: the question of financial gain from their writing 
appears to have intensified the outrage of those who consider their 
indentifications fraudulent. Gunew cites the title of one review of 
Wongar's work: "'B. Wongar Publishes Ferocious Fable, Collects $25,000,'" 
and explains that "The allusion is to a senior writer's grant from the 
Literature Board."78 Certainly Hulme, like Wongar, has access to another 
Otherness as a woman, an identification which in itself has not been 
contested, although her 'typicality' or representativeness certainly has been 
debated.79 Wongar wrote Walg from a female point of view, an act which, 
whether it produced a 'credible' text or not is described by Gunew as a 
"male intervention". She goes on to identify "male emphases" which 
overlay the representation of 'female' concerns.80 However, although 
whether Keri Hulme is a feminist, and whether The Bone People is a 
feminist novel, has been of some interest, the focus of concern about 
Hulme, a concern which has influenced and even determined readings of 
her novel, is the authenticity of her racial identification, something whose 
uncertainties and complexities are exacerbated in settler post-colonial 
societies. As has been shown, the issue of whether or not she can 'Write as 
Maori has been obscured by the factors which have caused the reader to 
conflate the author and her text into a unified act of expression. Therefore, 
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Keri Hulme and The Bone People have become the ground upon which 
politically urgent cultural crises are being played out. 
There are significant relationships between 'readings' of Wongar and 
Hulme, and readings of their texts. Gunew draws associations between 
overseas, that is I:\on-Australian, the reception of B. Wongar's texts outside 
of the debate over his "biographical credentials,"81 and their conferred 
status as "the voice of Aboriginal Australia,"82 accompanied by approbatory 
recognition of their themes of uranium mining and radioactive pollution, 
colonial oppression and racial politics. She contrasts this with their 
Australian reception where "one barely sees any reviews of the texts."83 
Whether or not this relates to anything about the texts themselves, or 
whether it is a reflection of different cultural priorities, will shortly be 
discussed. However, one reading of his texts is produced very much 
through a reading of Wongar himself. In Gelder's analysis of the novel, 
The Trackers (1975) and the collection of stories, The Track to Bralgu (1978) 
he finds, through the metamorphoses in characters' identities, Wongar's 
fictionalisation of "the construction of his own fictionality" which Gelder 
similarly discusses as a series of metamorphoses (implying for example 
that Wongar has replaced Bozic).84 There is the suggestion, then, that· 
Won gar 'metamorphosed' in order to write about characters who 
metamorphose, or perhaps that he has been unintentionally sentenced 
repeatedly to play out his own actions in fiction. As well as pointing to 
other works with 'Wongar variants', and the observation that Wongar's 
name has its "mythicality built into" Walg, however, Gelder argues that 
"in spite of his pseudonym, the completeness of his own apparent 
Aboriginality is never actually manifested. His fiction is ... littered with 
characters whose identities are in fact incomplete." This then contributes 
to the judgement that "there is no attempt at deceit here, at least."8s 
The terms of the debate over The Bone People are more clearly drawn. 
Opinion is divided over whether or not The Bone People is a Maori novel, 
as are the grounds upon which such a judgement is made. Elizabeth 
Webby refers to its "Maoriness,"86 while Merata Mita, clear that it is a 
novel by a Maori woman, states that "Certainly The Bone People cannot be 
characterised as a Maori novel," emphasising as the reason that "any true 
Maori literature must be written in the Maori language."87 Stead similarly 
denies its status as a Maori novel (another reason why it? Hulme? should 
not have won the Pegasus Prize for Maori Literature) on grounds of 
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language, adding the observation that "For the present ... all Maori writers 
of any consequence write in English,"88 and thereby conceding the 
possibility of a 'Maori writer' writing in a language other than Maori, so 
that Hulme's Maoriness is indeed not dependent upon her speaking or 
writing in Maori. However, Stead adds that The Bone People is not a 
Maori novel, and did not warrant consideration for the Pegasus Prize for 
reasons of literary form. In order to have been 'Maori writing', Stead 
argues, "the form required would need to have been one of those 
belonging to an oral tradition -- poetry, songs, laments, or some re-telling 
of local myth or legend." He finds it "hard to see why poetry should have 
been excluded, since poetry is something which exists in the Maori 
tradition, while the novel, obviously, does not." Indeed, it is given the 
failure of the novel to conform in language and form to his notion of 
Maori writing -- one which is firmly rooted in the static. adherence to 
(imitations of) traditions of the past -- that he shifts his focus to the "racial 
antecedents of the authors" as the determinant of 'Maoriness'. Futher, 
having repudiated the Maoriness of both The Bone People, and Keri 
Hulme, he has cleared the ground in order to proceed to apply traditional, 
universalistic literary criteria in his reading of the novel, finding 
unacceptable the points at which it takes "a dive from reality into wishful 
daydream," and worse, the events in the fourth section which when read 
"either as Maori lore or as fiction" he found "almost totally spurious."89 
Before examining responses to the issues raised by these points of view, 
it is also necessary to examine divided opinion on whether The Bone 
People is a 'New Zealand' novel, a question inevitably tied to both the 
authenticity, and the authority, of the author. No-one has denied that Keri 
Hulme is a New Zealander, although one reviewer posited an analogy 
between Hulme and her protagonist, Kerewin Holmes, whom the 
reviewer found ludicrously un-representative of her nationality (or her 
gender).90 Implicitly by extension, she asserted that "Whatever else The 
Bone People is, it has no claims to be taken seriously as a New Zealand 
novel .... This West Coast phantasmagoria is staggeringly far from the 
reality of anyone's real world."91 On the other hand, Merata Mita describes 
it as "the first real New Zealand novel ... in that it truly represents New 
Zealand society with its schizophrenic oscillation between the obsessive 
individualisation of the Pakeha world and the historical and spiritual 
consciousness of the Maori world."92 Stead, in a statement which is 
implicitly critical of the author-centred review he goes on to produce 
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himself, refers to the two New Zealand Listener reviews which "told her 
she had spoken for us all, or for all women, or all Maoris,"93 his tone and 
the implications of his qualifiers apparently dismissive of the larger claim. 
Origins, whether those of the author or those of the text, and the 
relationship between these, are clearly a problematic issue. They are also 
profoundly political. This raises the politics of the concern with authorial, 
and through the figure of the author, textual origins. Gunew suggests of 
Wongar's texts that "It may be that a concern with origins, the paternity of 
the text, may well in this case be invoked in order to curtail potentially 
embarrassing political meanings,"94 and here one is reminded of a facet of 
the 'author-function' described by Foucault, specifically the observation 
that "Speeches and books were assigned real authors ... only when the 
author became subject to punishment and to the extent that his discourse 
was considered transgressive."95 In the case of Wongar this suggests that if 
Wongar himself can be discredited, then by extension so is his discourse 
discredited and consigned to marginalisation. Fee makes precisely this 
point with regard to Stead's reading of Hulme as Pakeha: "To label her 
Pakeha discredits her vision, marginalizes her message, and buries her in a 
tradition that can safely contain her."96 Won gar has claimed that "his 
work had been blacklisted because of a photographic exhibition concerning 
the impact of mining on Arnhem Land Aborigines which he had 
organised in 1974 and which had been cancelled."97 Claims of 
'victimisation' have also been made for The Bone People. Elizabeth 
Webby, describing the search for a publisher for the novel, suggests that 
"the book's length and, one suspects, its feminism as well as its Maoriness, 
went against it." Specifically, for example, she asserts that the Advisory 
Committee on Women "thought the novel did not give a positive enough 
image of women, especially Maori women ... [and] turned it down."98 
Merata Mita posits the novel's uncomfortable representation through the 
characters of Joe, Kerewin, and Simon, of New Zealand's collective psyche 
as a factor in its reception: "New Zealand's deepest, darkest secret is its 
history of violence, subsequent repression and the damage it is doing to us 
as a na tion. "99 
On the other hand, some critics have argued that the political climate 
into, or out of which The Bone People emerged, has worked in the novel's 
favour. Judith Dale suggests that "The initial success might have been a 
matter of timing since by the middle nineteen-eighties sensitivity to 
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racism and sexism in Aotearoa could mean that we were ready for it,"100 
although she goes on to concede that this alone could not have accounted 
for its acclaim. Stead less generously refers to reception of the novel as "a 
babble of excited voices" and asserts that The Bone People touches a 
number of currently, or fashionably sensitive nerves. New Zealand 
intellectual life ... has been lately lacerating itself into consciousness that 
racism and sexism exist. Where they do not, zealots nonetheless find 
them. "101 Perhaps the most antagonistic view is that of the reviewer who 
describes the novel as "a frightening tribute to the power and 
determination of the women's movement which, through the Spiral 
Collective, adopted and promoted it in New Zealand and overseas."102 
Nevertheless, while claims of the political promotion of the novel to 
some extent undermine its status and success as the product of a 'creative' 
or literary act, claims of its political victimisation actually function to 
enhance this. Certainly, "Bits of mythology have begun to form around 
the book,"103 however Stead proceeds to dismantle such myths, 
understood as 'falsehoods' or 'misconceptions', largely by the invocation 
of his own status (which apparently allows him to base arguments on what 
he believes he can "recall" from early reviews of the novel rather than 
checking these sources again), and his inside, or intrinsically more reliable 
knowledge, such that he begins arguments with the phrases "For the 
record let it be said first", and "It should also be said that."104 However, 
rather than attempting to 'set the record straight', and certainly rather than 
denying that such a body of mythology has formed, it is more useful to 
analyse the functioning of those 'myths', understood as bodies of 
knowledge whose meaning and truth lie less in what they say than the 
'necessity' of what they accomplish or explain. This mythology circulates 
around both the processes of writing and of publication. 
Hulme has herself participated in this myth-making; indeed, it could be 
argued that she is in a privileged position to do so. In her "Preface to the 
First Edition: Standards in a non-standard Book," she evokes the 
development of the book as something organic, something which 'grew' 
according to its own inner energies, Hulme herself in the thrall of this 
process: "The Bone People began life as a short-story called "Simon Peter's 
Shell" ... ./"Simon Peter's Shell" began to warp into a novel. The 
characters wouldn't go away. They took 12 years to reach this shape." In 
fact, the novel is given something like a female genealogy, as both lack of 
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'authority' and the privileged experiential epistemology of amateurism, 
and labour (associating work and childbirth), are evoked in her statement 
that "I typed it out on my first typewriter, nights after working in the 
Motueka tobacco fields." Continuity of a line is suggested in the fact that 
"The typewriter was a present for my 18th birthday from my mother."lOS 
However, Hulme also tells the reader that "the first three publishers 
turned it down on the grounds, among others, that it was too large, too 
unwieldy, too different when compared with the normal shape of novel." 
Therefore, like the woman's body in patriarchy, it is judged for its shape. 
To the extent that a post-colonial intellectual culture flatters itself that it 
celebrates rather than suppresses difference, this stands as something of an 
indictment, such that the fact of the novel's eventual appearance is cause 
for celebration of its triumph over 'political' suppression. Indeed, Hulme 
follows with the triumphant "Enter, to sound of trumpets and cowrieshell 
rattles, the Spiral Collective."106 Similarly, to return to statements made by 
Elizabeth Webby, describing the search for a publisher for the novel, she 
argues, as we have seen that its length, its feminism, and its Maoriness 
"went against it,"107 thus by implication pitting the novel against the forces 
of institutionalised convention, sexism, and racism. Stead's description of 
these publishers places a different emphasis on the matter, encouraging 
sympathy for the "commercial publisher who was anxious about the 
novel's length and its prospects in the marketplace," and even trying to 
undermine the suggestion of a patriarchal conspiracy by pointing out that 
another was "a woman publisher who thought the book needed more 
work before it was ready for publication."108 Further, as has been stated, 
the Advisory Committee on Women's reception of it was founded upon 
what in current feminist literary circles would be understood as a naive 
emphasis on the value of positive images as a principle of evaluation of 
the novel's feminism. This point of Webby's places somewhat different 
light upon Stead's c1,aim that "of one of the three [publishers] who were 
offered the novel before Spiral saw it, one was a feminist who thought it 
insufficiently feminist for her list."109 However, even when the novel 
found a publisher, the feminist Spiral Collective, the process, according to 
Webby's description, is an odyssey of struggle and commitment: "The 
collective now searched for the cheapest quotes on typesetting, printing 
and binding. Typesetting was done by the Victoria University Students' 
Association; proofreading and pasting-up by the members of the collective, 
often at night when their other commitments were over."110 Such 
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dedication must surely render Stead's opinion that Spiral "produced a 
book as badly edited, printed, and proof-read as any I have seen, 
mismanaged in its finances,"l11 insensitive, even callous. But to 
understand the force of Webby's mythologising, one needs to examine its 
specific terms and the assumptions to which it appeals. 
The 'authenticity of the amateur' has already been alluded to with 
regard to the phonocentric privileging of 'experiential' as opposed to 
textual or professional knowledge. Related, but more specific is the 
construction of 'truth' and 'authenticity' through what Foucault has 
described as the "repressive hypothesis." If the institutionalised literary 
conventions and the judgements of the publishing industry are held to 
represent agencies of domination -- the law --, then what Foucault terms 
the "speaker's benefit"112 of the repressive hypothesis for those describing 
the process through which The Bone People came to be published, can be 
illustrated. Substituting 'publication', meaning the alternative publication 
of a 'transgressive' text, for Foucault's 'sex': 
If [publication] is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, 
nonexistence, and silence, then the mere fact that one is [achieving] it 
has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who 
[achieves such publication] places himself to a certain extent outside 
the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates 
the coming freedom.113 
According to the repressive hypothesis, the fact of the novel's repression 
means that its 'subjective' demand to surface constitutes it as something 
like a 'confession', traditionally positioned as the liberating (of truth) 
counterpart to repressive 'power': "Confession frees, but power reduces 
one to silence; truth does not belong to the order of power but shares an 
original affinity with freedom."114 Further, the 'truth' of the confession 
lies not simply in the fact of its production but in the difficulty of its 
production, its production out of struggle: "One goes about telling, with 
the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell .... [One produces] 
a literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the 
depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the 
confession holds out like a shimmering mirage."115 The full force of the 
truth of confession is its putative status as expression: out of the depths of 
the creative subject has come the plenitude of the inalienable, spoken 
word. Out of the depths of New Zealand's literary and publishing 
institutional psyche, one reads, has emerged that which could not be 
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admitted, the shadowy Other, The Bone People. The shadowy Other of 
The Bone People. The fact of its emergence into literary-national 
consciousness of course must be recognised as having removed it from the 
discourse of the Other -- the literary-institutional unconscious -- into its 
symptomatic form as an embodiment of resistance. However, this will be 
the basis of the discussion of the novel itself in the next chapter. Of 
significance at this point is the implication of the confession-expression 
analogy for the loca tion of power. 
As was pointed out in discussion of the response to Canadian Native 
women's writing, Foucault located power in the confessional relation less 
with the confessing subject 'unburdening' herself than with the 
interlocutor who confers it with truth. Analogously, one could argue that 
the 'authenticity' of The Bone People is conferred by those readers/critics 
who participate in its construction as confession-expression; who, in other 
words, find in it the voice of the author. At this point, and in the wake of 
the uncertainties and anxieties underpinning origins in (relation to) the 
novel, we are pointed to what Gunew terms "destinations," or "the birth 
of the reader."1l6 Further, it is through the figure of the reader that the 
author can be substituted by Foucault's "author-function." If the author is 
the "principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning,"1l7 and is further 
"the ideological figure by which one masks the manner in which we fear 
the proliferation of meaning,"1l8 then what of the reader? As has been 
shown, it is through readings of the texts of both Wongar and Hulme that 
the variant meanings have been produced. Taken as the idealist category 
posited by Barthes, the reader who is "'without history, biography, 
psychology,"'1l9 this reader is the source of the proliferation of meanings, 
allowing the 'different' meanings which, for example, constitute the settler 
post-colonial culture to emerge and be celebrated: nationality, race, class, 
gender, sexuality, renovated nationalism. Conversely, even the post-
colonial valorisation of 'difference' cannot tolerate ungrounded differance. 
Thus the reader also functions as the "necessary or constraining figure"120 
through which fictional discourse must pass, and this is the reader with 
history, biography, psychology. Under post-colonialism's historicising 
dispensation, the reader confesses her subjectivity in terms of the 
development of a "confessional sCience"121 which integrated with the 
juridico-religious model of confession, a "science of the subject" which 
investigated "the validity of introspection, lived experience as evidence, or 
the presence of consciousness to itself"122 as they related to the functioning 
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of truth. Thus Judith Dale cannot 'speak' until she has declared "I am a 
woman, pakeha, middle-class, lesbian, an academic, of Christian 
background, a teacher, contemporary with the author, resident in 
Aotearoa, and so on."123 The reader of this self-declaration is so dazzled by 
detail that questions of the meaning of 'a woman', 'a pakeha' and so on, 
and in what manner or with what emphases they unite to produce 'Judith 
Dale' presumably do not arise. Nor presumably does the question of 
whether she could have omitted anything 'of significance' from this 
apparently exhaustive list. Dale has intervened in, or pre-empted, the very 
process undertaken by the reader who seeks the truth of the author, for as a 
"certain functional principle" the author "does not precede the works."124 
The author-function 
is not formed spontaneously through the simple attribution of a 
discourse to an individual. It results from a complex operation 
whose purpose is to construct the rational entity we call an author ... 
. [T]hese aspects of an individual, which we designate as an author (or 
which comprise an individual as an author), are projections, in terms 
always more or less psychological, of our way of handling texts: in the 
comparisons we make, the traits we extract as pertinent, the 
continuities we assign, or the exclusions we practice [sic].12S 
Judith Dale's gesture conflates author and reader, and this arguably because 
she wishes to clear the ground for her reading/writing of the novel which 
she 'confesses' is unacceptable to the 'real' author, Hulme. However, she 
also provides grounds upon which the reader of her discourse may 
evaluate its truth-value with reference to her credibility. The author 
refuses to die. Similarly, the credibility of Wongar's work overseas has 
been enhanced by Simone de Beauvoir's associating the themes of Walg 
with French nuclear tests in the Pacific, Alan Paton's Foreword to The 
Track to Bralgu, and the German version's place in a series entitled 'Third 
World Dialogue.'126 In other words, if origins can be cast in terms which 
work against the text, the credibility of the (politically or institutionally 
positioned) reader may mitigate the fate of the text. 
The reader may, of course, also be positioned in order to discredit 
her /his discourse. In this way, Fee refers to Stead's "reputation and insider 
knowledge"127 as by implication dishonest props for his credibility, while 
Ash specifies "Pakeha critics" who question the novel's Maoriness and its 
representation of Maori spirituality, and argues that "A Maori critic, 
writing from the inside, may justify such a response, but imposing pakeha 
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value judgements on the novel feels too much like racism. "128 On the one 
hand, the problems of essentialism -- blood, chroma tism, up-bringing, 
identification -- inherent in such judgements have already been referred 
to; on the other hand, we are returned in the end to the political question 
of discursive grounds and discursive appropriation, such that the 
'aesthetic' question, 'who can write as Other?' is reformulated to replace 
notions of ability or talent ('can') with those of political sanction ('may'), 
and writing, with its unreliable links to origins, with speaking as the 
inevitable expression of the 'true self'. The question is therefore one of 
post-colonial discursive territory: in short, 'Who May Speak As Other?' 
4. IV. Constructing the Discourse of the Other. 
One text which exemplifies many of the points of the preceding 
discussion is Stevan Eldred-Grigg's Oracles and Miracles. 129 Issues of 
discursive territory or politicised discursive terrain, post-colonial 'value-
added discourse', and the politics of representation and literary authority 
pervade this novel about 1930s and 1940s New Zealand "'daughters of the 
poor. "'130 Although the text's problematic position in the intersection of 
oral history and fiction will be the focus of later discussion, it is useful at 
this point to invoke Eldred-Grigg's status as an historian to gain access to a 
self-reflexive statement of his assumptions and a prioris: "Working class 
women, in their ways of thinking and doing, lived in a culture older than 
the world of the industrial economy, older and wiser than capitalism."131 
In the light of this belief, he continues, "As a man, an intellectual man 
living an upper middle-class life at the fag end of the twentieth century, 
there would be obvious difficulties in my trying to write about working 
class women in the 1930s and 1940s."132 Although a number of 
ramifications of these statements will be examined throughout the 
discussion, one point of beginning is the method and implications of his 
positing of an essential difference, of the order of a culture, with regard to 
these women. 
The situating of Oracles and Miracles in terms of late twentieth-century 
post-colonial discourse can best be achieved by reading the novel against 
itself, or at least showing those points at which it is written against itself. 
In a work derived from the conventions of transcribed oral history, there 
are two important sites of reading intervention. One is the most recent 
present of narrative construction: those points which situate the discourse 
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within a discernable point in the subject's material and psychic history, 
and through which some grounding may be provided for recollections. 
Secondly, one should look for the latest point of narrative development, 
the point at which the subject considers the account of her life to be 
complete, thereby suggesting the closure of an episode or the failure of any 
relevant 'developments' to follow. The notion of the end of an episode is 
evoked in Fag's reflections on turning twenty-one, toward the end of the 
novel: 
I didn't want to think about the fact that I was turning twenty-one. It 
seemed too final, irrevocable, being twenty-one. It seemed as though 
it was the end of something. Definitively the end. As though what I 
was by the time I got to twenty-one was what I was always going to be, 
that there weren't going to be any more chances. (247) 
This is followed by the image of her life as a movie playing backwards, 
until "it seemed as though the climax wasn't me at all, that I was just the 
foetus, the embryo, and that the real person who grew out of me was a 
skinny little kid smoking dock leaf cigarettes in the back yard at Kent 
Street" (247). This does indeed encapsulate both the process and the 
'meaning' of the novel as transcribed life-story -- for example, the 
production of an account of childhood from the distance of the adult 
present; however, it also reflects a central argument regarding the character 
of Fag herself, as will be shown, that the real Fag was the childhood Fag, 
while her emergence into adulthood was at the cost of an accompanying 
inauthenticity. 
While the 'latest' point in the narrative construction proposes a 
'comedic' structure, the structure of narrative development is 'tragedic'. 
The narrating present finds Ginnie and Fag, despite the differences 
between them and the 'loss' of each other at the narrative conclusion, 
having regained enough ground in common to make a text of their 
juxtaposed narratives possible. Fag remarks that "Ginnie and I often talk 
about our childhood. Now that we're women ourselves, with houses, 
husbands, children, mortgages ... "(5). However, she also articulates 
something which exemplifies, even lies at the core of, the narrative in its 
tragedic moment. She explains that Ginnie 
hasn't read much, that's her trouble, she doesn't know enough 
words. When she left school to go to the factory she just stopped 
looking at words, she just made do with the ones she had and didn't 
bother to look for any more. But me ... I'd read brown -paper if there 
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weren't any books. So when I look at the past I can bring more 
knowhow to the job than Ginnie can. (6) 
Ironically, however, the novel posits the failure or 'tragedy' as Fag's rather 
than Ginnie's, and as suggested in her attitude towards words, it is 
presented as a condition of alienation, the effects of mediating discourses 
between these working-class women and the putative non-discursive or 
extra-discursive 'reality' of their lives. 
The positioning of Fag by the narrative is of central importance to 
understanding its 'argument'. This is most clearly presented in the last 
sections of the novel, when Fag and her husband Roddie visit Ginnie and 
her husband Jaz, holidaying at the local motor camp after some time apart. 
Fag's first impression of Ginnie makes her want to cry: "She looked so 
poor. Her hair was hacked short like a prisoner, her clothes were 
threadbare, and on her feet she was wearing a pair of old sandshoes" (259). 
Fag tells herself that despite her own failure to find real contentment or 
happiness, to "Count your blessings, forget about the old life, there's 
nothing there for you. Just look at poor Ginnie.!You don't know you're 
living" (260). However the description of Ginnie echoes an earlier 
description of women who "gave up the ghost," in that "One year they'd 
be wearing lipstick and little hats, clicking powder compacts open. Then .. 
. they'd be shuffling along in dirty sandshoes and their hair would be 
screwed up under a hairnet" (58). Importantly, these are the familiar 
neighbourhood women of working-class South Christchurch, so that 
Ginnie, in her resemblance to them, can be seen as having remained close 
to her 'origins'. 
Ginnie's view of Fag, by contrast, evokes Fag's distance and alienation 
from her family origins. When Fag arrives at the motor camp, Ginnie 
recalls, "I could see Fag's face inside, sort of pale and distant.! .... And she 
was a stranger. When she stepped out of the car and came across to kiss 
me, I felt like I was being visited by the royal family" (261). The novel 
closes with their mutually emotional leave-taking, but with the seal placed 
firmly on Fag's 'inauthenticity', her status as simulacrum of something 
that was never 'real': 
Fag burst into tears. 
'Come and see us again,' she said. 'Come and stay with us.' 
And I cried too, but somehow I felt like I was crying cause it was like 
there wasn't a Fag any more. I felt like I'd lost Fag for ever, that there 
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wasn't a person there any more, just clothes and money and alcohol. 
I felt like she'd died. 
And all that was left was a cardboard cutout of Princess Elizabeth. 
Or Lauren Bacall. (261-2) 
Fag's reduction to the status of cardboard cutout of women from equally 
culturally remote and yet invasive England (Empire) and America 
(Hollywood), women whose status is one of 'image' itself, provides the 
point of entry into the novel's 'intended' meaning. Mum Feron's 
constant antagonism toward Fag stands as the opposition of 'origins', truth 
and authenticity, to alienation, falsity and illusion. Ginnie recounts early 
in the text that "Fag to Mum was like a red rag to a bull. Fag was always 
'the cuckoo in the nest,' according to Mum, she was 'the foundling.' Mum 
really made it sound as though Fag wasn't one of us" (37). The privileged 
reading of the text is therefore one which centres on and valorises the 
values represented in their full integrity by Mum Feron, and mostly, 
though with difficulties which are symptomatic of the disruptions Fag 
represents, perpetuated by Ginnie. However, I would argue that this is a 
dangerous reading, and one which is more symptomatic of the anxieties of 
late capitalist settler post-colonialism, a lament generated and conditioned 
by Imaginary nostalgia, than the achievement of a 'true' re-creation of a 
'lost past'. 
4. IV. 0). The Essential Other. In Oracles and Miracles, Eldred-Grigg 
posits an essentialised working-class women's culture, whose integrity he 
respects and wishes to preserve, while lamenting its loss. This can be 
illustrated by examining the various strategies he employs to evoke such a 
culture. As language use and specificity is a central defining element of a 
'culture', he evokes their culture in the characters' uses of language 
specific to that period in history and to the activities which are shown to 
have dominated and thus characterised the women's lives. Indeed, 
Eldred-Grigg argues that "these women spoke a language that had once 
been alive and was now nearly dead. I wanted to record and then copy as 
accurately as possible its shapes and sound."133 This specificity is conveyed 
in the use of terms which the late twentieth century reader may find 
difficult to understand: Mum Feron states, "'This place needs a good lick 
and a root'" (13); she remembers her sister being told by her own mother to 
"'Poss those clothes, Millie .... Poss them good and proper'" (30); and she 
inspects Ginnie and Fag's efficiency in cleaning the make-shift toilet, 
regularly chiding them that they have left it "'half claggered up'" (35). 
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Significantly, such idiom is defined not only by its belonging to an era 
which has passed, but by its invariable concern with household cleaning 
tasks. 
Cultures also depend upon transmission from one generation to the 
next for their survival, and Mum Feron is actively engaged in handing 
down received wisdoms and myths to the female members of her 
household in the way which sustains a culture's practices and belief-
systems. Mum Feron is a repository of interdictions, usually of the 
practical household variety: "'Never rub blankets .... Rubbing blankets 
will make them hard'" (48), or similarly, "'Never rinse blankets in cold 
water, youse girls, if you rinse blankets in cold water they'll thicken up on 
the line'" (48). However, some 'wisdom' is more clearly 'superstitious' in 
nature: "'Never wash of a New Year's Day .... If you wash of a New Year's 
Day you wash your troubles in for another year'" (47). In such cases the 
existence of a belief-system itself, uniting its adherents into a continuous 
'culture', is posited as taking precedence over the use-value of the 
information. Yet this does not make adherence any more flexible or any 
less vehement. Apart from those which focus on an area suggested as of 
central, almost defining concern to working-class women's lives --
household cleaning -- there are those which concern what will be shown 
in later discussion to be portrayed as being of similarly dominant centrality 
to their lives: the (female) body and its various functions. Some of these 
are familiar and their derivations in the male professionalisation, 
institutionalisation and imposition of discourses of medicine, psychiatry 
and nutrition, largely recognisable. Mum Feron, still principally an agent 
of 'cultural' interdictions, warns Ginnie, "'Don't you dare wash your hair 
when it's that time .... If you wash your hair at that time of the month 
your brain will be turned'" (102). More alarmingly still, she tells her, 
"'Never drink beef tea when you're having a baby .... If you drink beef tea 
the baby will be so big they'll have to take it out in parts'" (223). 
Another constitutive or defining feature of a culture is the 
differentiation and exclusion of non-members, and the concomitant 
solidification of the sense of belonging for those who practise the 
exclusions. For example, Fag recollects that "Mum knew that Irish 
Catholics were dogs, because she'd heard her own mother say the same 
thing" (46). Similarly, that the novel posits a working-class women's 
culture is underscored by the otherness of males in the Feron household, 
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and eventually their effective absence from it. This is constructed through 
their marginalisation in and by the accounts of Ginnie and Fag which 
largely comprise the narrative. However, marginalisation is not 
necessarily disadvantage; in a novel which characterises women's lives as 
having in common an almost relentless harshness and need to struggle for 
survival, the males of the household are frequently differentiated by 
privilege. This privilege is regarded as 'natural', reinforcing the 
concomitant 'naturalness' of the women's position. For example, Ginnie 
recounts Mum Feron's insistence that "'The men haven't got time for 
[washing dishes and making beds]'" (35): 
'The men have to save their strength for work.' 
So we cleaned their shoes and washed their clothes and cut their 
lunches and all the rest of it. And of a Sunday, after they'd spent the 
day galumphing round a league pitch or roaring round cinder tracks 
on their motorbikes, we had to get their muddy boots and scrape 
them clean with sticks. (36) 
Despite the somewhat begrudged privileges allowed the boys, Ginnie 
explains, betraying a degree of distance from her mother's point of view 
both in the consciousness of her analysis and in her lexical choice, that "It 
wasn't that Mum liked the boys any more than us, it was just taken for 
granted that the boys should have it easy and us girls should be skivvies" 
(34). Mr Feron's position in the household is more isolated: 
When he was home they wasn't speaking to one another, and when 
he wasn't home just about all Mum could talk about was how terrible 
he was, how he was a waster, a boozer, and everything under the sun. 
She got the big boys and big girls on her side, and when the old man 
drifted in Eddie and Jock would swear at him and Sadie would yell 
and carryon. She really seemed to hate him, Sadie, she'd sort of get 
into a frenzy. 
'Piss faced stinking old goat,' she used to say. 
One day she spat at him, and he didn't do anything, just wiped it off. 
(23-4) 
Gradually, however, male members of the household absent themselves, 
beginning with Mr Feron, invariably referred to only as 'the old man'. His 
presence has never been constant, nor has it ensured the financial security 
of the family; nevertheless, Ginnie remembers a point when "the old man 
had cleared out again, and this time he never came back" (20) . 
. The passivity and absence of male 'heads' of households are familiar 
signs of matriarchal, matriducal working-class families. On the other 
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hand, the mother-daughter relation is far from idealised. There is a bitter 
nurture in the Feron household, suggested by Sadie's references to her 
mother as '''Old vinegar tits'" (51). Further, there is mutual hostility in 
Fag's sly contradiction of her mother's assertion, when she threatens to 
send Fag to Nazareth House to live with the other orphans, that "'There's 
a cellar under Nazareth House ... and it's filled with quicklime, and when 
the orphans play up the nuns throw them onto the quicklime and it eats 
into their arms and legs and faces'" (37). Fag argues against this that "'The 
nuns are just ordinary people and all they do is nag the orphans and hit 
them and say horrible things to them, just like ordinary mothers'" (37). 
The novel also emphasises 'cultural' matrilinearity, the continuity of 
women's lives in lines of descent from mother to daughter. However, 
although the overall construction of the narrative functions as a 
celebration of this continuity, and as will be shown, as a condemnation of 
those forces which have interfered with its perpetuation, it is narrated by 
the characters themselves in more fatalistic tones. Fag recalls her wedding: 
I was horrified to realise ... Mum's limp cotton frock was just a shade 
or two darker than my own lovely dress with its silver beads and 
padded sleeves. 
'Mrs Carrel,' Roddie said to me. 'Time for us to be off.' 
Mrs Carrel? I thought. She's his mother ... 
And for a moment or two I was confused. It was as though I was 
Roddie's wife, and his mother, and my own mother too, Mum in a 
limp blue frock. (202) 
If it is argued that Fag's disidentification with her working-class 
background compromises the reliability of the sentiments expressed in her 
narrative within the context of the novel's 'intent', an argument which 
will be contested later in this discussion, Ginnie also expresses 
ambivalence about her own status in the perpetuation of the conditions of 
women's lives, specifically, motherhood: "I can remember giving one last 
almighty scream just as it was born, because I thought, this is really the 
end, I'm splitting in two now, I'm dying, I'm splitting apart and that's all 
there is to it. I'm dead./But of course I wasn't dead, I was a mother" (224). 
Language performs a pivotal thematic function in the novel; it 
characterises a working-class women's culture, but also provides an entry 
into the analysis of the process by which such a culture is both posited in 
and problematised by, the novel. Linguistic, idiomatic specificity has been 
shown to evoke a self-contained and self-sustaining language community. 
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However, language is also presented as a highly politicised resource, and 
actively territorialised in discourse. Early in childhood, Ginnie and Fag 
learn of the relationship between language and power, language both as 
weapon and defence, as threatening and protective. At kindergarten, their 
make-shift tricycle is made fun of by a more well-to-do child with a 
sparkling new one: "'This trike's a special sort,' Fag said. 'It's urn, a 
special racing model and there's sacking on it to protect it .... ' /Fag was 
good at spinnng a yarn. So while she cracked up our trike all the other 
kids started jostling around looking at it" (64-5). Humour is another 
strategy of discursive protection or defence, whether against an Other, or 
even the harsh conditions of their own lives. An example which 
illustrates both of these occurs when Auntie Aggie reports a district nurse's 
diagnosis of her as having malnutrition. As defence against the 
irrelevance of a word whose meaning must be sought in a dictionary, to 
the solution of the reality, grounded in economics rather than ignorance, 
of insufficient food, and at the same time against the reality of that 
insufficiency itself, Aunt Aggie tells the Ferons, "'Said I've got to eat more . 
. . . I'd be happy to eat more but the legs of the furniture aren't too tasty if 
you don't have a bottle of sauce to help them go down'" (43). However, 
the larger battle of discourses which comprises the text can be understood 
in terms of a posited essential mutual antagonism between 'oral' --
understood as spontaneous and expressive -- and 'literary' -- or 
institutionalised and deceptive -- discourse. Fag's talent at 'yarn-spinning' 
is early evidence of her developing passion for language, fuelled by school. 
However, this is represented as the beginning of her alienation from the 
reality of working-class life, culminating in her personal dislocation and 
representing the effective demise of the 'culture' of which she should 
have been heir. She recalls that "Once school had given us literacy it 
started to open up other things, it started giving us access to the whole 
world of words. And that was really something. That really excited us, 
especially me" (77). Later, she recounts that "I was getting feverish for 
words, and especially long words. I loved to look at them, to listen to 
them, to hunt them up in their hiding places in thick books and let my 
brain sort of lovingly caress them" (85). 
However, Fag's obsession and talent with words earns only the 
resentment and contempt of her mother. Ginnie remembers Mum 
Feron's warning to Fag: "'Let me tell you, madam, ... what happens to 
nasty deep cats like you, let me tell you' ... ./But Fag kept reading books, 
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and that made Mum angrier than ever. Mum hated books" (37). For 
Mum Feron, language is a weapon used to confuse and divide the working 
class, and, the Historian reports, schools are in the front line of the 
offensive: "The Feron view of schools was that they were prisons built by 
'them' to turn working people into slaves, to tangle and trick working 
people with words and numbers and symbols, to let loose a noose of 
language and send it flying through the air to strangle you" (63). That this 
is an ironically literary view of schools attributed to Mum Feron, 
symptomatic of the novel's many contradictions, will be addressed later.134 
However, it is suggested that those members of the working class exposed 
to too much school are potential or actual traitors to their class. When Fag 
and Ginnie hear Mum Feron and their sister Peggy talking in the kitchen, 
and Fag presumes to correct Peggy's pronunciation from "somethink" to 
"something", Mum Feron reinforces Peggy's dismissal of her, with the 
reproval, "'Youse two shut yer big mouths .... We was talking to the 
butcher not the block'" (94). Part of her resentment is shown to be the fear 
of ridicule, which is shown in the women's ambivalence toward Uncle 
Jim Smithers. They believe that he has, through transgressing what is 
seen as a defining and self-constitutive discursive boundary, stepped 
outside of his proper social place, and is likely to betray them. Therefore, 
despite the girls' fascination with him, "we hated him really. Mum was 
sort of scared of him, cause of all the big words he used. She was scared he 
was making fun of her, and she thought he was a cut above her. And he 
thought he was too" (42). Nevertheless, Fag's alienated position, her lack 
of 'true' understanding is underscored by her unexpected encounter with 
her father shortly before she is to get married: "'A pitcher,' he said. 'I'll 
buy yer a pitcher.' / I was so confused I didn't know what he was talking 
about. A jug? Does he mean a jug? Then I saw a sign over the door he 
was leading me through, Bellevue Picture Framers./'Any pitcher you like,' 
he said" (199). 
However, it is not simply a matter of self-defined discursive territories 
protecting their own grounds and their own constituencies: if they were 
entirely self-defined and discrete, there would be no need to defend the 
boundary between them. Instead, they are not simply protective of, but 
defined by discourse, mutually and in struggle. For example, the working-
class integrity for which Mum Feron stands in the novel is also a 
discursive construct to which she is subjected, and which is integrally 
linked to institutionally-defined access to resources. Fag recalls that to 
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qualify as the 'deserving poor', there were systems or codes of domestic 
signification: "Spring cleaning was [a] way of showing we were 'poor but 
clean'" (48), an activity to which the use of 'dolly tints' was indispensable. 
Thus, the curtains "would emerge a yellowy sort of orange, ready to hang 
in our windows for another year, a jaundiced banner of good household 
management" (49). The Historian is less circumspect in the 
characterisation of discourse as a weapon violently wielded against 
working women. It is asserted that "In 1929, when Ginnie and Fag were 
born, women like Margaret Feron were being bludgeoned with phrases 
like 'scientific mothering'" (13), the implication being that a false, 
discursive mothering was imposed from without on to non-discursive, 
'natural' mothering. However, the territories of bourgeois discourse do 
not only mount attacks against the authenticity and terrain of 'working-
class' discourse; it must also apparently protect itself through the guarding 
of its institutional domains against inappropriate working-class 
incursions. Thus Fag recounts, "I'd discovered the Sydenham Public 
Library": 
It was one of those places built in colonial times for 'the 
improvement of the working class', partly paid for by the ratepayers 
and partly by charitable benefactions. . . . Inside there were these 
stupendously lipsticked women in grey cardigans who guarded the 
books. If you came in and looked as though you were going to disturb 
the books 'shelved' in rows, if you looked like you were actually 
going to take down a book and read a few pages, these women would 
sort of flash their glasses at you and let out little hisses. (85) 
If discourse is both an object and site of struggle, the need for these 
territorial boundaries and their vigilant defence problematises the notion 
of essential and natural class language. If there are working-class 
incursions into bourgeois discursive territory which must be prevented by 
both the working class itself and bourgeois discursive formatiqns, it is 
instructive to consider what perceived benefits and dangers are located in 
bourgeois discourse, and why these must not be sought by or made 
acccessible to, working-class people. Finally, what are the effects of this 
vigorous system of attacks and defences? As the character most attracted to 
the powers of language, Fag's view provides both an insight into its 
attraction, and at the same time a possible reading of Mum Feron's 
resistance. Having noted the role of school in opening up the world of 
literacy, Fag continues: 
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before starting school when we'd looked at books and magazines and 
newspapers we'd thought they looked very interesting but also very 
esoteric, very remote. When you can't read, language on a page just 
seems like an endless stream of letters, but once you've been taught to 
look at it the 'right' way and you start to see that it can be made to 
form pools or lagoons of meaning, well it's dazzling. (77) 
Although it is not what Fag means, the word "dazzling" is the key to Mum 
Feron's suspicion of, and antipathy towards, literary language. Fag and 
Ginnie become obsessed with movies, Hollywood magazines, and 
romance magazines. One of these is called Miracles and Oracles. Indeed, 
their engagement with such literature is profoundly inter-textual, 
conditioning their reception of even texts usually located outside of 
romance narrative. For example, Fag remembers religious instruction at 
school. The parson would 
lisp stories about the Christ child, and camels through the eyes of 
needles and so on, and handed out what he called: 
'Christian literature'. 
On hearing the word 'literature', Ginnie and I were on the alert. 
Now that we could read, we were eager to read everything. 
Mind you, the little limp books the parson passed round didn't 
seem up to the standards of Miracles and Oracles at first. (81) 
However, apart from the "stumbling block" of sin, Fag reasons that much 
of the Christian message does indeed fit in "just right with all the fairy 
stories and the movies and the love magazines:" 
They disagreed with one another on points of detail, it was true, but 
they all made it clear that the thing that did the trick, the thing that 
took Cinderella or the sinner or the princess from poverty, sadness, 
loneliness, unhappiness to bliss was love. 'God is love,' the little 
religious pamphlets told us. 'Only true love can bring true 
happiness,' sighed the heroines of the silver screen . 
. . . [I]n time we'd be saved by Jesus Christ or Clark Gable. (83) 
It is the power of language to 'seduce' its working-class victims into 
hopeless fantasy and inevitable disappointment that Mum Feron resists, 
and sometimes brutally exhorts Fag to do also. She points out the 
impracticality of "'Wasting yer time with trashy romances'" (80) in the face 
of what she sees as the inevitability of their lives. "'If you think words will 
pay the rent you've got another think coming'" (80), and she points out 
that "'Only words worth reading are printed on a one quid note'" (80). 
That this condemnation of romance literature is central to the novel's 
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argument is evident in its title: Oracles and Miracles is a reversal of the 
title of the magazine Miracles and Oracles, or as Fag reflects, "Miracles and 
Oracles. A literature of dreamland" (79). As such a reversal, it contrasts 
reality with dream, while indicating in its echo of the title the ultimately 
destructive influence of such literature and its ideas both on their 
individual lives, and on the 'culture' they embody. Ginnie learns the 
proffered lesson well. She recalls that: 
After I'd been at the factory a while I stopped dreaming about being 
rich or beautiful or famous. I just thought about how to get onto a 
better machine, how to divvy up my wages, or how nice my new 
shoes looked. I started thinking that real life was just a matter of 
getting along from one day to the next. That was about what it 
amounted to, there wasn't any point thinking about what you 
couldn't have. (146-7) 
It is not simply the irrelevance of literature, but its perceived danger in 
dislocating working-class girls from their 'true' place without being able to 
guarantee acceptance into middle-class life: "'No sense sticking yer nose in 
butter if yer going to have to eat dripping the rest of yer life'" (117). This 
motif of the mother's apparently cruel or destructive, but protective 
instinct is familiar in the literature of mother-daughter relations.135 There 
is even the suggestion that the Feron girls' given names have been 
wrested from them and replaced with prosaic nicknames in an attempt to 
prevent them romanticising their own possibilities. Ginnie and Fag both 
rename themselves in their games, Ginnie becoming Diana, and Fag, 
Pamela. In other fantasies, Fag, whose real name is Daphne, refers to 
herself as Daphne de Feron. Fag eventually names her own daughter 
Pamela. However, both girls, as well as other Feron girls, regard their 
given names as entirely inaccessible to them. Ginnie recalls being told by 
the supervisor at the factory, '''Janet, please call her Ellen .... I think Ellen 
is such a pretty name and Hock sounds so awful.'/Well I kept calling her 
Hock, but it was nice of Mrs Goodham to care about us, I thought" (140). 
There is a strong evocation of the different 'worlds' of working-class 
and middle-class 1930s and 1940s Christchurch; clearly demarcated 
geographical territories which amount to cultural boundaries. Characters 
who try to bridge or even transgress these boundaries are condemned by 
the narrative as, at best, deluded, at worst, radically inauthentic. Images of 
'unreality' are used to evoke the essential difference and inaccessibility of 
the 'world' beyond the South Christchurch suburbs of Spreydon and 
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Addington, undermining the attraction this other world may hold. For 
example, Ginnie and Fag were regularly sent into the town centre as 
children on various messages for their mother, such as going to the 
courthouse to "'slap a writ' on the old man" (25) for money. Ginnie 
reflects that, despite the distance, "it was nice once we crossed the railway 
and got into the middle of town where there was the river and the big 
smart shops and the weeping willows and that, it was like the postcards of 
Christchurch you could see on the news stands in Sydenham" (25). That 
these parts of Christchurch are only as real and as accessible as postcard 
images to the people of Sydenham both underlines the unreality of this 
other world to their normal lives, and casts them as 'tourists' or cultural 
outsiders when they venture into it. Fag's incursions into such territory 
are accompanied by fantasies which ameliorate the anxieties and 
discomforts of the reality. Although a short tram journey is a special 
attraction attached to the trip to the Charitable Aid centre, Fag imagines 
"(Travelling by tram, we do it all the time, shopping at the smart 
department stores, afternoon tea on bentwood chairs at big windows with 
little statues of naked gods beside us, looking down onto Cathedral 
Square)" (55). 
When working-class and middle-class 'worlds' are held in contrast, the 
novel posits the necessity of recognising them as essential territories, as 
constituting their respective constituents' authentic 'place'. 
Transgressions are represented as incurring only the status of 
inauthenticity. However, that the desire to enter the territory of the Other 
is manifested by both middle-class and working-class characters, serves to 
problematise the essentialisation of their difference. For example, there 
are bourgeois characters who are attracted to the perceived authenticity of 
working-class life. The child with the new red bicycle at kindergarten is so 
duped by Fag's description of theirs as a real racing model that he willingly 
lends his to them while he rides (the representation of) their ramshackle 
toy. Their promise of its authenticity is clearly enough for the boy to 
believe it, and ironically evokes the vulnerability of the bourgeoisie to 
their own romantic desire to invest the Other with the 'truth'. Ginnie 
recalls that she can "still remember .... thinking how queer it was that 
those other kids could be talked into thinking how a heap of old junk was 
better than what they had" (65). Much later, Fag realises that what she is 
expected to provide for Roddie is working-class 'truth', and she feels that 
"the only reason he listened to me was to make sure I was the real thing, a 
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real working class girl, who was unhappy" (180). A more obvious attempt 
to appropriate working-class 'authenticity' occurs when Roddie decides 
that he would like to undertake odd jobs around the home, "'like a 
working man'" (198). He presumes to tell Fag that "'working people have 
a lot to be angry about'" (180), and that because of this, he has joined the 
Labour Party. However, his condescending gestures only earn Fag's 
resentment. Just as she recalls that "I began to feel angry at him, this well 
groomed, well heeled man in his grey felt hat, walking around Addington 
like a psychiatrist visiting a mental hospital" (179), she now finds that 
suddenly, she "felt resentful again, I felt as though he wanted to take my 
life and pick up the whole of Phillips town and Addington and Spreydon 
and put them in some sort of filing cabinet in his brain, as though people 
like me were just some sort of problem for people like him to solve" (180). 
The message is that he should remain within his own political and 
discursive domain. Yet these images of institutional incarceration and 
organised knowledge also disrupt such a meaning. They suggest that 
power relations actually define these domains. 
On the other hand, Mum Feron explains that it is not only acceptable, 
but almost beholden on working people to take whatever they found 
"'lying round'" as 'perks' from the workplace. She explains that '''It's part 
of yer wages cause the bosses will make more out of you than you'll get 
back in yer pay packet, so it's up to you to take stuff to make up the 
difference. And don't take anything that belongs to another worker, just 
stuff that belongs to the bosses'" (144). In this 'us against them' paradigm, 
she understands that the working people must unite against the bosses to 
regain what is theirs in the first place. However, Fag, who represents the 
demise of working-class solidarity finds that when she and Roddie become 
property owners, "All of a sudden I was a Mrs Moneygall, a Mrs 
Stevenson, a Lady Pelf. And I was starting to feel the way they felt too" 
(213). Indeed, Eldred-Grigg has asserted that Fag represents the destruction 
of the 'working-class personality': "it certainly is my opinion that 
becoming bourgeois always shatters the personality of a working class 
person, as well as harming the political position of the working class as a 
whole. "136 However, the essentialism of this notion requires further 
analysis, to show how in positing it, the text also works against it. 
There is a mutual antagonism portrayed between the Feron girls and 
local Maori children. On their journeys to get coal, Maori children 
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regularly attack them as they broach their territory. However, as well as 
this example of physical territoriality, language is politicised into territories 
as well. Fag and her friend Nancy begin learning Maori at night school, 
and armed with their little knowledge, decide to visit a pa at Tuahiwi to 
practise on the local inhabitants. However, they bring with them images 
and expectations which can only be characterised as colonising. Their 
images consist of nineteenth-century romance and picture book exoticism, 
and Fag's fantasies venture even further as she imagines herself a cultural 
'missionary': "I had a sudden vision of myself sitting under a palm tree 
on a beach in the North Island, with a volcano smoking behind me and 
grateful Maoris in piupius giving me presents for explaining the ways of 
the white man" (159); they are therefore disappointed to find what they 
regard as a less authentic .architecture and surroundings, that "there were 
no palisades or wooden statues, just an ordinary country township, little 
houses scattered along a dusty road" (160). Further, they expect to receive 
gratitude for their efforts to learn Maori. However, their judgement of 
authenticity and expected grateful welcome is turned back on them as they 
begin to converse in Maori to be greeted only by the uncontrollable 
laughter of the Maori children: "They started rolling around on the grass, 
laughing and pointing at us. After a while it seemed a bit scary, there 
seemed to be something going on we didn't understand" (160). Although 
this appears again as an argument for remaining within one's appropriate 
discursive and cultural boundaries if one is to remain authentic, the 
'truth' which they have not 'understood', the full weight of the differences 
within and between elements of the working class, finally militates against 
such essentialism, and requires a different reading of the construction of 
their lives. 
An analysis of the 'terrain' of working-class discourse as it is 
represented, as opposed to the discernment of it from the middle class as 
'territory', serves to problematise its easy essentialisation as a 'culture'. 
The oppositions of 'us' and 'them' are destabilised not only by, but within 
the posited working-class culture. Hierarchies of prestige, prejudices, and 
perceptions of otherness not only destabilise the notion of a working-class 
women's culture, but are shown themselves to be unstable and shifting 
formations. As opposed to a unified essence, it is ultimately shown to be 
characterised by differance. The Ferons do not belong to an idealised 
community of harmonious neighbourhood relations,137 Neighbours are 
looked down upon, or criticised; prejudices form the bases of 
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categorisations and identifications of difference among working-class 
people. Fag ironically notes that "apart from the personality defects which 
strangely enough almost everybody seemed to be afflicted with, our 
neighbours had an unfortunate tendency to be Catholic, Irish, dirty, uppity, 
sottish, and all the rest of it" (46). Much of this is shown to be the attempt 
to attain some self esteem by pointing to the inherent inferiority or 
imposed disadvantage of others: "[E]ven though we knew we were rough 
and poor, we weren't above looking down our noses a bit at some of our 
neighbours" (46). For example, the households in their neighbourhood 
are hierarchised in terms of whether they have an employed male head of 
the household, an unemployed male head, or no male head at all. The 
latter are regarded as the bottom of the social 'heap' (50); however, as the 
Ferons discover, these are not essential and inviolable categories. Despite 
their smugness that "Even we weren't at the bottom of the heap, we 
belonged to a group of families in Simeon Street where the 'heads of the 
household' ... were unskilled workers" (50), they find that "in Braddon 
Street we were getting near rock bottom .... /The loss of the wage came 
hard and by the time we shifted from Braddon Street to Kent Street, Mum 
had definitely slipped into the rank of the deserted woman. This was 
awkward. Mum had to shift her ideas about who was 'them' and who was 
'us'" (50-1). 
Therefore, the danger of essentialising the 'culture' of the Other is, on 
the one hand, that the Other becomes primarily that which constitutes the 
self as securely not-Other, and in this sense, the Other is essential. Further, 
it obscures the need for a critique of capitalist class relations as the classes 
are posited as 'natural' rather than the effects of oppression. Indeed, as will 
be shown, the tendency to late twentieth-century post-colonial valorisation 
of the working class fails to be understood as valorising the effects of 
oppression; the terms of this idealisation are located in the lost 
authenticity of the bourgeoisie and its late capitalist transformations. 
4. IV. (ii). The Ideal Other. Oracles and Miracles attempts to posit the 
world of working-class women as a world of truth, a world constituted by 
reality and as reality as opposed to the falsity of bourgeois culture. Stevan 
Eldred-Grigg calls it, as we have seen, a culture "older and wiser than 
ca pitalism. "138 The authenticity of working-class culture is constructed 
through the use of two, inter-related, binary oppositions: the spoken and 
the written word, and the body and the mind. On the surface, the text 
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privileges the 'speaking-body' nexus, exemplified in the discourse of Mum 
Feron. The scatological emphasis of Mum Feron's discourse has been 
noted;139 however, although this is true to the point of being impossible to 
overlook, it is arguably less important in terms of the overall text that this 
language is defiantly in transgression of middle-class taboos (thereby 
providing a source, through the text, of middle-class titillation and the 
pleasure of vicarious transgression), than that it grounds her discourse in 
the relentless, unglamorous, bodily 'real'. Certainly the humour of such 
observations as that landlords are "'all so tight ... they wouldn't know the 
Brighton tram was up them till it rang its bell and people started getting 
off'" (26), or "'That bloody Ruby .... Gitting so bloody high and mighty she 
wouldn't show a blind widow a short cut to the dunny'" (109), serves to 
attract the reader to a character whose harshness may otherwise be 
alienating, and this is important in terms of Mum Feron's role as 
exemplar of the working-class women's culture Eldred-Grigg wishes to 
reconstruct. However, what is also evoked in the predominance of bodily 
imagery is the centrality of the body to working-class women's lives, and 
by extension that only discourse grounded in the 'truth' of the body is 
relevant or authentic to (the representation of) these lives. 
The grounding of discourse in the body, and its effects on the body 
comprise Mum Feron's epistemology. "'That bitch,' she'd mutter 
[referring to a neighbour] .... 'Talks so bloody much she gives me corns on 
the ear'" (46), or another would be so stupid '''you could ride to Brighton 
and back on her brain and it wouldn't be sharp enough to cut yer bum'" 
(46), while still another is indecisive: '''She's neither yer arse nor yer 
elbow'" (46). Discourse is not an intellectual but a profoundly physical 
activity whose bodily constitution almost outweighs content in 
importance. Fag remembers when she "stood there in front of Ruby's 
mouth, watching it open and close" (187), and "Auntie Aggie or Auntie 
Millie, sitting side by side and exercising their jaws down at the bottom of 
the table" (201). Similarly, Ginnie describes a landlord's wife as "really 
skinny, with scraggly sort of hair and a tongue that could take paint off a 
tram" (218). 
The physicality of the women's work is not glamorised: it is portrayed 
as exhausting and even brutal. In contrast with the satisfying and almost 
complacent efficiency of the Aunts' housework in Munro's Lives of Girls 
and Women, Mum Feron's food preparation is represented in images of 
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violence, as she is described "stripping the skin off some parsnips" (87), 
and "shov[ing] a knife into a parsnip" (161). Bodily cleanliness was' also 
. pursued with physical zeal. Fag remembers her mother's contention that 
"'We might be poor ... but at least we're clean"', and explains, "Not that 
we were all that clean; it was just that Mum put a lot of energy into a lot of 
violent scrubbings, scrapings, sandings, and delousings to satisfy her 
understanding of what cleanliness was'" (47). However, working-class 
women like Mum Feron were not simply the perpetrators of acts of 
domesticated 'violence': they were also their 'victims'. The Historian 
recounts that: 
the Feron women like most working women everywhere in South 
Christchurch continued like their grandmothers to scald their hands 
to a corned beef red as they boiled up their washing in the copper out 
the back, and burned the skin off their knuckles with lye soap as they 
scrubbed dirt off the linoleum in the front, and singed the tips of their 
fingers as they poked sticks into the cooking range in the kitchen. (76) 
However, despite the harshness of its lot, the working body is valorised 
for its truth to origins .. This is largely accomplished by its being contrasted 
with the seductive falsity of the romanticised body: the body in love, and 
particularly in magazine and movie representations of love and beauty. 
For Ginnie, these pose a troubling sense of her own physical inadequacy. 
She remembers that 
For me the biggest curse was my hair. It was red, of course, or ginger 
really, a sort of mop of fuzz. And my eyes was a sort of muddy green. 
Scarlet O'Hara had green eyes, so that was something, but hers were 
'as green as the hills of Ireland' and mine looked more like the green 
at the bottom of a sump. And I was pudgy too. Me and Fag read 
about 'puppy fat' in some of the love magazines and we decided that 
was what was happening to me .... 
Fag had her problems too, of course. She was really skinny. (94) 
Nevertheless, Fag is willing to submit her body to the 'violent' 
technologies of ideal feminine attractiveness as represented by movie stars 
and other celebrities, in a 'disciplining' of the body foreshadowed but not 
specified by Foucault, "a modality of the body that is peculiarly 
feminine. "140 Fag recounts that 
I got scientific about my appearance. I plucked and pencilled like Lana 
Turner, I depilated and waxed and polished like Grace Kelly, I put 
lipstick on with the expertise of Elizabeth Taylor. 
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I strutted on stilettos. I garotted myself in a tight wasp waist. I loved 
that narrow waist, that new style with its sloping shoulders and 
surging wider skirts. It seemed so romantic ... it was like Scarlett 
O'Hara and Lady Barker .... And, like Scarlett and Lady Barker, I laced 
my ribs into a knot, I stuffed my breasts and behind with foam rubber 
and nylon. A new style of brassiere, ferociously wired .... (236) 
Despite the evocation of the impositions of the Hollywood glamour 
industry on the bodies of working-class girls, the danger of positing the 
artificiality of the former and the authenticity of the latter is that it 
overlooks that all bodies are constructed by power, and that there is no 
access to a body which is outside relations of power,141 The processes of 
construction of compliant, or in Foucault's term, "docile",142 working-class 
bodies within capitalist class relations can be found throughout Oracles 
and Miracles. The bodies of school children are disciplined -- in the sense 
of structured or institutionalised, as much as punished -- and surveyed, in 
manners which suggest only the necessity of discipline itself, that 
compliance is indeed the objective. Ginnie recalls the words of their first 
teacher: '''We don't use the left hand, Janet and Daphne Feron,' she said, 
'we use the right hand. What do we call left handed people, 
children?' /'South-paws-Miss-Mitchell-son,' the kids all chanted" (69). 
However, if repetition and vigilant surveillance do not achieve 
conformity, violence is also used: "Miss Mitchellson would nag and nag 
us and tell us southpaws never got anywhere but Sunnyside. Then in the 
end, when she'd worked herself up into enough of a paddy, down would 
come the ruler on our knuckles" (70). 
As well as compliant bodies, capitalism requires healthy, 'efficient' 
bodies, able to work productively. It could be argued as being to this rather 
than a philanthropic end, that the children's nutritional and hygiene 
status is surveyed. During a period of relative financial security, Ginnie 
and Fag are congratulated by the school health nurse in front of the class, 
where all such examinations are conducted, for having "'Two of the best 
lunches in the class .... Bread for starch, meat paste for protein, butter for 
fats, and home made plum jam for sugar and minerals. Much better than 
the crusts and cold faggots so many of you children are eating'" (93). Eating 
has therefore become both an intimidatingly scientific practice, as well as a 
moral issue, and like the district nurse's diagnosis of Aunt Aggie's need to 
eat more, the problem is treated as one of ignorance requiring pedagogical 
intervention. 
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However a remarkable and ultimately even deceptive strategy of power 
is its decentralisation or surveillance, consistent with Foucault's 
description of the functioning of the Panopticon, so that its effects are felt 
to be everywhere.143 Working-class people are made to feel they are always 
everywhere under the bourgeois gaze, and thus become dedicated and 
efficient agents of their own surveillance and discipline. Thus, Fag recalls 
We always 'did well' in 'Health,' thanks to the way Mum had drilled 
us and thanks to the way Peggy and Sadie kept attacking us with 
toothbrushes and combs and hairbrushes. And our nails were always 
clean. Mum was forever ordering Peggy to 'git onto those 
fingernails,' telling us they looked like 'spades from a Irish spud 
farm.' Peggy, seizing a kitchen knife, would pare them right down to 
the quick. (93) 
This procedure is barely less violent than the impositions of 'fashion', yet 
the latter is regarded as a falsifying one, while the former is consistent with 
the notion of 'poor but clean', the badge of pride worn by the Ferons as 
expressing their true reality, but also a source of political exoneration for 
capitalist power relations. If the working class can preserve the standards 
of cleanliness approved by middle-class sensibility, their presence -- as 
different -- may be overlooked. If they are 'the same', there is no 'problem' 
of class. This rationale is further supported by working-class 
appropriations of these standards as matters of dignity and pride. 
Working-class girls like Ginnie and Fag must also be dispossessed of 
illusions that their abilities or dreams may release them from the 
inevitable patterns for their lives set down by preceding generations of 
women like them. Both family and educational institutions work to keep 
them in their proper place. For example, Fag approaches her teacher in 
Standard Six: 
'I want to go to high school next year, Miss Lightowler,' I said. 'I 
want to learn languages and that. I'm going to be a novelist.' 
The minute I said it I felt this horrible sinking feeling in my 
stomach, as though by putting my dream in words I'd shown myself 
how impossible it was. 
Miss Lightowler didn't seem to notice anything very particular 
about my feelings. She just gave me a quick glance then looked back 
a t her papers. 
'Nonsense,' she said . 
. . . 'You'll go to Tech and you'll be a typist. ... Thereis no reason why 
someday you shouldn't be somebody's secretary.' (125) 
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Although Ginnie has been less enthusiastic about school than Fag, her 
feelings about factory work are unequivocal. She is both afraid and bitterly 
unhappy, recalling that "I cried myself to sleep every night. I felt like I was 
just a machine that had to clock itself in at eight o'clock in the morning 
and then keep working till clocking out time at quarter to five of an 
afternoon" (137). It may appear ironic that later, Roddie's middle-class 
family are described by Fag as being "like well painted and very well oiled 
machines, those people, they seemed to move and talk like very subtle 
robots" (191). However, that both are described in very similar de-
humanised imagery suggests that they are both constructs of the same 
system: they are simply positioned differently within capitalist power 
relations. Neither has a 'truer' or 'more authentic' identity under 
capitalism than the other; it is not a matter of 'capitalists' being the false 
constructs of capitalism, while the workers retain their natural identity --
they are both constucts of an oppressive class system. To ground the 
authenticity of Mum Feron's life in its bodily reality is therefore ultimately 
vulnerable to deconstruction of the underlying misconception of the 
existence of a natural body outside of ideology. At the same time, to read 
the tragedy as Fag's disruption and loss of an authentic culture of the past 
is to risk complicity with a romanticised reconstruction of the effects of 
oppressive class-power relations. It is to posit Mum and to a lesser extent 
Ginnie Feron as the desirable Others to endemic bourgeois alienation. 
4. IV. (iii). Appropriate(d) Authority? As has been noted already, 
Eldred-Grigg has questioned his own position as a middle-class man 
writing about working-class women; however, he differentiates his own 
writing from that of writers whose "Lack of working class credentials ... 
never prevented [them] from filling their stories with working class 
characters." Further, Eldred-Grigg argues, these writers produced work 
which reflected that "what they knew [about working class life] was 
distorted and made suspect by their idealised and notional image of 'the 
worker."'144 He has described, both in "Working Class Novel, Okay?", 
which is largely an apologia for Oracles and Miracles, and also in a more 
extended analysis of the class bases of New Zealand writing from the 1920s 
to 1959, how this idealisation tended to identify the 'worker' with the 
figure of the solitary, itinerant male, engaged in casual and usually rural 
work. These characters were posited by writers of this period as challenges 
to the perceived character of New Zealand life as "'dumb and numb, null 
and dull,"'145 and to the loss of 'real' values in the emergence of 
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materialist, 'false', middle-class New Zealand. Indeed, Eldred-Grigg 
argues, these writers, although predominantly of middle-class background 
and means themselves, tended to identify with the stereotypes they 
created.146 However, while he posits the stereotype as romanticised myth, 
far removed from and in fact obscuring the 'reality' of the alienation and 
discontent of urban industrial and domestic workers,147 there is a tendency 
for his analysis to focus on the correctness or incorrectness of the image. 
He specifies elements of its functioning as social critique founded in 
nostalgia for the pre-industrial 'Man Alone', rather than the functioning 
of all such stereotypical images, including his own, as attempts to address 
the desire for the plenitude of origins. More precisely, although he 
acknowledges the roles these figures played in constructions of national 
identity,148 and as constituting vicarious oppositional stances for the 
writers themselves,149 he has disavowed the presence of some of the same 
processes, functions and dangers into his own 1980s representation of mid-
twentieth-century working-class life. Oracles and Miracles romanticises 
the lives of working-class women, not because their lives could be 
construed as 'romantic' but because they are constructed as the lost ("older 
and wiser") Other to the bourgeois culture condemned in both the novel 
and in its inter-texts. This, as Mark Williams has observed, is "most 
apparent in the obsession he displays with oral culture. . .. For Eldred-
Grigg, orality offers a way back to a world that was simple and complete, 
however impoverished. "150 It is therefore with a 1980s nostalgia for 
cultural wholeness and integrity, in the face of late capitalist industrial or 
post-industrial SOciety, with which he "invests the mental universe of 
Canterbury working people in the 1930s."151 
This nostalgia, the "1980s dissatisfactions and desires" which 
characterise it, can be seen in Oracles and Miracles to be overdetermined: 
there is the desire of the historian for 'more' or 'different' history; the 
desire of a literate middle class, whose culture is dominated by the 
technologies of print and image, for the 'authenticity' of the working class 
and its 'oral culture'; and the desire of a man for the elusive Otherness of 
women's lives. Although some of these points have been raised in 
previous discussion, they require amplification in the context of questions 
of authority. 
Oracles and Miracles is located, albeit only partially and ambivalently, 
within historical discourse, but rather than the history of monumental 
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events and similarly monumental agencies or figures in/of that history, it 
is the history of ordinary, unknown people and the unspectacular facts of 
everyday life. To some extent, Eldred-Grigg's novel constitutes an attempt 
to 'set the record straight', as he points out that despite the dominant 
literary portrait of working-class life, 
Most workers were women, not men. Many workers were unpaid, or 
spent their lives shuffling reluctantly backwards and forwards 
between unpaid housework during their childhood, wage work 
during their young adult years, unpaid housework again after 
marriage, then scraps and patches of wage work subsidising the 
housework as too many kids came along and the main wage in the 
household wore thin or stopped with the death or desertion of the 
husband.152 
This is precisely the pattern of the lives of the Feron women. However, 
there is also the implication that the 'history' of these women has 
remained invisible but intact, waiting to be brought to the surface of 
history's discourse; that having been suppressed, it was now being 
liberated into expression. The danger in such a notion is the elision of the 
role of the historian. As the historian (lower case), Eldred-Grigg fills the 
role of 'liberator' of working women's discourse; at the same time, he is 
characterised as a discursive explorer and discoverer, venturing into the 
dark terrain of unwritten discourse to draw it into the map of history's 
disciplinary progress. However, in Oracles and Miracles, there is not only 
Eldred-Grigg, novelist-historian, but also the figure of the Historian (upper 
case) in the text, whose discourse contextualises, amplifies, and in general 
terms mediates the stories of Ginnie and Fag. Early in the novel, the 
Historian states that "The truth was too complex for the Ferons, like all of 
us, with our formulas, our slogans that come so effortlessly and endlessly, 
our phrases that divide confusion into order" (26). Because the Ferons, 
apparently like any of history's subjects, are inadequate subjects of history 
and cannot be left to tell their own story, the Historian provides a 
'background' of the social structures and hierarchies of Christchurch (26), 
the statistics of paid workforce membership and pay rates (165-6), the 
contrast between commercial and promotional advertising regarding 
labour-saving appliances and the reality of their limited sphere of 
distribution among the city's population (74), descriptions of the Feron 
attitude towards schools and schools' attitudes towards families like the 
Ferons (63, 91), and much more. Sources, in a number of cases alluded to 
in the text, are not the 'authorised' or authoritative historical documents 
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and accounts, but newspapers, brochures, government statistics reports, 
newsletters. 
Answering the criticism that the voice of the Historian is "'distracting'" 
and "'unnecessary,'" Eldred-Grigg argues that 
No historian would agree ... that people from a particular historical 
time should be left to tell their own story, since the job of history is to 
try to make sense of things across time, not to leave the past 
embedded in itself .... A more important question is ... how much 
can the patterns drawn by the Historian ... or the novelist ... be 
allowed to obtrude on the 'truth.'lS3 
The particular conception of a pure 'truth' which precedes and underlies 
the Historian's and the novelist's 'patterns' seems, at best, notional. Apart 
from the implication throughout the novel that the Ferons cannot 'know' 
the 'truth', rendering the Historian's pattern making constitutive, the role 
of the novelist has been one of the production of Fag's and Ginnie's truths, 
at the same time alienating Fag and Ginnie from them. 
In a gesture of self-examination, Eldred-Grigg asks, "Why did I want to 
do this? Was I trying to appropriate these women?"lS4 He resolves this 
anxiety by reasoning that he "had the skills, the training and the resources 
of an established writer. Ginnie and Fag had none of those things and no 
wish to acquire them, because their culture is oral and informal, not 
literary and structured."lSS However, in this he falls prey to the argument 
suppressed within his novel's celebration of working-class 'culture' in 
itself: Just as the Ferons are working class because they are so positioned 
within capitalism, so Eldred-Grigg has the discursive resource of authority 
because of his different and privileged positioning within the same 
structure. This is underscored by the novel's representation of Fag's desire 
to be a writer, her belief that she possessed the ability to acquire the skills, 
and her strong wish to do so, met with the dismissal of the school teacher 
whose 'function' was to quash such transgressive, even 'false' ideas, 
dreams and illusions in working-class girls (125). While the novel stands 
in condemnation of Fag's passion for literary language, it is this which has 
defined Eldred-Grigg as an historian-novelist. Further, the oral culture-
based reality he privileges is in fact a textual construct: the discourses of 
Ginnie and Fag have been mediated not only by the Historian, but by 
Eldred-Grigg's (historical and literary) desire and his language. 
292 
Eldred-Grigg has emphasised the importance of the sounds, rhythms 
and idiom of 1930s working-class women's speech to his project. 
However, the representation of this speech has been fundamentally 
mediated by his own role as oral historian. He describes how he set about 
listening to women like Ginnie, "asking questions suggested to me by my 
training as a social historian and writer of fiction."156 A significant 
amount of 'their' discourse must therefore be reflective of his own 
agendas. He then became enmeshed in questions of selection, to the extent 
that "Most of the stuff gathered in the interviews was eventually 
discarded .... Huge chunks of the 'real' lives of Ginnie and Fag were 
simply dropped."157 Perhaps most significantly in relation to the avowed 
privileging of oral discourse, he describes the process of "turning 
something oral and informal into something literary."158 One explanation 
for this transformation is its necessity, given that 
All oral historians know that people talk in word packages rather 
than sentences .... Word packages elided until only the stump of a 
single word is left, silences, gestures, screwed up faces, jumps, lateral 
leaps ... hardly any reader would have the patience to keep up with 
it.159 
Therefore, 'real' speech must be turned into 'literary-real' speech. 
However, another possible explanation has less to do with the ability of 
truths to be communicated through the use of their 'pure' oral form, and 
more to do with his own literary desires. Eldred-Grigg's initial aim was 
one of "turning the talk into a sort of ballad or fairy tale,"160 forms which 
are oral in derivation, but which are activated and identified by the 
employment of conventions and formulae which problematise the 
opposition of oral and literary discourses. As has been shown in preceding 
discussion, Eldred-Grigg activates authenticating conventions for his 
literary language: the grounding of discourse in the body, evoking the 
unmediated emergence of that discourse from the very interior of one's 
being; the. use of vernacular; and the use of periodising idiom, which 
evokes the truth of local colour. A further convention of truth-telling he 
employs is the first-person narrative, creating the impression that Ginnie 
or Fag is speaking, and that the reader therefore has unmediated access to 
their discourse. However, the oral historian's craft is constitutionally 
falsified: "almost every sentence has been totally reconstructed and 
fictionalised. "161 
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There is some tension between Eldred-Grigg's roles as historian and 
novelist. Although employing the devices of narrative (used by fiction to 
represent truth), he also evokes the 'factual' or 'objective' conventions of 
historians' discourse. 'Local colour', already mentioned as prevalent in 
Oracles and Miracles, includes the names of streets and suburbs, 
descriptions of schools, shops, and other public and well-known buildings, 
and more. These details ground the realism of the text, although they also 
render it vulnerable to dispute on exactly those grounds in a way that 
fiction would not be held accountable to a reader's perception of the 
'reality' represented.162 In addition, Eldred-Grigg has expressed his own 
resistance to the possible appropriation of Oracles and Miracles by the 
literary institution of "'New Zealand fiction. Which is a strange and 
sinister thing I don't want anything to do with."'163 He has registered 
horror at one reader's response to Mum Feron as soon to be "one of 'the 
great characters in our fiction."'164 However, this resistance would seem at 
best inconsistent with his own avowals of turning the talk into literature, 
history into fiction, and the women 'informants' into discursive 
constructs -- characters -- whose 'lives' are constituted through his own 
preconceived purposes, selection of detail, and shaping of its expression 
into a form accessible to late twentieth century literate readers. Oracles and 
Miracles is at least as much "ballad or fairy tale" -- precisely the literary 
sentimentality, the textual evocation of dreams and illusions -- that both 
he, and the 'argument' of the novel disavow, as it is history. Further, it is 
radically dislocated from the origins he seeks to attribute to it. 
As a man 'soliciting' the stories of Ginnie and Fag, Eldred-Grigg's 
authoritative role points to the sexual politics of the 'confession'. Evoking 
Foucault's description of the religious and later scientific pressures to 
confess one's sex, the motivating force of Oracles and Miracles is both the 
historian's (lower case) need to complement or supplement the extant 
account of the lives of workers in the 1930s and 1940s with the lives of 
working girls and women. These lives are shown to be wholly located 
within relationships, for the "portrait of the worker as solitary is a 
particularly serious literary error. Solitude was a rare experience for 
working-class people, most of whom from the 1920s to the 1950s lived out 
their lives in small crowded rooms· or large crowded workplaces. "165 In 
addition, the novel includes a section of discourse attributed to The 
Industrial Psychologist, who claims that 
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Another outstanding characteristic of factory girls is the degree to 
which their -lives are absorbed by personal relationships .... [T]he 
lives of factory girls are not only dominated but absorbed by this 
factor .... [R]epetitive work, even though it takes up the greater part 
of their waking day, leaves them free to daydream about personal 
relationships . 
. . . . [I]t is not surprising that in their lesisure time they want and 
need, in contrast to their working days, informality, warmth, 
friendliness, variety, and entertainment. 
The younger, unmarried girls have an all-absorbing preoccupation 
with the subject of marriage. (172)166 
Eldred-Grigg's position in relation to these women, both in listening to 
their talk and in compiling research data about working women in general 
to provide the context for that talk, is curiously akin to that of the character 
Roddie, whose attitude causes Fag to feel that "people like me were just 
some sort of problem for people like him to solve, ... [that] the only reason 
he listened to me was to make sure I was the real thing, a real working-
class girl" (180). However, as if in response to the anxiety produced by the 
perceived gender-distance between him and Fag and Ginnie, Eldred-Grigg 
has sought to annihilate that very distance/difference. Just as writers 
between 1920 and 1959 have been described as having "eagerly repudiated 
their own class"167 to identify as "social vagabonds, idiosyncratic 
outsiders,"168 so Eldred-Grigg has publicly identified himself as ilia full-
time writer, a full-time housewife, and a full-time mother."'169 
What are the effects of his identifying with these socially and 
biologically female roles? It could be argued that, similar to Spivak's 
account of deprivileging the self, he chooses a 'deprivileged' identity 
thereby renouncing 'male privilege'. However, the gesture is not so 
clearly one of male self-abnegation, nor is his subjectivity so unilaterally 
constituted. European feminist Rosi Braidotti has wryly observed that 
It must be very uncomfortable -to be a male, white, middle-class 
intellectual at a time in history when so many minorities and 
oppressed groups are speaking up for themselves; a time when the 
hegemony of the white knowing subject is crumbling. Lacking the 
historical experience of oppression on the basis of sex, they 
paradoxically lack a minus. Lacking the lack, they cannot participate 
in the great ferment of ideas that is shaking up Western culture: it 
must be very painful indeed to have no option other than being the 
empirical referent of the historical oppressor of women, and being 
asked to account for his atrocities.170 
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This would all be very difficult had not the strategy of identification with 
and as the 'minus' not provided the grounds for disidentification with, 
and lack of historical accountability for, 'the oppressor', and for 
participation in whole new areas of discourse. On the other hand, Eldred-
Grigg cannot become a woman in the sense that his identification has any 
more than subjective, indeed, fictional meaning: in other words, he may 
identify as a woman, but he could not be identified as a woman other than 
in the context of a willed act of suspension of disbelief. In this way, Eldred-
Grigg's claims may be likened to Elaine Showalter's account of 'critical 
cross-dressing'. Adapted to the more general term, 'discursive cross-
dressing', this parallels the theatrical phenomenon in that it amounts to lOa 
way of promoting the notion of masculine power while masking it. In 
psychoanalytic theory, the male transvestite is not a powerless man; , , , he 
is a 'phallic woman' who can tell himself that 'he is, or with practice will 
become, a better woman than a biological female if he chooses to do sO,"171 
The more complex positioning of Eldred-Grigg within discursive 
power politics in relation to the Feron women therefore raises, not 
literary-aesthetic questions, questions of discursive terrain, but questions of 
discursive territory, transgression and appropriation, which may be held 
together under the overarching political issue of authority which has 
become paramount in consideration of post-colonial fiction. Chapter Four 
has focused upon the authoritative and appropriative representations of 
'others' by socially and culturally privileged subjects. In Chapter Five, I 
discuss a range of texts which constitute the accession to subjectivity on the 
part of 'others' of the dominant discursive network, a process which I term 
'self-making', However, as I argue, the entry of these 'others into 
discourse, and specifically into the valorised form of writing, also poses a 
challenge to the textual forms whose 'authority' has been predicated on 
the exclusion of difference, 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SELF-MAKING: ARTICULATING AUTHORITY OTHERWISE. 
5. I. Introduction. 
This chapter considers discourses and textual production from the 
'subject-position' of the 'other' in relation to dominant discourses. There 
are, within these discourses, moments of resistance to containment in 
oppressive and exploitative representations, and more positively, the 
production and insertion into the textual economy of the dominant 
cultures, of discourses of difference. The latter constitutes a recuperative 
---:---" -_. __ . ,-
or 'reci~mptive' gesture on the part of marginalised cultural groups which 
-~~iY~s both in-group objectives of 'self-making', and broader objectives of 
author-ising the discourses of 'others', while challenging the (textual and 
other) structures which hav'e kept them marginalised within the 
. dominant culture and its forms. A principle strategy I explore is the 
attempt to evoke aspects of (traditional) oral practices and forms in writing . 
. However, I also explore the ambivalence of celebratory and resistant 
identification with the very characterisations which have informed the 
processes of 'othering'. 
5. II. Representing the Self: Storytelling as Post-Colonial Recuperative 
Strategy. 
Those whose social and cultural positions of dominance assure them 
readier access to the means of cultural production are more likely to have 
the products of their discourses author-ised through and by textuality, 
enabling both the specification and demarcation of discursive space, and 
dissemination of their discourse, thus ensuring the continuation of that 
authority. Those, on the other hand, whose social position alienates them 
from the means of (textual) production, are more likely to have their 
discourses and social products circulate in a more limited, less valorised 
way. Oral history-making and 'storytelling' within confined discursive 
communities are features of such 'unauthorised' discursive production 
and circula tion. 
Alice Munro's Lives of Girls and Women l and Patricia Grace's Potiki 
share a number of manifest similarities with Oracles and Miracles. Both 
are texts which, like Eldred-Grigg's, privilege orality. Lives represents a 
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female storytelling community, as is posited in Oracles and Miracles, and 
explores some of the same relationships -- in particular, that between 
mothers and daughters -- similar themes in relation to women's lives, and 
it employs similar motifs in relation to the production of women's stories. 
Potiki shares with Oracles and Miracles the multiple narrative perspectives 
drawn largely from the members of one family, and the resultant 
relativisation of point of view. However, unlike Oracles and Miracles, 
both Lives and Potiki are written from within the subjective stance 
represented, rather than about or on behalf of it, and this is not simply a 
factor of authorship, but also of the narrative situation: while Eldred-
Grigg's text implies the presence of the outside transcriber, the narratives 
of Lives and Potiki are produced and authorised from within their own 
discursive communities. In this way, they enact the necessity posited in 
post-colonial discourse of discerning the meaning of discourse in relation 
to the situation of its production. Therefore, if Oracles and Miracles can be 
seen as constituting an act of appropriative identification and idealisation, 
Lives and Po tiki, although bearing numerous thematic and structural 
similarities to it, are read as textual acts of resistance to imposed socio-
discursive positioning within the dominant discursive formations. 
Munro and Grace foreground, in these texts, the act of storytelling, not 
as capitulation to hegemonic literary expectations, nor in an act of 
privileging marginality per se over authority, but as an 'argument' for the 
constitution of meaning through discursive situation and historicisation. 
In constructing discourses in resistance they both stake claims to discursive 
territory, and constitute subversive discursive terrain. For example, as it 
will be shown, the search for 'voice' in writing, and the use of the 
'feminine' and 'folk' crafts of weaving and carving as metaphors for 
textual prduction can be re-read as gestures of empowerment, imbuing 
these forms with authority, and as strategic subversions of dominant 
cultural hierarchies of value -- art over craft, authority over orality --
within the current institutions of cultural and reading practices. Similarly, 
as well as investing de-privileged forms with new authority and new 
meaning, acts of (inter)textuality subvert traditional narrative forms of 
containment by the 'inappropriate' mimicry of them.2 Thus the 
storytelling structure and motifs of Lives and Potiki effect the privileging 
of discursive process over product, and the historicisation of the texts 
through reference to the subject-positions out of which they arise, allowing 
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the contestatory meanings and significance of their textual strategies to be 
discerned. 
For example, at the time of publication in 1971, much of Munro's 
exploration in the text of women's relationship to desire and to cultural 
production was new to public discourse. She has noted, in relation to 
Lives, that "'It just occurred to me once that I wanted to write the kind of 
thing about a young girl's sexual experience that had been written about 
boys.'''3 This sentiment, and its realisation in Lives, coincided with the 
rise of women's visible political and cultural activism. Her text was 
therefore transgressive in its admission and celebration of the 
inadmissable within patriarchy: that women could be subjects of their 
own desires and their own discourses, not simply objects of men's.4 This 
claiming of subjectivity as female implies the specificity of that 
subjectivity, defining it as a region within some idealis't subjective totality. 
As I argue in Chapter Six, this notion is consistent with patriarchal 
conceptions of subjectivity, and thus its representation in women's 
contestatory texts must be read as descriptive, evoking the symptomatic 
status of discourses of resistance, and at the same time, to the extent that 
women are the Other of patriarchy, as critical. However, more positively, 
the notion of female subjectivity as a region within patriarchy can also be 
seen as consistent with the feminist/post-colonial demand for situated 
discourse and reading practices, as well as incorporating the element of 
gender into the recognised importance of 'place' in post-colonial writing.S 
Although it was published a decade and a half later, in 1986, in Potiki 
many of the same discursive features and textual strategies can be found. 
Along with a broader crisis of post-colonial legitimacy for Pakeha cultural 
and political supremacy, there has been a resurgence of Maori activism and 
a cultural renaissance. This has created a context in which Maori literature 
increasingly challenges, its containment within the Pakeha institutional 
creation of a national literature, serving as a store of symbols and source of 
indigenising 'local colour'. 
There has been wide critical discussion of whether Lives is properly a 
novel, an 'episodic' novel, or a collection of linked stories. The te.rms of 
such discussion are more revealing than any solution posited. As well as a 
'novel' and 'stories', Lives has been described as a "scrapbook of 
anecdotes" and a "collection of autobiographical sketches."6 However, as 
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Martin points out, the question invokes a hierarchisation of literary forms 
which privilege the novel.7 As Helen Tiffin has stated, "European literary 
criticism has traditionally measured 'good literature' by an unrelativised 
'universality' whose general claims and assumptions have now been 
exposed by a number of critics as the hegemonising tactics of a particular 
cultural group."B At the same time, stories are denigrated as limited and 
feminine, more akin to a craft, with its manual associations, than an art, 
with its more intellectual implications. Munro herself is complicit in such 
a judgement. She once told Graeme Gibson in an interview that she 
writes on a single string, rather than manipulating a lot of strings at once 
like a true novelist. Specifically, she felt that, "the sections could almost 
stand as short-stories. They're all a little bit too loose, but this seemed to be 
the only way I could work, and I think this is the way I'll have to write 
books."9 However, Lives can be argued to have taken on the 'feminine' 
label and mimicked its terms, thereby displacing its force of containment. 
For example, women's 'life-writing', an apt description of Munro's 
bildungs-/kiinstlerroman -- has been decribed as "disconnected, 
fragmentary, or organized into self-sustained units rather than connecting 
chapters."IO Similarly, the evocation of communal orality and the range 
of craft metaphors to decribe the text have been noted in Rapsorich's 
observation that "the stories are structured and linked by parallel crises 
and parallel points of view. Thus relativity is central to the aesthetic in 
Lives,likening it to the crocheted squares combined to make an afgan." 
More generally of the short-story as female form, she argues that "As a 
work in miniature, the short-story, like a needle-point square, demands 
flawless execution,"ll while Godard discovers patchwork quilting as a key 
image in women's texts, symbolising the intertextuality of their narrative 
technique.12 
Similarly, Potiki is structured into stories, defined largely by their 
narrative point of view, evoking the oral folk tradition deprivileged by 
literary art. There are 'stories' and 'storytellers' rather than 'chapters'. 
Thus although it does not posit an exclusively women's storytelling 
tradition or its re-enactment in the post-colonial present, and although it is 
not solely or even principally women's lives that are being told, the text is 
'feminised' by its implication in culture's feminine Other, the' "Other 
culture, which is traditionally interpreted as female 'folk' life."13 This is 
precisely what Eldred-Grigg chose to 'recognise' and celebrate in Oracles 
and Miracles. Therefore, more important than finding the most 
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appropriate genre in which to place the texts is the acknowledgement of 
the questions they raise about the notion of genre itself. 
How, then, does the apparent conformity of these texts to the very 
positions or status with which they are conferred within the patriarchal 
hegemony of western institutions, constitute a possible position of 
resistance as opposed to mere containment? By recognising the centrality 
of subject-position to the meaning of discourse, it is possible to see how 
these texts enact, in their representation of a 'folk' or 'women's' culture, 
both a "celebration of womanly [and Maori] things," and "feminist [and 
Maori] comment and protest."14 For example, the 'celebration' could be 
seen as occurring in the structuring and motifs of the texts, while the 
'comment and protest' are discerned in the themes. Finally, the status of 
this evocation of orality and folk culture as mimicry, manifesting slippage 
between the discourse and its effects and thus constituting it as ambivalent, 
is clear in its employment within literary texts, so that these 'marginalised' 
cultures negotiate and articulate positions both within and other than 
literary authority. Therefore, orality and folk crafts are not purely 
marginal, and literary authority is no longer purely patriarchal and post-
colonising. There is a 'feminine' undecidability to the 'body' of these texts, 
isomorphic with a feminine subjectivity.15 By eluding labels such as 
'novel', 'chapter' and 'story', they destabilise rigid genre classification, 
existing in the gaps between which hegemonic patriarchal western literary 
discourse finds difficult to name. In eluding the name, they elude its 
controlling, containing, objectifying force, and thus function as resistant, 
disturbing texts. 
Within the sections of Lives, whether these are seen as stories or 
chapters, there is a complex enactment of storytelling processes. 
Throughout the novel characters share stories, characters become stories, 
and stories received from literary, scientific, religious and many other 
traditions influence and shape characters' lives. Through Del Jordan's 
narrative, we see these storymaking processes construct the world in 
which she lives and simultaneously construct her as part of that world. 
Some stories have greater cultural authority than others, and although the 
narrative as a whole presents Del as the locus of conflict between them, 
negotiating and eventually subverting the traditional hierarchy of value, 
the presentation of the stories in the text itself occurs in such a way that 
they weave together, resisting hierarchical ordering into such terms as 
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'plot' and 'sub-plot'. The story of Del's development as an artist is 
inextricably involved with the story of her development as a young 
woman, rendering it again undecidable between the genres of 
bildungsroman and kunstlerroman, as suggested earlier. This weaving 
together evokes the posited inseparability of body and subjectivity in the 
construction of discourse. Del is not so much both a woman and a writer, 
as a womanwriter. However, neither 'woman' nor 'writer' is a 
monolithic or idealist category, but rather the product of multiple stories. 
Del's narration is the locus of the meeting of all the stories that have gone 
before to construct her (the history of her subjectivity), and the stories 
created in her challenges to these (the ways in which she refuses 
interpellation). In short, she is the site of their meeting, conflict, 
resolution and problematisation. The text becomes fabric which exists only 
in the inter-relation of warp and weft. It can continue to be woven in any 
direction, as the s,tories can continue to be told. There are stories present in 
the text only as allusion or rumour, unfixed and unfixable by 
substantiation (101; 150), or unable to be shared (158). All can be likened to 
loose ends of story that have the potential to be woven into the fabric, but 
always resisting final closure. 
The endless construction of stories in Lives implies the endless 
construction of reality through language; it is not stable and out-there, but 
always coming into being through the subject's relation to it. Early in the 
text, and in her life, Del confronts the existence of multiple truths. The 
stories suggested by the newspaper headlines she reads at Uncle Benny's 
house seem tantalisingly possible when she is in his environment. The 
otherness of the reality they represent is in place in the otherness of Uncle 
Benny's house, "at the edge of the bush -- the bush that turned into swamp 
... -- ... tall and silvery, old unpainted boards, bleached dry in the 
summer, and dark green blinds, cracked and torn, pulled down over all the 
windows" (2). However, the closer she gets to home, the less possible they 
seem. Similarly, Uncle Benny "told stories, in which there was nearly 
always something happening that my mother would insist could not have 
happened" (9). The stability of truth is further questioned when, having 
heard her mother's stories about Uncle Bill as a child, "the terrible fat boy, 
so gifted in cruelty, so cunning, quick, fiendish, so much to be feared" (87), 
Del meets him as a dying old man whose stories, and storybook excesses of 
generosity cause her to reflect, "I kept looking at him, trying to pull that 
boy out of the yellowish man. But I could not find him there" (87). 
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The storytelling among women represented and celebrated in Del's 
narrative emphasises the constitution of non-hierarchical oral discursive 
community. Rapsorich argues that "Munro substantiates . . . 
Brownmiller's point that women prefer equality and community in 
discussion, rather than the hierarchy of leader and led discourse. "16 Del's 
great-aunts Elspeth and Grace tell stories which do more than impart 
information or entertain an audience. The act of telling the stories links 
the sisters not only by drawing on common pasts, but in the present, in the 
act of sharing the story-telling voice. For example, in telling the story of 
the foreign "hired man" their father had had, they call on each others' 
memories, constantly interrupt each other, both support and challenge 
each others' interpretations of events, and add things the other has 
omitted (33). The narrating of these stories is invariably good-humoured, 
and the aunts continue to enjoy the mirth they engender, sometimes even 
indulging in some new joke or trick that has arisen out of the context and 
the act of their storytelling (see 34-5). The centrality of the bonding 
function over the story itself is noted by Del when she says: "It did not 
seem as if they were telling them to me, to entertain me, but as if they 
would have told them anyway, for their own pleasure, even if they had 
been alone" (33). 
That such stories are produced out of a 'women's' culture is 
demonstrated in the context of rigidly demarcated, and again celebrated, 
notion of women's domestic work: 
The veranda where they sat in the afternoons, having completed 
morning marathons of floor scrubbing, cucumber hoeing, potato 
digging, bean and tomato picking, canning, pickling, washing, 
starching, sprinkling, ironing, waxing, baking. They were not idle 
sitting there; their laps were full of work -- cherries to be stoned, peas 
to be shelled, apples to be cored. Their hands, their old, dark, 
wooden-handled paring knives, moved with marvelous, almost 
vindictive speed. (32) 
Despite the sheer amount of work described, the evocation of produce and 
productivity, the suggestion of plentitude and of a self-satisfied efficiency 
and sense of achievement, contrasts greatly with the representation in 
Oracles and Miracles of struggle to amass sufficient food out of meagre 
resources, and body-breaking labour which merely kept the Ferons in the 
standard of poverty to which they were accustomed. Further, 'storytelling' 
in any entertaining or frivolous sense, was virtually unknown in the 
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Feron household. Mum Feron's few stories recognisable as such, provoke 
amazement in Ginnie and Fag: Me and Fag sort of gaped at each other. 
Mum had told us a story!" (31), and her own self-conscious discomfort: 
"'You kids gitl' she said. 'What jer think this is, a mick confessional?'" 
(31). 
The physicality of the aunts' work -- both its reference to the needs and 
comforts of the body, and its accomplishment by way of bodily skill and 
activity -- parallels the depiction of the physical energy and the 'bodily' 
orality of their storytelling. It is evoked in the use of textual devices such 
as italics and exclamation marks. Similarly, Del's own fascination with the 
sounds of words foregrounds the orality of her conception of language. 
She experiments with the sounds of words: '''Day-ud cow,' I said, 
expanding the word lusciously. 'Day-ud cow, day-ud cow'" (44). She 
contemplates "Heart attack. It sounded like an explosion, like fireworks 
going off" (46), and notes that her mother's voice was clear and dangerous: 
"just by using a word like barbaric, she could make a pool of silence, of 
consternation around her" (56). The stories produced out of this orality 
contrast with Uncle Craig's family tree and written history of Wawanash 
County. While the stories of the aunts enact their relatedness in the 
telling, both to each other and to their audience, Craig's family tree, on 
which he works in protected isolation, records the skeletal details of dates 
of birth, marriage and death. Similarly, his long historical manuscript 
records the past with an apparently arbitrary sense of priorities. 
Descriptions of the weather on a particular day could receive as weighty 
attention as anything else in his attempt to compile the whole history of 
the County. The will to objectivity and totality in his history paradoxically 
requires that he exclude any discernible point-of-view. His history is thus 
unsituated and dehistoricised. Its transcendent voice is monologic and 
closed, colonising and naming an "'irrevocably interpreted past,'''17 
dealing a death blow to voice, and thus necessarily 'other' voices. It is in 
death that Craig can be tropologically linked to his writing. As Del looks at 
his body under the blanket of lilies, she describes him as "the terrible, 
silent, indifferent conductor of forces that could flare up, in an instant, and 
burn through this room, all reality, leave us dark" (58). 
The early suspicion with which Del regarded writing related to its 
tendency to bring to her stories from far beyond her own experience, yet 
the suspicion was combined with an attraction to the very power writing 
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had to do this. However, as she grows older and the social construction of 
sexual difference starts to impinge more and more on her self-image and 
options, the suspicion is accompanied by a sense of vulnerability to the 
power. Describing the hatred of boys for girls, she says: "The things they 
said stripped away freedom to be what you wanted, reduced you to what it 
was they saw, and that, plainly, was enough to make them gag" (115). She 
begins to see power and writing concentrating largely in the hands of boys 
and men. She finds that while men do most of the writing, much of the 
writing is about women, and it both objectifies and controls them. Uncle 
Benny's marriage to Madeleine is arranged through an exchange of letters 
between Benny and Madeleine's brother. Later Del is disturbed to read a 
magazine article by a Freudian psychologist discussing the different 
reactions of boys and girls on looking at the moon. She does not identify 
with the description of a girl's thoughts, and becomes confused, believing a 
Freudian psychologist must know - more than she knows herself (177). 
Similarly, Mr Chamberlain's note, "Del is a bad girl" (160), disturbs her 
with its authority. She believes it could expose the hidden truth about 
herself. Jerry Storey transmits male stories about female intelligence, 
delimiting its power and patronising Del. What she had was, he said, "a 
first-rate memory, a not unusual feminine gift for language, fairly weak 
reasoning powers, and almost no capacity for abstract thought" (193). 
Finally, when Garnet French, whom Del describes as "the solid intrusion 
of the legendary into the real world" (211), eventually expects Del to 
submit to his religious beliefs and practices, her shocked rejection of him is 
a rejection of the master-narrative which he embodies. 
However, women's oral storytelling, while constituting and relying on 
community in the transmission of a folk culture, also reveals a dark 
underside in its own implication in patriarchal discursive dichotomies. 
Communities are linked through exclusion of 'outsiders', just as 'place' is 
defined through a conception of some region 'beyond'. Del both 
participates in, and is aware of the way individuals and communities 
make stories out of events, and turn people into legends, thus shaping 
their meaning or the way they will be remembered. Soon after 
Madeleine's departure, Uncle Benny reshapes his role in the end of the 
relationship by choosing to remember her as someone discarded, to laugh 
over, like a character in a story or a play, and she eventually becomes 
known as "Madeleine. That Madwoman" (27). As Del says, "We 
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remembered her like a story, and having nothing else to give we gave her 
our strange, belated, heartless applause" (27). When Miss Farris drowns, 
the speculation in the Jubilee Herald-Advance serves to avert the 
threatening suggestion of suicide. The townspeople prefer to create stories 
of murder (the act of an unknown outsider), or accident, repressing any 
explanation which may force them to confront the inadmissable elements 
of love or sexuality in relation to her, or their own lives. Throughout the 
text, stories and rumours circulate, such as those about the members of the 
Sherriff family discussed by Del's mother and Fern Dougherty, though in 
Del's presence (100-101). By setting up scapegoats representing what is 
considered abnormal, undesirable, or unfortunate in the community, 
these stories create a sense of normality and bonding within the rest of the 
community. They create the 'other' against which the 'self' is defined. 
Del's mother's consistent belief in the essential otherness of burglars (91-2), 
is consistent with a dichotomised reality which is (critically) represented in 
Lives, invoking the literary form of the gothic. 
In the small town of Jubilee, order is opposed to chaos, town to 
country, same to different, 'us' to 'them'. There are characters 
representing the traditional dark 'villains' of gothic: Uncle Benny is 
described as having "a heavy black moustache, fierce eyes, a delicate 
predatory face," and as being "a steadfast eccentric" (2).18 The gothic is also 
suggested in the shadows of horror and violence which inhabit the. 
inevitable narratives of women's sexuality and childbirth. Naomi tells Del 
that "if a girl has to get married, she either dies having [the baby], or she 
nearly dies, or else there is something the matter with it. Either a harelip 
or clubfoot or it isn't right in the head. My mother has seen it" (117). A 
sceptical Del reflects that "Naomi's mother was a practical nurse. On her 
authority -- or what Naomi claimed was her authority-- I had heard that 
babies born with cauls will turn out to be criminals" (117). An horrific 
story of childbirth explains Mary Agnes Oliphant's simpleness, and as a 
result Del feels that "the gloom spreading out from Aunt Moira had a 
gynaecological odor" (40). Later Del reads in Fern's assorted papers about 
"a poor farmer's wife in North Carolina throwing herself under a wagon 
when she discovered she was going to have her ninth child, about women 
dying in tenements from complications of pregnancy or childbirth or 
terrible failed abortions ... "(163). Even if these things happen to 'other' 
women, 'elsewhere', they hang as warnings or threats over the lives of 
'all' women.1 9 
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However, as has been noted by Rapsorich and Howells, Lives belongs to 
a resistant tradition of female gothic. Howells argues that 
Del's dissatisfaction with the traditional gothic stems from her 
perceptions of what it neglects, for not only does it leave out 
ordinariness but more importantly for her it leaves out women's 
sexuality. Gothic fiction is obsessed with sex, but stories of heroines 
fleeing male predators elaborately displace female knowledge into 
fictions of feminine fear and innocence, refusing to recognize physical 
desire as a strong component in women's sexual fantasies. 2o 
The specification of a female gothic in contestation of the patriarchal 
tradition results in the discernment of writing "primarily concerned with 
definitions of female sexuality and the role of the female in patriarchal 
culture. Partly a subversive fiction, it nonetheless apes the values and 
images of male culture. "21 However, just as Bhabha's formulation of 
mimicry as a, disturbance or ambivalence in authority constitutes it as a 
resistance effect, Rapsorich notes of female gothic, as it is enacted in Lives, 
that "Although the fiction reproduces the status of women in patriarchal 
culture, it is meant as feminist accusation."22 Thus female gothic implies 
in itself the necessity of determining the meaning of discourse in relation 
to the subject position out of which it is produced. 
Del is eager for sexual knowledge and sexual experience. She is 
intrigued by the experience of her own body as sexual (149; 200), and her 
sexual fantasies range from the childish narratives she constructs with 
Naomi about 'F.A. 's' (Fatal Attractions) (133), to the private and elaborate 
fantasies about Mr Chamberlain (151). She seeks physical sexual 
experience with Mr Chamberlain (166), and ultimately Garnet French (223-
4). Yet her sexual desire is not the same sado-masochistic desire for 
submission to men and to men's construction of desire in women that is 
found in traditional gothic. She is not impressed by the sight of Mr 
Chamberlain's genitals, as he clearly expects she should be (166-7), and 
although she complies for her own reasons with Jerry Storey's wishes, she 
finds the idea of intimacy with him "offensive" (199). Listening to opera, 
she finds her passions and fantasies aroused. However, she imagines 
Voluptuous surrender. Not to a man but to fate, really, to darkness, 
to death. Yet I loved most of all Carmen, at the end. Et laisser moi 
passer! I hissed it between my teeth; I was shaken, imagining the 
other surrender, more tempting, more gorgeous even than the 
surrender to sex -- the hero's, the patriot's, Carmen's surrender to the 
final importance of gesture, image, self-created self. (181) 
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Similarly, as has been shown, her sexual experience with Garnet French 
resulting in her loss of virginity still does not represent, or result in, her 
submission to him. In these refusals, she is differentiated from the more 
traditional gothic heroine-victims, Marion Sherriff and Miss Farris. 
On the other hand, Del resists her mother's refusal of sexuality, and of 
mystery and passion. In this, Lives exemplifies the tendency of female 
gothic to involve conflict with the all-powerful Mother. Reversing the 
usual formulation of this relation, in which the mother represents the fate 
of the girl who heeds her sexual self, Del's sexual self is almost something 
she fosters in order not to become like her completely rational mother (94); 
and just as her mother deflects consideration of the spiritual mysteries of 
death with her animistic account of bodies as "Combinations of elements" 
and Uncle Craig's as eventually "flowers" (47), her discussions of sexuality 
are, for Del, either depressingly grim, or embarrassingly practical. She 
exhorts Del, "'Use your brains. Don't be distracted. Once you make that 
mistake, of being -- distracted, over a man, your life will never be your 
own. You will get the burden, a woman always does'" (173). Yet she has 
also written to the Jubilee Herald-Advance, arguing that "'prophylactic 
devices should be distributed to all women on public relief in Wawanash 
County, to help them prevent any further increase in their families'" (173). 
Del's perception of reality is not so dichotomised. The boundaries 
between inside and outside, us and them, are unstable. Her family lives 
on the Flats Road which is neither inside nor outside, but on the edge of 
the town. It is only an act of will on her mother's part in insisting that 
they lived "at the end of the Flats Road" (7), that separates them from its 
bootleggers, prostitutes, idiots. But Del discovers that the ordinary and the 
strange inhere in each other: "People's lives, in Jubilee as elsewhere, were 
dull, simple, amazing, and unfathomable -- deep caves paved with kitchen 
linoleum" (249). She experiences her own and her mother's 'otherness' in 
the Jubilee community, and conversely, the surprising 'normality' of the 
prostitutes at the end of the road: 
I wished I had seen more of this Peggy than the soft, mouse-brown 
nest of curls above the paper; I wished I had seen her face. I did expect 
something -- a foul shimmer· of corruption, some emanation, like 
marsh gas. I was surprised, in a way, that she would read a paper, that 
the words in it would mean the same things to her, presumably, as 
they did to the rest of us, that she ate and drank, was human still. 
(150) 
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In her development into a writer, Del is therefore heir to two 
traditions. The stories told by her aunts are, by extension, her stories of 
family history, through her relatedness to them and through the process of 
narrative bonding -- the relating of them. However, Del and her aunts 
retain an ambivalent attitude to writing. It is, after all, Aunts Elspeth and 
Grace who, though they laughed at it, also respected men's work. Thus 
they protected Uncle Craig from interruption when he was writing. 
Though they intended to give Uncle Craig's written history to Owen to 
finish "because he's a boy" (61), they eventually acknowledge Del's "knack 
for writing compositions" (61), and she inherits it. This dismays Del, who 
describes the manuscript as "so dead to me, so heavy and dull and useless 
that I thought it might deaden my things and bring me bad luck" (62). 
Del's 'things' are her own writing, for although the manuscript is 
eventually destroyed, Del does not reject writing completely. Her 
ambivalence at the loss of Uncle Craig's manuscript is clear when she says, 
"I felt remorse, that kind of tender remorse which has on its other side a 
brutal, unblemished satisfaction" (62). She wants to write a novel, but 
cannot do so until she has worked through her fear of writing as a process 
of exclusion. She reflects in the Epilogue that she would eventually 
become "Voracious and misguided as Uncle Craig ... writing his history" 
(249), attempting her own exhaustive lists in the futile hope of accuracy. 
Like Uncle Craig, she wants "every last thing" (249), but the things she 
strives for, "every layer of speech and thought, stroke of light on bark or 
walls, every smell, pothole, pain, crack, delusion" (249) are drawn not from 
written documents as his were, but from memory and perception. Thus 
while they derive from the intertextuality of stories which comprise her 
memory and subjectivity, they differ from the putative objectivity of Uncle 
Craig's chronicle of facts. Her attempt at inclusiveness derives not from a 
desire to fix and name reality once and for all, but to include all possible 
points of view. Her ultimate acceptance that she can only 'write what she 
knows' follows the relativising of her own subjectivity through a 
recognition of other possible stories. 
Del must break into the culturally valorised and powerful form of 
writing, undermining the dominance of the male voice, to tell her own 
stories. It could be argued that, strategically, demands for equality, such as 
that implicit in her determination to write, "are not simply that -- they also 
necessarily comport a threat and a resistance to domina tory structures."23 
But Del's task is greater. Without positing an essential femininity, her 
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writing recognises the culturally and historically determined absence of 
some subject-positions within the 'dominant discourse'. Their insertion is 
in itself an act of historicisation, relativising the ostensibly universal 
discourse of patriarchy. Thus her writing is finally able to foreground the 
legacies of the storytelling shared among women such as Fern and her 
mother, her aunts Elspeth and Grace, and Del and her own friends -- her 
fascination with the sounds of words, the semantic possibilities and 
dimensions of phrases, and her sensitivity to the use of specific words by 
specific people -- in short, the story-telling situation itself. 
Storytelling has also been central to indigenous cultures whose 
traditional cultural production was primarily oral in form. Patricia Grace's 
Potiki articulates the need of the New Zealand Maori people to take back 
the discursive power which, after nearly 150 years of cultural and political 
marginalisation through colonisation, has been concentrated in the hands 
of the Pakeha. But addressing the cultural dominance of writing, its power 
to name, and to fix and disseminate its naming of reality, Potiki represents 
in textual form a challenge to, and decentering of, the colonising claims to 
universality of Pakeha stories, Pakeha cultural forms. The reintroduction, 
indeed celebration of oral storytelling practices poses a strategic challenge 
to the textual hegemony which both facilitated and accompanied 
colonisation. Potiki thus shares with Lives the multiplicity of stories and 
the self-conscious storymaking of the characters. These include the many 
stories of traditional legend, ancestral and recent history, the impact, both 
general and local, of colonisation on Maori culture and beliefs, and the 
struggle for Maori survival in and challenge to Pakeha-dominated New 
Zealand. In Po tiki, stories and storytellers replace chapters and narrator. 
Some are defined by the storyteller, others are defined by the story, or the 
characters on whom the story focuses. The stories intersperse the voices of 
a number of storytellers, though principally Roimata and Tokowaru 
(Toko). Foregrounding the multiplicity and specificity of voice, the text 
represents individual speech characteristics. Mary's pronunciation is 
transcribed -- "'I got suffing in my bag'" (17) -- and her characteristic 
phrases, "pretty and nice" or "beautiful and nice" become chants repeated 
over and over as she polishes the carvings. Thus Mary, whose limitations 
prevent her in other ways from telling her stories, still has a voice. 
Granny Tamihana's speech combines both English and Maori language, 
and English language with Maori idiom, both seen in a phrase such as 
"'When you had your cup of tea and a kai"' (20). This variety of 
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perspectives prevents the emergence of a single controlling narrative 
voice, and when the different narratives of different characters focus on a 
particular event or set of events, point of view is privileged over 
hierarchical notions of authority. The textual representation of oral 
storymaking draws on traditional practices and patterns, not simply to 
reverse the hierarchy of privilege, but to reintroduce the suppressed 
element of a potential dialectic into dominant discursive production. 
Stories which evolve and are transmitted orally often consist of 
traditional formulaic structures which serve as 'writing' to preserve them 
both in the general cultural context and the individual memory.24 In 
Potiki stories are often shaped and shared on the basis of repeated patterns 
of acting or telling. Telling his 'big fish' story, Toko adds: '''Well I don't 
really remember Tangimoana staring at my face, but I know that's what 
she always does'" (48). He makes word associations with times and events 
to prompt stories from his memory: "'Vine' and 'brine' were both new 
words to me then, and these words quickly recall that time for me 
whenever I hear them'" (57). However, not subject to the fixity of print, 
stories evolve and adapt with the storytelling context, and thus are 
continually and inextricably enmeshed in a process of historicisation. 
Roimata narrates: "In the evenings the Te Ope people talked about their 
struggles of the past, of their new work, and of their hopes and dreams. 
They were not new stories to us, except that stories are always new, or else 
there is always something new in stories" (132). Stories also evolve in 
relation to the personality of the storyteller. Again, Toko's big fish story 
illustrates this, when he says: "'Then Hemi cut off its head that was as big 
as my own head, or that's how I remember it'" (51). Characters and stories 
in Potiki are therefore linked in a dialectic of mutual definition, evoking 
the centrality of discourse to subjectivity, and subjectivity to discourse. 
Paradoxically contained and absent within Pakeha cultural 
representation, finding and telling their own stories is seen by the 
characters in Potiki as integral to their self-definition and survival. This is 
most clearly demonstrated in Manu's fear that because he cannot find his 
stories at school, he will disappear through the cracks in the floor. His 
mother Roimata keeps him at home, saying "I remembered that 
everything we needed was here .... We just needed to live our lives, seek 
out our stories, and share them with each other" (38). The loss of self and 
stories can be seen in a number of characters who embark on a rediscovery 
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of both, but the individual subjectivity foregrounded in the representation 
of orality is structurally situated within a collective process of sharing and 
concomitant formation of community in and by storytelling. Just as the 
Tamihana family as individuals and as a whole are the meeting points of 
all these stories, they meet together to tell the stories. Therefore, as with 
Lives, weaving serves as a valuable metaphor for the production, structure 
and relationships of the stories which make up Potiki. However in the 
latter it is a self-conscious structural and thematic element. In traditional 
Maori culture, weaving is largely a women's activity.25 Women tell stories 
as they weave, just as the Aunts in Lives told stories as they carried out 
their domestic tasks. Toko, who joins the women in weaving because his 
physical disabilities prevent him from doing heavy work, describes the 
weaving of panels for the new meeting house following the destruction of 
the old: "As the strands worked to and fro, so did our stories .... We sang 
to and fro, latticing down and along the strips of black, red, white and gold, 
which had become the strands of life and self" (144). There are also 
traditional weaving chants one of which is often used, as it is in Potiki, in 
. the context of funeral oratory: '''And now let there be joining - the dead to 
the dead, the living to the living. Let the strands fall together ... '" (28). 
The inter-relation of warp and weft parallel the inter-relation of stories, 
and the gathering of the women to weave parallels the meeting to tell 
stories, and the collectivity of identity sought through their sharing. 
Orality is thus represented in the group context essential to its existence 
and preservation. 
The valorisation of wholeness possibly seen as implicit in the 
metaphor of weaving, and in the notion of collective identity, is only 
problematic when the product is privileged over the process. But in Potiki, 
it is the process of collectively reconstituting a fragmented social and 
discursive community which enables the 'dominant discourse' to be 
challenged, its terms renegotiated in relation to 'other', but not fixed 
realities. We have seen that the post-colonial historicising imperative is 
strategically addressed through oral forms. At the same time, views of 
history 'itself' are problematised. Redefinitions of the present depend on 
redefinitions of the past, and on conceptions of the relation between them. 
In Lives, the storytelling of the Aunts blurred the distinction between 
past and present. In Potiki, this occurs in the context of a traditional non-
linear conception of time and history,26 articulated by the narrating voice 
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which declares that the past is "your jumping-off place that tells you where 
you'll land. The past is the future" (94). While a differentiation is made 
between past, present and future, it is only the differentiation of strands in 
a woven fabric. Their importance, or meaning, comes through their inter-
relation in the shifting present. Roimata says of the 'given' stories of the 
past: "It was a new discovery to find that these stories were, after all, about 
our own lives, were not distant, that there was no past or future, that all 
time is now-time, centred in the being" (39). It is in the context of these 
understandings of time that the novel interweaves sections set in, or 
dealing with different recent historical periods and the present, and that 
within and beyond these, the distant legendary past and the future of 
prophecy provide even greater depth of understanding of the present. The 
endless present of repeated patterns recalls the spiralling patterns woven 
into panels. Thus each story is "a story not of a beginning or end, but 
marking only a position on the spiral" (180). 
Family history is a living, articulated knowledge. Unlike Uncle Craig's 
family tree in Lives, which is destined to remain silent on paper, and 
eventually to be destroyed, the family genealogies in Po tiki are recited on 
ceremonial occasions (25). The children visit and speak to their buried 
ancestors as if they are present, and in many ways the ancestors are present. 
They are there in the living wood from which they are carved, and this 
presence is underscored in the concept of "tupuna.". As explained by 
Johansen in a Danish anthropological study: "this word unites in it all the 
generations which have set up and still set up the standards by which the 
kinship group lives. We have set forth this view as regards the departedj 
but the grandparents are the living representatives of custom and 
common practice. "27 
While weaving served as a metaphor for the collectivity and inter-
relation of stories, the metaphor of carving, an activity which is 
traditionally carried out solely by men,28 applies to other aspects of 
storymaking. A carving, unlike a European artifact, is not to be looked at 
alone for its value. The mana of a carving is increased by the stories that 
are told with it.29 In the prologue of Potiki, the carver is also a storyteller: 
"They came especially to listen to his stories which were of living wood, 
his stories of the ancestors. He told also the histories of patterns and the 
meanings of patterns to life" (10). The physicality of -speech30 is 
represented in the carvings of great storytellers: "His tongue is long and 
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fine and swirling, the tongue of a great storyteller" (11). Carving and 
storytelling are further linked in the rhythm or movement, the mauri, 
which can be heard in their crafting. In the final section of Potiki we are 
told that "The ones who work in words or wood listen for the beat that 
words and wood have" (184). In order to be the subjects of their own 
discourse, the smothering wood of Pakeha Eurocentric and racist 
mythology must be hewn away to allow the Maori past and Maori values 
beneath to 'breathe'. Subsequent change is a part of a living, rather than a 
preserved or museumified, culture. 
Therefore, Potiki is not simply a novel of return. As Tiffin has pointed 
out, "there is no possibility of a return to or a rediscovery of a pre-colonial 
cultural purity, nor the possibility of the manufacture of national or 
regional formations independent of their implication in the European 
historical enterprise. "31 Echoing through the text is the phrase, "'The 
stories are changing'" (70), and Maori traditional values and customs 
change and adapt as they interact with those of the Pakeha to produce new 
syncretic post-colonial realities. For example, Christian and Maori 
religious or spiritual beliefs merge in the story of Toko's birth. His mother 
is unexpectedly, but undoubtedly Mary, while his father could be the 
vagrant Joseph Williams (Joe-billy), or it could be the ancestral carving 
with which she has a loving relationship. Toko's "special knowing" and 
sacrificial death further mirror Christian beliefs.32 However, the Maori 
demi-god Maui was, like Toko, the last-born of his family; he is, like Toko, 
found in and taken from the sea; and he has special powers, but dies in the 
quest for immortality.33 The names of the novel's characters further 
evoke syncretism, some being Maori (Manu, Tangimoana, Roimata), some 
being Maori transliterations (Hemi, Rupena, Matiu), and some Pakeha 
(Mary, Reuben). 
New stories arise from the interaction of old and new events, and the 
meeting house symbolises this not only in its function of bringing people 
together, but also in its spiritual and physical structure. Symbolically, the 
central roof beam and those pointing down from it are the backbone and 
the ribs of an ancestor.34 But going beyond mere physical symbolism, 
those gathered in the meeting house experienced "the warmth of embrace, 
because the house is a parent, and there was warmth in under the the 
parental backbone, enc10sement among the patterned ribs" (88). Thus the 
new stories are told in the body of the traditional past. James eventually 
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becomes a carver who finishes the unfinished carving of the prologue. 
Manu, who symbolises the loss of discursive subjectivity following the 
marginalisation of language, skills and beliefs effected by colonisation, also 
refocuses the need for healing collectivity. The fight to save and eventual 
need to rebuild the destroyed meeting house is also the fight for the right 
to tell their stories. Roimata says, "We were busy telling and retelling the 
stories and histories of a people and a place, and learning or relearning a 
language which was our own, so that we could call it our own again. We 
worked for our own survival" (107). 
Part of that struggle has been the adapting of old ways to the new 
conditions, which is reflected in the continual recasting and retelling of 
stories. Those who are strong are asked by the whanau to learn from the 
Pakeha world skills which will be used to enable Maori survival in that 
world. Tangimoana studies law so that it can be used for, rather than 
against her people. Although writing was brought by the Pakeha, and has 
largely served Pakeha interests, its value in preserving history and 
disseminating stories can be, indeed as the text seems to argue, must be 
appropriated by Maori. It was finding old letters about legal proceedings 
that enabled new evidence to be brought to the Te Ope land issue. 
Redressing the imbalance which showed little or no Maori in Pakeha 
books, Roimata and the children make their own. Roimata says: We 
could not afford books so we made our own. In this way we were able to 
find ourselves in books. It is rare for us to find ourselves in books, but in 
our own books we were able to find and define our lives (104). Conversely, 
they watched little television because "There was little indication through 
television that we existed at all in our own land" (105). 
Del's task in Lives was continually to negotiate the two traditions to 
which she was heir, metonymically represented through the writing of 
Uncle Craig, and the oral storytelling of Aunts Elspeth and Grace, effecting 
a dialectic between them. Similarly, Potiki is a textual enactment of Maori 
and Pakeha cultural forms, using both English and Maori language, and 
combining the two activities of weaving and carving, as material process 
and narrative metaphor, to symbolise the entry of both Maori women and 
men, and traditional Maori art forms, into Pakeha-dominated literature. 
Both Lives and Potiki enter the powerful and valorised discursive form of 
text to tell their own, hitherto largely suppressed stories of alterity. Both 
foreground oral storytelling practices to present or evoke many voices, 
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exposing and challenging the monologism of patriarchal and imperial 
authority, and also to recuperate the marginalised discursive and creative 
traditions and practices of those whose subjectivity is suppressed by the 
'dominant discourse', those who could not find themselves or hear their 
voices in books. 
5. III. Constructing the Truth of the Resisting Self: Post-Colonial 
Autobiography. 
Although it was argued in Chapter One that no 'subject' fully inhabits 
anyone discourse, and no one discourse is sufficient to any 'subject', such 
plenitudinous 'fits' are frequently constructed to, or posited within, not 
only discourses of oppression, but apparently paradoxically, discourses of 
resistance. It is therefore necessary to address the question of how those 
discourses which derive from 'marginal' subject positions have gained a 
certain privilege, such that the discourses of women, indigenous peoples, 
sexual minorities, the working classes, are variously actively solicited. In 
the context of the active solicitation of the once suppressed discourse of the 
post-colonised by the post-colonisers, there is a shadow cast by the now 
familiar question of Who May Speak as Other: the darker form which 
both inhabits and escapes it is the question of Who Must Speak as Other. 
This question brings to the surface the ambivalence of the production of 
contestatory discourses: their conquering of silence with voice, but also 
their containment within discursive formations which limit their power 
to 'speak'. 
Each term in the question can be isolated and examined for its 
inplications in relation to the whole, and these in turn can be shown to 
relate to points so far discussed. First, to ask 'Who Must' is to refer both to 
an imposed confinement of the speaking subject to a particular discursive 
territory, and to the sense in which one is obligated to produce one's 
discourse, obliged to confess. Secondly, to Speak, as has been shown, is 
understood as being to express the authentic truth of and from within the 
interiority of the self, and under this phonocentric dispensation is -- when 
one 'speaks' through a text -- to be read in purely expressive terms, a 
reading which is blind to the play of language in writing. This effects a 
type of literary marginalisation, in which the text of the Other is read only 
in terms of its value "because it speaks for some area of social experience, 
hitherto neglected" and not in the privileged terms of writing which 
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"finds new ways of expressing and giving form to that experience."35 Nor 
is it considered that the text of the Other concerns anything but the 
experience of being Other. This relates the the third point that the term 'as 
Other' both describes the discursive territory proffered by the dominant 
literary discursive formation -- the institutions of publishing, criticism, 
and canonisation through pedagogy -- and names that territory not as 
'identity' or specificity, but as a monolithic, homogeneous position in 
relation to these institutions. Thus the question as a whole articulates the 
phonocentric assumption that the marginal voice speaks and expresses the 
authentic truth of itself (and itself alone), and the power relations that 
inhere in the confessional situation: the truth of discourse conferred by the 
One who requires it, thereby defining the Other as confessing subject, and 
who hears and appreciates it through authority. 
These questions and issues can be brought productively to bear in 
consideration of the textual form of autobiography. They are of particular 
relevance in relation to autobiographies by post-colonialism's Others, post-
colonised indigenous subjects. The contemporary form of the 
autobiography has been differentiated from the confession: "while 
autobiography is often an attempt at constructing a self out of the bits and 
pieces of a life seen from the inside, a confession is an opposite attempt at 
dismantling the self that has been created from without, by others."36 
However, a text like Morgan's My Place cannot easily be categorised 
according to this difference; instead it is an example of the way they can be 
brought together, sometimes contradictorily or disruptively, within a text. 
Post-colonial Native women's autobiography -- to reify these writings into 
a genre -- is ambivalently placed within dominant literary discursive 
formations. This is especially true of an autobiography like My Place, 
whose subject is not simply Sally Morgan alone, nor even Arthur, Gladys 
and Daisy Corunna as well, but also 'Aboriginality' itself. Therefpre, like 
the 'autobiography' as defined by Gunnars, the text constructs both 
individual identities and racial identity out of the 'bits and pieces' of 
subjects' lives and memories, while like the 'confession', it challenges and 
dismantles false or negative public images, and self-images in relation to 
Aboriginality shown to be formed by way of detour through, and 
contamination by, public or White Australian perception. Further, it has 
been asserted that 
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The dramatic structure of conversion that we find in Augustine's 
Confessions, where the self is presented as the stage for a battle of 
opposing forces and where a climactic victory for one force . . . 
completes the drama of the self, simply does not accord with the 
deepest realities of women's experience and so is inappropriate as a 
model for women's life-writing.37 
However, My Place demonstrates a number of aspects of just such a 
conversion narrative. Indeed arguably any autobiography by an 
indigenous or immigrant writer in a settler post-colonial society will 
manifest features of the subject as the stage for a battle of opposing cultural, 
linguistic, racial! ethnic, or historical forces, written from the perspective of 
some resolution of these forces. For example, Gunnars refers to the 
problem for the woman writer, belonging to an ethnic group different 
from the majority, of shifting divisions of the self into 'us' and 'them'.38 
Further, if it is argued that in fact the subject of My Place is not properly 
Sally Morgan at all, that it is not an example of women's life-writing, but 
rather is 'Aboriginality', then as later discussion will show more fully, the 
very conventions which are held to characterise women's autobiographies 
in differentiation from men's, serve also, through their similarity to 
methods of representation of Aboriginality, to 'feminise' Aboriginality 
itself. 
Along with the construction of (awareness of) Aboriginality, 
particularly for Sally and her sisters and brothers, an attainment inherited 
by her own children ("'I've got some good news this morning. I'd like you 
all to know I got a bit of blackfella in me'" [320]), and the construction of 
the life-stories of Arthur, Gladys and Daisy, there are a number of 
redemptive conversions undergone by the characters. Through the 
process represented in the novel, Sally and her siblings' false identities as 
Indian are replaced by true identities as Aboriginal; the 'false' absence of 
characters' visibility as Aboriginal is replaced by its 'true' presence; and 
feelings of shame and fear are gradually replaced by pride. Perhaps it could 
be conceded, in relation to Mason's argument, that instead of one climactic 
victory, My Place differs from the 'male' conversion narrative in that it 
contains many smaller though no less important, climactic victories. 
These are marked, for example, by Sally's observations that she would 
have to "learn to be content with the little [Daisy] was willing to give" 
(149); that "It was a small victory but an important one" (162) when Daisy 
informed them that she believed Howden Drake-Brockman to be her 
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father; that Arthur's story was "something to be proud of" (214); and that 
Daisy, in finishing her story, "felt she'd achieved something" (351). 
However, preceding discussion has also demonstrated that if My Place 
is in part a confession, then it is necessary to address the question of whom 
the confession is produced for. Some features of the narrative suggest that, 
contrary to Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis as it refers to 
the production of discourse, it is indeed the confessing subject who benefits 
from it. It is suggested, for example, in Arthur's in~tial disappointment 
that "Different people, they say, 'Arthur, we'll write your story,' but none 
of them come back to see me" (166), and in his assumption that Daisy's 
reluctance to tell her story is because "'she's bin with whitefellas too long. 
They make her feel 'shamed'" (148), so that her speech would be an index 
of her liberation from this oppressive imposition. These points are 
underlined by Sally's admission that when she rang Judy, Howden Drake-
Brockman's daughter, she "had expected to encounter opposition. Perhaps 
I wanted to encounter opposition, it fired my sense of injustice" (153). 
More generally, or rather more collectively, Gladys observes that "There's 
been nothing written about people like us, all the history's about the white 
man. There's nothing about Aboriginal people and what they've been 
through" (161). In this way, to speak out is to insert themselves into 
history's record, an outcome seen in itself as redemptive: "'If I stay silent 
like Nanna, it's like saying everything's all right. People should know 
what it's been like for someone like me'" (238). Both in the slippage from 
'us' to 'people like us' and 'me' to 'someone like me', as well as in the 
sense that 'good' for the confessing subject and those who identify with 
her comes from self-declaration, from people 'knowing' (about) her, there 
is evidence of what has been referred to as the 'exemplary' nature of native 
women's autobiographies. This has been related to the form in which they 
origin a ted: 
The first Native autobiographies were 'told-to' narratives, the joint 
'collaboration' of an ethnographer or missionary, and a Native .... In 
this they are the narrative of a 'representative of their culture, their 
story emphasizing the individual only in relation to her/his social 
roles, not as [a] distinctive individua1.39 
The exemplary status of Native autobiography is also acknowledged in 
recognition of such texts as produced by writers "from more communal 
traditions" in which "the self does not stand out against the background of 
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the group in quite the same way."40 There are, further, grounds for 
pointing to My Place as overdetermined by race and gender as an 
autobiography by an Aboriginal woman, in the sense that women's 
autobiographies have been described as written through, or at least 
illustrating the importance of 'significant others'.41 It could certainly be 
argued that there is nothing posited in My Place which characterises Sally 
or any member of her family as inherently 'special' as individuals; rather, 
the effect of their discourse lies in its 'representativeness', presenting Sally 
as a 'vehicle' through which the process of tracing and recording family 
history can serve as inspiration or model for other Aboriginal people. 
Nevertheless, the argument that Sally, her family, and by association 
'Aboriginal people' of which they are representative, are both the subjects 
and the beneficiaries of the confessional aspects of My Place, is 
compromised by inter-textual evidence that the text has been shaped and 
modified in line with the 'requirements' of the predominantly Anglo-
Australian publishing industry and reading public. In the light of the 
assertion that "The editor was concerned that the Aboriginal English 
expression of some of the oral material could be regarded as demeaning to 
its users when represented in printed form," and that "There was some 
fear that literate Euro-Australian readers would be less sympathetic to such 
'alien' forms of expression,"42 it would seem that the power of definition 
of discursive acceptability lies with the literary and publishing institutions 
and their perception of reader prejudice. It is indeed ironic that despite the 
"publishing industry being in a state of readiness, even eagerness, to 
publish work by Aboriginal writers,"43 or more correctly because of this 
readiness, the prejudice and oppression which generate the text as an act of 
liberating expression return to censor the form of that very expression 
while proclaiming it as authentic 'Aboriginal literature'. This is not to 
argue that 'authenticity' can only be attributed to those texts which closely 
mirror traditional narrative or discursive forms. Rather, it is a matter of 
where the power of definition lies. 
However, there is a mediating function operating in the text even 
before it reaches editing and modification by publishers. This function is 
undertaken by Sally herself, as the transcriber of the family's stories. Is 
there justification, therefore, for regarding Sally as the receiver of the text's 
confessions? This question can be addressed by an analysis both of 
structures of subjectivity in relation to each other, and particularly of 
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Sally's various 'placements' by the text. Unlike Eldred-Grigg in Oracles 
and Miracles, another transcribed narrative, Sally is an integral member of 
both the family and the self-constituting group identity, Aboriginal. In 
many ways My Place presents itself as a 'collective autobiography', and 
there are assertions and illustrations in the text of the centrality of story-
sharing to the characters involved and even to the process of its 
construction. When Sally has finished Arthur's story, she telephones her 
mother: "'It's finished' .... /'Can I come and read it?'/'That's what I'm 
ringing you for'" (172). When Daisy has finally shared her story, Sally 
narrates, "she still couldn't bring herself to tell my brothers and sisters. 
Consequently, I found myself communicating it to them in bits and pieces 
as it seemed appropriate" (307). Further, Daisy's sharing of her story is 
presented as an outcome of other stories being shared: 
I read her the section on Arthur's boxing days. When I stopped, she 
said, 'That's a wonderful story, a really good one. I did enjoy it, where 
did you get such a story from?'/'This is what I've been writing, Nan,' 
I grinned. That's Arthur's story' .... I read a little more, and then we 
began to talk about the old days and life on Corunna Downs Station. 
For some reason, Nan was keen to talk. ... Her words tumbled one 
over the other, as if her tongue couldn't say them quickly enough. 
(308) 
It has been noted that the effects of the text have been projected by the 
characters as collective. However, the motivation for pursuing it as 
process has also been regarded as beyond the concern of the individual. 
Sally's decision to continue studies on an Aboriginal scholarship is 
explained following her vision of her grandmother: "If I denied my 
identification with the past now, I'd be denying her as well" (141). 
Similarly, when Sally has finished Arthur's story, she reflects, "lowed him 
a great debt. He'd told me so much about himself and his life, and in 
doing so, he'd told me something about my own heritage" (172). The 
autobiographical 'I' is therefore placed by the narrative within an overall 
understanding of the priority of the collective autobiographical 'we'. In 
this way, Sally's function suggests the writer as 'transmitter' rather than 
'creator' or 'owner' of stories. One feature of this role of transmitter is, 
according to Godard, that "the storyteller feels herself to be essentially a 
keeper of a sacred trust."44 In My place, Sally is invoked to ensure the 
'safety' of the stories she is given, both in the process of their production, 
and once the stories have been finished. She recounts that Arthur was 
"always worried about my cassette recorder. I had to check it each time and 
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make sure it was working. 'You don't want to miss nothin',' he'd remind 
me. 'Those batteries get low.' Even if the batteries were new, I still had to 
check" (164). This concern is later mirrored by Daisy in relation to her own 
story (320-1). When the stories are finished, Daisy asks Sally "'You'll keep 
what I told you safe, won't you?'" (353), and of Arthur's story similarly 
tells her "'You got to keep that story safe'" (308). Thus discourse is 
understood not as a commodity whose value is dependant upon its 
dissemination, but as a personal possession or even part of the self, and 
whose transmission requires certain qualifications of the one to whom it is 
transferred. In this way the text could be seen as an account, among other 
things, of the process of Sally's initiation by Daisy in preparation for the 
role, a process which is completed on Daisy's death which itself signifies 
the point at which the text could be produced. 
Other features of the narrative, and the form of the text itself, suggest a 
reading of it as an autobiography with embedded biographies, casting Sally 
not simply as confessing subject and part of a collective confession, but as 
confessor to the stories of Arthur, Gladys and Daisy. These stories are 
structurally anticipated and formed by as well as situated within Sally's 
narrative, and while 'her' sections of the narrative have thematic titles, 
the stories of Arthur, Gladys and Daisy appear in the table of contents with 
third-person references to their subjects, so that they are to some extent 
enclosed within and separated from the overall text. Sally's narrative 
incorporates numerous indications of her role and participation as 
researcher, interviewer, transcriber and editor, influencing the stories she 
records. There are indirect suggestions of her presence as interlocutor, as 
the characters tell their stories. These include second-person addresses 
such as Arthur's "I can't tell you how old I am exactly" (175). There are 
similarly indirect references to her direction of the stories appearing as 
clear answers to questions the reader is left to reconstruct: "I wish I could 
give advice for the young blackfellas of today" (212), although Daisy (or 
Sally as editor) is more explicit when she says "Now you asked me 'bout 
the future" (349). Further, Sally's narrative contains many instances of 
active, even aggressive soliciting of these stories where there is reluctance 
to offer them to her. Arthur's willingness has already been noted, 
however Gladys and Daisy are frequently challenged by her. Gladys is told 
"'You only THINK you don't know anything. I'm sure if you searched 
those hidden recesses of your mind you'd come up with something'" (151), 
and she is placed under moral pressure to do so: '''You've got to help me, 
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you're my mother, it's your duty'" (151). However, Sally finally leaves no 
doubt as to which of them is ultimately in a position to benefit from, and 
confer value upon' the discourse of her mother: '''What seems 
unimportant to you could be a really good lead for me'" (151). Daisy is 
placed under similar moral pressure when Sally tells her, "'You can't put 
lies in a book. You know that, don't you Nan?'" (161). Occasionally her 
exhortations to confess are made in the context of actual accusations. She 
tells Gladys, "'You've lied about things before'" (156), and although she 
admits, using the terminology of Christian accountability, that Gladys is 
guilty only of "a sin of omission rather than anything else" (171), she 
chooses a moment of vulnerability for Gladys ("before she had time to 
gather her wits") to accuse "'You deliberately misled us .... Why on earth 
didn't you tell us the truth?'" (171). She indirectly 'threatens' Gladys (172), 
and uses the aggressive term "tackled" to describe her questioning --
catechising? -- of Daisy (236). Sally therefore reveals herself as a harsh and 
relentless 'confessor', wresting the truth of their 'souls' from her family. 
The reader is also frequently told of her research procedures, generally 
as she explains them to others: '''I'm putting down what I know. It's not 
much, but it's a start. Then I'm going to try and fill in what I don't know, 
and I expect you to help me'" (150; also 153). These procedures include 
those by which the stories are turned into text. She describes, underlining 
her 'amateurism', the point at which she "bought a typewriter and started 
to type. As [Gladys] watched my jerky two-finger effort she said, 'It'll take 
you a lifetime to do a page at that rate'" (150). This amateurism, as has 
been shown, serves to authenticate her text by differentiating it from the 
product of a 'writer',4S as do the suggestions of writing as an act militated 
against by various difficulties which are overcome only by determination. 
For example, the chapter which recounts her decision to _ begin the book is 
entitled, "Where There's a Will" (150). However, as her work proceeds, 
she describes her transcription and, importantly, arrangement of the 
material into a form closer to that in which we read it than -in which it was 
produced. She tells Arthur, "'i'll finish typing all the cassettes. Then I'll 
put it all together, because we've got bits and pieces all over the place'" 
(165). Therefore, the reader does not have unmediated access to the 
'authentic' discourse of Arthur, Gladys, and Daisy, as Sally's role, like that 
of confessor, has been one of soliciting and directing discourse as well as 
appreciating it within the context and function of her authority. However, 
her own status as confessor, for whom the discourses are produced, is 
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ambivalent: she also produces her own confession, that of the process by 
which the text -- at this pre-published point basically her own discourse --
was produced. Further, Sally acknowledges her own fallibility in 
admissions of insensitivity and errors of judgement, such as "It was a 
stupid thing to say" (156), "It was another tactical error" (171), "I felt 
ashamed of myself for doubting her" (156), and "she was hurt, and I felt 
terrible, because I'd caused it" (161). 
For whom, therefore, is Sally's confession produced? If it is the reader 
who decides not only whether the text is acceptable, as reflected in the 
editor's concern, and whether it has the 'ring of truth', an ideologically 
determined evaluation, then it would seem that the reader confers 
meaning and truth on the text. Of course, to posit a homogeneous 
'reading public' would be fallacious, as would any tidy categories of reader 
which could be added together to produce as a 'whole number' the total of 
the reading public. However, the point could still be made that, for 
example, post-colonised subjects are likely to receive the text in a different 
way from post-colonisers. For the former, its redemptive function relates 
in part to the recognition of their own 'entry into literature'.46 However, it 
has also been shown that post-colonising readers represent a stronger 
source of influence over the fate of the text as it is shaped to conform to 
expected and accepted, conventional modes of expression.47 The very form 
in which it is granted authenticity is that which inscribes and guarantees 
its inauthenticity, if 'authenticity' is equated with origins. However, the 
post-colonising reader is also placed by the text in a compromising position 
as 'confessor'. In this role, the reader is reinvested with the power which 
she/he is accused of having inherited by way of colonial history and the 
perpetuation of colonial power relations. On the other hand, participating 
in the 'redemptive' reading poses the danger of eliding the history and 
continued existence of racial oppression which generated 'the text. 
This discussion has not been intended to decide once and for all where 
'power' truly lies in relation to the discourses of My Place; nor to locate it 
within one 'agent' or even a collective agent. Discursive power is 
distributed throughout the range of participants in the production of 
discourse, albeit unevenly. It inheres not in agents or even institutions as 
such, but through them by way of strategies employed. It therefore is a 
powerful gesture to produce an Aboriginal autobiography, to the extent at 
least that the entry into public discourse means that "through struggle, 
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acquiring some of the strategies and structures of the dominant [subject], 
the subaltern rises 'into hegemony,' this process constituting a 
dis/placement of the dominant discourse and strategies of hybridization 
that undermines its monolithic position of power."48 Similarly, the 
narrative recounts how the process by which the text was produced 
involved powerful effects in the transference and circulation of discourses 
among the participant-characters themselves. 
However, the process among the characters of the text's production, 
although recounted, is effective properly speaking outside of the confines 
of the text itself. It is not a source of the power of My Place once it, as 
object, has left the 'authors' to enter the sphere of the reader. Gladys 
acknowledges this when she admits "I find I am embarrassed sometimes 
by what I have told, but I know I cannot retract what has been written, it's 
no longer mine" (306). 
5. IV. Resisting Silences: The Ambivalence of Identification. 
In the context of the loss of textual and discursive control on the part of 
the writing subject once a text is published -- made public -- the question is 
raised as to how such a text can constitute resistance, or further, how the 
resisting subject can be constituted in and by the text. If the effects of 
discourse are ambivalent, it is worth turning attention to the text's 
silences, and posing the different question of the role of silence in 
resistance. This could be regarded as a perverse question, given the general 
association of silence with the effects of oppression, as illustrated in 
Gunew's reference to those who "have signalled their oppression largely 
through their silence, at least for those who were prepared to hear it."49 
Silence certainly has functioned as an index of oppression, once the 
absence of discourse it signifies has been discerned. However, Foucault 
provides an insight into silence which allows it to be heard differently: 
Silence itself ... is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side 
from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that 
functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to 
them within overall strategies. There is no binary division to be 
made between what one says and what one does not say; we must try 
to determine the different ways of not saying such things ..... There is 
not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the 
strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.50 . 
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Silence can therefore be reconsidered as a strategy of resistance, a positive 
withholding of discourse in subversion or refusal of the exhortation to 
confess, to produce the truth of the self for the post-coloniser. This is 
definitely not to argue the post-colonised into silence; it is, rather, to 
propose an analysis of the many silences which inhabit discourse and to 
acknowledge the possibility of their functioning not as negative lack or 
absence, but as positive presence within complex and multiple strategies of 
resistance. 
At least three forms of 'silence' can be discerned in My Place: the gaps 
in discourse, literariness, and the instability of subjectivity. The most 
obvious silences are the places in the text where discourse is solicited and 
withheld, or indicated and not produced. Despite Sally's protestations, 
discourse is withheld from her in the form of secrets kept by other 
characters. Those secrets are variously kept as a matter of propriety, as 
when Arthur declines to divulge Daisy's Aboriginal name: "'No, I can't 
tell you,' he said, 'it's not as if I wouldn't like to, but Daisy should tell you 
herself'" (148), and when he admits "'Some things 'bout her I can't tell. It 
wouldn't be right'" (158). However, discourse is also withheld from the 
reader on these grounds. Arthur tells Sally, "'Now, some things I might 
tell you, I don't want in the book, is that all right?'" (164). Sally's 
agreement underlines for the reader both dependence on Sally's integrity 
and judgement, but also areas in which the transfer of information may 
exclude him/her. To the extent that Sally honours this agreement, there is 
an exercise of power by the protagonists over the reader in the 'editing out' 
of some of the 'truth', thereby destabilising the text's overall claim to this 
plenitude despite its invocation in the presentation of multiple 
perspectives. Sally's role as mediator sometimes directly interferes with 
the amount of information provided to the reader. When Daisy tells her 
"There was rows all the time with Bill. You know all 'bout that, so I'll say 
no more" (347), we are provided with the 'gratuitous' information of 
Sally's presence as interlocutor, but as a result of her position as family 
member with 'insider knowledge' (a position which differentiates her 
from the 'ethnographer' recording the discourse of the 'native informant' 
including that which Jeanette Armstrong defined as "unnecessary"), it is 
suggested to the reader that aspects of Daisy's narrative are elided. 
Although it could be argued that sufficient information is provided on this 
matter by other characters, notably Sally herself but also Gladys, or even 
that further information is indeed unnecessary once the fact of "rows ... 
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with Bill" has been noted, it is more important to recognise the devices by 
which Daisy's narrative is suggested as being constructed for Sally, and not 
for the reader. Indeed, the bringing to the surface of some information is 
suggested by Gladys to be potentially destructive, as she urges Sally, "'Can't 
you just leave the past buried, it won't hurt anyone then?'" (152), while 
the dissemination of information is regarded by Daisy as dangerous: "'you 
dunno what you're doin' writin' this book. Bad things might happen to 
you. If I tell you some things, next thing, you'll be tellin' everyone'" (319). 
Secrets pervade the text, making the absence of discourse one of the 
strongest and most compelling presences of the text. These are 
occasionally to do with areas of 'traditional Aboriginal knowledge'. In a 
passage which associates the 'sacred' with the 'secret', and indicating the 
possibility of more information having passed between Daisy and Sally 
than the reader is given, Daisy confides, "Now, I'll tell you something, Sal, 
this is a sacred thing, so I better speak quiet. I helped your mother with 
that polio. You see, our family's always had powers that way. I don't want 
to say no more" (346). However, more usually, the secrets appear to relate 
to sources of personal shame or anger, and they almost exclusively 
surround Daisy, even as they affect or relate to other characters. Early in 
the process of story-sharing, she says "'Glad, you're always goin' on about 
the past. You and Arthur are a good pair, you don't know what a secret 
is'" (148). Even when she agrees to tell her story, she warns Sally "I got my 
secrets, I'll take them to the grave. Some things I can't talk 'bout. Not 
even to you, my granddaughter. They for me to know. They not for you 
or your mother to know" (349). Sally is therefore forced to accept that 
"'she's still going to keep her secrets, but anything's better than nothing'" 
(320). However, despite Daisy's reproval, Gladys and Arthur do appear to 
know what a secret is: Arthur's reticence in relation to information about 
Daisy has been noted; similarly, Gladys is accused of "hoarding [her] own 
little secrets" (172), and Sally observes in the early stages of her research 
that "Nan and Mum had united. Now that Mum was feeling threatened, 
she suddenly found she had more in common with Nan than she'd ever 
imagined" (172). As will be shown, the status of this observation is a 
complex one within the text; there is a possible dramatic irony in which 
the observation of Gladys and Daisy having more in common includes 
more in common than even Sally as narrator 'knows'. 
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Discourse withheld from the reader constitutes an act of resistance in a 
context in which 'visibility' has been learned to facilitate control. Daisy's 
physical absences as attempts at invisibility have already been discussed.51 
However visibility can also be 'audibility' where one's Otherness can be 
'heard', and in this respect Daisy's initial reticence, even defensiveness 
with regard to her native language (149) may constitute resistance by 
avoidance. It is a strategy of resistance, nonetheless. Further, her and 
others' silence on some Aboriginal matters may function to preserve the 
sacredness or appropriate guardianship of such matters from the profanity 
of dissemination and the loss of control that would result. Indeed, perhaps 
it is strategy that the text invokes so strongly and almost completely the 
discourse of pan-Aboriginality, rarely providing any consciousness of 
detail specific to the people of particular areas and languages. Even if such 
detail is present in the text, it is re-presented as 'Aboriginal'. Although 
this could signify the adoption of a discourse more powerful within post-
colonial Australia, it could also be read asa strategic silence which refuses 
to empower the reader with 'true' knowledge of the Other, thereby 
protecting and preserving difference.52 
However, there are disturbing ambivalences and inconsistencies in the 
presentation of privileged knowledge and and 'personal secrets'. For 
example, Sally's position as recipient of 'sacred', family or personal 
knowledge not only results in places where the reader discerns a gap in the 
discourse, but also conflicts with her role as narrator for the reader. It must 
be asked how something considered so 'sacred' by DaiSY that she must 
speak quietly finds its way into the text even to the limited extent that it 
does -- one cannot speak quietly in writing; or why a statement preceded by 
the formula for confidentiality, "Just between you and me" (347) is shared 
with the reader as well, albeit placing the reader in the position of 
eavesdropper. Indeed, the text's positioning of the reader in relation to its 
secrets requires further analysis in terms of the functioning of secrets as the 
silence of resistance. 
The text appears to contain one pervasive secret, a secret which 
everywhere makes itself clearly heard. As has been pointed out, this secret 
centres on Daisy, and initially is present as her mysterious reticence. 
However, other aspects of the narrative intensify the presence of this 
absence until statements fairly throb with significance. As Muecke has 
pointed out in his reading of the text in relation to the "repressive 
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hypothesis," the difficulty of getting Daisy to produce her story serves on 
one level to reinforce that its eventual production represents as "index of 
liberation, as well as a delaying device in the narrative."53 Although 
Muecke goes on to posit "a possible Aboriginal discursive strategy of non-
disclosure in the face of the demand to speak,"54 a point which is clearly 
the basis of my argument, the relevance of the former suggestions should 
not simply be passed over. While narrative structuring as 'silence' will be 
analysed shortly, it is useful at this point to hold the two 'readings' of 
Daisy's reticence together, illustrating the way in which the validity of the 
former shows up disturbances in the latter. Obviously the secret could not 
function in the text if its presence were completely successfully submerged. 
However, the extent and manner of its presences compromise not only its 
status as a secret, but also the positions of the characters, Sally as 
narrator/recorder, and the reader, in relation to the text. 
Quite simply, the secret is related to the similarly insistent question of 
paternity. On the one hand, it is a question of Daisy's paternity, and Sally's 
efforts are focused on obtaining answers to this matter. At the very 
beginning of her project, Sally recounts that she rang Judy (Aunty Judy): "I 
explained that I was writing a book about Nan and Arthur and I thought 
she might be able to help me. We agreed that I would come down for 
lunch and she said she could tell me who Nan's father was" (153). 
However, despite the lack of expected opposition, when she returns from 
her visit to Judy with the information that Maltese Sam is Daisy's father 
and tells Arthur, he responds, "'She said WHAT?'" (157). Having 
dismissed this idea, he explains the conspiracy of silence which resulted in 
this false information: 
iNow you listen to me, Daisy's father is the same as mine. Daisy is 
my only full sister. Albert, he's our half brother, his father was 
Howden, too, but by a different woman.' 
'So you reckon he fathered the both of you.' 
'By jove, he did! Are you gunna take the word of white people 
against your own flesh and blood? I got no papers to prove what I'm 
sayin' .... 
'[T]hey had the Victorian way of thinking in those days. Before there 
were white women, our father owned us, we went by his name, but 
later, after he married his first wife, Nell, he changed our names.''' 
(157) 
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In addition, when Sally eventually tells Daisy that Judy had said her father 
was Maltese Sam, Sally recounts that "I suddenly realised she was hurt" 
(161). One of Daisy's first revelations is therefore in response to what she 
perceives as denial of her by the Drake-Brockmans. In an evocation of the 
difficulty of producing discourse which transgresses the accepted or 
acceptable 'truth', Sally relates that "Nan was quiet for a few seconds, and 
then, pressing her lips together, she said very slowly, 'I ... think ... my 
father was ... Howden Drake-Brockman'" (162). Therefore, this secret is 
one in which the 'truth' has been repressed in the interests of preserving 
the fa<;ade of colonial morality at the expense of the Aboriginal people. It is 
a silence whose status is that of an index of oppression, and its breaking 
one of liberation. 
However, there is a second question of paternity which only initially is 
seen by the reader to function in the same way, although Sally's 'reading' 
of it remains consistent with the repressive hypothesis. Further, it is this 
second question which has sealed Daisy's silence. It concerns the identity 
of Gladys'S father. Along with information regarding Maltese Sam, Sally 
has returned from her visit to Judy with the information that Gladys's 
father was Jack Grimes. However, Gladys is "stunned" by this news, and 
her vague recollection of his visits provides neither confirmation, nor at 
that point, particular grounds for doubt. However, in the later context of 
Judy's apparent unreliability, the reader may be caused to regard Gladys'S 
surprise and vagueness as intuitive evidence that it could not be true. 
Further, the narrative includes a number of unsettling observations and 
statements. Despite Arthur's assurances of the 'truth' of "flesh and blood," 
Sally records that he "had us both nearly completely convinced, except for 
one thing, he avoided our eyes. Mum and I knew it wasn't a good sign, 
there was something he wasn't telling us" (157). This is attributed by Sally 
to the veracity of his claims about Daisy's father. However, given that the 
identity of Gladys'S father is also of intimate concern to Daisy, a following 
statement by Arthur suggests that this is indeed the matter over which 
Daisy, supported by him, 'has her secrets': "'She could tell you everything 
you want to know. You see, Howden was a lonely man. I know, one night 
at Ivanhoe, we both got drunk together and he told me all his troubles. He 
used to go down to Daisy's room at night and talk to her. I can't say no 
more"' (158). 
339 
At this point, the reader is made most clearly conscious of the 
ambivalent functioning of discourse as silence in the text. Sally's account 
of Arthur's protection of Daisy, rather than protecting her from exposure 
to the public gaze and respecting her wish for privacy, serves to place her 
more firmly under that gaze. To allude to a secret with the words "'I can't 
say no more'" is only to focus attention on the point at which this 
withdrawal from discourse was considered necessary. It is, for the reader, 
the secret "whose discovery is imperative, a thing abusively reduced to 
silence, and at the same time difficult and necessary, dangerous and 
precious to divulge."55 In literary terms, this presence of absence of 
information activates a reading in terms of the genre of mystery, and 
'clues' are sought in both what is said and what is left unsaid. In this way, 
the whole of the 'truth' may be reconstructed. In other words, the text is 
placed by the reader not within a discursive practice of resistance, but 
within a western literary genre whose function is to solicit the deciphering 
and fixing of meaning once and for all, a process of utter containment. 
That Sally as narrator is complicit in this through the structuring of the 
narrative in terms of the characters' (but especially her own) pursuit of 
"'the full story'" (158) of Daisy's 'truth' is emphasised by the irony of the 
places in the text where the reader appears to know more than the 
narrator. 
For example, following Arthur's reference to Howden's loneliness and 
his night visits to Daisy's room (suggestive in itself as the point at which 
he will say no more), Sally reflects that "'There's another possibility. 
Howden may have been her father, but there could be something else, 
some secret that she wants to keep, that is somehow tied in with all of this. 
Perhaps that's why he didn't look us in the eye'" (158). Later, in what 
functions as something like a second mirror encounter, ,which as Chapter 
One showed, confers identity by way of the Other, Sally narrates that 
Mum fronted up to the mirror and tried not to laugh. She felt silly. 
Suddenly I held up a photo of Howden as a young man next to her 
face. We both fell into silence. 
'My God,' I whispered. 'Give him black curly hair and a big bust 
and he's the spitting image of you!' 
Mum was shocked. 'I can't believe it,' she said. 'Why haven't I 
ever noticed this before, I've seen that picture hundreds of times.' 
'I suppose it never occurred to you,' I replied. 
'You don't think it's possible he was my father?' 
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'Anything's possible. But he couldn't be yours as well as Nan's. 
You know features can skip a generation.' (237) . 
At this point, the reader, reading for 'clues', marvels at the 'obtuseness' of 
Sally and Gladys: or is it the deliberate obtuseness of the narrative? Is 
there a deliberate strategy of refusing to admit the inadmissable? This 
appears to be the case in the light of Daisy's eventual concession regarding 
Gladys's father that "how all this came about, that's my business. I'll only 
tell a little. Everyone knew who the father was, but they all pretended they 
didn't know. Aah, they knew, they knew. You didn't talk 'bout things 
then. You hid the truth" (340). Not only is the secret clearly something 
inadmissable, but there are two silences surrounding it, and the reader is 
placed in an impossible position. In relation to the silence of the Drake-
Brockmans who "knew", the reader is provided with a narrative full of 
'clues' and structured by 'suspense', to be drawn into the search for the 
truth which will expose the exploitative practices to which Daisy and her 
family were subjected. However, in doing so, the reader must invade 
Daisy's much wished-for privacy which is so strong that not even Gladys 
or Sally can be told explicitly what remains unspoken. Thus Daisy is once 
again objectified by the gaze of the Other. Further, the reader's state of 
knowledge at the end of the text threatens to undermine the closeness and 
unity attained by the characters as a result of the process of tracing the 
Corunna family history. Is the reader therefore exhorted to 'under-read', 
to relinquish the power of the confessor by choosing not to see what the 
text seems to offer? In the case of two silences inhabiting the same absence 
of discourse, can one be complicit with one silence, and not with the 
other? 
A second form of silence in the text is 'literariness'. The features of the 
text which emphasise it as writing subvert the illusion of the speaking 
voice. As has already been argued, the narrative is structured to achieve 
an effect of suspense, and Muecke points out that the culmination of the 
narrative in Daisy's agreement to share her story, "represents a shift to 
more traditional Aboriginality. "56 There is therefore a defining 
movement in the narrative which has been chosen to reflect the thematic 
concern of the text. Another critic has referred to the use of symbolism as a 
unifying device in the text. Newman has discussed the use of bells, the 
theme of children taken from parents, and bird calls.57 The latter is most 
obvious as a framing device for the text. Near the beginning of the text 
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Sally narrates that "Suddenly the yard filled with a high trilling sound. My 
eyes searched the trees. I couldn't see that bird, but his call was there. The 
music stopped as abruptly as it had begun./Nan smiled at me, 'Did you 
hear him? Did you hear that bird call?'" (14). At this point Sally 
recognises it as a "magical moment," but it is not until its return at the end 
of the text that its full (Aboriginal) significance is realised. Daisy has 
become very ill, and Sally says, "The following morning, my phone rang 
very early./ .... 'I heard the bird call.' It was Jill's voice./'What Bird 
call?' /'This morning, about five o'clock. I heard it Sally. It was something 
spiritual, something out of this world. I think she'll be going soon'" (356). 
Daisy herself is unperturbed by the bird call, and tells Sally, "'it was the 
Aboriginal bird .... God sent him to tell me I'm going home soon'" (357). 
Finally, on news of Daisy's death, the bird call unites them all: "For some 
reason, Jill's words from the previous day began echoing inside of me. I 
heard the bird call. I heard the bird call. Around and around./'Oh, Nan', I 
cried with sudden certainty, 'I heard it, too. In my heart, I heard it'" (357-
8). 
Apart from framing the narrative and defining its movement from 
innocence of Aboriginality to spiritual knowledge, Newman has noted 
that the bird call's "organization as a structuring symbol is indicative of a 
literate use, but its origins as a sign of impending death are oral and 
folkloric."58 However, it could be argued that the text consistently 
swallows origins in writing. For example, it has already been shown that 
Sally's role as transcriber and editor of the stories radica:ly separates words 
from their (oral) origins. The stories pass not only through Sally's 
processes, but in their narration and textual~sation, through networks of 
intertextuality. The mystery story has already been discussed. In addition, 
Muecke argues, in a discussion of My Place and A Fortunate Life, that 
"different discourses cluster around the texts as support groups .... For My 
Place there is the feminist support group of discourses which in many of 
their current forms place a high value on subjectivity as opposed to 
'movement' politics. There is also Christianity and a touch of New Age 
mysticism. "59 Although he does not claim so specifically, there are also 
echoes of A Fortunate Life itself, largely in Arthur's story, as discussed in 
Chapter Three. Finally in relation to the narrative structure of the text, the 
fact that Sally's narrative frames the stories of the other characters reflects 
not the natural 'emergence' of her story, but an ordering which conforms 
to elements of the conventions of autobiographical writing, notably the 
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illusion of chronological events. Although Sally's own narrative, correctly 
speaking, follows the processes which constitute the text, early events in 
her life are re..;invested with the significance these processes have 
conferred, and placed at the beginning so that the text begins with her 
childhood, and develops chronologically to the point where she 
undertakes the book itself, then represents that process. That what we read 
is the adult rather than authentic child's voice at the beginning is 
suggested in the unlikely observation of a five-year-old that, to her 
amusement, the doctor, asked about her claim of chalk allergy, 
"prevaricated" (76). 
Because, as has been noted, the autobiography is not an authentic 
native form, it could further be argued that the extent to which My Place 
conforms to features of the autobiographical genre represents the extent to 
which 'authentic' Aboriginal' discourse is silenced. With regard to the 
general form of the autobiography, for example, My Place employs the 
characteristic first-person narrative, the narrator-protagonist, 'local colour', 
and 'facts' drawn from history. These are the characteristics of 
autobiography identified as also used in 'autobiographical' fiction, and 
although fiction and autobiography are generally differentiated, 
autobiography also uses devices of fiction. These range from those 
consistent with the general observation that "Any human verbalizing is a 
process that by its very nature fictionalizes experience,"60 to the more 
specific assertion that "linear cause and effect replace the complexities of 
real life."61 
Features described as characteristic of men's autobiographies rather 
than women's are, as has been shown, also found in My Place. Its 
similarity to the 'conversion narrative' was remarked earlier in the 
discussion. In addition, despite Jelinek's attributing of the qualities of 
chronology and progression to 'male' narratives,62 these are features of 
both the overall text and the embedded stories of My Place. On the other 
hand, her description of women's autobiographies as "disconnected, 
fragmentary, or organized into self-sustained units rather than connecting 
chapters,"63 also has applicability to Morgan's text,just as it did to Lives. 
The stories of Arthur, Gladys, and Daisy are largely set off from, and self-
sustaining within, the frame narrative, even if their place within that 
narrative is ordered by the chronology of their production. 
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Mary Mason has argued tha t 
One element ... that seems more or less constant in women's life-
, writing -- and this is not the case in men's life-writing -- is the sort of 
evolution and delineation of an identity by way of alterity. . . . 
Relation to another autonomous being ... , relation to one single 
transcendant other ... , relation to two others ... , relation to a 
multiple collectivity, a many-in-one .... 64 
Without entering into debate over the validity of these gender-based 
categorical differentiations, there are a number of points of relevance to 
My Place. For example, it is presumably typical of 'women's' 
autobiography that Gladys's story contains within it her recounting of her 
husband Bill's story. However, one principal 'alterity' in relation to which 
characters' identities are delineated is colonial and post-colonial White 
Australia. It is against the silences imposed that the characters 'speak out'; 
against the imposition of 'false' identities that 'true' identities are sought; 
against the ordered absence of Aboriginality that its presence is 
reconstructed. Indeed it is here that Aboriginality-as-subject is precisely the 
'female' subject of autobiography/history. It is defined by way of the Other 
-- the language, the literary conventions, the Symbolic order -- as the Other 
-- the unconscious, the alterity -- of colonial/post-colonial Australia. 
Miller also discusses the 'relatedness' of women's autobiographies. She 
argues that "The mother is the significant other in many female 
autobiographies. She is both an agent of the patriarchy, socializing her 
daughter to her role ... , and at the same time a potentially subversive 
model."65 The female line of descent from Daisy to Sally is fundamental to 
the text, with Gladys placed ambivalently between them. Sally symbolises 
the 'future' of Aboriginality, while Daisy, the wise grandmother, is its 
source in tradition and in the past. In fact, as Daisy is dying, Sally notes, 
"She was a symbol. Part of us was going, too" (355). Gladys is caught 
between them, 'protectively' socialising Sally and her other children into 
educational and vocational success in the White Australian world, and of 
necessity out of Aboriginality (into a fabricated identity as Indian). On the 
other hand, despite Daisy's stronger links with the traditional Aboriginal 
past, it is Gladys who is the more willing to help Sally subvert the 
processes of racial and family dislocation in her readiness to speak out 
against them through Sally's book. 
However, it is necessary to specify how these similarities to the 
conventions of autobiography silence Aboriginal discourse within the 
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hegemony of the literary text. Any convention represents the absence of 
presence, the absence of the unique specificity of expression. That the 
convention does not belong traditionally to one's culture is a silence in 
respect of that tradition. Of course, this is not to argue that they constitute 
only silence. For example, it could be argued that My Place's bridging of so 
many sometimes contradictory forms represents the presence of 
transgression as the text challenges the limits of an institutionalised 
literary genre. On the other hand, to the extent that it posits a model for 
'Aboriginal autobiography', participating in the formulation of another set 
of literary expectations and norms, then the resisting voice of Aboriginal 
discourse is silenced precisely as it is heard. However, silence is not 
necessarily to be regretted: it protects what is not turned into literary 
discourse from the processes and institutions of literature; it restricts the 
circulation of traditional forms to within the social configurations chosen 
by those with 'insider' status, and prevents their knowledges from being 
either used 'against' them, or even appropriated. Indeed, autobiography 
has been described as "self-appropriation": 
autobiography writing is self-appropriating activity which in Lacanian 
terms may be described as a kind of reconstitution of the subject. The 
autobiographer as a witness to his own actuality takes responsibility 
for his own past (his life history) in order to make the past his own --
to own it.66 
However, to appropriate oneself is to cast oneself simultaneously as self 
and Other, the Other appropriating the self, so that the term is ultimately 
shown to be oxymoronic. This is suggested as Manganyi continues that 
"Self-appropriation enhances self-mastery and personal growth because as 
Olney has suggested, autobiography as a metaphor of self, as a creation of a 
meaning-pattern establishes order subjectively and in the external 
universe of experience. "67 Therefore, the self is appropriated by the Other -
- language -- and in particular the literary conventions of autobiography. 
The self remains .forever alienated in the field of the Other, mastered by 
discourse. 
Therefore, the third form of silence operating in My Place is that of the 
instability of subjectivity, and the concomitant instability of the text. The 
relationship between these can be discerned when it is remembered that 
the autobiography is traditionally founded on the Romantic belief in the 
unified subject of expression,68 and that the instability of My Place as text --
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between autobiography and biography; autobiography and 'confession'; 
between its conventionality and its difference; and its employment of 
multiple conventions -- subverts the possibility of its status as a unified act 
of expression. That there is no stable solution to the question, 'What is it 
saying?' is suggested in the culmination of sections of the preceding 
discussion in questions rather than answers, and in the positing of 
multiple and contradictory readings of the same discursive act, or strategy. 
My Place therefore problematises the imposition of fixable meaning and 
the search for the text's expression. 
The instability of subjectivity characterises the multiple subjects of My 
Place. It is not simply Sally's autobiography; it includes the stories of 
Arthur, Gladys and Daisy, as well as of 'Aboriginality' in colonial and post-
colonial Australia. While it could be argued that the stories are unified 
through Sally's re-presentation of the material and organisation of the text, 
Sally herself is a divided and contradictory subject of the text. She 
functions as transcriber, author, and character; in terms of the text as 
'confession', she is both 'confessor' and 'confesser'; and as a character she 
changes from· one who believes herself to be Indian, to one who knows 
herself to be Aboriginal. She, like the other characters, including 
'Aboriginality' itself, is the fragmented subject of race and class 
interpellations. Newman, for example, comments that "The language use 
signifies social class distinctions rather than racial ones," although she 
regrets this as evidence of linguistic capitulation, as if social determinants 
of language were less authentic or applicable, as if Sally and her family 
were interpellated only by racial subject-positions.69 Yet Sally and her 
family are variously interpellated by the institutions and discourses of 
white Australian society, and Aboriginal community and identity. There 
is a similarity in this to the autobiography written out of the immigrant 
experience as described by Gunnars, where "It is not surprising that [the 
subject] should posit a division in her sense of herself, since she was 
shaped by two cultures simultaneously."70 Further, there is the 
paradoxical status of a unified discourse of pan-Aboriginality: it is both a 
sign of strength for resistance to white oppression, and a symptom of the 
post-colonising reduction of 'Aboriginality' to a symbol which can stand 
for what it has replaced. These are the empirical and historical 
fragmentations of the subjects of My Place, which even within the 
redemptive and regenerative thematics and energies of the text, allow it to 
remain unsettling. The ensuing silence is not the absence of discourse but, 
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in the sheer proliferation of discourses, the refusal of a discernable self-
expression. 
However, the subject of autobiography, whether individual, plural, or 
collective, partakes of the unstable colligations of all subjectivities. This is 
most clearly evident in the articulation in the present of the remembering 
subject of the past. The basis of much of the text in transcribed oral 
narrative is, as Kateryna Arthur has pointed out, one reason to look for 
"recognition of the role of the present in constructions of the past."71 My 
Place provides markers of the present situation of the narrative despite the 
substantive concern of much of it with the past. Arthur reflects that "it 
seems funny, lookin' back now. Mucka was a good place to live in the old 
days" (211). Gladys admits, "I feel embarrassed now, to think that, once, I 
wanted to be white" (306). It would have been a very different story of 
Gladys's had it been told from that past perspective -- that is, had she 
wanted in the text's present to be white. 
It has therefore been argued that a literary method for the study of 
autobiography should be to "single out for special study everything that 
the autobiographer says in the present tense about his affects."72 The 
present tense "moors a reader's primary emotional response to an 
imaginary 'starting' point, the author's newest self (his writing self). "73 
What My Place thus reveals, despite characters' self-portraits as children, as 
workers, as domestic servants, and whether at Corunna Downs, 
Muckinbudin, or Parkerville Children's Home, is "an up-to-date 
personality profile not essentially unlike that which an analysand 
constructs for himself with the help of a psychoanalyst."74 The fact that the 
autobiographical text provides "a picture from a specific viewpoint of a 
coherent shaping of an individual's past,"75 and that the self as character is 
presented as "a developing entity, changing by definable stages,"76 
. emphasises the importance of the present and the teleological drive which 
shapes the text as an account of subjects constituted by cause and effect. It 
also differentiates the subject of the autobiography (the textual'!', the 
character, the subject of the enounced), from the autobiographical subject 
(the writing'!', the subject of the enunciation). 
The subject of the enunciation is the remembering subject, and it has 
been shown that the functioning of memory causes the subject to differ 
from, and defer, itself, offering only its Imaginary representation: 
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The illusion begins from the moment that the narrative confers a 
meaning on the event which, when it actually occurred, no doubt had 
several meanings or perhaps none. This postulating of a meaning 
dictates the choice of the facts to be retained and of the details to bring 
out or to dismiss according to the demands of the preconceived 
intelligibility.77 
The meaning of My Place is, from the first page, the recuperation of (pride 
in) Aboriginality. From that perspective, there is a 'selecting out' of events 
for the characters whose ultimate meaning is not of relevance to this 
overarching telos. For example, there is little to suggest Sally's white 
father's influence on her developing character, talents, and so on. Where 
these are identified, such as her drawing ability, or her awareness of 
spiritual matters, they are related of necessity to her Aboriginal traditional 
and genetic inheritance. Similarly, because there is the element of quest in 
the text, this takes precedence in Sally's account of her own adult life over 
her roles as wife and mother, which could be argued to constitute an 'anti-
quest'. Almost nothing is said of her developing relationship with, and 
marriage to Paul, or his subsequent place within the family and its journey 
of self-discovery. While she discusses her children's antics with family 
members, these are largely omitted from the text.78 
However, not all selection and transformation of events is the result of 
the autobiographical artifice: the subject is subject to the illusions of 
memory and not simply the perpetrator of them. The psychoanalytic 
account of the funtioning of memory describes its transformations of the 
past, through the workings of the unconscious, into forms inaccessible in 
their 'original truth': 
Firstly, all recollections (the register we call memory) invariably create 
a limit or screen 'beyond which unfolds the scene of another 
memory'. Secondly, and to complicate matters still further, 
mnemonic representation is selectively related to the actuality of 
events. This means that what remains of the actuality of an event 
tends to be fragmentary due to its transformation into psychic 
reality.79 
If the 'original event' is locked in the unconscious, it returns 
symptomatically in a form determined by the interaction of material that 
has become sedimented as psychic reality, and the context and act of 
remembering in the present. The relationships between memory, the 
unconscious and its return in the production of the autobiographical 
narrative can be examined by focusing on the formative moment of the 
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unconscious, the 'mirror stage'. As has been shown, the unconscious is 
produced at the point at which the perception of the image of the self in 
the mirror generates the repression of the excess of Imaginary plenitude, 
and although language enables the partial traversal of the distance between 
. perceiving and perceived 'selves', so that the 'I' may be articulated as the 
partial return of the Imaginary, it must remain an'!, alienated in 
language. The writing of autobiography has been likened to another 
'mirror stage' in the sense that what is produced is a mirror image of the 
self: "The image is another 'myself', a double of my being but more fragile 
and vulnerable, invested with a sacred character that makes it at once 
fascinating and frightening .... According to most folklore and myth, the 
apparition of the double is a death sign. "80 The image is the signified self 
in language of autobiography; its sacred character is that ideal, unattainable 
truth of the self in the image; and the death sign is the sign as death, the 
empty signification of language in its differance. Thus the autobiography 
guarantees the silence of the subject in its implication in the chain of 
signification, image, writing, and death. Rosenblatt has argued that "Every 
autobiography ... is an extended suicide note; both announcement and 
vindication of the event. The life recorded is the life complete to a specific 
point, and is therefore as good as dead."81 
The self that results from the autobiographical narrative is a 
mythicised product, partaking of the Imaginary processes of Symbolic 
myth-making, the "myth of personal coherence"82 in which the subject is 
complicit from the moment in which the split of the self into 'self' and 
'other' is provisionally sutured. It is the fate of autobiography that the 
'truth' of the subject is locked within the Real, that which cannot enter 
discourse, and in escaping the defiles of the signifier, remains silent. 
However, the assertion that "Even after Freud ... autobiography has 
remained a consciously contrived kind of text and 'may,·indeed, become a 
defense against true self-revelation"'83 casts that silence differently. Myth-
making may indeed protect other truths, something which Gladys perhaps 
ingenuously acknowledges in My Place. Despite Muecke's concern that "if 
we question the motives of this or that character, [our comments will] be 
taken as criticisms of real people,"84 Gladys concedes that "I know I cannot 
retract what has been written, it's no longer mine" (306). Contrary to being 
a loss of control, this may well signify freedom from self-definition or self-
fixing through the discourse of the text: Gladys can be recognised as a 
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character, not a 'real person'. Her only connection to the Gladys of the text 
is discursive, the legal tie of the Symbolic. 
Therefore, while the discourses of My Place can in many ways be read 
as resistant, it is also beneficial, in the context of the increasing post-
colonial solicitation of 'Aboriginal' discourse, to read post-colonised 
discursive terrain in terms of demarcated territories of silence. As silence, 
they use impenetrability as resistance to the control and imposed silences 
of 'visibility', and the dangers of appropriation, or discursive re-
colonisa tion. 
5. V. Hybrid Discourses of Resistance and Redemption. 
Discourses of resistance cannot be understood as radically other than 
the dominant or repressive discourses they resist. Of necessity, there is a 
meeting on common ground, even if it is the ground of struggle or battle, 
and in this meeting each acknowledges,and thus is implicated in the 
construction of, the other. In this way, discourses, whether dominant or 
oppositional, comprise strategies of both power and resistance: there is, as 
Foucault's analysis of power has shown, "no easy division between a 
dominant and essentially repressive discourse, and one oppositional, pure 
voice of liberation." Instead, as one commentator has put it, power is 
characterised as "a multiplicity of force relations, the interplay of various 
discursive fields with their immanent necessities and developments. 
Power and authority are no longer vested in a central point. ... Nor does 
resistance arise from a single point."8S This analysis of power and 
resistance as dispersed through subjectivities and discourses has alreadL_05 
been related to the settler post-colonial context; however, it may be r~e-J . 
iterated that settler post-colonialism produces historically and culturally 
hybrid subjects, and similarly hybrid discourses of. opposition and I 
complicity. 
Keri Hulme's The Bone People is a novel of resistant and redemptive 
discourses. As a novel of post-colonial hybridity, the place and functioning 
of language is a principal exemplar of tensions and ambivalences. Clearly, 
to be redemptive, there must be posited or at least implied, a preceding 
'Fall'. Further, a discourse of resistance is, first of all, discourse, and is, as 
Chapter One argued, therefore the sign of a 'Fall' from the plenitude of 
pre-Symbolic origins, returning symptomatically through the Symbolic 
order. The redemptive subject (or text) may be seen as seeking to 
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reconnect with those origins through language, which is paradoxically the 
point of separation, or Fall. The spiral structure of origins, Fall, and 
redemption ('origins') which characterises The Bone People is suggested in 
the evocation of Biblical beginnings: "In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John, I:i). However, in 
the post-colonial New Zealand context, origins are posited as Maori, while 
the Christian originary Word is contemporaneous with colonisation, and 
t~~_~~presents the Fall itsel~ Therefore, as the novel opens, even 'The 
Beginning'ls not~Wnal it seems; it is, as the Prologue makes clear, 'The 
End'. Similarly, it is neither the pure, true Word of truth, nor is it the 
Word which anticipates Redemption in its own terms. For Simon, the 
Word -- Logos -- was carried on the "nightmare voice. The vivid haunting 
terrible voice" (5), and it was deceptive, as it "seemed to murmur 
endearments all the while the hands skilfully and cruelly hurt him" (5). 
For Joe, "IN THE BEGINNING, it was a tension, an element of strain" (6), 
while Kerewin "HAD DEBATED, in the frivolity of the beginning, 
whether to build a hole or a tower" (7). In all three cases, words deceive, 
strain against or struggle with 'the Real', or engage in active opposition 
(enter the condition of discourse). Similarly, each character's relationship 
with language as represented in these beginnings, mirrors the complex 
alienations and dislocations in language which constitute their 
subjectivities. Just as language is not wholly what it seems, but is a 
doubled tool of fracture or subjective alienation, and repair or subjective 
constitution, the characters' relations to language and silence are multiple 
and ambivalent. Both language and silence have many meanings in The 
Bone People, and as a result, subjectivities are the unstable positionings of 
complicity with and resistance to, just as they embody the cultural and 
historical violence of, colonisation. 
For Kerewin, The Word is frivolous: language is both the object and 
the vehicle of her virtuosity. She invents words, placing them in 
idiosyncratic phrasing, such as "A right piratical-looking eschewball I 
suppose I look" (21), and she hunts out obscure, technical or other 
specialised words, so that she can use phrases like "'0 you icthyphagal 
numbskull'" (23). Her mastery of language gives her pleasure, evoked in 
the rhyming or assonant incantations she produces and lingers on even 
when alone in contemplation: "'Lichen-bole; gow-worms' hole; bonsai 
grove'" (18); and in the self-indulgent linguistic movement from 
description to invention, to evoke, significantly, meaninglessness: 
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"Gimcrack trumpery in gold and azure and scarlet and a glory silver ... 
becasually nerthing is ... "(418). Language also confers power. As she 
observes to a bewildered Simon, "'obfuscation is my trade. I didn't get to 
be thirty odd and horridly rich by being intelligible'" (24). However, it has 
also isolated her in its use as sheer display rather than communication, so 
that Simon wonders, "What does she talk like that for? To fool me? and 
shakes his head in exasperation. Kerewin's multisyllables were, for the 
main part, going straight in one ear and out the other" (38). On the other 
hand, communication only too well by language-as-weapon has had the 
same isolating effect: "Why did I lose my temper that night and wound 
everybody with words and memories?" (167). Kerewin's wall of language 
is both protection, as Joe observes: "Aue! Trust her to wriggle away under 
the cover of words" (243), but also her prison, as Kerewin herself 
occasionally senses: '"Wordplayer,' she says sourly. 'Mere quoter'" (92).86 
The pleasure conferred by her mastery of language is the phallocentric 
pleasure symbolised by her similarly phallic tower-home, in which she is 
intellectually, emotionally and spiritually imprisoned. 
Kerewin's silence is also ambivalent. This silence most noticeably and 
notoriously surrounds her discovery of the beatings Simon endures from 
Joe, and it bears many meanings. It is a reluctance to become "involved" 
(149), which holds dangers for her: "Find a friend, grow a friendship, and 
something intervenes to twist it, kill it" (149), and thus it can be 
understood as a silence of complicity. On the other hand, it is an 
acknowledgement of the inadequacy or even dangers for Joe and Simon 
which attend the consequences of speaking out: 
I could tell Joe, but not tell anyone else. 
Who else to tell anyway? The fuzz? The welfare? That means the 
experts get to wade in, but how does the section in the Crimes Act 
go? Something about assault on a child, carries a sentence 
maximum five years, child removed from environment 
detrimental to physical or mental health and well-being ... sheeit 
and apricocks, that's no answer. (149) 
Finally, silence is an even more reliable index than words of Kerewin's 
outrage: "She thinks, I'll wait. I'll do nothing except watch out for the 
brat. Say nothing to \Joe but wait for a good time to tell him my mind on 
the whole bloody thing. Preferably with my fists" (151). Therefore, silence I . 
and violence are doubly linked through the inactive and active complicity 
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of the former with the latter. Both speech and silence are ambivalent 
strategies in Kerewin's life, most dramatically represented in her refusal of 
simple solutions to the problem of Joe's violence against Simon. 
Joe's own speech is characterised by the linguistic markers of social and 
cultural alienation. His use of language is rarely frivolous in the way that 
Kerewin's is, although at a point when he attempts to lighten a heavy 
atmosphere, his contemplations of an eclectic pile of reading material in 
Kerewin's bach at Moeraki echo her style of rhyming word-play: "Piles of 
Giles, two Leunigs, and an early Searle" (181). More characteristically, 
Kerewin first identifies him as a voice in the pub, "in the middle of a 
drunken anecdote" (12), whose swearing strikes her as sadly excessive, 
while lexically limited: 
Why this speech filled with bitterness and contempt? You hate 
English, man? I can understand that but why not do your conversing 
in Maori and spare us this contamination? No swear words in that 
tongue .... there he goes again. Ah hell, the fucking word has its place, 
but all the time? ... aue. (12) 
Joe's linguistic alienation from his Maori cultural origins is further 
evoked in his avowed awkwardness in expressing emotions or 
communicating in intimate situations adequately in English. The Maori 
language is redemptive, a healing of that rift, in being 'subjectively' 
coterminous with such expression. It is also, in its intimacy or sincerity, 
privileged as true expression. Thus he tells Kerewin, who has minded 
Simon, and listened to Joe's story of their background, "'I don't know how 
to say thank you except this way.' He says very formally, 'Ka whakapai au 
kia koe mo tau atawhai"' (62). Later he tells Kerewin he has a present for 
her, a surprise: "'I'll give you a clue. He ata koa iti, he pounamu.' His 
voice has grown stronger and more relaxed with each word" (281). 
Similarly, Simon likens the sound of an old man speaking Maori to Joe in 
a good mood at home (176-7). Although Joe's monotonous swearing is the 
'silence' which is the absence of presence of true discourse, and stands as a 
sign of that absence, another example of the absence of presence of speech 
is read more correctly as a Pfotective strategy. Following his reporting of 
the death of the kaumatua to the police, and their probing questions and 
speculations, Joe deflects their interest with a flippant remark, then thinks, 
"Forgive me, Tiaki. But if we keep talking this way, they might get curious 
about some of your other secrets. Kill it with a foolish joke .... " (379). Thus 
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like My Place, The Bone People posits the sacred-secret silence of resistance 
to discursive or cultural incursion. 
Just as Kerewin is characterised by her garrulousness and linguistic 
virtuosity, Simon is most strikingly identified by his silence. Yet the 
profundity of this silence can only be explained in terms of its multiple 
significations. Even in its ubiquity, there are differences and degrees to 
which he refuses speech. The most obvious 'interpretation' of his silence 
is that his voice has somehow violently and traumatically been wrested 
from him, suggested in Joe's explanation that "The ENT bloke who 
examined him said there was no physical reason to prevent him from 
speaking. He's got all the gear needed, eh. But if he vocalises, he throws 
up, and violently'" (86). The impression of some mysterious trauma in 
his past is supported by his similarly abject response apparently to 
Kerewin's use of French to speak 'past' him to Joe. Simon has hurt 
himself badly on a fish hook: 
'Sheeit/ says Kerewin, 'we'll have to go back. You can't have the 
bloody pauvre petit en souffrant like that/ and the child's eyes snap 
open. They're black and blank and his face has twisted in terror. He 
jolts out of his father's arms as though he's been banged with a cattle 
prod and falls against the side of the boat. Next minute, he's spewing 
his heart out over the gunwales. (209) 
Thus it is not simply his own speech he refuses, but the ability of language 
to violate him. A further 'refusal' which could explain his silence is that 
of resistance through absence. If he disavows subjectivity, he refuses to 
constitute the very entity which is the object of violence and the subject of 
pain. In refusing to unify his perceiving subjectivity with his perceived 
objectivity, he remains somehow outside of the hurting body, preserving 
some undamaged part of himself. 
The phonocentric conception of speech which underpins this novel 
(though as will be demonstrated, the Logos is culturally determined), 
privileges the voice precisely because the truth of the self is projected on 
the voice from the interiority of that self into the field of the Other.87 Its 
impact is in entering the Other's body (via the ears), so that oral 
communication is effected through its emanation from and access to the 
interiority of the self. However, if the voice is regarded as a part of the 
bodily self, its projection out and into the body of the Other may be felt as a 
threatening split of the body's integrity, and loss of subjective self-mastery. 
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There are sufficient indications of early bodily injury suffered by Simon, as 
well as the injuries incurred in Joe's beatings, to argue that Simon keeps 
his voice within himself as a protective strategy of bodily integrity. The 
physical-psychical basis of this fear is also consistent with Simon's 
willingness to communicate through a signing system, a body-language 
produced only from the 'exterior' of his body, and remaining in the 
interval of space between subjects which allows it to be perceived visually 
by the recipient, whose point of view must remain at a distance from, or 
outside the message/image itself. The same reasoning can be applied to 
Simon's grudging acceptance of the occasional necessity of writing to make 
his meaning clear. There is an obvious implication that writing, in failing 
to produce the truth of the presence of the subject, in being 'secondary' or 
'derivative' to primal speech, is not threatening to subjective integrity in 
the same way that spoken language is. Simon's silence could therefore be 
posited as akin to an attempt to remain in, or return to, the pre-mirror-
stage plenitude of origins and wholeness. 
However, The Bone People is not primarily a representation of the 
subject of an individual case of child abuse: indeed, Simon is arguably less 
of a 'character' than a force or an agent of redemption.88 Although the 
discussion of his silence as resistant or protective strategy as well as index 
of victimhood has been intended to evoke the multiple meanings of 
silence surrounding Simon, rather than simply attaching naturalistic links 
of cause and effect, it is necessary to read his silence in relation to the 
events of the novel as a whole. Simon functions not simply as (resisting) 
victim but as positive agency in the novel, and for this reason his silences 
should be scrutinised for their meanings beyond resistance or refusal, and 
instead in relation to that agency. For example, Simon's attempt to 
preserve or restore his own wholeness parallels his function in the novel 
as a unifying force in relation to Kerewin and Joe as (divided) individuals, 
and the three of them as a group.89 
Throughout much of The Bone People, Kerewin is emotionally, 
spiritually and phy~ically 'at war with herself'. She both feels herself to be 
so, and is seen by Joe in these terms. The narrative enters Kerewin's 
consciousness, as she contemplates her chosen solitude, finding herself 
confronted with feelings she would rather suppress than admit: 
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It's an odd macabre kind of existence. While the nights away in 
drinking and fill the days with petty killing. Occasionally, drink 
out a day and then go and hunt all night, just for the change. 
She shakes her head. 
Who cares? That's the way things are now. (I care). (13)90 
Later, Joe observes her from a distance as she stands on a "black tongue of 
rock" near the sea, a "strange person in blue denims, sometimes obscured 
by mist from the waves that explode like geysers in the blowhole. She 
looks tense and desperately unhappy. Like she's at war with herself. Like 
a sword wearing itself out on its sheath" (187). There is the suggestion that 
her emotional state is not only visible, but is also somehow tied in with, or 
responsible for the cancer which grows in her. Even this illness can be 
understood as the body at war with itself -- the production by the body of 
tissue which is both excessive and hostile to, while being part of 'itself'. 
Similarly, in her attempts to pacify it, "She bought antihistamines as soon 
as the chemist opened, and spent the day feeling doped and sluggish, and 
especially, at war with herself" (412). 
Joe is similarly divided within himself, remembering, for example, 
"the sadsweet months with Taki. I knew it was wrong, I know it was 
unnatural, but he was gentle, he was kind, I loved him and it was good" 
(175). However, for a number of reasons Joe's fractured 'self' is more 
clearly the fracture of and from his cultural origins, so that he feels 
contradictory cultural, emotional and intellectual impulses, themselves 
only partial or incomplete. His life is represented as an attempt to create 
one complete picture out of the pieces of two different, incomplete jigsaw 
puzzles. For example, he tells Kerewin that Simon is 
'Scared of ghosts and things in dreams ... If I was a proper Maori I'd .. .' 
Into the following silence, 
'You'd what?' 
'Hah, I don't know.' He laughed quietly. 'Maybe take him to people 
who'd know what to do, to keep off the ghosts in dreams.' Laughing 
again, a dry unfunny sound like a cough, 'See? Bloody superstitious 
Nga Bush? Get the Maori a bad name, eh?' (61) 
The alienation from himself in this passage is evoked in the "unfunny" 
laughter, while the cultural alienation is implicit in the inclination 
towards, but loss of uncritical acceptance of traditional practices. Further, 
the acknowledgement of the dominance of rational discourse is suggested 
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in his reference to the 'bad name' conferred on 'superstitious' Maori by the 
subjects of that discourse. 
While Joe's cultural alienation is more manifest, it could be argued 
that Kerewin's is more complete. Her manner of living implies the 
museumification of cultural taonga as artifacts she keeps locked away. 
Their status is relegated that that of part of her eclectic collection of objects 
whose value is in their inventory, and further, to her fascination with and 
indulgence in linguistic exoticisms: 
She opens the lid, her heart thudding. On trays in the pale pool of 
light, a hundred smooth and curvilinear shapes. 
Two meres, patu pounamu, both old and named, still deadly. 
Many stylised hook pendants, hei matau. 
Kuru, and kapeu, and kurupapa, straight and curved neck pendants. 
An amulet, a marakihau; and a spiral pendant, the koropepe. 
A dozen chisels. Four fine adzes. 
Jade of my heart, your names a litany of praise; kahurangi; kawakawa; 
raukaraka; tangiwai, auhunga, inanga, kahotea; totoweka and 
ahauhunga .... (33) 
Yet further she is not easily conferred through visible signification with 
the status of even alienated or dislocated Maoriness. In other words, 
because she does not look particularly Maori -- she is "blue-eyed, brown-
haired, and mushroom pale" (62) -- she is not easily identified as such, and 
indeed feels the need to assert it: 
Shrouded in smoke, the brown faces stare at her with bright 
unfriendly eyes. 
'Tena koutou, tena koutou,' she says, 'tena koutou katoa.' As 
always she wants to whip out a certified copy of her whakapapa, 
preferably with illustrative photographs (most of her brothers, uncles, 
aunts and cousins on her mother's side, are much more Maori 
looking than she is). 'Look! I really am one of you,' she could say. 
'Well, at least some of me is ... .' (112) 
Therefore, while the visible 'signs' of Maoriness are produced in 
discriminatory relations, they may also serve as a cultural 'safe-guard' or 
back-up recognition by Maori. Without this, her isolation is exacerbated. 
Kerewin and Joe are both products of the racial and cultural 
fragmentations effected by colonisation: 
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'I feel all Maori. Or,' she looked down into the drink, 'I used to. Now 
it feels like the best part of me has got lost in the way I live.' 
Joe was very still; so softly, that it was almost on a level with his 
breathing, 
'That's the way I feel most of the time.' More loudly, 'My father's 
father was English, so I'm not yer 100% pure. But I'm Maori. And 
that's the way I feel too, the way you said, that the Maoritanga has got 
lost in the way I live.' (62) 
These fragmentations and contradictions are carried to violent extreme 
and acted out on and around the body of Simon. Joe loves and viciously 
beats Simon; he has lost "korero .... our tribe's famous talk-it-out with all 
concerned" (273). Kerewin's illness makes its presence violently felt 
during a fight she has with Joe, a fight provoked by Simon and joined by 
Kerewin in a combination of defence of Simon against Joe's blows and her 
own spoiling for battle. Gloating over her victory, she is suddenly gripped 
by pain, and falls in "a simulacrum of Joe's agony" (192). 
However, Simon's silence is also complicit with the beatings he 
receives. When Kerewin discovers welts on his body, Simon 
unequivocally instructs her, "NO DOCTOR JOE OK 1M OK" (115; also 146), 
so that he not only 'protects' Joe from the official discovery of the beatings, 
but even places concern for, and acknowledgement of Joe's well-being 
ahead of his own. In this way, Simon's silence can be re-read, not as self-
preservation, but as self-sacrifice: in physical terms because he suffers and 
sometimes provokes the beatings which culminate in the one so severe 
that there is no avoidance of institutional intervention; and in subjective 
terms because Simon eschews the power of language to traverse the space 
between perceiving and perceived selves and its partial repair of the split 
between them which instigates subjectivity. In the former instance, which 
is consistent with readings of Simon as a Christ-figure,91 Simon, the 
'innocent' nearly 'dies for' the 'sins' of Joe and Kerewin, and catalyses a 
series of events that result in the possibility of their 'redemption': Joe, 
after a period in jail, attempts suicide and is saved by Tiaki Mira, an elderly 
kaumatua, in order to receive his mantle; Kerewin's illness brings her 
near death, but she too receives healing and redemptive intervention.92 In 
terms of the sacrifice of subjectivity, it is as though Simon's presence --
signified in his voice -- must, not be allowed to prevent the violence 
against him; as though he must remain the force which enables the 
healing of Joe and Kerewin, effects Kerewin's membership of her local 
community (94), and ultimately secures his goal of bringing Kerewin and 
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Joe together so that they constitute a group. It is through, or even into 
Simon's 'absence' that presence-to-the-self may emerge: "One thing about 
having Himi for your child: you learn to read what people meant but 
didn't say'; 'I am Kerewin the stony and I never cry. I want to like or even 
love you, but I don't trust anyone now' (243). Conversely, Simon both 
merges himself with, and is merged with by Kerewin and Joe, both of these 
reinforcing the absence of his own presence. Kerewin's 'voice' merges 
into his consciousness, so that he thinks to himself in her idiosyncratic 
style, though with his child-like echolalic 'misappropriation', "Where the 
unprintable as Kere says did I put that berloody jersey. I remember, end of 
the bed .... Yeah, I'd believe it. On the berloody apricock floor" (177). 
Observing Joe tending Simon, Kerewin wonders at "That curious 
impersonal property sense parents display over their young children's 
bodies ... check this, examine that, peer here, clean there, all as though it's 
an. extension of their own body they're handling, not another person ... " 
(197). Indeed, she notes, despite the pain Simon must be feeling, "the 
weird thing is, it's Joe who sucks his breath in each time, as though it was 
him that was hurting" (198). 
Simon is 'absent' to Kerewin and Joe, other than as an intermediary 
between them, illustrated when Kerewin "raises her gaze, and Simon's 
gesture leads it on to the other person, waiting quietly on the threshold" 
(46). However, although Simon is the absent centre around which 
Kerewin and Joe stabilise, he is, in the moments of achievement of unity 
between them, almost painfully present to himself: "The elation .... had 
come to a climax last night when her hand and Joe's had touched, with 
him aching and unsteady and overwhelmed with joy in the centre" (73). 
His sacrificial and catalysing function is explicitly acknowledged later in 
the novel, when he reflects that "He has worked at keeping them together 
whatever the cost" (395). 
There is, therefore, in relation to all three characters, an ambivalent 
but strategic negotiation of speech and silence. Both are complicit with 
dislocation and pain, and both also heal and redeem. However, the 
structure of 'Fall' and 'Redemption' in The Bone People as it relates to 
language as well as cultural wholeness more generally, is clearly one 
which posits pre-Iapsarian Maori origins. 
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The contrast of 'Maori' and 'Pakeha' values occurs in contexts which 
posit the latter as a Fall from Maori cultural plenitude: that effected by 
colonisation and its solidification into the institutionalised discourses of 
colonialism. The benefits of 'knowledge' instigated by the 
subjective/ cultural split also have their price, as Kerewin discovers: "I 
won a lottery. I invested it. I earned a fortune by fast talking. And while I 
was busy blessing the god of munificence, the lightning came. It blasted 
my family, and it blasted my painting talent. I went straight out of one 
bind into a worse one" (28). Joe similarly believes a price has been paid for 
his adherence to Pakeha values and priorities. He tells Kerewin that 
'If I could start from the beginning ... you know what I'd do? I'd stop 
work. Stay home most of the time. I was thinking yesterday, what a 
waste it all was ... I'd worked hard, pakeha fashion, for nearly six solid 
years, making money to make a home. And the one thing I never 
made was a home.' (324) 
It is the kaumatua, Tiaki Mira, who rescues Joe and prepares him for his 
place as guardian of the sacred canoe and the mauri it holds, who places 
this Fall from the edenic "shining land" that was Aotearoa within a more 
broadly mythic-historical, and a more clearly cultural and political rather 
than individual, context: 
'I was taught that it was the old people's belief that this country, and 
our people, are different and special. That something very great had 
allied itself with some of us, had given itself to us. But we changed. 
We ceased to nurture the land. We fought among ourselves. We 
were overcome by white people in their hordes. We were broken and 
diminished. We forgot what we could have been, that Aotearoa was 
the shining land.' (364)93 
As a result, his people were '''no longer Maori. They were husks, aping 
the European manners and customs. Maori on the out~ide, with none of 
the heart left'" (359). This echoes Joe's and Kerewin's nostalgic laments 
that, despite any wealth or success in Pakeha terms, in losing their 
Maoritanga that have lost "the best part of me" (62; 344), the "main part" 
(63). 
Consequently, the terms of Redemption are 'Maori': however, the 
Maori is, of necessity, that which knows and acknowledges, even as it 
disavows, its own status as post-colonial symptomatic discourse, as sign of 
its own loss of originary plenitude. The 'knowledge' passed from the 
kaumatua to Joe is filled with the signs of its own hybrid reconstruction; 
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the doubled voice of Maori resistant, recuperative struggle and colonising 
intervention. This discursive doubling is shown in the anticipation and 
disavowal of rational explanations for events of Maori spiritual 
significance. Joe's defensive reference to his belief in dream-ghosts has 
been noted; similarly, Kerewin describes to Joe her discovery of a special 
piece of greenstone: 
'I was just going onto the reef for pupu and a wave uncovered it at 
my feet -- when I picked it up, there seemed to be voices all around 
me saying 'Te tahoro ruku! Te tahoro ruku!' It was bright sunlight, I 
wasn't drunk, and there were people further out on the reef who 
didn't look round or anything, so the voices must have been in my 
head. But they were loud. They echoed ... .' (253) 
She therefore manifests the consciousness, through anticipation of others' 
doubt or scepticism, that there may be rational or naturalistic explanations. 
Both implied explanations are symptomatic, in their specifity, of Pakeha 
intervention: the advent of alcohol and psychiatry. However, again it is 
the kaumatua who most clearly evokes the hybridity of post-colonial 
Maori discourse. On the one hand he is associated with Maori origins, and 
even a transcendental status suited to his trans-historical function, 
through for example, his "two parallel blue lines across ... [his] face. A 
truly archaic moko, te moko-a-Tamatea", while Joe had "thought the 
people who had worn that tattoo dead for centuries" (346). On the other 
hand, the kaumatua himself acknowledges and accounts for the breaks 
with cultural convention or orthodoxy in the very sources of his 
knowledge in his grandmother: 
'Remember, it was a time of flux and chaos when she sought her 
knowledge. No-one can be blamed for giving her information that 
she maybe should never have known. And she can be praised for 
having the staunch courage and intelligence to preserve something 
she believed, as I believe, to be of unusual value. Incalculable value. 
How do you weigh the value of this country's soul?' (370) 
Clearly the struggle for survival requires adaptations of cultural 
tradition in order to meet the unusual circumstances with which it is 
confronted by colonisation, and the kaumatua and, as will be shown, the 
novel, advocate this strategic flexibility. The most striking evocation of the 
loss of unself-conscious inhabiting of mythical time and discourse, and its 
replacement with entry into culturally self-conscious historical time and 
discourse, occurs with the kaumatua's accounts of what happens to the 
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spirit of a Maori person after death. This is prompted by Joe's admission 
that he is troubled by visitations by his dead wife's spirit in the form of a 
moth. To the kaumatua's explanation that, on death, "'One goes north to 
Te Rerenga-wairua, down the grey root of Akakitererenga, onto the rock 
platform and into the sea. Into the sea-hole that leads into Te Reinga'" 
(354), Joe responds with rational scepticism: 
'It is all myths and legends,' says Joe, 'and I never liked any of it.' 
'Tsk,' says the kaumatua, 'and your wife still returns to you as a 
moth?' 
'Sometimes she turns into moths. Sometimes she decays in my 
arms. Sometimes she eats one of my sons and then starts on me, 
beginning at my privates. That is all business for a psychiatrist, 
maybe, but not any exemplar of Maori truths.' (354) 
However, in disagreeing with Joe, the kaumatua narrates "three versions" 
of what happens after death, the first of which he concludes is "'allegory, I 
think it means you journey on and on, becoming less human and more '" 
something else'" (354). The second version, which includes a judgement 
followed by either heaven or hell, is regarded by the kaumatua as "'cribbed. 
It doesn't sound quite Maori'" (354). He concludes, "'The third version, 
however, I like, therefore,' chuckle, 'it is more sophisticated'" (354). The 
possibility of alternative versions bespeaks a lack of unself-conscious, 
continuous faith in anyone of them, leaving only the possibility of 
conscious, willed belief, which is also suspension of disbelief.94 A literary 
term such as 'allegory' places the kaumatua in the position of knowing, 
rational subject, reading not Truth, but the 'fallen (literary) language' of 
trope. His assessment of the second version implies the intervention of 
Christianity and its forcing of, among other things, Maori spiritual self-
consciousness or self-knowledge. The notion that one may express 
preference for a particular version and reflect this in the construction of its 
greater 'sophistication' is cynical rather than innocent, and again, self-
conscious, as suggested by his chuckle. The loss of Maori spiritual 
plenitude (paradoxically evoked in an excess of 'truths') is therefore clear 
in his account even before he admits, fearing his own imminent death, '''I 
have no faith in the old ways and no hope in the new'" (355). Even in this 
admission, faith, something non-rational, is differentiated from hope, 
which is rational, so that there is, no matter how optimistic one may be, 
only a future founded on loss of or break from, cultural 'innocence'. This 
is crucial to the reading of the novel. 
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Much has been made by critics of the "spuriousness" of the Maori 
spiritual redemption posited in The Bone People. Mita has commented on 
its place in relation to the overall novel, expressing disappointment that 
"the catharsis through reawakening near the end of the book is not as 
integrated into the story as its other aspects,"95 while Stead is critical of the 
points at which he feels "the novel has taken a dive from reality into 
wishful daydream." In particular and above all, he objects to 
the sequence in which Joe comes close to death and then is rescued by 
an old Maori man who has waited his whole lifetime under semi-
divine instruction to perform just this rescue, so he can pass on to the 
man he saves proprietorial rights over a piece of land and the 
talisman in which its spirit is preserved .... I found it, read either as 
Maori lore or as fiction, almost totally spurious.96 
Stead's refusal of the Maori terms in which this episode is cast -- his use of 
'old Maori man' rather than 'kaumatua', the general 'talisman' rather 
than specifying the culturally significant canoe and the god that came with 
it, and 'spirit' rather than the term 'mauri' used by the kaumatua (363) --
underscores his repudiation of the episode itself. However, if Hulme's use 
of Maori language and mythology seems to Stead "willed, self-conscious, 
not inevitable, not entirely authentic,"97 it can be argued that the reason 
for this lies beyond Hulme in the history of colonisation, and further, that 
it is an overt thematic and structural constituent of the novel itself. 
For example, Williams takes up Stead's allusion to the 'inauthenticity' 
of the novel's representation of Maori spirituality, and places a different 
light on it when he argues that, rather than emanating from Hulme's 
fanciful imagination, much of it bears the "imprint of the Pakeha 
reception and interpretation of that material."98 He cites a number of 
textual sources for Hulme's representations.99 However, he continues to 
take issue with specific departures from received notions· of authentic (pre-
colonial) Maori spirituality. In relation to the little god of which Joe is 
bequeathed guardianship, he argues that 
As the pre-European Maori had no concept of New Zealand/ Aotearoa 
as a unified entity ... it is highly improbable that they would have 
held that there was a special god for the whole country .... that there 
was a rna uri for Aotearoa. Who would have guarded it? Where 
would it have been placed? The notion involves a transcending of 
tribal affiliations that was not possible till the arrival of the colonists 
made the Maori aware of their unity as well as their differences as a 
people.IOO 
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Precisely. Had Hulme attempted to construct or retrieve a spiritual and 
cultural redemption from before the fractures of colonisation, her novel 
would have been more open to the charge of eliding that history in favour 
of ahistorical idealism than can be made of the version she produces, full 
of, and acknowledging the disturbances and ambivalences of, hybridity. 
One of these disturbances, indeed despite the spiritual eclecticism of 
the novel (Sufic mysticism, Buddhism) the principal one, is Christianity. 
It is Christianity which not only effected the earliest and most sustained 
interventions into Maori spirituality, but was also most readily and in a 
widespread way integrated by Maori, and institutionalised by what would 
become the dominant Pakeha culture. It would be a truly ingenious novel 
which successfully represented the spirituality of a settler post-colonised 
culture with no such 'contamination'. Of course, the reader is one source 
of this contamination: Simon evokes the Biblical Simon Peter; 
descriptions of him as "transfixed like a crucifix, 'standing stiff and straight 
like some weird saint in a stained gold window ... haloed in hair, shrouded 
in the dying sunlight' (14 [my edition, 16]),"101 suggest Christianity and its 
institutionalisation, for a reader attuned to such imagery. Judith Dale 
argues, for example, that 
the Christian response to the existence of evil and the moral and 
philosophical problem of its 'purpose' in the world is reworked in the 
bone people in a new way. A perennial and archetypal question 
achieves newly dramatic force: why do the innocent suffer? The 
traditional Christian answer involves ideas of the Fall, Original Sin, 
and the inheritance of guilt. ... 'Salvation' is the ultimate outcome 
and justification of the existence of human suffering. In the bone 
people, it seems to me, Simon Peter ... serves the function of a kind 
of 'saving' figure who effectively (though not consciously) turns pain 
to joy and hope for others, and is himself much damaged in the 
process.102 
However, the ability of the writer whose subjectivity is produced within 
the settler post-colonial context to refuse such readings must be, at best, 
disavowal; in the case of Hulme's rejection of the reading of Simon as a 
'Christ-figure',103 it can only be read in terms of the limitations such an 
interpretation may impose, and is therefore a strategic gesture. 
Dale's reference to the 'new way' in which Christian themes are 
reworked is not specified beyond the 'newness' of rejuvenation: "newly 
dramatic force." However, its recontextualisation in post-colonial 
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Aotearoa suggests the possibility of reading it as symbolic of colonisation --
the entry into an historical Symbolic order by way of colonisation. Thus 
the Fall is not a question of individual moral guilt and redemption sought 
through the salvation of the individual soul, so much as a cultural, 
historical, and political loss of innocence. Therefore, redemption is also 
differently accented as the product of knowledge. Hulme's strategic 
disavowal of Christianity effects a disturbance to the easy containment of 
the novel by a totalising explanatory system which both in itself and in 
relation to Maori spirituality, seeks to elide history. 
The suggestion that Stead feels 'cheated' by the inauthenticity of 
representations of Maori spirituality is somewhat ironic, if the processes of 
colonisation -- of which he is a cultural heir -- are understood to have 
rendered unself-conscious authenticity forever inaccessible. As Margery 
Fee points out, questions of authenticity or inauthenticity in cultural 
contexts of settler post-colonialism are problematic, even unhelpful: 
the idea of accurately or finally distinguishing authentic from 
inauthentic discourse [is] impossible: the ideal of 'authenticity' has 
been proven to be, like so many others, relative and context-bound. 
This does not leave us with nothing but language games. If the 
context is firmly kept in mind, it is possible to argue that to be 
classified as 'Fourth World,' writing must somehow promote 
indigenous access to power without negating indigenous 
difference.104 
For example, with regard to Stead's criticism of the novel, Fee argues 
for a relativisation and historicisation of his literary and cultural 
assumptions. She points out that his "insistence that the Maori elements 
be 'unconscious,' rather than 'willed,' is essentially a demand to hear what 
seems 'natural' to him, that is 'authentic' accounts that echo the 
'authentiC' accounts he is used to -- those written by White anthropologists 
and those Pakeha writers who borrow this material."lOS Ironically, 
Williams finds precisely those anthropological echoes in his own reading 
of Hulme's representation of Maori lore and spirituality. He argues that 
"The Maori spiritual material in the bone people is not pure and 
unmediated, a direct link back to the source. It bears the imprint of the 
Pakeha reception and interpretation of that material."106 However, this 
does not constitute a simple reinforcement of Stead's assertion of its 
inauthenticity: Stead's judgements regarding authenticity must inevitably 
be textually mediated, as Fee argues. However, Hulme's access to the 
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Maori spirituality she represents is similarly historically mediated. To 
claim that it could survive intact the effects of colonisation and its 
fractures of the traditional, communal oral and other conditions of its 
perpetuation, to surface in a 1980s novel seems ridiculously, and 
dangerously, essentialist. Indeed, one anthropologist has suggested that a 
number of so-called 'authentic' or largely unchallenged constituents of 
Maori traditional belief and mythology entered Maoridom already 
'contaminated' by colonial in authenticity, and have in fact gained their 
authenticity through adoption, absorption, and subsequent transmission. 
He suggests that 
The image of Maori culture that developed around the turn of the 
20th century was constructed in the main by scholars who were 
predisposed to analyze institutions in terms of long distance 
migrations and who cherished the political desire to assimilate 
Maoris into Pakeha culture. The present image has been invented for 
the purpose of enhancing the power of Maoris in New Zealand 
society, and is largely composed of those Maori qualities that can be 
attractively contrasted with the least desirable aspects of Pakeha 
culture,107 
He goes on to claim that "the 'distortions' have been accepted by Maoris as 
authentic to their heritage."108 Such an argument is bound to be 
contentious, for mythologies must preserve their unself-consciousness to 
function, and yet if the point is extracted that Maori beliefs have become 
irreversibly hybridised, and that authenticity need not derive from pure 
and unmediated origins, Maori discursive ground may be both enlarged 
and strengthened. Indeed, Stead's insistence that Hulme's representation 
of Maori spirituality be 'unconscious' implicitly requires that it conform to 
those conventions of discourse by which language effaces its own 
mediation of experience and observation, that her fiction be 'speakerly' 
rather than 'writerly'. This is, as has been shown, the· demand that the 
dominant discourse has consistently made of those writing from and of 
minority positions, or positions of marginality. 
The Bone People, as has been noted, is self-conscious about its own 
inauthenticities, if origins are invoked as guarantee of authenticity. Joe's 
scepticism is irreversible (though it may be masked); similarly, the 
kaumatua's cynicism is the product of a lost cultural innocence. Further, 
the inter-textual eclecticism of the novel's language and its field of 
reference constitutes it as a 'Fallen' or 'knowing' text, and evokes the 
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promiscuity of the Word-in-history. Webby has remarked on the wide 
range of intertextual allusions and references: J.R. Tolkein's hobbits; "the 
traditional damsel in distress, locked in a tower by the sea"; to Robinson 
Crusoe, when "Kerewin is made aware of Simon's intrusion on her 
solitude via discovering his sandal in the dust"; and the "literary 
associations" of the name, Holmes.109 Stead is reminded by Kerewin's 
solitary tower existence, of Yeats,110 while Williams, as well as many of 
those mentioned, and the Maori source-material referred to earlier, finds 
echoes of Masefield's 'Sea-Fever,'111 Shakespeare's King Lear and The 
Tempest,112 and despite the novel's disavowals of its literary inheritance in 
'Pakeha' culture, the novels of the 'Man Alone' theme by Pakeha males 
including Lee, Mulgan, Crump, and even early Stead.113 There are many 
more elucidated by these and other critics, too many to list exhaustively, 
but the point made by Williams is already clear: The Bone People has been 
"painstakingly stitched together out of scraps and shards and flotsam and 
jetsam of literature that had been washed up on New Zealand shores from 
everywhere imaginable."114 The language of the novel has been drawn 
from a similarly wide range of backgrounds. It has been criticised as "over-
clever Joycean word-play,"115 and praised precisely for the innovative uses 
and inventions of language.116 More to the point here, Williams has 
demonstrated the 'promiscuity' of the novel's linguistic 'parentage' in its 
use of Anglo-Saxonisms, Latinate words, Scottish mediaevalisms, Old-
French- and Greek-derived words, and those of Middle English origins; 
similarly, the novel employs specialised terminologies of medicine, 
pharmacoepias, floral taxonomies, craft-derived terms, sporting and slang 
'New Zealandisms', and of course, Maori language.117 
If the very language of the novel is so contaminated, questions of 
original purity seem ridiculous. However, unification is a central theme 
in The Bone People, and it is a unification which acknowledges the 
diversity of disparate elements of a society and advocates conscious choice 
as both all that is available, but more positively, that which is more 
affirming of the many levels and spheres of difference in New 
Zealand/ Aotearoa. The reader is interpellated by the novel's discourse of 
unification to participate in the reconstruction of something coherent out 
of the disconnected and partial elements of the 'story'. The Sherlock 
Holmes motif draws the reader into the 'mysteries' running through the 
novel. Although Kerewin's estrangement from her family and her 
reluctance in the face of contact with others are introduced in manners 
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which generate questions rather than providing answers (22; 24), it is the 
mystery surrounding Simon's background, and the events in the novel 
which bring the question to the narrative surface, which invokes the 
mystery genre in a more sustained and self-conscious way (87; 95; 210). 
There are also situations in which the hermeneutic activities of the reader 
provide more knowledge than Kerewin or Joe have amassed. 
The notion that The Bone People comprises "different elements united 
by a prodigious authorial will [which offers] a cultural vision that suited 
the moment,"118 is therefore not simply a structural observation on the 
text, but a central and conscious thematic principle underlying it. It is 
symbolised in Simon's understanding that frames the novel: in 'The End 
at the Beginning' it is explained that 
They were nothing more than people by themselves. Even paired, 
any pairing, they would have been nothing more than people by 
themselves. But all together, they have become the heart and 
muscles and mind of something perilous and new, something 
strange and growing and great. 
Together, all together, they are the instruments of change. (4) 
Much further into the novel (though not in chronology), Simon reflects 
that 
He doesn't know the words for what they are yet. Not family, not 
whanau ... maybe there aren't words for us yet? (E nga iwi 0 nga iwi, 
whispers Joe; 0 my serendipitous elf, serendipitous self, whispers 
Kerewin, we are the waves of future chance) he shakes the voices out 
of his head. But we have to be together. If we are not, we are 
nothing. Weare broken. We are nothing. (395) 
This passage introduces the crucial element of the togetherness posited: it 
is one of allegiance, the product of conscious choice, and thus transcends 
racial or sexual essentialism, or biologically or sexually determined bonds. 
The novel repudiates essentialism in many ways, from the unequivocal 
acceptance by Hana, then Joe, of Simon as their son (6), to Kerewin's 
Maori identification '''by heart, spirit, and inclination'" (62). Nor does it 
posit biological or sexual determinism: Joe plays both father and mother 
roles for Simon, and despite the beatings and his own physical size and 
strength, is also a gentle nurturer (57;198). On the other hand, Kerewin's 
'neuter-ality' means that she has "'never been attracted to men. Or 
women. Or anything else. It's difficult to explain, and nobody has ever 
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believed it when I have tried to explain, but while I have an apparently 
normal female body, I don't have any sexual urge or appetite'" (266). 
Therefore her link to Joe is not a sexually determined one, and further, as 
she explains of neuters, "we're kind to mother earth, and don't seek to 
stock her with replicas of self ... we're neither horned nor slatted, a twilight 
of the genders" (277). That this 'neutral' position is valued as strategic, 
rather than suffered as lack, is suggested in an explanatory gloss provided 
by Hulme in an interview: 
A neuter to me is not so much standing 0 [sic] the fence as being on 
both sides of the track at once. You are then free to adopt whatever 
blend of qualities society deems to be specifically male or specifically 
female without being put on the line as to where your loyalties lie --
sexual loyalties lie -- you don't have them.119 
Simon cannot think of a word to describe the new form of togetherness 
they represent, although Kerewin later suggests "commensalism," which 
she defines as "Common quarters wherein we circulate like corpuscles in 
one blood stream, joining (I won't say like clots) for food and drink and 
discussion and whatever else we feel like ... a way to keep unjoy at bay" 
(383). Therefore, despite the refusal of predictable forms of essentialism 
and determinism, the body metaphor in this passage suggests that the 
togetherness posited is an organic one. Similarly, it is one which chooses 
to privilege Maori values. It has already been shown that Kerewin and Joe 
both relate certain failures in their lives to their adherence to Pakeha 
values, and identify the 'best' or 'main' part of themselves as their 
Maoritanga. Further, the privileging of 'Maori' values does constitute a 
form of essentialism: they are held in opposition to 'Pakeha' values in a 
willed forgetfulness of their history of inter-relation. Maori values are 
overtly privileged as those in intimate harmony with the land and the 
spirit of the land, and it is the land which is the embodiment, or site, of the 
organic healing of the nation the novel envisages. Thus the kaumatua 
tells Joe, 
'Maybe we have gone too far down other paths for the old alliance to 
be reformed, and this will remain a land where the spirit has 
withdrawn. Where the spirit is still with the land, but no longer 
active. No longer loving the, land'. He laughs harshly. 'I can't 
imagine it loving the mess the Pakeha have made, can you?' 
'No, it wouldn't like this at all. We might have'started some of the 
havoc, but we never would have carried it so far. I don't think.' (371) 
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Even this contrast between Maori and Pakeha reveals doubts about the 
relative share of responsibility for the 'fallen' state of the country. 
However, the issue of blame is passed over in in the novel in favour of 
recognition of the land as the basis of a national 'healing' or 'redemption', 
symbolised, for example, in· the descriptions of wild (natural) herbs 
gathered and prepared to heal wounds (118) and sickness (161), and in the 
use of pieces of wood to bind Joe's broken arm (342). Significantly, Joe's 
broken arm is the result of a fall, or symbolically, a descent into the land, 
which precedes his discovery and healing by the kaumatua, a healing 
which is not simply physical, but spiritual and cultural (340-9). Similarly, 
Kerewin is healed of her cancer by an old woman/man who asks her 
'''What do you love?''' (423). Despite the kaumatua's fears that the love of 
the land has gone, Kerewin's redemptive answer is that she loves '''Very 
little. The earth. The stars. The sea. Cool classical guitar. Throbbing 
flamenco. Any colour under the sun or hidden deep in the breast of my 
mother Earth. Ah Papa my love'" (423). If she has not completely 
renounced her love of material and physical comforts, she has at least 
given priority to the land. The old visitor gives her a "sour brew," possibly 
of redcurrant juice, without Kerewin's chemical '"additives,''' and then 
vanishes (425). Kerewin is then hailed by the land and to the land: 
Haere mail 
Nau mail 
Haere mail 
an earthdeep bass. (426) 
Following a dream of an unknown landscape, sprouting under her touch 
the new buildings of a rebuilt marae, "onto the land as sweet and natural 
as though they'd grown there", she wonders, "Where is the land I am 
invited to?" (428). However, it is not simply a specific land to which she is 
called, but to the land, and to the people, as to the Maori in her origins. 
This has been foreshadowed in her earlier dreams of the marae at the heart 
. of the island of Maukiekie, the body imagery here supported by her 
perception of the '''island breathing, or Papa herselfltl (254) At the end of 
the dreams, which she did not understand, a great voice tells her, "'Kerial 
Kerial" (254), thereby linking her to Joe's redemption by the kaumatua 
who has looked for a "digger" as well as the "broken man." 
The drawing of elements of the text, not least the characters 
themselves, into a final togetherness is symbolised in the tricephalos 
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Kerewin sculpts: "Beads of clay flattened, beads of clay raised. Day by day, 
the three faces grow. The blunt blind features become definite, refined, 
awake./Back of head to back of head to back of head: a tricephalos" (314). 
The heads are those of Kerewin, Joe and Simon. The final scene of the 
novel is one of family meeting and resolution, and the formation of a new 
togetherness among Joe, Simon and Kerewin, as Kerewin "offered them 
both that unlikely gift, her name" (444). That this is described by Kerewin 
as simply good sense underscores the novel's insistence on this conscious 
act of allegiance as the path to a more general healing of cultural and 
historical wounds. The conclusion is an optimistic pointing to such a new 
beginning: 
Reaching out with one hand to join us, 'Ka ao, ka ao, ka awatea ... .' 
It is dawn, indeed it is dawn, and bright broad daylight braiding our 
home.' 
TE MUTUNGA -- RANEI TE TAKE. (445) 
The Bone People therefore adopts an essentialist standpoint of 
privileged Maori values as the way to national-cultural redemption, at the 
same time positing it as a matter of allegiance, necessarily one of conscious, 
choice. The value of the Maori essentialism has been in constructing a 
discursive territory of contestation, and a discourse of difference for the 
post-colonised culture and its subjects, resisting its easy subsumption 
under totalising Pakeha cultural and institutional formations. However, 
at the same time, the novel consciously undercuts its own essentialist 
propositions, in the (interHextual recognition of the history of cultural 
interruption, intervention and fragmentation which has resulted in the 
hybridity of Maori discourse. Because it is self-conscious, as has been 
shown, this should not be read as the inauthenticity of its Maori discourse, 
but as th~ strategic negotiation of the difference of Ma()ri to Pakeha, and 
'-~ __ ~." _ _ ~_ _ _ "-I 
,~«;H!fe!~I!c:~QLMaori to itself. It is an enactment of theparticul~r 
differance of settler post-colonial culture. 
The discussion of post-colonial discourses in Section Two of this thesis 
has focused on questions o!p~~i!~onality: position as 'self' or 'other' in 
relation to the 'dominant discourse' and to its institutionalisation within 
the hegemonic culture. However, the specific value of subject-positions, 
and the discourses which articulate them, was shown ~_b~mQre complex 
than the authorisation of the 'self' and the marginalisation of the 'other'. 
The post-colonial anxiety concerning authenticity and belonging has 
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resulted in both the discursive valorisation of the (position of the) other of 
the dominant settler cultures -- which may amount to an appropriation of 
that position which parallels the appropriation of the indigenous place on 
the land -- and the author-isation of the discourses of Nation's Others (the 
identities 'produced' by the exclusions of National identity, and which 
'return' in post-colonialism), in which processes of 'self-making' and of 
the reaffirmation of belonging are both complicit with, and subversive of, 
discursive and textual hegemonies. Chapter Five concluded with a 
discussion of The Bone People which specified 'hybridity' as a problematic 
which informs these ambivalences. In Section Three of the thesis I 
examine, not so much specific post-colonial discourses, as problem(atic)s . 
which characterise their construction and articulation. Chapter Six, the 
first chapter in that section, continues the discussion of hybridity which 
began in Chapter Five, positing it as a problematic of settler post-colonial 
subjectivity and discourse. 
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CHAPTER SIX. 
REFLECfIONS ON THE BODY/OF THE TEXT. 
6. I. (Re)Introduction. 
Chapter Six constitutes both a return to the body of the thesis, and a 
return of the body to the thesis. In turning the 'gaze' of my discussion back 
upon itself, I recognise, however, that such a re-turn is not the regaining of 
the original. Instead, I re-read the thesis through the opacity of itself, each 
part 'contaminated' by all the others. Thus it neither begins nor ends with 
a concluding metadiscourse which claims transparency to the 'original' 
text, offering the closure of mimesis, and representation where the part is 
already the whole -- the 'essential' argument. Instead there is the further 
elaboration of a problematic of post-colonial discourse and subjectivity 
which has gradually been demonstrated in preceding chapters -- that is, 
hybridity. While the last chapter concluded with a discussion of the 
hybridity of post-colonial discourses and the hybrid subject-positions they 
produce, the introduction in this chapter of Bhabha's analysis of colonial 
hybridity serves to specify this as a condition which has been implicit in 
much of the discussion of post-colonial discourses and texts in the thesis. 
Bhabha's analysis therefore provides a certain mirror on the thesis, while 
this text provides a multifaceted mirror on Bhabha's. It enacts, for 
instance, the return of the image of the (phallocentric) production of 
sexual difference as the 'silent support' of (post-)colonial subjective 
differentiation. Further, the implications of phallocentric sexual 
differentiation for post-colonial subjectivity and discourse, and for cultural 
production and critique (theorising), are explored, demonstrating their 
culmination in the continual necessity of abstracting the subject from the 
body. However, failures of abstraction result in the- abjection of the 
(phallocentric) subject, and signal the return of the body, a return whose 
insistence points to the radical strategy of bodily 'con-tamination' of 
discourse and subjectivity as the basis of post-colonial cultural production. 
As it is specifically the maternal/female body which is. excluded from 
paternal/Symbolic Law, this chapter must function both as the 
reintroduction of the body of the thesis -- preventing the phallocentrism of 
metadiscourse -- and of the sexed body to the thesis -- keeping open the 
possibilities of dialogue and exchange. It is the materiality of the body (of 
text) which is privileged. 
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This Section functions to acknowledge the academically sanctioned 
habit of 'conclusion', so that its position within the thesis is 'in 
conclusion'. However it attempts to subvert such closure within its own 
structure and by including a final chapter whose status is the ambivalent 
one of supplement, so that it embodies 'inconclusion'. The Section argues 
and enacts the necessity for the return of the body, and specifically the 
maternally-connoted body to the orders of language and subjectivity, the 
inclusion of the maternal body and the possibility of sexual difference 
rendered as in(con)clusion. Further, the 'con' is bracketed to suggest 
precisely the specificities of sexual difference, resisting the phallocentric 
order of the Same which in it~ Symbolic order contains the feminine as a 
reflection of itself. 
6. II. The Problematic of Hybridity. 
Much of this thesis has concerned the hybridity of post-colonial 
discourses: I have tried to show resistant discourses which paradoxically 
conform to the desire of the dominant discourse they contest, both 
assuming and offering, for example; originality, presence, and identity; and 
similarly dominant discourses have been shown to appropriate the image 
of 'original presence' identified with indigenous populations, women, and 
the working class, through their putative closeness to the land, to natural 
origins, even to pre-urban and pre-industrial 'traditional' cultures. 
Nevertheless, the appropriation of the content and even position of 
contestatory discourses by the subjects of the dominant discourses 
necessarily implies their insertion into the economy of exchange(-ability) 
which characterises the social Symbolic. In other words, their Imaginary 
'difference' is inserted into and articulated by the Symbolic order of the 
(valorised) Same. The demands of contestatory discourses -- for rights, 
representation, identity -- conform to, or mirror, the ethical, legal, 
theological precepts of the very discourses they oppose. Therefore, 
discourses of resistance cannot be understood as radically Other: indeed 
their oppositional status names their relational construction; while their 
relational status points to their position on some shared boundary between 
discourses where their agonism is played out. If it were radically Other-
wise, the dominant discourse, or discursive structures would remain 
untouched, intact: the Other discourse would neither be resistant nor 
contestatory nor oppositional. In short, the ideal of pure alterity would 
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achieve nothing in its non-relational status, while resistant discourses 
must contend with the difference-from-themselves that is hybridity. 
Chapter Five, for example, concluded with a discussion of the hybridity 
of post-colonial discourses in The Bone People. It was discovered in the 
linguistic alienation of Joe, whose 'Maoriness' is alienated, yet marked, in 
the bitterness of his use of English, and in Kerewin, whose 'Maoriness' is 
alienated in trivial word-play; and in the fact that both Kerewin and Joe 
acknowledge the loss of their 'Maoriness', a loss whose supposedly 
original 'presence' was projected as the effect of loss itself. As Bhabha 
observes, "the difference of cultures can no longer be identified or 
evaluated as objects of epistemological or moral contemplation: they are 
not simply there to be seen or appropriated."l Further, hybridity is the 
condition of the cultural self-consciousness of Tiaki, who recognises his 
people as mere 'husks', aping European manners and customs, and of Joe, 
for whom awareness of cultural difference precludes the plenitude of 
continuity with a 'Maori' cultural past. Yet 
[t]o see the cultural not as the source of conflict -- different cultures --
but as the effect of discriminatory practices :..- the production of 
cultural differentiation as signs of authority -- changes its value and 
its rules of recognition. What is preserved is the visible surfaces of its 
artefacts -- the mere visibility of the symbol, as a fleeting immediacy.2 
Even the construction of a post-colonial identity must therefore be 
understood as such an artefact of hybrid cultural production, an artefact of 
the (positive/productive and negative/exclusive) discriminatory gaze. In 
this way, Joe is marked by appearance as 'Maori', despite feeling alienated 
from traditional and spiritual facets of Maori identity, and Kerewin, who . 
'feels' Maori, but does not 'appear' so, must assert this identity in response 
to a sceptical discriminatory gaze. It was argued that The Bone People 
posits a strategy of self-conscious essentialism in which 'Maori' values are 
privileged within the organically-inspired social ideal of 'commensalism'. 
As self-conscious essentialism, it is a contradictory strategy -- or strategic 
contradiction -- and yet as resistance there is arguably no other ground 
available in post-colonial space than that of hybridity. Therefore, despite 
Benita Parry's criticism of the "dec:onstructive" analytical practices of 
Bhabha (and Spivak), which claims that they "act to constrain the 
development of an anti-imperialist critique,"3 it is more useful to 
acknowledge their problematisation of positivist discourses which 
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disavow precisely their oppositional, and thus their relational, deferred, 
displaced, status. This problematisation of positivism does not preclude 
efficacy in anti-imperialist critique. Bhabha argues that hybridity "reveals 
the ambivalence at the source of traditional discourses on authority and 
enables a form of subversion, founded on that uncertainty that turns the 
discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention. "4 
However, to move beyond the circumscriptions of such strategy requires 
the analysis and dismantling of the terms of encounter out of which 
hybridity occurs -- a kind of rewriting of history, or more precisely, 
historicity.s 
Hybridity must not be understood as in any sense a resolution of terms 
of cultural difference, a synthesis which transcends the dialectical pairing 
of thesis and antithesis, thereby establishing a new colonial -- post-colonial 
-- positivity of culture or identity. Rather than "a problem of genealogy or 
identity between two different cultures .... [h]ybridity is a problematic of 
colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of 
colonialist disavowal so that other 'denied' knowledges enter upon the 
dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority."6 The agonistic 
relations between these terms of Self and Otherness, admitted and 
disavowed knowledges, are kept in playas definitive of hybridisation. 
They emerge, for example, in settler post-colonial discourses of bi-
culturalism (New Zealand) and of multi-culturalism (Australia, Canada). 
Neither refers to a 'melt..,down' of cultural difference, nor to a meeting of 
original and pure cultures, but rather to a negotiation of hybrid 
(op)positionalities whose strength lies in their relational location along 
shifting but discursively impermeable boundaries. This point will be 
developed further through the chapter. 
Bhabha's analysis is related specifically to the colonial encounter; 
however, its terms are clearly important for consideration of post-colonial 
cultures and discourses. It defines the fundamental structuring of 
relations which in turn determine the content of their cultural 'artefacts'. 
Similarly, colonisation itself, although frequently referred to here as an 
'encounter', must not be understood as a discrete 'event'. There is no 
moment at which a land or people are 'colonised', and a new, 'colonial' 
society set in place. The encounter is in the form of relations which, as 
discussion in Chapters Two and Three illustrated (through post-colonial 
texts which posit the indigenous relation to the land as subject to persistent 
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colonisation) are maintained through the structural inequalities and 
processes of discrimination. In addition, Stephen SIemon refers to post-
colonialism's retention of ,"a specifically anti-colonial discursive energy ... 
which emerges not from the inherent cultural contradiction that 
necessarily marks transplanted settler societies but rather from their 
continuing yet subterranean tradition of refusal towards the conceptual 
and cultural apparatuses of the European imperium."7 However, despite 
the invaluable terms of Bhabha'a analysis, they are extended here to take 
account of the advent of Nation in Britain's white-settler colonies, and of 
Nation as informing and indeed 'motivating', or driving, the symptomatic 
(of prior repression), hybrid post-colonial discourses of contestation. 
The dismantling of the terms of the settler-colonial encounter may 
begin with a return to the argument of Chapter One, which took as its 
beginning the advent of Nation as analogous to the erection of the 
monolithic 'Self'. A colonial-cultural 'mirror-stage' was posited, so that 
whereas colonial hybridity -- the particular self-other relation of differance 
constituted by the colonial encounter -- is founded upon the disavowal of 
the productivity of that encounter, or the functioning of the mirror as 
anything other than mimetic, Nation is constituted through a process of 
repression of colonialism's already hybrid objects.8 The construction of 
Nationhood is differentiated from the colonial relation in that colonial 
authority is explicitly founded upon its identification as a metonym of 
Empire, and colonial identity as legitimised through its metonymic status 
as British, disavowing its already displaced, hybrid status, while Nation 
disavows Britain as the source of authority, even if Britain provides terms 
fundamental to its dominant cultural assumptions. Further, Nation 
disavows the imperial relations which structure it and lend it its authority. 
Instead, the Nation claims to name itself as 'Self', emphasising identity 
within itself -- presence -- rather than difference from Britain or Empire, 
let alone similarity to these. It is these disavowals which will be shown to 
return asa threat to Nation's putative autonomy. Nationalism can be 
understood as that political drive toward the instigation of body-
separateness from the Imperial (M)Other, and which proffers the image of 
body-unity. Nation therefore stands alone and apparently autonomous, 
not as English, but as the form(ul)ation of 'Australia' or 'Canada' or 'New 
Zealand'. 
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To understand the power of Nation's appearance of presence-to-itself, 
the appearance which underlies and guarantees its authority, it is helpful 
to see it as the product of a 'mirror' encounter. Chapter One explained the 
ambivalence of the passage of the mirror-stage: primary narcissism directs 
the infant's positive investment in wholeness and unity, and by extension, 
the narcissistic drive is posited as the morphology for preoccuption with 
(images of) national identity. Literature functions as an important 
'mirror' in the production of these images. However, the mirror 
encounter also instigates a relational sense of self, and identity -- also a 
relational construct -- is attained only at the cost of presence to the self, or 
plenitude. It is this plenitude which is sacrificed in the attainment of the 
whole and unique, or autonomous, body-image by way of the production 
of discriminations, their objects relegated to the status of the not-Self, and 
repressed. It is the not-Self which would compromise the image of 
wholeness and autonomy. Produced by the mirror encounter in the 
Imaginary, the not-Self is structured by, and returns through, that same 
Imaginary, to be accorded the status of discriminated identities, stereotypes 
of the Imaginary -- Nation's Others. In short, the 'identities' of Others owe 
more to the structure of the Imaginary than to any anterior, alterior 
presence. This initially alarming insight into the ontology of resistant 
subjects and discourses does, nevertheless, point to a more radical site of 
intervention into colonising power relations, as will be shown. 
As the mirror stage determines that the (sense of) self is separated from 
the image of the (ideal) self, a process which is the precursor to castration 
in and by language, an ambivalent mix of loss and compensation is set in 
place. As has been stated, in exchange for presence the subject attains 
identity, and this enables participation in the Symbolic order through the 
'I' whose articulation will effect a suture of the separation of self and 
image, or signified and signifier. While narcissism is accompanied by a 
primary aggression, characterising relations of exchange, substitution, and 
representation, these terms are essential to the Symbolic order, the order of 
representations: 'I' for self; identity for presence; and image for 
corporeality. However, the suture is never entirely successful. There is 
always a residual lack or absence in language which both founds desire, 
and ensures the subject's traversal of an endless chain of signifiers, eluded 
by fullness and by closure. These absences in language constitute the 
vulnerability of the subject's place in the Symbolic. Further, this account 
must be extended (and ultimately fractured) by the recognition of the 
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double alienation of the female 'subject' who is either alienated from 
more than in the Symbolic (,normal femininity'), or doubly alienated 
from herself by it ('masculinity complex'). In other words, while language 
calls the masculine subject into being, it is language which renders the 
'feminine subject' an impossible contradiction. 
If the image replaces corporeality -- absence replaces presence -- it is 
necessary to look at the inducements to privilege a place within the Law 
which articulates -- even masters -- the subject, over the jouissance of the 
body. This re-siting of privilege is once again a function of the mirror 
stage. The encounter with the mirror raises the threat of 'castration', a 
threat associated with access to the mother's body, access which 'occurred' 
in uninterrupted plenitude in the pre-Imaginary. The mirror image 
confronts the infant with the absence or lack of/in the mother, 
concomitant with its own 'wholeness' and 'autonomy'. While celebratory 
of that wholeness and autonomy, the Imaginary infant perceives that the 
'castration' of the mother threatens it with its own castration (the 
recognition of its existence as the product of separation). Therefore the 
narcissistic investment in bodily integrity directs the infant's identification 
(the position offered the boy) and desire (the position offered the girl) to 
the privileges of subjectivity and legitimacy offered by the Law, the 
Name/No of the Father. To identify with the mother, or to retain her 
desire, would confront the infant with the threat of castration, because in 
the Imaginary the mother is perceived (imagined) as castrated, whereas the 
Father has the Phallus. 
Thus we return to the determinate power of the mirror and its 
productivity. In his analysis of the colonial encounter, Bhabha has warned 
against underestimating the importance of the surface appearance 
projected through the mirror image: 
The power play of presence is lost if its transparency is treated naIvely 
as the nostalgia for plenitude that should be flung repeatedly into the 
abyss -- mis en abime -- from which its desire is born .... For it is this 
surface that stabilizes the agonistic colonial space; it is its appearance 
that regulates the ambivalence between origin and Entstellung, 
discipline and desire, mimesis and repetition.9 
It is this same power piay of presence which stabilises the authority of 
Nation, casting it as transparent to its 'self' -- Nation as the articulation of a 
structured surface, or image. To refer to surfaces in this manner should 
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not be understood as implying their 'falsity', nor that 'truth' resides, in its 
integrity, in the depths beneath. The Imaginary order ensures that there is 
only a play of surfaces, and that in this depthlessness there can be no 
reversal of positions which would be truer to origins or presence. 
Therefore, what is repressed in the formation of Nation, the content of its 
'unconscious', is not natural presences, but already hybrid objects, 
discriminated and constituted as identity-effects in that Imaginary 
encounter. What is disavowed is the process of the construction of these 
'identities', and their hybrid status. It is now possible to see the authority 
of Nation as the articulation of a structured surface, an image which 
represents, and is held to be representative of, Nation. 
In Chapter One I argued that the constructions of images of national 
identity in Australia, Canada and New Zealand have their basis in some 
form of 'representation'. It was shown that images of national 
'distinctiveness' emphasised national 'autonomy', so that the 
representation was the image, and the image already the 'whole'. Images 
of national 'typicality' invoked the representation of metonymy, where 
the 'part' does not fill, but stands for, the 'whole'. Finally, images of 
identification with the 'valorised exception' constituted representation in 
which the part was erected on the basis of its privileged right to 'speak for' 
the whole. Images of national identity were argued to concern the 
representation of a Self, as the construct of Nation involved the repression 
of (its) Others. However, in Chapters Four and Five I considered the more 
complex politics of representation in the subjective and discursive 
territorialisation of post-colonial contestations of that Nation-Self. The 
issue became one of both the representation of the Self and the re{-) 
presentation of the Other, the result of the return of Nation's repressed 
Others from its 'unconscious', and demanding re-presentation. Indeed, 
the questions, problematisations and demands which destabilise the 
smooth surface of of Nation's authority, disrupting the transparency of 
that authority, are posed from the post-colonised discursive space (which 
must now be understood as the hybrid space of Nation's mirror reflection). 
This is emphatically not to argue that the post-colonised represent the on~y 
true post-colonial subjectivity, as has been suggested by Mark Williams, 
for example, who claims that "Post-colonialism speaks on behalf of those 
dispossessed by empire and struggling in its wake to. reconstitute, or 
constitute anew, their identities."lO 'Post-colonialism' does not speak such 
a unified subject. While this is a mode of post-colonial discourse, it would 
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be misleading to understand it in these limited terms alone. It is with this 
understanding that Wiiliams can go on to ask "are Breyten Bretenbach or 
J.M. Coetzee post-colonial writers because they write against a colonizing 
power or are they disqualified because both belong to the oppressing racial 
group that still benefits from colonization?"l1 I argue that such searching 
for unified terms of definitive (and autonomous) identity elides the very 
issues of complex positionality generated by the post-colonial condition. In 
a similar vein, but more prescriptively than Williams, Linda Hutcheon 
has argued that "when Canadian culture is called post-colonial today the 
reference is very rarely to the Native culture, which might be the more 
accurate use of the term .... Native and Metis writers are today demanding 
a voice ... and perhaps, given their artticulations of the damage to Indian 
culture and people done by the colonizers . . . and the process of 
colonization, theirs should be considered the resisting post-colonial voice 
of Canada."12 Post-colonial subjectivity embraces both post-coloniser and 
post-colonised in the mutual (even if not equal) loss of originality and 
authenticity, and the interrogation of cultural codes and bases of authority. 
If the post-colonised position is that from which the question of National 
authority is posed, the question already inheres within Nation, within its 
disturbed authority. Therefore, just as the discussion of the representation 
of Nation included 'representation' in the politico-administrative sense 
and in the (also political) sense of the construction of identity-images, 
these two meanings, which can be aligned with the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary orders respectively, are negotiated in post-colonial questions of 
hybrid representation. 
Nation's claim to represent its Self is contested by the exposure, in 
post-colonialism, of the necessary basis of its power in the representation 
of, or the more clearly aggressive substitution for, the Other. Questions 
raised in Chapter Four of the 'dominant' representation of 'marginal' 
Others included both the concern with the Imaginary -- the production of 
(both positive and negative) images of the Other -- and with Symbolic 
questions of subjectivity -- not how the Other should be represented, but by 
whom. The violence of representation was identified as being less in the 
nature of images, than located in the arrogation to the dominant National 
Self of subjective privilege, the right to speak for and about the Other; in 
other words, in the Symbolic nature of representation. Post-colonial 
contestatory discourses therefore argue the political necessity of refusal to 
'colonise' the discursive space of the Other-Self, and that one must specify 
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one's credentials to speak by specifying the 'fit' of (Imaginary) identity and 
(Symbolic) subject-position. They therefore posit the territorialisation of 
discursive space as a counter-strategy against the political or discursive 
colonisation or appropriation, a move which actually reflects the 
dominant notions of subjectivity, identity, and transgression which named 
them Other and policed the boundaries of authorised discourse. Further, 
the only means of defence of 'their own' discursive territory is the weapon 
of identity, that which recognises them in the field of the Other. Thus they 
are more or less imprisoned in the discursive space proffered by the 
dominant discourse, but because identity substitutes for presence, it must 
also be recognised that they are not there; and 'they' are not, there. 
Like National strategies of self-representation, post-colonial privileging 
of the representation of the Self not only negotiates the Imaginary sense of 
representation as image and the Symbolic sense of substitution-
subjectivity, but merges them into a parallel conflation of identity and 
truth or knowledge: the possibility of 'true' representations produced by 
'identities' which guarantee, and are reflected in, subject-positions. 
However, as Gayatri Spivak has argued, this "cannot be held as a 
theoretical presupposition. . . . [K]nowledge is made possible and is 
sustained by irreducible difference, not identity. What is known is always 
in excess of knowledge. Knowledge is never adequate to its object."13 The 
essentialist assumption of adequacy, which is also that of truth to identity 
and identity to truth, relies on the same mirror-relation and the same 
mirror morphology which underlies the determination of colonial 
positionality and of 'national identity'. It is the mirror of mimesis, where 
self and image are held to be entirely coterminous. It overlooks the 
production of the image out of difference, and the location of the image in 
the inaccessible field of the Other, returned to the Self only by way of the 
phallus. The phallus stands for the logic of substitution and 
representation, not presence; it is that which signifies the repression of 
difference (the difference-in-being), while ensuring that identity is both not 
Self, and not not-Self. 
However, returning to -- or still within -- the as yet inescapable power 
of the Imaginary, it is necessary to acknowledge the implications of a 
politicised Imaginary, that images are political, and that they embody a 
form of violence, whether they are 'negative' or 'positive'. The question 
is not one of the ability or right to circulate images, with the assumption 
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that self-representation will be 'positive', let alone 'true'; nor is it solely 
the issue of the violence which inheres in all representations or images as 
substitutions (whether ontological or epistemological). It is, further, that 
the structuring of the Imaginary order itself is political, in that it is not 
'human' or 'universal', but rather 'masculine' and 'Western'. In eliding 
these specificities, however, it speaks of the 'human' and the 'universal'. 
This is a political issue of representation and a political act of silencing or 
suppression. Masculine, Western self-representation submits to the 
violence of all representations (within phallocentrism); however within 
this order, even positive (self-)images produced by or for those positioned 
as Other will be further contained as reflections or negatives of the 
valorised, phallocentric Self. In other words, there is a specific politics, or a 
politics of specificity, informing the very structuring of the Imaginary, and 
it is this which must be addressed. 
Post-colonial discourses which disavow their status as hybrid products 
of the colonial encounter, repressed into the 'unconscious' of Nation and 
returning through the National Imaginary, and instead privilege their 
own claims to identity, can be argued to be at least partially complicit in the 
process by which they are reappropriated by the dominant discourse. Their 
focus on Imaginary identity is flattering to the narcissism of Nation --
indeed they arguably become fetishised by Nation. True alterity cannot be 
found(ed) in a reversal of the mirror gaze, because the mirror itself is no 
natural or innocent medium. It is a technology specific to the production 
of certain -- dominant -- cultural effects. It is therefore necessary to heed 
Bhabha's identification of "the need, in our contemporary moment, to 
contest singularities of difference and to articulate modes of 
differentiation. "14 
6. II. (D. The Hybridity of 'Hybridity': The Mirror Speaks B~ck. 
Ironically, the articulation of modes of differentiation may begin with the 
revelation of the terms upon which Bhabha's own analysis of colonial 
differentiation, discrimination, and authority are founded. It can be 
suggested that his own discourse is the (hybrid) product of an encounter 
with the mirror of sexual differentiation; its terms pervade Bhabha's 
analysis but the productivity of the encounter is, at this point, disavowed.15 
The Lacanian analysis of sexual difference is 'invisible', but is the 
condition of visibility of his own argument. Thus colonial difference can 
be understood as the product, or even the hybrid of sexual difference. It is 
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therefore this debt which must now be acknowledged. In bringing this 
encounter from 'disavowal' to light, it is also possible to demonstrate the 
hybridity of sexual difference -- its non-present, non-essential differance, its 
terms as the product(ivity) of (a specific) Imaginary structuring, and its 
articulation through a socio-Symbolic order which legitimises that 
Imaginary. It is also this de stabilisation of the transparency of its authority 
that will allow it to be recognised as a powerful, and therefore 'true', 
reflection of currently existing modes of sexual differentiation, and by 
analogy cultural differentiation in colonial through to post-colonial 
discourses of identity-in-resistance, but which at the same time identifies 
the ground of its own deconstruction. Specifically, it will be shown that 
'sexual difference' is not difference after all, but rather contained in a 
binary logic of presence and absence. 'Sexual difference' does not underlie 
sexual relations as articulated in the social Symbolic, but is produced 
within the logic of the Imaginary encounter itself. What follows is a 
mirror encounter of passages from Bhabha's analysis of racial! cultural 
difference in his "Signs Taken for Wonders," and its reflection of the 
process of sexual difference. 
Hybridity Before th~ Mirror of Sexual Difference. 
"What is 'English'in ... discourses of 
colonial power cannot be represented as a 
plenitude or a 'full' presence; it is 
determined by its belatedness. As a 
signifier of authority, the English book 
acquires its meaning after the traumatic 
scenario of colonial difference, cultural or 
racial, returns the eye of power to some 
prior, archaic image or identity. 
Paradoxically, however, such an image 
can neither be 'original' - by virtue of the 
act of repetition that constructs it -- nor 
'identical' -- by virtue of the difference 
that defines it. Consequently, the 
colonial presence is always ambivalent, 
split between its appearance as original 
and authoritative and its articulation as 
repetition and difference. It is this 
ambivalence that makes the boundaries 
of colonial 'positionality' -- the division 
of self/other -- and the question of 
colonial power -- the differentiation of 
colonizer / colonized -- different from 
both the Hegelian master/slave dialectic 
or the phenomenological projection of 
Otherness. It is a differance produced 
within the act of enunciation as a 
specifically colonial articulation of these 
two disproportionate sites of colonial 
discourse and power: the colonial scene 
as the invention of historicity, mastery, 
mimesis, or as the 'other scene' of 
Entstellung, displacement, fantasy, 
psychic defence, and an 'open' textuality. 
Such a dis-play of difference produces a 
mode of authority that is agonistic (rather 
than antagonistic)". 
What is 'masculine' in discourses of 
phallocentrism cannot be represented as 
a plenitude or a 'full' presence; it is 
determined by its belatedness. As a 
signifier of authority, the Phallus 
acquires its meaning (value) after the 
traumatic scenario of sexual difference 
which institutes the narcissistic gaze and 
its disavowal of castration. However the 
image produced by the narcissistic gaze 
can neither be 'original' -- by virtue of 
the act of repetition (in the field of the 
Other) that constructs it - not 'identical' 
- by virtue of the difference (of 'self and 
'image') that defines it. Consequently, 
the masculine presence of 
phallocentrism is always ambivalent, 
split between its appearance as original 
and authoritative and its articulation as 
repetition and difference. It is this 
ambivalence that makes the boundaries 
of sexual 'positionality' - the division of 
masculine/ feminine -- and the question 
of patriarchal power -- the differentiation 
of men/women -- different from both 
the Hegelian master/slave dialectic or 
the phenomenological projection of 
Otherness. It is a differance produced 
within the act of enunciation as a 
specifically sexual articulation of these 
two disproportionate sites of sexual 
discourse and power: the mirror 
encounter as the invention of 
phallocentric historicity, mastery, 
mimesis, or as the 'other scene' of 
Entstellung, displacement, fantasy, 
psychic defence, and an 'open' textuality. 
Such a dis-play of difference produces a 
mode of authOrity that is agonistic 
(rather than antagonistic). 
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"Despite appearances, the text of 
transparency inscribes a double vision: 
the field of the 'true' emerges as a visible 
effect of knowledge/power only after the 
regulatory and displacing division of the 
true and the false. From this point of 
view, discursive 'transparency' is best 
read in the photographic sense in which a 
transparency is also always a negative, 
processed into visibility ... , not a source 
but a re-source of light. Such a bringing 
to light is never a prevision; it is always 
the question of the provision of visibility 
as a capacity, a strategy, an agency but also 
in the sense in which the prefix 
pro(vision) might indicate an elision of 
sight, delegation, substitution, contiguity, 
in place of ... what?" 
"The exercise of colonialist authority, 
however, requires the production of 
differen tia tions, individ ua tions, 
identity-effects through which 
discriminatory practices can map out 
subject populations that are tarred with 
the visible and transparent mark of 
power .... Colonial authority requires 
modes of discrimination . . . that 
disallow a stable unitary assumption of 
collectivity. The 'part' (which must be 
the colonialist foreign body) must be 
representative of the 'whole' (conquered 
country), but the right of representation 
is based on its radical difference". 
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Despite appearances, the visibility of the 
Phallus (signification, truth, identity) 
inscribes a double vision: the Phallus 
emerges as the visibility of 
knowledge/power only after the 
possibility of its loss or absence (in the 
castrated or split subject). Therefore it is 
not originally there, followed by its 
perception and valuation, but is 
produced out of its differentiation from 
lack/absence. It is the product of the 
power of the mirror to reflect the 'light' 
of the phallic gaze on to 'it'. From this 
point of view, the phallocentric 
'transparency' (of authority) is best read 
in the photographic sense in which a 
transparency is also always a negative, 
processed into visibility: in which the 
feminine is the negative out of which 
masculine positivity is produced. Such a 
bringing to light of the masculine subject 
-- and his privileged relation to the 
Phallus -- is never a prevision; it is 
always a question of the provision of 
visibility as a capacity, a strategy, an 
agency but also in the sense in which the 
prefix pro(vision) might indicate an 
elision of sight, delegation, substitution, 
contiguity, in place of what? The 
feminine -- invisible but the condition 
of viSibility. 
The exercise patriarchal authority ... 
requires the production of sexual 
differen tiations, indi vid ua tions, 
identity-effects throught which the 
discriminatory gaze can map out subject 
populations that are scarred with the 
visible mark of castration .... Patriarchal 
authority requires modes of 
discrimination that disallow a stable 
unitary assumption of collectivity or 
wholeness. The 'part' (whiCh must be 
the Phallus) must be representative of 
the 'hole' (the castrated feminine), but 
the right of representation is based on 
the logic which produces phallic 
positivity. 
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6. II. (ii). Colonisation and Sexual Difference: Where the Part 
Represents the (W)hole. From the moment of the mirror encounter and 
the instigation of the Imaginary order, it becomes impossible to speak of 
'male' and 'female' as natural presences (and of course before this, they are 
undifferentiated). The Imaginary order of images makes available to 
consciousness only the disembodied 'idea(l)', while the Symbolic order 
articulates values. Even 'man' and 'woman' constitute Symbolic 
articulations of Imaginary identities. Thus the terms 'masculine' and 
'feminine' are used in relation to Imaginary identities to emphasise both 
their status as 'idea(l)s' and their socio-cultural construction. The 
corollary, of course, for racial or cultural 'identity' following the colonial 
encounter is that the terms of such identities do not re-present natural or 
original presences, but the Symbolic articulation of Imaginary identities. 
Therefore the notion, in Chapters Four and Five, of embodied subject-
positions may now be more precisely understood as subject-positions 
inhabited by Imaginary bodies. This is in no way to diminish the real 
effects of power in relation to these bodies; colonial and/or patriarchal 
power produced them, and power contains and controls them, through the 
stereotypical conflation of 'being' and image, whereas the 'self' is always 
also elsewhere, and excessive.16 
Clearly, the mirror encounter structures the differentiation of 
masculine and feminine in a symbiotic relation. Thus they are non-
identical -- absent -- identities. However, the work of feminist theorist 
Luce Irigaray has exposed the already gendered hierarchisation of the 
masculine and feminine, not through a critique of the empirical basis of 
'truth' or 'falsity' of images of the masculine and feminine, but through 
an analysis of the morphology of the mirror itself. Irigaray's contestation 
reaches back to Freud's account of the entry into subjectivity predicated on 
the process of oedipalisation which, she points out, casts the feminine not 
as a positive term, but as the negative reflection of masculine positivity, 
guaranteeing its presence. Subjectivity consists of variations on one 
model, which will also be the model of one-ness. Femininity is 
constituted as dependence in relation to a phallic economy of sameness 
and identity, as determined by the definitive model.17 'Phallocentrism' 
names the use of one model and the definition of others in relation to it, 
the phallus being understood as the key or threshold signifier which 
divides the sexes into oppositional relation, separated by a bar, isomorphic 
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with the erection of a unity of being: the 1, the 1. However, the term 
'phallus' also points to the rationalisation of identity with reference to 
biology, itself also necessarily a socio-cultural construction which produces 
sex (or race). 'Phallus' (signifier), according to the logic of this construction, 
is conflated with 'penis' (organ), providing males with a privileged 
relation to subjectivity and the process of signification. Thus the attempt 
to recuperate the function of the phallus by freeing it from linguistic 
conflation with the penis (and presumably rendering it more palatable to 
feminism) would be misguided. The conflation points to the need to 
refuse the phallus, so that the penis (masculinity) both loses its privilege 
and regains its pleasure.18 The logic of phallic privilege is that instigated by 
Lacan's contribution of his own postulate of the mirror stage to Freud's 
theory of oedipalisation. The mirror stage indicates the specular economy 
of 'visibility' conditioning the entry into subjectivity and the relative 
positioning of 'the sexes' in relation to the phallus/penis. However, 
lrigaray's analysis points to the specificity, or non-innocence, of this 
mirror. Her view (through rather than into, or even from the mirror) is 
summarised by Grosz: 
Lacan's model of the genesis of the ego provides not a universal or 
human phenomenon, one preceding sexual difference; for [Irigaray], 
the mirror reflects only an image placed in front of it: the (implicitly) 
masculine being. The specular relation is thus composed of man and 
his self-reflecting other, an image of himself that he takes to be his 
other, woman. The speculative mirror in which his world, his 
experiences, his position(s) are projected onto the other must be 
traversed in order to clear a space for women's self-representations, 
for women to become the subjects looking.19 
The difference of lrigaray's aim from merely reversing given masculine 
and feminine subject positions in relation to the same mirror-morphology 
is explicated in later discussion. The conflation of penis· and phallus, and 
their construction into visibility -- the 'fact' that the penis is perceived as 
the organ of male sexuality, and that it is the phallus -- constructs 
masculinity as active, and femininity as the passive object of the gaze, a 
gaze which necessarily defines them as castrated, as lack. Grosz explains: 
The phallus and penis can only be aligned if there are those who lack 
it. It is assumed only on the basis of division and dichotomy, 
represented by the lack attribtlted to women. The penis can only 
enhance one's narcissism if it is somehow distinguished from other 
organs and parts of the body. It enhances men's narcissism because it 
constitutes their corporeal unity in relation to women's 
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incompleteness. The penis comes to represent tangibly the 
differences between the sexes as other organs, in our culture, do not, 
enabling it to function on an imaginary level to signify presence and 
absence or fullness and privation.20 
The masculine subject is therefore assured that he 'has' what woman 
'lacks' and thus desires. The phallus, as the term of exchange between 
them, functions as an emblem of language -- the third term which 
fractures the Imaginary dyad. Patriarchal socio-symbolic relations mirror 
phallocentric subjectivity; language and social relations are a product of the 
mirror of "dichotomous structures of knowledge, the binary polarisations 
in which only man's primacy is reflected."2l They are characterised by a 
specific singularity and monologism under the illusion of transparent 
reflections of the universal. Further, the masculine subject is isomorphic 
with the Western subject of colonialism and (post-)colonial Nationalism. 
As Irigaray argues, "all Western discourse presents a certain isomorphism 
with the masculine sex: the privilege of unity, form of the self, of the 
visible, of the specularisable, of the erection (which is the becoming in a 
form)."22 
The mirror structure which abstracts the subject from the body, 
necessitates that phallocentric self-reflection (self-knowledge, 
metadiscourse, theory) be a product of self-distance, the mediated 
relationship between terms on either side of -- therefore separated or 
distanced by -- the flat mirror of reflection or mimesis: "the near side, the 
empirical realm that is opaque of all language" and "the far side, the self-
sufficient infinite of the God of men. "23 That the positions are essentially 
irreversible and irreducible points to the logic which underlies patriarchy. 
The position of (male) dominance is founded on self-distance, the 
privileging of the ideal phallic image over the materiality of the body and 
its excess, including the 'excessiveness' of its jouissance. The earlier 
reference to the social construction of biology and sexuality can now be 
understood further in terms of the function of phallocentrism in arresting 
or solidifying, rather than expressing male sexuality. Irigaray argues that 
"to place genitality in a privileged position amounts in fact to according a 
privileged status to the values which unify, but also the values of 
production, the values of 'making', and with the aim of bringing to light 
something visible and which would be the proof of the efficiency of 
'making' -- in this case the child. "24 She points out that the "teleological 
model is ... possible for a man -- even if he thus loses pleasure,"2s and asks 
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why, for example, "such little emphasis has been placed on the fluidity of 
the sperm"26 rather than the solidity of its 'product', a possibility which 
could profoundly alter the representation of male sexuality. If it should 
seem curious that feminist thinkers such as Irigaray (and, for example, 
Cixous) should focus on the morphology of the male body, male sexuality, 
and masculine subjectivity, it can be seen as their recognition of the 
determining role these constructions have played in the possibilities for 
women's sexuality and subjectivity, and further that "the masculine can 
speak of and for the feminine largely because it has emptied itself of any 
relation to the male body, its specificity, and socio-political existence."27 
Therefore, while men stand to regain their polymorphous pleasures, it is 
also crucial for recognition of women's subjectivity and sexuality as other 
than that of non-man, that 
Men still have everything to say about their sexuality, and everything 
to write. For what they have said so far, for the most part, stems from 
the opposition activity/passivity, from the power relation between a 
fantasized obligatory virility meant to invade, to colonize, and the 
consequential phantasm of woman as a 'dark continent' to penetrate 
and to 'pacify.'28 
6. III. Concentricities. 
This section addresses three broad areas of challenge to phallocentrism, 
and its patriarchal cultural manifestations, by the materiality of the 
(female/maternal) body -- the 'sexual/textual' body. These include 
(feminist) considerations of the relationships between feminism and other 
(race, class) struggles against oppression, and between feminism-as-practice 
and the practice of theory; the attempt in this thesis to subvert some of the 
features of phallocentric argument through discursive self-touching and a 
concentric structure, while remaining contained in/by academic 
prescriptions; and the disruptive return of the (never fully) excluded 
maternal body as the abjection of the phallocentric subject. All three 
therefore acknowledge the location of the body in phallocentrism, so that 
"this 'outside the law' [which is the locus of femininity] is always already 
inside the field of meaning that the Law, the Logos, delimits. "29 
Nevertheless, it is a politically. necessary strategy to place this 
material/maternal body provisionally at the centre, in order to 
demonstrate the provisionality, and ultimate impossibility, of the phallic 
Ideal. Further, post-colonialism itself names the tension between the Law 
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and its impossibility, its discourses negotiating the materiality of culture 
and the disembodied Ideal of the Law. 
6. III. (i). Feminism and Post-Colonialism: At the Interface of Theory 
and Praxis. In a gesture which can be seen as symptomatic of the power of 
phallocentrism to determine even contestatory discursive paradigms, it 
has been argued that "Feminism has not in general provided post-colonial 
criticism with a model or models because its development has been rather 
as a coincident and parallel discourse."30 However, as has been suggested, 
the very notion of a 'model' is phallic, and it is one which feminism both 
actively and constitutively problematises. There is, for example, the 
plurality of feminisms which resist the unity implied in the 'model' 
because they function less as discrete or autonomous alternatives -- in 
which case they could offer models -- than as analyses, discourses, praxes, 
that continually refuse their erection into the positive form of a model. 
However, the question must also be raised of the desire that feminism 
fulfill this function, echoing as it does, the patriarchal demand for 
feminine perfection and self-display for masculine gratification. Braidotti 
warns, for example, in relation to the post-modern critique of 
representation and legitimacy, that "The specificity of the female 
problematic is implicitly denied by being melted into a sign -- a symptom? -
- of masculine preoccupations. "31 She asks, "Why does the subversion or 
deconstruction of the subject of rationality seem to imply the transition via 
the 'feminine'?", and suggests that "Feminism ... stands as the mark of 
desire for a new way to conduct human affairs, to think about the human 
being as an entity, as well as being the expression of a political will to 
achieve justice for women."32 These concerns for the retention of a 
specifically women's programme of social and political contestation recall 
similar concerns, discussed in Chapters Three and Four, that the specificity 
of indigenous contestation not be subsumed in the appropriation of the 
indigene as the sign of cultural authenticity in settler post-colonial 
cultures. In both cases, the 'place of enunciation', figured in Chapter Four 
as 'discursive territorialisation', functions as a limiting term on the 
groundless dissemination of discursive strategies of identification. 
However, the strategic value of theoretico-political alliances cannot be 
discounted; further, the 'autonomy' of political 'movements' is 
confronted not simply by their implication in the dominant political 
systems against which they struggle, but also by the multiple 
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interpellations of subjects of gender, race, class and other discourses and 
practices. Programmatic specificity need not be sacrificed in certain 
alliances or commonalities of analysis. However, unless such 
commonalities are founded on an understanding of the production of 
subjectivity out of discourses and their institutionalisation, theoretical 
impasses emerge which ultimately constrain effective social action or 
political change. There are, for example, feminist analyses predicated on 
phallocentric and universalising, humanist assumptions. The 'model' 
approach can be found in some attempts to construct a relationship 
between feminist analyses of women's oppression and post-colonial 
analyses of colonial oppressions. However, there is a tendency for such 
arguments to become caught in the stasis of binary contradiction, between 
whether the primacy of patriarchal oppression of women provides a 
model for subsequent/ consequent colonial oppression,33 or whether 
colonial oppression provides a model for the analysis of women's 
oppression.34 In other cases they are seen as two separate instances of 
oppression, so that women in (post-)colonial space are doubly colonised or 
oppressed,35 while this view has been challenged by those who 
differentiate (post-)colonial space into (post-)coloniser and (post-)colonised 
subject positions. These commentators maintain that white women, in 
relation to colonial oppression, are colonisers,36 or are at most 'half-
colonised', while it is indigenous women who bear the double burden of 
colonial and patriarchal oppression.37 'Class' analysis contributes a further 
dimension, as women are posited, along with 'underdeveloped societies', 
as "the unseen foundation for the entire social edifice of industrialism," so 
that "the women's question is related to the colonial question and ... both 
are related to the dominant, global capitalist-patriarchal model of 
accumulation,38 a perspective which is then vulnerable to the splitting 
into respective positions of (post-)coloniser and (post-)colonised women. 
It would be to disregard Bhabha's warning to denigrate the value of 
such empirical descriptions, as they reflect, within the hegemonic 
apparatus of power, the presence of authority, and the authority of 
presence. Further, the tendency of any such explanatory system to split 
under the weight of the production of further analytical paradigms, is a 
valuable indicator of the fundamental inadequacy of any model. 
However, while the humanist tradition of western consciousness which 
dominates settler post-colonial space valorises and articulates Imaginary 
presences, it remains trapped within the reproduction of its own blindness 
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to the conformity of knowledges to a specific rather than universal 
epistemology. Where feminism has recognised the specificity of a 
'masculine' structure of knowledges, this has, perhaps paradoxically, 
informed some feminist hostility to 'theory'. Toril Moi refers to the belief 
that "Theoretical discourse is ... inherently oppressive, a result of 
masculine libidinal investment. Even the question 'What is it?' is 
denounced as a sign of the masculine impulse to imprison reality in rigid 
hierarchical structures. "39 
However, an alternative understanding of the process of theorising is 
possible, one which is not predicated on the positivity of the model. For 
example, there is the functioning of feminisms to problematise a radical 
theory-praxis split, and thus the possibility of privileging one or the other 
of these in any definitive way. Moira Gatens has identified three ways in 
which the relationship between feminism and philosophical discourse 
(theory) could be characterised. The first, consistent with the view cited by 
Moi, is that there is no acceptable relation, and that by implication, 
"Feminism ... is pure praxis.4o Secondly, some feminist theoretical 
projects have focused on extending 'masculine' theory, so that "Feminist 
theory adds to, or completes, traditional or existing philosophy, by filling 
in the 'gaps' in political, moral and social theory."41 While this is argued 
to leave existing theoretical structures intact, addressing only the content, 
the third approach posits that "philosophy is not neutral in character, that 
the problem ... is not merely a problem of content." Feminists who hold 
this position "take feminist theory or a feminist perspective as their 
starting point and philosophy itself as the object of study."42 
Nevertheless, although it is clear that this has been the project of 
Irigaray, for example, in her deconstructive re-examination in Speculum 
of Western philosophical tradition from Plato to Freud -and beyond, it is 
also possible to see, particularly in relation to psychoanalysis, the way in 
which the feminist project of extension (the second project) can be used 
not to complement and complete masculine theory, but to push it beyond 
its limits, undermining its lawful integrity. Feminisms refuse theoretical 
integrity and purity as belonging to the paradigm of paternal anxiety to 
guarantee the Name-of-the-Father by 'policing the desire of women'. 
Instead, they are able to invoke theory-praxis both strategically and 
together.43 Spivak claims that "the best of French feminism encourages us 
to think of a double effort (against sexism and for feminism, with the lines 
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forever shifting),"44 and that the feminist is/must be "an essentialist from 
time to time."45 Braidotti's exploration of the politics of ontological 
difference is founded on her belief that "a feminist woman theoretician 
who is interested in thinking about sexual difference and the feminine 
today cannot afford not to be essentialist", while her discursive strategy 
"cannot be dissociated from the place of enunciation and the enunciative, 
textual game" in which she is involved.46 The strategic and provisional 
negotiation of positions is found in Gallop's claim that "Identity must be 
continually assumed and immediately called into question."47 However, 
such strategies form not only a basis for the development of a feminist 
political theory, but also describe the co-functioning and mutually 
questioning moments of feminist discourse. Paul Smith suggests that 
contemporary feminist theory could perhaps be regarded as a project 
which recognizes that its aims would scarcely be met by either the 
positing of a fixed identity or the conjuring of some new and 
dispersed 'subject'. And, in this respect it is almost unique -- and thus 
salutary -- among the various discourses of resistance.48 
6. III. (ii). The Body at the Centre of the Thesis. A similar strategic 
promiscuity has been employed in this thesis. Theoretical purity has been 
refused in the appropriation of elements of psychoanalytic theories of 
subjectivity, including both the Freudian and Lacanian master-discourses, 
and their feminist developments and contestations, as useful in the 
analysis of post-colonial (cultural) production of subjectivity, especially 
subjectivity in resistance. However, not 'faithful' to psychoanalysis, even 
in its varied moments, aspects of the work of Foucault, as well as his 
commentators -- followers and detractors -- have proved useful in analysis 
of post-colonial discourses. Texts analysed have included fiction, 
autobiography, and critical, cultural and theoretical writings, and the 
respective 'positions' of these' have shifted between their functions as 
subjects and objects of analysis, in an unsystematic way. 
The structure and relationship of chapters refuse linearity, and instead 
move in concentricities toward an in(con)clusive ending. In one sense, 
'post-colonialism' has been placed at the centre and the argument has 
moved outward to consider the 'subject' and its institutional and political 
analogues, toward the need to dismantle the 'subject' in its unified sense. 
The recognition of the construction of subjectivity in discourse pushed the 
circles out toward the consideration of discourses of identity, belonging, 
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authenticity and resistance in the settler post-colonial societies of 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The 'outer' circles hold those 
elements 'beyond' dominant cultural constructions -- femininity and the 
body -- maintained, by the centrifugal forces of western phallocentrism, 
apart from the privileged male western subject; but also placed within the 
thesis to enact the bodily embracement of all culture, discourse and 
subjectification. The 'circles' may therefore be read outward -- the 
'descriptive' argument -- and inward -- the 'critical' argument, in which 
the culturally and sexually inscribed body (of the text) is placed at the centre 
(though the artificiality of this distinction is demonstrated in their 
coterminosity). In this way, the thesis attempts to avoid both its own 
possible position as well as the position of the texts as "reduced to a passive 
'feminine' reflection of an unproblematically 'given', 'masculine' world 
or self."49 
6. III. (iii). Abjection: The Return of the Irrepressible Body. An 
important project of feminist theory continues to be the return of the sexed 
body to theories of subjectivity. One focus of this project has been the 
insertion, into phallocentric theories of subjective morphology, of the 
constitutively excluded maternal body, and the exploration of the 
consequent 'contamination' or 'failure' of that phallocentric subject. 
Therefore, it is useful to examine the implications of the masculine 
abandonment of corporeality in the constitution of subjectivity, with 
reference to Kristeva's postulate of 'abjection'. Despite the differences in 
their projects, both Irigaray and Kristeva are 
committed to developing analyses of the production of sexed 
subjectivity .... In articulating the mother-child relation as a site for 
both the transmission and the subversion of patriarchal values, both 
affirm the archaic force of the pre-oedipal, which although repressed 
is thus also permanently preserved. Both affirm the fluid 
polymorphous perverse status of libidinal drives and both evoke a 
series of sites of bodily pleasure capable of resisting the demands of 
the symbolic order.50 
In the infant's experience of the 'space' Kristeva calls the semiotic 
chora,51 the mother and infant form an undifferentiated body characterised 
by the circulation of drives and impulses: the infant requires food to 
sustain it and the mother feeds the infant and fills its being; the infant 
expels the excess, that which is constituted out of what is necessary but 
would engulf it and threaten its being/self. Thus the expulsions initiate 
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the process of separation from the mother's body in order to establish the 
infant's own, 'proper' (propre) body. They constitute "the earliest attempts 
to release the hold of maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her, 
thanks to the autonomy of language."52 Defined in relation to the child's 
drives and the mother's activities of feeding and cleaning, the sites of 
introjection and expulsion form rims, the undecidable inside-outside 
borders of the body which will later become erotogenic zones, and which 
will both project and threaten the infant's autonomous being. The 
mother's activities thus constitute a preliminary mapping of the infant's 
body, so that "Maternal authority is the trustee of that mapping of the self's 
clean and proper body; it is distinguished from paternal laws within 
which, with the phallic phase and acquisition of language, the destiny of 
man will take shape."53 It may therefore be said that despite the paternal 
incitement to symbolisation, the first writing of the body is the mother's. 
Abjection is the continual and constitutive need for that which is 
ultimately threatening to the subject, and the never entirely successful 
processes of exclusion and expulsion (of the threat). It forms the 
precondition of Imaginary narcissism, where the positive investment in 
the perceived image of body-unity is predicated on separation from the 
mother. However the foundation of unity in the 'work' of separation 
returns to confront the Imaginary-Symbolic being with its archaic debt. 
This return instigates the subject's abjection: "a violent, clumsy breaking 
away, with the constant risk of falling back under the sway of a power as 
securing as it is stifling;" so that with regard to the diachronic constitution 
of the subject, abjection is "co-existent with [narcissism] and causes it to be 
permanently brittle."54 
The wholeness, unity, and autonomy of the body as perceived in 
Imaginary narcissism, are themselves (pre)conditions of the 'clean and 
proper' bpdy of phallocentric, Symbolic subjectivity, where "The body 
must bear no trace of its debt to nature ... in order to be fully symbolic. "55 
That is, the Symbolic order of culture is psychically separated from nature 
and the body. Importantly, as will be shown, abjection as described by 
Kristeva is a condition of phallocentric subjectivity. Although formed in 
pre-Imaginary space through the delineation of its corporeal objects, it is a 
condition of the Symbolic subject, appearing through the gaps exposed by 
the instability of the subject in its articulation by language. The instability 
of the 'clean and proper' subject is manifested through the return of its 
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maternal, corporeal debt. As Kristeva explains, "If language, like culture, 
sets up a separation and, starting with discrete elements, concatenates an 
order, it does so precisely by repressing maternal authority and the 
corporeal mapping that abuts against them."56 However, "from its place of 
banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master."57 
The force of abjection is lost if it is understood in relation to processes 
of expulsion, separation and exclusion alone. It is precisely in the 
undecidable movement between these and the processes of introjection of 
what the subject requires to sustain its disavowed corporeal foundation. 
Abjection is "what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect 
borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite. "58 What is incorporated constitutes a threat to 'autonomy' by 
confronting the subject with its bodily dependence: the movement from 
without to within threatens to engulf, suffocate, overwhelm. What is 
expelled constitutes a threat to 'unity' by confronting the subject with the 
excess of itself, contradicting the Imaginary ideal, and forcing it to face the 
permeability of its boundaries, the provisionality of its propriety. What is 
expelled is both part of it and outside of it. There are, therefore, two 
constitutive movements or 'sites' of abjection, but they cannot be 
separated: "We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambiguity. 
Because while releasing a hold, it does not radically cut off the subject from 
what treatens [sic] it -- on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in 
perpetual danger. "59 
Not only can these movements not be separated, but the inside-outside 
undecidability characterises each form of the abject, as much as the two 
together. Kristeva has identified as 'the abject' the return of corporeality as 
represented in those bodily substances which traverse the body's rims. 
Those associated with the threat to the subject from outside (identity) are 
represented by "Excrement and its equivalents (decay, infection, disease, 
corpse, etc)."60 These are parts of the (bodily) subject outside of itself, or in 
other words the splitting of the self which contradicts Imaginary unity or 
integrity. Thus, while they must be expelled, their externalisation gives 
rise to the abjection of the subject. On the other hand, the threat from 
within (identity) is represented by "Menstrual blood ... ; it threatens' the 
relationship between the sexes within a social aggregate and, through 
internalization, the identity of each sex in the face of sexual difference."61 
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It confronts the subject with the materiality of the maternal body to which 
the subject owes life. 
However, as has been pointed out, abjection is the condition of the 
phallocentric subject, and phallocentric subjectivity privileges masculinity 
as the position from which the subject is able to pass 'cleanly' through 
oedipalisation to its 'proper' place in the Symbolic, having 'definitively' 
separated from the mother's body. (Abjection marks the failure of such 
'clean', 'proper' and 'definitive' status). By contrast, the girl's gradual, 
even incomplete, oedipalisation requires that she remain in contiguity 
with the mother. It is therefore necessary to examine the position of 
women in relation to abjection. Kristeva has posed the question of the fate 
of maternal authority by asking "what happens to such a repressed item 
when the legal, phallic, linguistic symbolic establishment does not carry 
out the separation in radical fashion -- or else, more basically, when the 
speaking being attempts to think through its advent in order better to 
establish its effectiveness."62 However, the question of the specific relation 
of women to abjection may be posed, somewhat abjectly, to echo to 
Irigaray's 'scandalous' question regarding women and the unconscious: it 
then becomes, 'Are women subjects of abjection, or are they the abject?' 
Processes of oedipalisation, entry into the Symbolic, and confrontation 
by the abject tend, in Kristeva's analysis, to replicate the Freudian-Lacanian 
privileging of an assumed male infant! subject. In other words, 'pure' 
abjection, acknowledging the difficulties of this expression, is a condition 
of the masculine subject of/in the phallocentric Symbolic. Phallocentrism 
can allow no identity as 'woman', while those socio-culturally, Imaginarily 
marked with the negative identity of 'woman', are offered two positions 
with regard to the Symbolic, neither of which constitutes active 
subjectivity: femininity as an Imaginary construct cannot be present but 
only represented through the Symbolic, not as spoken by and in the field of 
the Other (which masculinity is), but precisely unspoken by the Other; it is 
the articulation of emptiness, for there is 'nothing' to speak of. Maternity, 
on the other hand, "must not be confused with a subject, for maternity is a 
process without a subject,"63 but it nevertheless offers indirect access to the 
Symbolic through the mother's relation to the husband/father, and to the 
child. 
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Female oedipalisation may occur in one of two ways. Identification 
with the mother and the transfer of desire from the mother to the father is 
understood as 'normal femininity', while the disavowal of (identification 
with) maternal 'castration' and the identification with the phallic father, is 
understood as the 'masculinity complex'. Unlike the male's passage 
through the oedipal crisis, neither option enables the girl both the 'clean' 
separation from the mother and a secure place within the Symbolic 
required for full and proper subjectivity. The position of 'normal 
femininity' is "too close" to the mother. Not only does the girl retain her 
maternal identification, but in her "desire for the father she becomes the/ a 
mother. Her 'sex' (which in femininity is no-sex) becomes that of the 
mother, and "Kristeva argues that maternity satisfies a desire originally 
directed towards the mother's mother (the pre-oedipal desire to give/bear 
her mother a child): in this sense maternity functions on a 'homosexual-
maternal' axis .... [It constitutes] a vertiginous identification that brings 
the mother into a corporeal contact with her mother's maternity."64 If 
subjectivity is predicated on the break from the mother's body, 'normal 
femininity' in its tendency toward maternity is clearly problematic -- an 
impossible pathway to the necessary abandonment of the mother. 
Similarly, if the maternal chora is never fully repressed, and is indeed 
reproduced by the girl in her own maternity, how is it possible to speak of 
its return through the gaps in the Symbolic? In addressing this, it is 
helpful to examine the girl's second option for oedipalisation, the 
'masculinity complex'. While the girl distances herself from the maternal 
body, as does the boy, she nevertheless fails to achieve her proper place in 
the Symbolic. 'Her' place is that of a pale reflection of the masculine, as 
her identification is with the reflection of the (phallic) masculine body. 
Her position in the Symbolic is not specifically as a woman. Therefore in 
the female 'masculinity complex', the cover of Symbolic subjectivity must 
be even more tenuous, perhaps no more severely invoked, but more 
permeable than for the male subject of the Symbolic order. Abjection 
could therefore be argued to be more permanently and more 
'immediately' a condition of 'women' in phallocentrism. 
6. IV. Woman as Migrant Subject. 
Elizabeth Jolley's The Well65 explores the abjection of the subject 
threatened from outside identity, represented in motifs of intrusion and 
contamination. However, the specific abjection of Hester Harper is 
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founded in her 'identity' as a woman, and the difficult passage through 
oedipalisation which women inherit. Clearly, the denial of the maternal 
body, as the cost of subject-status, is a difficult matter for the girl, whose 
first love-object is also her immediate object of identification. 
Hester Harper's childhood has included a traumatic scenario of 
separation from a mother-substitute, her governess, Hilde Herzfeld. 
Although older and more knowledgeable than the infant of the oedipal 
crisis when it occurs, Hester experiences a replication of crucial psychical 
aspects of the daughter's Imaginary separation from the mother. Prior to 
separation, many features of their relationship are suggestive of the 
maternal semiotic chora: they are initially undifferentiated, sharing the 
initials HH. Acknowledging this, "the two of them had initialled sheets, 
table cloths, table napkins, little linen towels and pillow slips with an 
elaborate monograph designed from a double aitch" (54). With Hilde, 
Hester had felt "safe and young and happy" (142). However, their idyll is 
dramatically ended one night when Hester goes to the bathroom where 
she finds Hilde "crouched on the floor, her nightdress spread like a tent, 
red splashed, round about her .... [and] crying" (121). At this sight -- the 
blood she understood, "knowing something of the scene already -- never 
having been banned from the sheds and out houses" (122), to be the blood 
of the maternal body -- Hester abandons Hilde, rather than bringing help. 
She cannot acknowledge her father's intrusion into her ('mother-infant') 
relationship with Hilde: 
Without really telling herself that she could not reveal to her father 
what it would seem she knew about him privately, she limped back 
to her own room, instead of going to his room or her grandmother's. 
Climbing into bed she pulled the blankets up and round the top of 
her head. Towards morning she heard her father's car turning on the 
gravel outside her window. (122) 
Thus she is twice separated from Hilde by her father: first, her desire for 
Hilde is prohibited by her father's claiming Hilde's body to his desire; then 
access to her is abruptly denied in her removal from their home. 
However, Hester's own 'abandonment' of Hilde is ambivalent, this 
ambivalence evoked in Joan Kirkby's argument that Hester "betrays the 
voluptuous Hilde Herzfeld whom she adores rather than share Hilde with 
her father."66 It is the first gesture in a separation which will remain 
unresolved and will 'haunt' her subsequent relationships, particularly 
with women. Hester represses her desire for Hilde, such that it returns 
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accompanied by the knowledge of its 'inappropriateness' (to the Symbolic 
Law). 
Whereas the oedipal son retains a model of his primary attachment 
and gains identification with the father in order to attain access to the 
mother-substitute, the girl must abandon her first love object and may 
only identify with her (castration) in order to attain the desire of the father. 
This is 'normal femininity', in which the girl's desire is exiled to the place 
of the father. 67 However, the second possibility is the retention of the 
maternal desire and identification with the father. This is to emerge from 
oedipalisation into the 'masculinity complex'. Yet this identification does 
not equip her with subjectivity. She is marked as different, inferior, out of 
her proper place, and could thus be seen as a migrant to paternal/Symbolic 
positionality. Kristeva has suggested that the migrant be included among 
the representations of abjection.68 This may be understood both in terms 
of the (necessary) parting from the constitutive maternal continent, whose 
'markings' -- sex, colour/race, language/accent -- return through the 'gaps' 
in socio-Symbolic interaction in the new ('cultural') space, exposing and 
permeating the incomplete cover over the ('cultural') abyss between 
continents. The very term 'migrant' names the non-belonging or non-
continuity which repeatedly confronts its subject's identification with, 
habitation of, and security in the 'new' Symbolic order. 
Hester comes to identify with her father, and thus elements of her 
desire for Hilde are retained, even though repressed. Among these 
identifications, which must always be seen both in their similarity and 
their difference -- in other words in their mimicry of masculinity -- is her 
inheritance of her father's land: after he died, "she decided that she would 
continue to run the property," and she proceeds, "Following her father's 
ways and wearing all the keys on a gold chain round her neck" (17). 
Similarly, the nature of her relationship with Katherine manifests an 
ambivalent paternal identification. Hester symbolically 'buys' Katherine: 
"'What have you brought me then?'" her father ... said as if asking for 
chocolate biscuits or sweets supposedly hidden in the groceries being 
unpacked.! 'I've brought Katherine, father,' Miss Harper said .... 'But 
she's for me,' she added" (10). While Veronica Brady argues that 
Katherine represents Hester's desire to bear a child by her father,69 this 
would need to be predicated upon Hester's accession to 'normal 
femininity'. However, there is more evidence to suggest that Hester's 
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position in relation to both her father and to Katherine is founded in the 
paternal identification of the 'masculinity complex', whose instigation 
reaches back to the Hilde Herzfeld scenario.70 Therefore, while Kirkby 
argues that "For her father Hester betrayed the one nurturing maternal 
figure she had ever known,"71 this must be understood as not being (at 
least directly) in order to win her father from Hilde, but rather in order to 
identify with (please) him. Nevertheless, Gallop maintains that the girl 
who accedes to the 'masculinity complex' attempts, having been denied 
his penis (by the Law which forbids incest) to seduce the father through 
devotion to his Law.72 Thus the frustrated desire for the father generates 
paternal identification and maternal abandonment, while maternal 
abandonment results in a "longing for a positive nurturing relationship 
with a woman that is inevitably betrayed. "73 While Brady argues that Miss 
Herzfeld separated Hilde from her father,74 the affective content of Hester's 
subsequent memories, identifications and desires weighs more heavily in 
favour of seeing the crucial separation as that of Hester from Hilde, 
perpetrated by her father. For example, having returned with Katherine 
from her shopping trip, Hester displaces her father's claim to Katherine, 
thereby taking his place. Further, the relation of displacement of her father 
by Hester is suggested in the decline of his (phallic) power and influence in 
the household after the arrival of Katherine: "Hester spent less and less 
time with her father who, like a character in a play, wandered about the 
house trying to remember where his pistols were. The old man took it 
into his head to read cookery books" (13-14). The nature of the 
relationship with Katherine belongs primarily to the Father's Symbolic 
order, rather than the Mother's Semiotic. Hester considers Katherine "her 
new acquisition" (10), and indeed a maternal relation is specifically denied: 
"Hester had never known her mother. Neither had Katherine. They did 
not talk of this as the word seemed to have very little rp.eaning for either 
of them" (47). Yet there is a 'fullness' to this silence, indicated when we 
are told that "She treated Katherine with an affectionate though severe 
generosity. She did not regard herself as a mother or even as an aunt. She 
did not attempt to give any name to the relationship. She realized quite 
quickly that she was possessive" (14). Hester's possessiveness casts her in a 
'masculine' relation to Katherine. .This is supported by the status of 
Hester's body as non-maternal. Katherine refers to Hester as being 
'''through your change of life,"' and beyond child-bearing (128). Further, 
the unwillingness to give a name to their relationship could suggest an 
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awareness of the 'impropriety' of the name, because it would require the 
admission of an inadmissable desire. Hester 
knew privately that it gave her infinite secret pleasure to watch Kathy 
abandon herself to her own energy. Whenever she watched Kathy 
dancing, Hester, though outwardly showing no signs, moved in a 
wonderful freedom within herself. Her tiniest, most obscure muscles 
all took part. Unseen, her heart beat faster. She breathed more 
rapidly. In the privacy beneath her strict clothing she knew she was 
capable of an inner excitement which belonged only to her. It was a 
solitary experience but she did not mind this, being simply grateful 
for it. (73) 
This frankly sexual desire is, nevertheless, submitted to the 
containment of the patriarchal Symbolic, and like prohibited incestuous 
desire, is coy about touch (10; 114). Perhaps as an extension of an erotic but 
socially contained (paternally connoted) relationship, Hester is more like a 
teacher than a parent to Katherine: "She planned to herself how she 
would keep Katherine, perhaps travel with her sometime, educate her and 
leave her all her money when she died" (12; see also 142).75 It is crucial, 
however, that Hester's paternal identification can only be at best 
. ambivalent. Her sex, as recognised in the field of the Other, does not 
conform with her Imaginary narcissistic identification. This phallic 
identification is itself a refusal of that with maternal castration. Thus she 
is confronted with the specific abjection of the 'masculinity complex' 
woman in phallocentrism. Her ability to repress the difference of herself 
from her phallic-ideal image is severely compromised by the return of that 
difference from outside identity, from the gaze of the Other. Hester's 
narcissism is satisfied within herself, but threatened when its objects are 
externalised. For example, Hester remembers a childhood photograph of 
herself, skilfully composed so that "the little body and limbs looked perfect, 
the lame foot was tucked in behind the good one. Perhaps that was why 
when she became older .and painfully aware of the disfigurement, she had 
removed the photograph from its place and put it away" (47). Similarly, as 
well as the desire for Kathy she keeps as a kind of ideal within herself, 
Hester finds when singing songs associated with her idyllic Hilde-connoted 
childhood, that "In her head the songs were perfect. The sounds which 
emerged bore no relation to this perfection, but she did not mind this. The 
perfection somewhere inside her was enough" (10; my emphasis). The girl 
who oedipalises into the 'masculinity complex' retains the desire for the 
mother, and for the maternal space of the semiotic chora, before binary 
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division into inside and outside which constitutes the latter as threat 
(while the same division clarifies the danger of engulfment to the subject 
from the "ambiguous obscurity" of the merger of self and other).76 
Hester attempts to create the uninterrupted, uncontaminated space of 
the semiotic chara with Katherine, replicating, through a Symbolic 
relationship, the (mediated) access to maternal desire available to the post-
Oedipal boy. Although their relationship consists of 'I' and 'you' 
identities, these are Symbolically-articulated Imaginary constructs, images 
rather than bodies, and therefore not sexually differentiated and 
articulated. As I want to show, their relationship, as articulated in the 
Symbolic is, precisely, asexual, or sexually undifferentiated, and thus once 
again evocative of the mother-infant space of the chara. It is a relationship 
which could be described as Hester's abjection in phallocentrism, which 
exiled her from her first love and from the possibility of a stable 
subjectivity. It is a form of return, for Hester, of the oedipally disqualified 
impulses and desires, threatening her place in the Symbolic. The return 
of! to the chara is, therefore a nostalgic gesture of disavowal of oedipal 
displacement. 
This return may be seen to coincide, in the novel, with gradual 
contractions of the social and spatial spheres of the women. At the time of 
Katherine's arrival, figured as an issue of exchange -- Katherine for 
Hilde/Hester's mother? -- Hester is "the daughter of the largest 
surrounding landscape" (8), while her status and her enjoyment of "the 
respect of the community" (8), is 'borrowed' from her father's position as 
landowner. Hester runs the business side of the land, and she and 
Katherine live in the large house which is actually two houses joined (25). 
However, Katherine's presence causes Hester to begin neglecting the 
business of the land, and their shared activities of -cooking, sewing, 
embroidery, centre increasingly on the internal domestic space. Eventually 
the neglect of the farm leads to financial difficulties at first addressed, on 
Mr Bird's advice, by moving from the large house to a small cottage on a 
remote part of the land, renting the large house out. However, they also 
later face the need to sell the land (54-6). With this, Hester loses her 
(father's) community status, her borrowed position in the socio-Symbolic. 
Mr Bird is uncharacteristically rude to her (60), and she discovers at the 
community dance that "Harper's good reputation was, all at once, 
overnight it seemed, Borden's .... She knew at once the place would be 
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called Bordens" (68). Therefore, Hester's and Katherine's lives have 
withdrawn spatially to the small cottage and immediate garden, while 
social influence and interaction also decline. 
Within this reduced space, however, "their life was all pleasure" (38), 
seemingly a matter of the circulation of drives and satisfactions. Their 
excessive wastefulness defies any principle of reality represented by Mr 
Bird, but it represents the 'external' principle of 'American-style' 
consumerism, an influence which accompanied the arrival of Katherine 
(from 'outside'). Hester works to keep Katherine 'young', encouraging her 
to dress like a pre-pubescent child, so that in psychical terms, 'her sex' is 
undifferentiated from the 'little boy's'. It is therefore doubly 
undifferentiated from Hester's ('masculinity complex'). However, this 
relation is fragile, vulnerable to fracturing intrusions, and Hester cannot 
completely disavow this danger, and thus the status of their relationship as 
already 'lost', as determined by the 'primal' loss of Hilde. She dreads the 
thought of Katherine leaving. Choosing tapes as a gift for her, Hester 
"studied a few of the titles, 'I can't let you go' and 'Never Never Say 
Goodbye to me' and 'Hold me Just a little longer.' She smiled in a twisted 
way, one of her little smiles" (105). Hester admits to herself that "she did 
not want Katherine to go away. She loved her and wanted her near always 
as she was now. The thought of her belonging to someone else ... was 
unbearable" (109). Indeed, it is the intrusion of any term of separation 
between them which Hester resists. She is attracted to the idea of "Two 
people entirely alone, together and happy" (20), and consequently, "They· 
did not encourage visitors" (21). Outsiders are by definition intruders, 
whether into their physical space, or into their lives and relationship. Mrs 
Borden points out at the dance that "'it is not right to keep Katherine, a 
young woman like Katherine shut away'" (72), and that '''that dress, 
Kathy's not her age in it. It's too nave, but'" (75), which Hester gradually 
understands means 'naIve'. She later resentfully reflects, "What right had 
Mrs Borden to intrude in this way?" (109). 
Similarly, Hester dreads the arrival of Katherine's friend, Joanna. 
Described as "now out" from a place which "was not a prison really ... 
only a place to get better from 'what she'd been taking'" (42), Joanna 
increasingly represents a disturbance to her relationship with Katherine. 
Hester is shaken by the realisation of Katherine's wish for companionship 
of her own age (42), and although she suggests that Joanna come and stay, 
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"with her usual honesty she went on to tell herself that she was jealous" 
(45). It is within the context of this jealousy that Joanna comes to represent 
not simply an intrusion, but a source of contamination in their lives. She 
would be "Rubbish company, a girl who could do nothing but harm. 
Hester was vague in her mind about the life this other girl could have had, 
but it was dirty and infected and should be kept away from the freshness 
and purity of their own lives" (45). 
The 'freshness and purity' of their lives is predicated, like the purity of 
Symbolic subjectivity, on the repression of the excesses of the body, 
enabling them to conform to the masculine phallic ideal. Specifically, it is 
the repression of the maternal body, and it is to this threatening entity that 
Mrs Borden, herself heavily pregnant, alludes when she suggests that 
Katherine '''must think of men, a man? Sometimes?'" (72). 'Men' are 
also possibly part of the contamination represented by Joanna (See 104). 
With her visit imminent, Hester and Katherine embark on "a merciless 
cleaning programme" (158), which could be seen in part as not simply a 
preparation, but from Hester's perspective as a symbolic ritual of 
purification prompted by the very (abject) thought of the contamination 
she will bring. Again, therefore, Hester's and Katherine's relationship is 
characterised by abjection. It is founded on Hester's fear of the threat to it 
from outside, and sustained by her activities of 'policing' the boundaries of 
their physical and social space. However, as Grosz explains, "The abject 
cannot readily be classified, for it is necessarily ambiguous, undecidably 
inside and outside (like the skin of milk), dead and alive (like the corpse), 
autonomous and engulfing (like infection and pollution). It disturbs 
identity, system and order, respecting no definite positions, rules, 
boundaries or limits" (74). Abjection is in fact the sensation of this 
ambiguous attraction/repulsion. It is figured in Hester's response to Mr 
Bird's 'bending of the boundaries' of her property (propriety?): "He 
pushed one leg over the fence. At the sight of the wires being pushed 
down even more Hester flinched" (90). Abjection testifies, as Kristeva 
argues, to the fact that "there are lives not sustained by desire, as desire is 
always· for objects. Such lives are based on exclusion. "77 On the other 
hand, the undecidability of abjection means that the threat to Hester's and 
Katherine's relationship is also to be found within. 
The inside/outside ambiguity of the abjection of the 'clean and proper' 
self is most directly and centrally represented in the figure of the body in 
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the well. There are three significant placements in the novel of the 
incident which instigates the presence of the body. It is described at the 
beginning of the novel, suggesting its status as an originary event; it is 
described and developed almost exactly in the middle of the novel, 
suggesting its centrality to, or dominance in, the meaning of the text; and 
its return as the beginning of Hester's narrative at the conclusion suggests 
both the return and repetition of objects of repression, and the act of re-
symbolisation. The re-symbolisation may be read as either containing the 
body within fiction, thus controlling abjection; or it may be read as raising 
questions about the status of the preceding text: was it only ever a story she 
told the Borden boys? Initially, the 'body' is represented as an unexpected 
and out-of-place presence on Hester's and Katherine's track one night. Its 
precise nature is uncertain, but it is apparently killed in a collision with 
their Toyota ute, so that its status becomes that of the 'body' or corpse. 
Hester immediately decides it -- both its existence (presence) and death 
(absence) -- must be hidden from public knowledge, and it is disposed of 
down their well. However, it is the role it assumes in their lives after this 
attempt at closure of the incident which elucidates its full significance, 
both as presence and as absence. 
As I have stated, the precise nature of the 'presence' is uncertain or 
vague. Initially, it is variously "'something on the track'" and "'someone 
there'" (5). Hester refers to having "'caught something on the bar,'" but 
when she speculates that "'there may be someone else around'" (6), 
suggests that it is human. By circumstantial or associative evidence, it 
would seem that he -- for 'it' is only ever gendered male -- was an intruder 
who had already broken into and robbed the Bordens on pretence of 
looking for work (91). However, his status as 'thief' is complicated by the 
folklore which begins to develop around the mysterious combination of 
unexpected characteristics for a 'criminal': he is pleasantly spokE!n, has a 
wife and baby waiting for him, and altogether they are, according to Mrs 
Grossman, who "claimed more knowledge of the unknown[,] 'Ever such 
nice people'" (100). He is therefore both within and outside the law: he is 
(the abject.78 
He is also an intruder, on a number of levels, for Hester and Katherine. 
Not only was 'he' -- the ontology of the man/thing may be provisionally 
accepted -- on their track, but he had also (possibly) been inside the cottage 
earlier. Finding a sum of money gone, a fact that is Katherine's discovery, 
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Hester "pulled open the cupboards. She looked at her own empty helpless 
hands. 'He must have been in the house.' Disgust made her choke" (86). 
Similarly, 
It made her feel sick to think that someone, a thief, had been in the 
kitchen. As she opened the door she thought she could smell the 
intruder. Perhaps every room and corner of the house was tainted. 
These thoughts and the knowledge of what lay at the bottom of the 
well took away any wish for the tea which was brewing in the patient 
teapot. She supposed this was what fear was. (92-3) 
We have seen that the corpse represents that form of abjection associated 
with bodily waste and decay, the external threat to identity. The corpse is a 
reminder of the materiality of the body; the abjection it precipitates is "a 
personal and cultural horror of the subject's (and culture's) finitude and 
material limits."79 The abject status is redoubled in The Well by the 
corpse's apparent possession of their money, for like the corpse, money is 
also a reminder of the materiality of the body that abjects the subject.80 
However, the corpse as body is both dead and alive, and just as Hester is 
subject to involuntary physical responses -- in reluctance to incorporate 
bodily sustenance, and more importantly, in impulses to expel through 
choking and vomiting -- abjection is, Grosz continues, "a sickness at one's 
own body, at the body beyond the 'clean and proper' thing, the body of the 
subject."81 Hester's paternal/masculine identification implies the 
necessary exclusion of the body. She is sickened when confronted with its 
materiality and desires to live outside of its maternity. 
To understand the ways in which the corpse/body is multivalent in 
the text, it is useful to examine the circumstances of the women's collision 
with it/him. On the night of the 'accident', Hester and Katherine have 
been to the dance in the community hall. It is here that Hester has 
watched Kathy dancing, watched her "abandon herself to" her own -energy," 
while the effect of the dancing on Hester is to make her feel "as if her hair 
was loose and as if her clothes were bright and light and as if they moved 
too, easily with her own rhythm" (73). It is also there that Mrs Borden has 
commented on Katherine's dress and her likely interest in men and 
marriage. When they leave the dance, "Katherine, elated with the 
evening, [has] insisted on driving" (77). Further, she discusses, while 
driving, the romantic fantasy of being "'married to the man of your 
dreams''', and suggests that she could make baby clothes for the fete (79), 
both of which receive dismissive responses from Hester. But Katherine 
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drives too fast, with too much energy, suggesting the collision as one with 
her externalised sexual/maternal drives. It is also the object of Hester's 
fears (of those desires in Katherine and her potential loss of Katherine to 
these desires/ a man). That Hester insists on the disposal of the object of 
collision/ confrontation (to protect Katherine), suggests her Symbolic 
repression of the abjecting excesses of the body. Indeed, abjection as been 
described as "a deep well of memory that is unapproachable and 
intimate,"82 and the image of the 'abyss' of abjection is also suggestive of 
the well. Grosz refers to "an abyss at the borders of the subject's 
existence,"83 and "the abyss that haunts and terrifies the subject."84 This is 
precisely the placement and effect of the well and its inhabitant on Hester 
and Katherine. Further, it becomes this 'haunting abyss' from the time it 
bears an inhabitant, so that it is associated with the (abjection of) the 
pregnant/maternal body, which itself is the splitting of the subject beyond 
'Symbolic oneness'. As has been shown, the sexual/maternal body has 
been excluded from their lives and relationship. Katherine has 
deliberately been kept 'young'. Further, Hester has demonstrated a deep 
repugnance for the idea of sex between men and women: "Hester in the 
presence of so many clean couples, for they did look so well washed and 
ironed, wondered at their cleanliness in relation to their own cowshed 
activities" (70), thereby evoking Kristeva's statement that "The abject 
confronts us, on the one hand, with those fragile states where man strays 
on the territories of animal. "85 In relation to this abjection, Hester "almost 
moaning aloud, said over and over that she did not want a husband for 
Kathy" (118), and "faced the truth that she did not want to lose Kathy, 
especially not into vulgarity and loss of innocence" (119). 
However, symbolic of the irrepressible body, which will always return 
to haunt the subject, the 'man' in the well cannot be denied. At first its 
'return' is suggested in their shared and terrifying perception at night of "a 
noise, a faint noise of movement, strangely close to them. It suggested 
merely skin and bones, dry, rasping lightly on each other, eerie and 
haunting" (83). There is temporary and partial relief in the rationalisation 
that "'It's only a poor moth, your intruder,' Hester, knowing her heart was 
pounding, laughed" (84). Katherine is repelled by the suggestion that she 
should go down into the well to retrieve the money, for as Hester reasons, 
"Often something had to die so that something else could live and 
flourish. Like rotten frui t discarded, the dead man at the bottom of the 
well was not her concern. All they had to get from him was the useful and 
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valuable thing which he had down there with him. The money" (107). 
But Katherine refuses, "'I won't! He's dead. I'd have to touch a dead man. 
I might have to look for the money on him, I'd have to touch him' .... 
'I'm going to be sick. Miss Harper, he might have it next to his body, next 
to his skin, I couldn't do it'" (87). 
Their abjection is fully realised, however, when the body returns, 
'literally' through the Symbolic: he begins to speak from the abyss. 
Returning from a journey to the village to buy rope to help retrieve the 
money, Hester finds that Katherine has done none of the household 
chores and the food has disappeared. She is shocked by Katherine's 
explanation: 
'I gave the meat to the man and I gave him the bread and ... ' 
'What man!' 
'The man down the well, Miss Harper, dear. He said he was hungry 
and anything would do .... ' 
'Katherine!' Hester's voice was deep with warning. But Katherine, 
smiling said, 'Oh, Miss Harper, dear, he isn't dead at all. I heard him. 
Soon after you'd gone I heard him. I heard him praying. He prayed 
'Our Father' and he called on Jesus to get him out of the hole.' (112) 
Katherine becomes enmeshed in a relation of fascination with the man in 
the well, sometimes one of fear -- "'He wants out Miss Harper. I'm scared 
Miss Harper. He's going to kill us both'" (126; also 133) -- and increasingly 
predominantly, one of attraction -- "'1 love him you see Miss Harper, dear, 
I love him and he says he loves me and he's glad I didn't kill him only 
knocked him out. When he's up from down there he's going to ask me to 
marry him'" (115). Thus the well, as the maternal body, as the abject, 
"beckons the subject ever closer to its edge,"86 while in its signification of 
the maternal body, it is significant that it is Katherine whom it begins to 
attract more than repel, and who approaches it through acts of nurturance 
(providing food). 
Katherine develops an involved fantasy of romantic desire, heavily 
drawn from the traditions of American popular romance and film, and 
tending towards the conventional resolutions of weddings, marital bliss, 
and babies (115;118). Thus she accepts her own maternal body, and her 
relation to the Symbolic proffered by 'normal femininity'. This is 
emphasised in the nature of that relation for the girl as the 'exile' of her 
desire, and the intensification of the fake American idiom and accent she 
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had always playfully adopted (5;13;41;57), when relaying these messages 
and plans to Hester: "'He's very bruised, he says, but it's not too serious he 
don't think. ... Oh but Miss Harper, dear, it's trew,' Katherine's imitation 
American accent irritated Hester .... 'I've bin telling him all about yew'" 
(113). Therefore, while her desire is figured as 'foreign' in the adoption of 
an outlandish accent, feminine desire is paradoxically dependent upon, 
indeed constituted in, a foreign Symbolic for its articulation. In other 
words, the American accent is ambivalently foreign and constitutive, 
echoing the construction of the colonised subject, and suggesting the neo-
colonial relation of seduction of Australian culture by American popular 
culture. Further, the paternal connotations of the American accent and 
the discourse of romance are evoked in Hester's fear of its intrusive 
function, similar to a 'cultural contamination', in her idyll with 
Katherine. Hester is afraid that "Katherine in that fake American accent 
would blurt out the whole thing. It was a pity that the accent had been 
encouraged, it had been a little joke between them but now it played an 
alarming role in the representation of unreality" (124). The threat of the 
Law includes both the consequences of the accident and the disposal of the 
body, and the admission of the divisive phallus into the time-space of the 
chora. 
Hester both resists Katherine's messages from the man as evidence of 
her deep disturbance, and yet finds her own certainty, the Symbolic cover 
which divides "the proper and the improper, the clean and the unclean, 
order and disorder,"87 foundering. She refers to "the dead man" (119), but 
there is also an ambiguous moment when Hester decides "it was better to 
keep Katherine away from the well. She tried to think of ways of detaining 
her so that, she stumbled in her thoughts, so that he might, if left 
unattended for long enough, die -- again" (127). Here it is unclear whether 
Hester attributes his 'survival' solely to Katherine's imaginative 
engagement, or whether she is unsure herself of his life or death. She 
insists to Katherine that '''Whoever is down there is dead -- D. E. A. D. --
dead' ... 'otherwise he would not be down there'" (131), and yet she has to 
check herself: "how could she even think about what he, the man in the 
well was supposed to have said when he was not even alive" (132; see also 
151). Eventually even Hester's senses respond to the presence of the body 
in the well: "She shivered with an intense cold and she had to clench her 
teeth against waves of nausea. She thought she heard a voice somewhere 
outside. She thought someone was calling and calling" (145), and looking 
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into the well with torchlight, "She thought ... she saw ... a man's head 
which, because of being drenched was small, sleek and rounded" (148), an 
image located on the border of life (birth), and death (drowning). Hester's 
abjection is strongly associated with bodily processes of expulsion. 
Although intensifying with the advent of the body in the well, the pattern 
has already been established in which Hester's symptoms appear soon after 
there has occurred some threat to the exclusivity of her relationship with 
Katherine. Following their agreement that Joanna should visit, for 
example, Hester is afflicted with a headache "accompanied by that total lack 
of dignity suffered during bouts of vomiting, not once or twice but several 
times" (47). This response suggests the inseparable necessity of, and fear of 
the separation she cannot consciously accept. There is an early incident in 
Hester's life, represented as the 'original' event to which these bouts of 
sickness refer, again a point of separation when immediately following 
Hilde's departure, "arrangements were being made for Hester to go away to 
school, 'as girls did in books', the words began to pound like the pain of 
the first headache, the first sick headache" (122). Katherine's developing 
preoccupation with the 'dead man', and particularly the development of 
her romantic/sexual attraction to him and fantasies about motherhood, 
but also her references to the physical impossibility of Hester's maternity, 
elicit Hester's abject sick headaches. Thus her abjection relates not only to 
Katherine's potentially maternal body and the threat of separation from 
Hester that this represents, but also the inability of Hester's own body to be 
that object of desire, that phallus, for Katherine. In other words, the body 
of the 'man' confronts Hester with the psychical import of her female 
body, a body which, though oedipalised into the 'masculinity complex', 
cannot aspire to the status in the Symbolic of proper masculinity because of 
the discriminating and disqualifying return of the phallic gaze. 
Hester intuits that "the awful truth about the dead body .. pushed 
ruthlessly down the well .... might emerge at any time. But even if it 
never did and she was, for the most part, able to keep it out of her mind, 
r .. 
she knew it would return time and again" (119). It is the return of the 
repressed memory of the traumatic circumstances of Hilde's leaving which 
surfaces for Hester from the depths of the well, these linked by the image 
of the maternal body. She is sleepless with "this memory coming to the 
surface now with inexplicable suddenness ... " (121), and haunted by "The 
night when Hilde cried so much, blood-stained and frightened in the 
candlelit bathroom" (149-50). For Hilde too, Hester had failed to be the 
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phallus, or total object of her desire. Instead, Hester's desire is 'excessive', 
superfluous and improper in relation to the Symbolic body. Therefore, the 
threat from outside 'identity' posed by the 'intruder' also exposes the 
threat from within the ideally unified, integrated self. 
Hester believes that "The dead man, the intruder, had distorted their 
relationship. He had brought disaster and a remedy must be found" (134). 
In a sense this is true, but the intrusion from outside has also exposed the 
'distortions' or Others which already inhabit their relationship as those 
aspects of themselves which cannot be integrated or reconciled with the 
notion of purity. What intrudes into their relationship is the abject return 
of these differences which had been disavowed, and the affect associated 
with them repressed. For example, despite Hester's preoccupation with 
Katherine's 'purity' there are many indications throughout the novel that 
Katherine is not what she seems. This has been suggested in her 
representation of 'cultural contamination' through her employment of 
American popular romance idiom. Further, however, Katherine's facial 
expressions occasionally trouble Hester, such as the "squint [which] gave 
her some uneasiness [but] she dismissed it at once" (16). Later she is caused 
to reflect on 
the travelling tinker and his shifty eyes, eyes like Katherine's were 
just now, she thought. She wondered how Katherine could suddenly 
look dishonest. She had to realize that it was not sudden, that she 
had always dreaded a revelation of something not quite truthful. ... 
[P]eople often judged by what they feared or knew existed in 
themselves. (116) 
Katherine has, and is aware of, some ambivalent skills, which Hester 
notices, but quickly rationalises: "There was nothing Katherine could not 
copy or learn. She seemed to have all the makings of an efficient criminal. 
... Katherine could be an excellent business woman if necessary" (20). She 
even jokes to Hester, having skilfully removed the keys from round 
Hester's neck, "'Make a good burglar, wouldn't I"' (78). 
In this way, a link is established between Katherine and the man in the 
well. This has been increasingly suggested in Mr Bird's warnings to 
Hester, about 
'Any person, Miss Hester,' he said, 'as you are not acquainted entirely 
with, I mean what's in their lives, what's gone before and such.' Not 
noticing Hester's increasingly stormy frown he continued, 'You being 
419 
good hearted don't have the knowing of the bad sides of people.' 
Irritated, Hester told him to mind his own business and to confine his 
remarks to the running of the farm. 'What I am saying concerns just 
that,' he said in a low voice. (31; see also 61; 76) 
Katherine's self-conscious use of the word 'he' in attributing the 
disappearance of the money to the man could be seen as another self-
betrayal of her integrity, but the almost incontrovertible evidence that it 
was she who stole the money occurs when "Katherine's voice was soft like 
honey .... '[H]e sent this up just now for our shopping. He says he's sorry 
he took your money Miss Harper and he says to tell you here's a hundred 
dollars for you to go to town -- he wants oysters .... She held out a 
crumpled note" (131). The ontological status of the body in the well --
man? animal? real? imagined? -- is most clearly problematised in this 
suggestion that Katherine has had the money all the time. At the very 
least, the assumption that the young man seeking work and the burglar are 
the same person, and that this was the man who was killed on the track, 
becomes questionable. Nevertheless 'his' function as intruder is the 
important point, and as the intruder from within as much as outside 
Hester's and Katherine's lives. 
Hester's response of disavowal of the abject intrusion of this Otherness 
in their relationship, necessarily returns to haunt and terrify her. 
Disavowal becomes increasingly difficult and Hester finds herself 
beginning to feel "irritated as she felt the thin, nimble and, as she thought, 
thieving fingers moving over her scalp and in her hair (134). Similarly, 
sleeping fitfully, she repeatedly feels for the keys round her neck, and she 
dreams that Katherine has tied her by her plaited hair to the back of a chair 
(146-7). Disavowal and repression have been Hester's habitual responses 
to the knowledge of the body, and when Katherine expresses anger and 
resentment at this, she reassures Katherine, "'You realize don't you that I 
put the body in the well to save you .... I got rid of the body, of fhe 
evidence'" (138). However, the failure of the well (now also able to signify 
the unconscious) properly to contain the body prompts Hester to make the 
further move of having it closed over completely, "'fixed all the way 
round'" (153). For "Abjection is what the symbolic must reject, cover over 
or contain."88 Nevertheless, even with that done, "Hester, at the back of 
her mind, wondered whether it was possible to really close off the incident 
in this simple way" (160). Katherine, distanced from the body, has 
changed. She "had developed a different way of speaking. Her voice was 
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flat and often she did not look up when she replied to anything Hester 
said" (160). The Symbolic is an alien order for Katherine. She inhabits it 
only in the abject manner of the exile. Significantly, it is at this time that a 
letter from Joanna arrives: "'She, Joanna's into religion,' she said, her 
voice beginning to lift. She's an evangelist. Oh, Miss Harper, dear,' she 
said with more life, 'she wants me to be an evangelist too .... Evangelist!' 
she said. Isn't that just Great! America! Greatl'" (161). It may also now be 
recalled that among the first things Katherine reports hearing from the 
man in the well is his praying and calling upon Jesus to free him. 
Katherine's 'otherness' persists, therefore, in her excitement about 
America (more than once associated in the novel with 'unreality'), but 
also in the regaining of something of her former self at the thought of 
evangelism (the purveying of the Truth of the Word). Just as Hester is 
apprehensive about the inconclusiveness of the cover over the well, Grosz 
claims that "It is impossible to exclude these psychically and socially 
threatening elements with any finality."89 Similarly, Katherine's response 
to evangelism is not the exclusion of the abject, but its displacement, for 
"religion functions to wrest the subject away from the abyss of abjection."9o 
However, for Hester, the Symbolic is the order in which her masculine 
identification and subjectivity are articulated. With the threat of the 
(material, sexual) body disposed of, Hester allows the workmen who sealed 
the well into her kitchen (159), and even expects and seeks Mr Bird, to 
whom she had been so rude. However, when he does not arrive and 
f' cannot be found, she feels "as if she was on the edge of a black hole ... [,] a 
great fear and dread" (164), suggesting the return of abjection. Reading 
through the books in which he had meticulously kept the details of her 
farm's business, "She understood ... at once, that she needed to be looked 
,after, cared for, more than ever. She had never felt so afraid and so alone" 
(167). Hester is thus confronted with her lack of autonomy, her 
'incompleteness' in relation to the social order. 
There are (at least) two possible ways of concluding this discussion. 
The one which retains the 'integrity' of the reading of the novel in terms 
of abjection would point to Hester's establishment of wider community 
and social contact, whose 'dangers' -- she is travelling with the 
enormously pregnant Mrs Borden, and Dobby Borden notices the broken 
spotlight on the roo bar (172) -- are 'contained' by her submitting the 'body' 
to the Symbolic in the construction of a narrative (175-6). Thus while 
(' 
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Katherine appears to displace the abject, Hester sublimates it.91 However, a 
different and more subversive (for the phallocentric Symbolic) and 
redemptive (for women, and for all subjects of cultural abjection) reading 
is possible. 
In this reading, Hester, while necessarily located within the Symbolic, 
confronts it with the 'body', thus putting it under pressure. In renouncing 
her earlier concern to up-hold Symbolic 'purity' -- her identification with 
the Law -- there is acknowledgement of the possibility that she may have 
more to gain in its 'contamination'. She embarks, at the end of the novel, 
on the story of the body, putting into discourse what the Symbolic 
excludes, thus generating the ambivalent attraction-repulsion of the abject. 
This has been (or, for the Bordens, 'is to be') illustrated in the story of 
attraction and repulsion in relation to the well itself, and is further 
demonstrated in the story-telling situation with Mrs Borden's agreement 
with her sons' pleas, "'Make it real scarey!"': "'Yes, Miss Harper, do that. .. 
. Scare 'em witless. They'll love itl'" (175). The production of her story in 
the company of pregnant Mrs Borden and her boys locates it (and Hester) 
within the contaminated space of discourse and social relations. 
As well as producing the story of the body, the novel may be read in 
terms of the story as body. The structure of The Well, rather than linear, is 
circular. The beginning of the story Hester tells the Borden boys links back 
to the opening of the novel, so that the reader is uncertain of the status of 
what has just been read: the events upon which her narrative will be 
based, or that narrative itself? The story itself generates uncertainties: was 
there a man? was he an elaborate realisation of Hester's paranoia, or 
Katherine's desire? did he steal the money? did Katherine have the 
I money? Further, the novel! story includes elements of self-referentiality. 
In Mrs Grossman's shop, Hester meets a writer who tells her '"I'm writing 
a perfectly horrific little drama set, do you see, in a remote corner of the 
wheat. Very regional. ... I need an intruder to distort a relationship'" 
. (157). Any apparent stability of reference is disturbed by other possible 
interpretations, defying unity, so that the reader is situated within the 
circulation of responses which call upon the Semiotic, rather than the 
dominant teleological trajectory of the Symbolic. 
Of course it would be naIve to claim that this in itself constitutes any 
movement of liberation from the Law, or that there is any access to a 'true' 
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body, unmediated by ideological systems, which will dismantle the 
authority of the Law. The cover of the 1987 Penguin edition of The Well 
proclaims it to be 'a dark and disturbing parable.' One reading in these 
terms would find it to be a parable of the impossibility of any place outside 
of its authority before its terms have been unwritten -- de-scribed. Thus it 
describes the effects, for wom"en, of the (phallocentric) Law; of their 
containment within the possibilities of either exiled (excluded) or migrant 
(provisionally and partially included) subjectivity. It is not necessary to 
have recourse to a notion of an 'authentic' uninscribed femininity which 
would be liberated from the imposition of (patriarchal) ideology in order to 
dismantle the terms of the latter; however, it is necessary to acknowledge 
the specificity of any inscription in discourse even if that place can not be 
specified without invoking another ideology. Further, the inscription of 
all subjectivity in discourse does not preclude the recognition, critique and 
dismantling of oppressive and colonising discourses which (dis-)place 
their Others on/to the margins of their own purview. Subjectivity is 
where one is in discourse. 
This chapter has discussed hybridity as a problem(atic) of settler post-
colonial discourse and subjectivity, and through an analysis of the 
invisible term of sexual difference in the encounter with the other, has 
explored some of the consequences of the return of the female body to 
subjective morphology. In Chapter Seven I extend this discussion of the 
abjection of the phallocentric subject into consideration of post-colonial 
subjectivity, discourse and culture. Here, I posit it as a second 
problem(atic) of settler post-colonialism in the articulation and negotiation 
of discourses of inclusion and identity. 
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subject modifications, either of speech (parapraxes, etc.), or of the body (symptoms), 
or both (hallucinations, etc.) .... 
Yet, facing the ab-ject ... one might ask if those articulations of negativity germane 
to the unconscious ... have not become inoperative. The 'unconscious' contents 
remain here excluded but in strange fashion: not radically enough to allow for a 
secure differentiation between subject and object, and yet clearly enough for a 
defensive position to be established" (Powers of Horror, p. 5). 
Hpwever, a diachronic and substantive differentiation may be posited which enables the 
subject to be seen as subject to both abjection and the unconscious. Because the 
unconscious is formed upon entry into language and subjectivity, the 
conscious/unconscious distinction pertains to systems of representation. However, 
abjection precedes this, occurring with the first movements of separation from the 
maternal body. It is therefore before, and a precondition of, primary narcissism (which 
itself is a precondition of language, subjectivity and the unconscious). The abject returns, 
not from the unconscious, but from the more archaic semiotic space which precedes the 
binary division of inside/outside. The form of the return is not that of psychical 
representation/symptom, but is inseparable from the bodily drives. As Kristeva explains, 
for example, "A wound with blood and pus, or the sickly acrid smell of sweat, of decay, 
does not signify death. In the presence of signified death -- a flat encephalograph, for 
instance -- I would understand, react, or accept. No, as in true theater, without makeup or 
masks, refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live" 
(Powers of Horror, p. 3). In Hester's case, she has repressed her desire for Hilde with the 
advent of the primary narcissism which accepts the prohibition of maternal incest in 
return for a place in the Symbolic. However, the abject separation from the maternal body 
(of Hilde) has been the precondition of this narcissism. Therefore, through the well, 
Hester is confronted not only with the maternal body but with the repressed 
memories/desires associated with it. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ABJECTION OF (THE SUBJECT OF) SETTLER POST-
COLONIALISM. 
7. I. Introduction. 
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In Chapter Six, I read The Well as the narrative of Hester Harper's 
abjection. However, I now suggest that Hester's abjection is a parable of 
the abjection of settler post-colonialism. The novel, which we read 
through Hester's point of view, is set in Australia in the 1970s, but the 
sense of place in itself is vague, almost missing apart from 
(symptomatically) emblematic features such as 'roo bars' on her Toyota. 
The 'place' occupied by Hester, and represented in the novel, is instead a 
negotiation of the heimlich Other, the (M)other culture of Europe, 
associated with Hilde Herzfeld (who represents in her name the place to 
which Hester's heart belongs), but is now distant and lost; and the presence 
of American popular culture through the presence of Katherine -- an 
other~ess already within, but striCtly unheimlich for Hester. This is 
evoked in the co-extensiveness of a cultural with a generational gap, 
where the representation, through Hester, of Kathy's language and the 
attendant cultural phantasmagoria jars severely -- produces it as 
unheimlich -- while its necessity in order for Hester to be close to Kathy is 
unquestioned. There is little question, for Kathy, of locating herself within 
Hester's European cultural space. There is thus a certain directionality of 
influence suggested. Further, the 'time' of the novel is most clearly 
established with reference to popular American iconography such as disco 
and John Travolta. There is no particular sense of 'Australian time'. 
Hester therefore occupies an in-between space, a no-place (of her own) as 
she listens to German lieder and Beethoven string quartets, and with 
Kathy, throws plates and other household items down the well in orgies of 
consumer wastefulness suggestive of American-connoted marketing 
strategies which promote endless renewal and consumption. 
Certainly the argument that Hester -- and by implication, Australia --
occupies 'no place', cannot secure her belonging, must be seen in the light 
of her designation as "the daughter of the largest surrounding landscape" 
(8), and as occupying a homestead known as "Harper's Place" (68). 
However, while she is the lawful inheritor of her father's position, she 
does not achieve a full accession to it. With her father's death, like the 
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.passing of the rule of Empire, the guarantee of that (paternal) Law is now 
absent. As a result, the 'legitimacy' and security of her place becomes 
increasingly uncertain, and eventually she faces the loss of the majority of 
it (owing to her mismanagement), and retreats into an increasingly 
smaller and more defensive space. Threats to identity and security are 
projected as external in origin. However, the threat to Hester's --
Australia's -- identity and position is hybridity. I have argued that 
women's positions in patriarchy are either as 'migrant' to or as 'exile' in 
language, desire and subjectivity. Similarly, the settler-migrant and 
indigenous-exile are the only available partial-presences in relation to 
authenticity and identity, and as such they are always already partial 
absences. Hester's solution, as I have shown, is to renounce the platonic 
purity of subjectivity and to produce her discourse in contiguity with the 
body, a solution which holds instructive allegorical potential for settler 
post-colonial societies. 
I now argue for a reading of settler post-colonialism in terms of 
abjection against understanding it as either the 'arrival' or even a coherent 
struggle towards some decolonised 'golden age' of true identity. This is 
not to deny the political necessity of such struggles, but to argue that even 
within the context of these, it would be a dangerous simplification to 
understand post-colonialism in terms of such a state of unified self-
presence, self-identity, and autonomy, or even to specify a subject-position 
for or from which it speaks. To read the abjection of settler post-
colonialism is to acknowledge, on the one hand, the threats to self-identity 
from inside that identity -- the multiple differences and differentiations 
which, characterised by Bhabha as the "supplementary space of cultural 
signification," may not 'add up', but rather "may disturb the calculation;"1 
which seeks the solution of the whole (and full) number of national one-
ness or cultural authenticity. The post-colonial nation is thus threatened 
with its always imminently apparent dismantling as the space of unified 
cultural discourse. On the other hand, the abjection of settler post-
colonialism testifies to threats to identity from outside, Other nations, or 
cultural powers, against which post-colonial nations or cultural discourses 
defend. In the cases of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, cultural 
discourse has largely identified 'America' and 'Europe' as these external 
threats to cultural self-identity and autonomy, historical and cultural links 
pointing to the sources of perceived vulnerability.2 
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7. II. Against the Autonomy of Post-Colonialism: Post-Modernism as 
Interlocutor. 
Opposing the prevalence of 'autonomous self-definition' as the 
characteristic mode or desire in cultural discourses of post-colonialism, I 
want to problematise the 'autonomy' of settler post-colonial culture by 
citing a reading of it in relation to post-modernism, and then to produce it, 
in difference from itself, out of further post-modern cultural analysis. It 
would be indisputable that 'post-colonialism' addresses issues of cultural 
difference; thus, the spirit of this way of proceeding is captured in Bhabha's 
statement that 
The identity of cultural difference cannot ... exist autonomously in 
relation to an object or a practice 'in-itself', for the identification of 
the subject of cultural discourse is dialogical or transferential in the 
style of psychoanalysis. It is constituted through the locus of the 
Other which suggests both that the object of identification IS 
ambivalent,. and, more significantly, that the agency of identification 
is never pure or holistic but always constituted in a process of 
substitution, displacement or projection.3 
My procedure is not intended to suggest that post-colonialism and post-
modernism are the same, however, but rather that post-colonial (and post-
modern) cultural production occurs out of the frisson of encounters with 
Others.4 
In a discussion which largely concerns post-modernism and post-
modern cultural production, John Frow argues that 
The concepts of the post-colonial and the post-modern are perhaps 
most consistently defined in terms of their difference from and their 
difficult and ambivalent resistance to modernity. It is a logic of 
periodization that ties them together, or more precisely a logic of anti-
periodization, defining them emptily through- a retrospective 
negation. Even so open-ended and paradoxical a conception of 
period, however (the 'post'), runs the usual dangers: of reducing a 
disparate set of political or cultural circumstances to a more or less 
unified temporality with an ultimately spiritual essence.s 
Post-colonialism names a difficult and ambivalent resistance to 
colonialism, modernity understood to be the philosophical character of its 
temporality. Certainly colonisations have been an historical fact of 
centuries, even millenia, but 'modernity' could in such cases be 
understood 'anachronistically' as that philosophy which constructs 
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knowledge of cultural relativisms and hierarchies. Has any culture/nation 
colonised that did not perceive itself to be more 'advanced' (culturally or 
militarily) than its object? However, to return to Frow's warning, the 
work of the 'post' is to unify a process and form of relations -- colonisation 
and its cultural effect, colonialism -- into a discrete era which may be said 
to have been superceded, while also producing a successor which itself is 
discrete and unified. Both colonialism and post-colonialism are therefore 
understood to conflate subjectivities into the one expression of their 
homogeneous essence; (paradoxically this essence may be 'plurality'). 
Indeed, 'colonialism' and 'post-colonialism' are produced as fully present 
subjectivities, sites of the production of coherent discourse. However, 
post-colonialism names also the ambivalent resistance to colonialism 
because the 'post' suggests both succession and implication. The 'empty' 
definition which results produces post-colonialism as an uncanny 
repetition of colonialism. It gives rise to what SIemon has termed the 
'scramble for post-colonialism,'6 in which, as 'empty object', it is invested 
libidinally and interestedly with meaning or content. Post-colonialism 
becomes both the sign and the object of desire in competing claims to (its) 
self-identity. 
The contradiction of post-colonialism as both successor to and 
implicated in colonialism may be further explicated in consideration of 
both temporality and terrain as the constitutive 'spaces' of post-colonial 
definition. As I have pointed out, I attempt this through a reading out of 
the difference of Frow's discussion of post-modernism. In considering the 
problems of a purely temporal understanding of post-modernism, Frow 
argues, 
The temporality of modernism requires its own obsolescence: a 
modernism that failed to age, that didn't demand to be superceded, 
would be a contradiction in terms. Hence the necessity of a successor 
to modernism, but hence also its definition solely in chronological 
form ('post') which refuses all indications of content. The paradoxical 
result of this is that, since this 'post' must be a real alternative to 
modernism, it must be based upon a different temporality: not that of 
novation but that of stasis .... In its determination to succeed 
modernism, however, it corresponds entirely to a modernist logic .... 
As Lyotard notes, we may suspect today that this 'break' is more like a 
repression (that is, a repetition of the past than it is an overcoming of 
it.? 
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While post-modernism is generally understood in an immediate relation 
to modernism (succession, negation, logical and/or chronological 
continuity), and while some post-colonial critics posit the post-colonial as 
the immediate successor of the colonial, I have argued throughout this 
thesis for the efficacy of specifying, in relation to settler post-colonial 
societies, a National phase which precedes post-colonialism as response to 
Empire, delaying but also influencing the terms of the emergence of post-
colonialism. There is thus a split temporality of response to Empire, 
already contained within the putatively unified project of colonialism (a 
split whose character may have bearing on the modernism/post-
modernism problematic). Of course this is not strictly a discrete and 
chronological separation, and may intead be an epistemic one.s 
Nevertheless it is useful to note that in white settler societies which 
quickly established numerical, cultural and institutional dominance· of 
British forms over indigenous populations and cultures, Nationalism, as a 
response to Empire, rather than constituting a clear movement of 
decolonisation, has been doubly implicated in that same Empire. Settler 
colonialism requires the advent of nationalism as the mark of its success. 
As such, colonisation as a process is succeeded by Nation as product. The 
'new' society settles; novation becomes stasis. The 'new' society is, 
however, intrinsic to the logic and the relations of the project of 
colonisation. Colonial society is simply legitimated in this Nationhood, so 
the need for an alternative has not been fulfilled. Yet the entrance of post-
colonialism has already been prepared by the vulnerability of the fictions 
which instituted and sustained Nationhood. As Bhabha notes, "Renan 
argues that the non-naturalist principle of the modern nation is 
represented in the will to nationhood -- not in the identities of race, 
language, or territory. It is the will that unifies historical memory and 
secures present-day consent."9 Bhabha investigates the implications of 
Renan's characterisation of the nation as "'a daily plebiscite,'" and 
discovers the "'partial identification'" inscribed in it which "represents the 
performative discourse of the people": "Renan's pedagogical return to the 
will to nationhood is both constituted and confronted by the circulation of 
numbers in the plebiscite which break down the identity of the will -- it is 
an instance of the supplementary that 'adds to' without 'adding up."'lO It 
is this proliferation of multiple and competing -- incompatible --
expressions of the 'will to nation' within settler post-colonial societies, and 
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the discourses they invoke in order to frame them, that I address 
throughout this discussion. 
However, the revolutionary optimism suggested by a name that claims 
to denote succession and supercession is at the same time disturbed by the 
'reactionary' reference back to colonialism. Again, process looks to become 
product, journey to arrival, dislocation to return. In a sense, then, 'post-
colonialism' promises a resolution of colonialism even more final than 
Nation. Yet post-colonialism could be argued to constitute a re-playing of 
the colonial scene of (mis)recognition of cultural difference (as opposed to 
Nation's disavowal) -- although 'nation' is also a principle site of the 
articulation of post-colonialism. 
If temporality cannot produce post-colonialism as a radical alternative 
to colonialism, is difference a matter of terrain? Frow suggests that 
having reached the point of absolute aporia, having taken the 
exploration of the material to its end, the modernist project becomes 
both complete and irrelevant. The intervention of post-modernism 
at this point would not involve a linear succession but a change of 
ground. Losing faith in both the purity and the futility of modernist 
practice, post-modernism takes up the discarded or marginalized 
materials of modernism ... and exploits them with a quite different 
kind of rigour.ll 
There is a familiar understanding of post-colonialism as naming culture 
and cultural production grounded in the indigenous cultural materials 
marginalised by colonialism, and relegated by Nation to the position of the 
spoken object rather than speaking subject. Indeed, post-colonialism may 
further be recognised to speak more generally from the position of 
Nation's Others. Yet these Others within are also those who have (been) 
identified inter-nationally in various liberation and social movements, so 
that "we cannot contextualize the emergent cultural form by explaining it 
in terms of some pre-given discursive causality or origin [e.g. colonialism]. 
We must always keep open a supplementary space for the articulation of 
cultural knowledges that are adjacent and adjunct, but not necessarily 
accumulative, teleological, or dialectical," one which militates against the 
"implicit generalization of knowledge."12 I have negotiated these inside-
outside sources of the activist problematisation of Nation throughout this 
thesis, in considering the articulation of indigenous subjectivities and, for 
example, those of women, working-class, and migrant groups. This is not 
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to imply that the latter are purely external to Nation, but rather that their 
(self-)recognition as oppressed and resistant groups does not depend upon 
a prior history of settler-colonialism, but is the product of the settler post-
colonial. society's insertion into inter-national politics. Indeed, while the 
rationale for indigenous resistance belongs to the history of colonialism, its 
forms are mediated by the international circulation of other racial/cultural 
liberation movements which emerge from different histories into a shared 
present. The impact of such 'externalities' to the rubric of (post-) 
colonialism produces a post-colonialism which locates an interventionist 
positionality into the dominant discourses of National culture and 
identity. 
However, an even further degree of complexity begins to emerge in 
analysis of settler post-colonialism when it is recognised that whenever 
the 'identity' or 'strategies' of (post-)colonialism are specified, there is the 
suggestion of either their undifferentiated, or privileged (authentic), 
subjectivities. Instead, it is necessary to ask what it means to take up and 
exploit the marginalised materials of colonialism. For example, when the 
dominant culture, in need of legitimation, takes up colonialism's 
marginalised materials, is the effect not quite different from when the 
oppositional/resistant subject confronts the dominant culture with them, 
and thus with precisely the problem of the latter's (il)legitimacy? 
Positionality -- the discursive space occupied by the subject of discourse -- is 
therefore a constituent of meaning. On the other hand, even if these are 
identified as different and competing moments of post-colonialism, it 
cannot be simply a matter of specifying 'complicit' and 'oppositional' post-
colonialisms,13 as if such positionalities were available -- viable -- in their 
essence and autonomy. As I have shown throughout the thesis, 
'oppositional' post-colonialisms must use strategies w~ich are, to some 
extent, 'complicit' with dominant cultural and discursive forms, while 
'complicit' post-colonialisms attain precisely this status in part through 
their post-colonising manouevre into 'oppositional' space, seeking their 
legitimation through the appropriation of the very materials marginalised 
in colonialism. Further, however, both 'returns' to the terrain of 
colonialism's marginalised are conditioned by their belated temporality, 
signifying an irrecoverable departure from origins which relegates (new) 
beginnings to the problematic of hybridity: those objects taken up --
remembered -- are the (mis)recognised objects of colonial hybridity 
produced out of the temporal and spatial dislocations of identity and 
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presence, in difftrance. Their recuperation in the project of cultural or 
national legitimation requires the disavowal of an historical gap, similar to 
the disavowal of the space and time between insemination and knowledge 
of conception which underwrites the (un)certainty of legitimacy. As 
Bhabha notes, Renan's 'will to nationhood' is "the site of a strange 
forgetting of the history of the nation's past: the violence involved in 
establishing the nation's writ. It is this forgetting -- a minus in the origin --
that constitutes the beginning of the nation's narrative." He continues: "It 
is through this syntax of forgetting -- or being obliged to forget -- that the 
problematic identification of a national people becomes visible," and 
further that it entirely changes "our understanding of the pastness of the 
past, and the unified present of the will to nationhood."14 Post-
colonialism must therefore be seen as produced in difference within itself, 
in deferral of its presence, and in difference from, and thus in relation to, 
(the site of) the Other; in short, in hybridity. 
As this discussion has shown, attempts to 'unravel' settler post-
colonialism have demonstrated the impingement of space upon 
temporality, and of temporality upon space, in its constitution. In this, it 
suggests the similarly irresolvable spatio-temporality, the movement, of 
abjection. Neither 'element' adequately addresses the complexity of post-
colonialism, yet nor does it conform to the synthesis of their dialectical 
pairing. Rather, like abjection, it represents a ceaseless movement between 
them which is, in Frow's formulation for a different context, "so rapid as 
to resemble a vertiginous stasis."lS 
Abjection evokes a space-time of subjectivities, relations and 
discourses produced in difficulty, agonism and ambivalence. Post-
colonialism cannot be defined in itself, in its 'purity', but rather in its 
impurity. The difficulty and ambivalence of its discourses arise partly 
because it is a repetition of colonial relations on different terrain. Just as 
the abjection of the subject is a repetition of the difficult and ambivalent 
work of initial separation-into-being -- being founded on loss -- and thus 
refers to pre-subjective time to which the subject is always in danger of 
returning, post-colonialism replays the colonial scene of (mis)recognition 
in a different temporality, appearing as stasis, 'before' and 'after' Nation's 
disavowal; as the Other. Post-colonialism's abjection names the impurity 
of its constitutive multiple, shifting and complex positionalities in the 
context of the return and recognition of hybridity, disavowed by National 
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authority, to its dominant discourses and valorised subject-positions. 
Indeed, abjection may be understood as the effect and affect of the 
recognition of hybridity, of constitutive contamination. The subjectivities 
of settler post-colonialism are thus located on the borders of identity and 
difference, presence and deferral, authority and disturbance. Prow's 
'vertiginous stasis' is that dizzy, even nauseating space from which post-
colonial discourses assert their presence -- spatially to themselves, and 
temporally to the latest moment -- but between whose poles such discourse 
is always just about to disappear. 
However, lest this should seem like unremittingly bad news for 
interested readings of post-colonialism, pointing to the claim for 
abandonment of its projects and struggles, to sink into political quietism 
and indifference, let me assert that this is not necessarily the implication at 
all. After all, to invoke abjection is also to invoke its contextualisation as 
an affect/effect of phallocentric subjectivity, with its valorisation of 
subjective unity and purity at the expense of (bodily) heterogeneity. 
Therefore, the reading of settler post-colonialism as abjection should be 
seen to imply the possibility and the need to change the grounds of 
intervention, not to abandon it. In such a project, questions of (self-) 
knowledge and of relations, rather than identity, become paramount. I 
posit abjection as suggestive of a space of intervention and agency, a 
different place from which to speak. 
I have shown that the subject is compromised by threats to identity 
from 'inside' and from 'outside', the different 'sources' of the abject. 
Provisionally positing 'post-colonialism' as such a subject allows these 
sources of threat to be examined. In the following discussion I analyse the 
threats to post-colonial identity from 'inside' in terms of the Mother-
land/maternal continent configuration of discourses. 
7. III. Against the Integrity of Post-Colonialism: The Mother-land as 
Differance 
In Chapters Two and Three I discussed the problematic desire for 
authentication and identity enacted in and through fictional and other 
textual inscriptions of the landscape. In considering settler post-colonial 
discourses of the land as instantiating a form of the abjection of these 
nations or cultures, I necessarily address the role of the land as a threat to 
identity, even as it functions in the assertion of identity. The land may be 
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seen to comprise a threat to identity from within that identity in the sense 
that both identity-as-a-construct and its dominant national or cultural 
forms have been predicated on particular relations to the land, converging 
in their shared privileging of the masculine subject which, posited as 'self', 
casts the feminine as 'Other', and the 'Other' as feminine. 
7. III. (i). Colonisation. The centrality of land to cultural identity in 
settler post-colonial societies is an inheritance of colonisation/colonialism 
'itself. It is the land which calls colonial subjects into being, establishing 
their relative inside-outside positionalities. However, 'abjection' points to 
the problematic relation of the (masculine) subject to the maternal body. 
Settler post-colonial nations inherit specifically inflected significances of 
the expression 'mother-land' through colonial histories. These histories, 
like phallocentric subjectivity, are predicated on separations and 
discontinuities rather than continuity. Thus they render concepts such as 
abjection and oedipalisation useful in analysis of the developments of 
cultural discourses of 'identity', as they suggest problematic and 
unresolved relations to, and positionings of, the 'maternal continent'. At 
this point two caveats are needed: in this discussion, 'land' must 
inevitably refer to discourses of the land, while the heterogeneity of 
possible discourses constitutes the 'body' -- the excess -- invoked in the 
concept of abjection. I do not refer to any unmediated land-in-the-Real. 
Secondly, to suggest the land as a source of abjection for settler post-
colonial cultures is not to valorise discourses of the land-as-mother, 
whether the threatening, engulfing mother, or the nurturing, sustaining 
mother. Rather, I acknowledge this as implicit in dominant discursive 
constructions of the land and by implication of the subjects of such 
discourses, and -- differently -- in the counter-discourses of the dominant 
culture's Others. Rather, I analyse and critique their implications for 
subject-positioning, as these emerge in the post-colonial 'return' of the 
repressed heterogeneity of land discourses which bid for, and problematise, 
identity and legitimacy. 
Colonisation and colonial status cannot coherently be submitted to an 
account of a process which runs 'abjection-narcissism-oedipalisation-
repression-subjectivity'. They exhibit a symptomatic excess over such an 
account, with its 'will-to-naturalisation'. However, this does not negate 
the usefulness of the analogy with a diachronic outline of the attainment 
of subjectivity. On the one hand it affirms the belief that historical and 
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political events are not 'natural', while on the other hand it may be used 
strategically to elucidate the functioning of attendant discourses to 
naturalise such events and relations (while these could be argued to have 
been complicit in the naturalisation of certain subjective processes and 
morphologies). Discourses of national identity constitute the clearest 
claims to a Natural National Self, an authentic and authoritative --
legitimate (therein the symptomatic contradiction!) -- speaking position in 
relation to culture. In positing this as analogous to the attainment of 
phallocentric subjectivity, it is possible to look back to the implied 
processes which preceded and projected it, and forward to its implications, 
the reinscribed returns of what was 'originally' repressed. 
Colonisation as a process may be understood as either or both abjection 
and oedipalisation. In relation to settler colonies, colonial or settler 
identities require the prior separation from the maternal continent of 
Britain. There is a certain irony in the suggestion that numbers of settler 
groups represented the expelled excess, or the abject, of an ideal British 
corps-propre: through the rims of economy came the poor, and the 
population overflow; through those of the law came criminals; and· 
through those of state authority came political dissidents and trouble-
makers. Each of these rims, it should be noted, was overdetermined by the 
others. 16 However, this separation is also necessary to the production of 
the separate colonial-settler body, which enables the narcissism which in . 
turn is the precondition of the subject. Further, colonial status, with its 
differential positionalities produced in the colonial encounter with the 
Other, locates the 'bodily rims' of incorporation and expulsion traversed by 
the abject, and which will define the separate 'infant body' of the colony, 
and will later become the erotogenic zones -- zones of (discourses of) fear 
and desire. The rims of temporality and history are traversed by discourses 
of origins and legitimacy; spatiality and positionality by those of belonging 
and authenticity; and of politics and discourse by authority and mastery. 
All ,of these must be understood as inseparable and as constitutively 
enmeshed.17 
To allude to the colonial encouhter is to recall the crucial and 
constitutive fact that colonisation is not an intransitive, nor even a simply 
self-reflexive process (though critical analysis may represent self.:.reflexivity 
as one of its oppressive moments). For example, I have argued an analogy, 
in relation to Australia, Canada and New Zealand, between the colonial 
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and the mirror encounters, and their privileging of images of 'sameness', 
so that the coloniser must struggle to expel the excess of the real body upon 
which the colony is located -- that is, the otherness of the colonial land -- in 
order to attain the ideal, white, western body of Empire. On the other 
hand, to compare colonisation with oedipalisation serves as a reminder 
that the compensation, or 'reward', for that separation from the maternal 
continent, and from bodily-continuity towards an image, is the accession to 
a subjective position through the Name/Law of the Symbolic/Father. 
Colonisation constitutes a masculine relation to the land: it entails the 
oedipal abandonment of the British 'motherland' to accede to the 
Symbolic position of possessor of another land. However, while gaining 
the subjective, 'lawful' right, in terms of Imperial relations, to another 
land, the legacy is an unresolved ambivalence towards the maternal body. 
Nostalgia for the motherland casts the colonial land as mother-substitute, 
whose specificity is the object of repression -- and suppression -- in the 
project of settlement. However, as this mother-substitute, this 'new' land 
inherits the same ambivalence which the Imperial mother evoked. As the 
nurturing, sustaining mother, it has 'called into being' the 'identity' of the 
settler; it has 'seduced' the coloniser, for whom it is an object of desire. For 
example, in her extended study of the Australian land as inscribed in 
discourses of desire, Kay Schaffer has pointed out that "the idea of 
Australia has a long history as a land of desire, traversed in the 
imaginations of explorers, settlers and visitors alike."18 But as the 
threatening, engulfing mother, the dependence on the land threatens the 
autonomy of colonial-settler identity, and the land is perceived as hostile, 
needing to be tamed and contained: "Landscape looms large in the 
Australian imaginary, although its infinite variety has been reduced to a 
rather singular vision -- the Interior, the outback, the red centre, the dead 
heart, the desert, a wasteland .... [I]n Australia the fantasy of the land as 
mother is one which is particularly harsh, relentless and unforgiving." 
Thus, the bush "becomes the space in which the native son plays out his 
primal fear of and love for the mother. "19 One of the constitutive psychic 
fears of abjection is that of engulfment or absorption. Schaffer refers to the 
powerful fantasy in Australia of "the power of the bush, like the fantasy of 
the primal mother, to suck up its inhabitants, assimilating them into its 
contours and robbing them of a separate identity."20 While the weight and 
persistence, or rather, insistence, of such fantasies would vary between 
each of the settler colonies, the psychic identification of the land as 
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maternal body, and the projection of primal ambivalence holds, I believe, 
for cultural discourses in each of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
The masculine relation of 'settler' to the land 'feminises' the land 
itself, defining it as the Other to be possessed and controlled, the 
accomplishment of which enterprise affirms the mastery of the settler. 
However, the Other is not a term which denotes specificity of identity, but 
positionality. It is the not-Self, the external support of the Self, and in the 
colonial context conflates everything that is not the privileged masculine 
colonising subject. Thus, again in the context of Australia, but relevant to 
all three colonies, "History comes to be seen as the valorized achievement 
of man over Nature. Nature is the raw material providing a passive 
context for (white) man's activities. The Aboriginal peoples become 
absorbed into the context of Nature. Their presence is repressed."21 
Similarly, the separation of indigenous people from their traditional 
cultural relation to the land by the process of colonisation casts them in a 
'feminine' relation to the land. They remain in a kind of contiguity with 
it as their 'first continent', but as such are always about to be reabsorbed, to 
signify the land itself, for the colonising subject. While remaining to an 
extent 'in touch' with the land, the relation of indigenous peoples to it is 
mediated by a foreign Symbolic, while to the extent that they are 'in touch' 
with the land, they are excluded from that Symbolic. 
At the same time, 'coloniser' or 'settler' as masculine subjectivities 
problematise the relationship of women to the land. If the land is 
'Woman', how can the Symbolic articulate a relationship between 'real' 
women and the land? The paradox is that land as Woman renders it 'no 
place for a woman', the no-place of feminine subjectivity itself. In the 
context of an historical-sociological study of New Zealand masculinity, 
Jock Phillips has argued that the rise of urban and sedentary occupatIons in 
Britain had threatened the distinctions of masculinity and femininity, so 
that "Emigration provided a new confrontation with nature, a chance to 
face life in the raw, to show courage and physical strength. In the colonies 
one could feel a man once more."22 Thus generally "Women have been 
considered to be absent in the bush and the nationalistic bush tradition. 
Yet they are constantly represented through the metaphors of landscape. 
Women carry the burden of metaphor."23 
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7. III. (ii). Nationalism. Through the violence of the colonial 
encounter -- a process, not an event, and one whose violence is not of 
course confined to, but refers to, the racism of the colonial gaze -- emerges 
the subject-position from which a national identity may be articulated. It is 
an identity founded on the mastery of the land through discourses which 
both repress and sublimate the abyss of abjection into which the National 
subject may fall. These discourses repress the heterogeneous difference of 
the land, containing questions of the spatial and temporal disturbances to 
the certainty of legitimacy inscribed in histories of separation, 
discontinuity, and the loss of origins. It is important that other discourses 
of the land are repressed: it cannot be admitted to National consciousness 
that "The white Australian bush, for example, is not the bush of the 
Aboriginal dreamtime which has sustained tribal life in the outback for 
over 40 000 years .... [that] the relationship of white Australians to the 
bush produces a very different bush from that of Aboriginal Australia."24 
Such knowledge would disturb the presence of white authority, the latter 
sustained in myths, images and representations of the landscape which 
sublimate the threat of abjection, and which inscribe the subject-position of 
masculine mastery over the feminine land. As I argued in Chapters One 
and Two, however, the production of myths of national identity as 
expressed in the heroic settler's mastery of the land, tended to be produced 
from within an urban context, a construction out of distance and 
difference. Indeed, as Brydon has noted, "the [Canadian] North functions 
for many non-Northerners as a final frontier,"25 suggesting that the myths 
do not work for those who live there. Nevertheless, the function of such 
myths has been to authenticate the Nation, and dominant National 
subject, through their invocation of the primal, original, (maternal) 
significance of the land. Again, authenticity has tended to comprise the 
negation of difference, the disturbance or 'originality' contaihed or 
repressed by the isomorphism of the images produced, with the valorised 
National subject, so that they may only be spoken authentically by that 
subject. For example, consistent with the notion of land/the feminine 
body as the object of a rival exchange between men, Schaffer refers to 
battles for supremacy in, and over, the Australian bush. The 'squatter' was 
identified with English ruling class values; the 'selector' with Irish 
migrants and ex-convicts, so that the (white) 'native bushman' (a term 
which itself enacts discursive erasure of Aboriginality) emerged as the only 
authentic Australian, defined as such in part against the others. 26 
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Therefore, she argues, "The land ... is not only a metaphor for feminine 
otherness through which man attains a (precarious) identity but also a 
shifting site of battles -- moral, political, religious, economic -- invested 
and traversed by the relations of power/knowledge. Writers of 
authoritative texts, in their attempts to master knowledge, construct the 
land as an object and an instrument of power. "27 
In short, discourses of the land 'speak' the National subject. They 
include discourses of production, installing and legitimating a utilitarian 
conception of the 'right' to land ownership and control, founded in the 
early example of Locke's Second Treatise on Government: 
'And hence subduing or cultivating the Earth, and having Dominion, 
we see are joined together. The one gave Title to the other. So that 
God, by commanding to subdue, gave Authority so far to appropriate. 
And the Condition of Humane Life, which requires Labour and 
materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.'28 
By contrast, Schaffer observes: 
The Aborigine was not perceived as having rights of ownership in 
terms of the Lockean appropriation. In 1911 James Collier had 
written: 
'[The Aborigine's] inability to till the ground or even make use of 
its natural pasture . . . was the capital offence, and it was 
irredeemable .... Their disappearance was a natural necessity. It 
came about in obedience to a natural law. It was effected by natural 
processes, and followed the lines of substitution of vegetal and 
animal species all over the world.'29 
What is remarkable here, apart from the fact that "the concept of nature is 
employed in the cause of colonial conquest,"3D is the force of the repression 
of the Aboriginal presence in the discursive construction of their absence --
the use of the past tense -- an absence which is as much a discursive 
'necessity' as a socio-political one. Apart from discourses of productivity, 
the National subject, or Nation-as-subject, is spoken, for example, in 
discourses of defence -- the delineation of boundaries and autonomy -- and 
of the 'consumption' of the land in the tourist industry's production and 
marketing of attractive images and motifs of 'natural' landscape -- the land 
as 'trophy' for the masculine-nation's ego; the land as pornography! 
'Other' discourses, those of women and migrants for example, are 
rendered inauthentic. The emergence of the 'national identity' may 
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therefore be likened to the erection of the phallic'!', the 'self' whose 
passage through an historical-cultural mirror-stage confers the image of 
autonomy, unity, integrity and identity. In other words, it reflects the 
separation from the maternal continent -- Britain as cultural specificity; the 
land as the materiality and heterogeneity of discourses -- and projects a 
narcissistic investment in images of the whole and unique 'self', images of 
national identity. Yet the morphology of the 'national mirror' is such that 
it produces an image valued as autonomous, but valued on the basis of its 
specular similarity to British cultural and institutional models. Similarly, 
the mirror instigates 'masculine' and feminine' positions which reflect 
differential access to National subjectivity. Only the 'borrowed' or 
'migrant' subjectivity of the female 'masculinity' complex is available to 
Nation's Others in the production or articulation of a counter-claim to 
discourses of the land. 
The nation is therefore founded on a debt to the land, but the land 
remains problematic for it, just as the subject retains a problematic relation 
to the maternal body. National presence and authority are a frail legal 
fiction repressing the threatening 'beyond' of the abject. Like the abject, 
these Other discourses of the land cannot finally be contained. The very 
Law which attempts this containment attests to National anxiety regarding 
its legitimacy, regarding the return of maternal desire. 
7. III. (iii). Post-Colonialism. In post-colonialism, National repression 
and sublimation have failed to contain discourses of the land within those 
forms which 'naturalise' its presence and authority. It is not that different 
and contestatory discourses are articulated for the first time, but that they 
cannot be prevented from impinging on and disturbing 'National 
consciousness'. The post-colonial proliferation of discourses problematises 
the basis of the National relationship to the land by confronting it with its 
own (inadmissable) excess. It represents a crisis in the transparency of 
authority -- the 'fit' of National image with site of articulation -- and the 
reappearance of the political opacity of the socio-Symbolic. Post-
colonialism is marked, for example, by the emergence of discourses which 
privilege the indigenous relation to the land, threatening 'national 
identity' from within. In such discourses, land is understood as the basis 
of indigenous identity and subjectivity, and the relation is predicated, not 
on distance and mastery, but on contiguity. 'Originality' is claimed as 
ethical priority, challenging the basis of settler identity founded in the loss 
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of origins and the discourse of heroic beginnings. For example, in The 
Temptations of Big Bear, Big Bear and his people are described as having 
lived, before the treaties which Symbolised the relation to the land, in the 
undifferentiated landscape of a maternal cultural chora. They experienced 
no boundaries between the land and themselves, but rode "'wherever 
their eyes touched land'" (350; my emphasis). Similarly, the imagery 
associated with the landscape, which I argued in Chapter Three to be that 
of the female body, may now be specified as the maternal body, with 
references to "rounded bellies" (134), "sagging belly" (331), and "nipple" 
(162). In discussion of My Place, I showed that the land represented, for 
Sally and her family, an original space of belonging, associated with idyllic 
childhood memories which again suggest the chora. However, just as the 
Symbolic Father breaks up this corporeal bond, it was in childhood that 
many Aboriginal people, including members of Sally's family, were 
separated from both their mothers and the land to which they belonged, by 
the paternal-Symbolic Law of the Nation. Thus 'mother' and 'land' were 
shown to be linked in the Aboriginal child's archaic origin. Sally's desire 
to return to the birth-place of her family (see 214), represents the attempt to 
acknowledge and regain the maternal-bodily relation to the land as the 
source of 'true' (matrilocal -- in the locus of the mother) post-colonial 
identity. Further, the motif of uncertain paternity which pervades the text 
may be seen to be emblematic of the post-colonial condition as one of 
problematised cultural legitimacy, of the lapse of the secure hold of the 
paternal function over maternal desire -- of the abjection of the subject. 
The post-colonial discursive situation cannot be reduced to the mutual 
antagonism of 'claim' and 'counter-claim'; indeed, there is a simplification 
in the very term 'counter-discourse' if it is the discourse itself which is 
understood as purely oppositional. Rather, discourses are not so pure or 
autonomous. In their valorisation of the body of the land, of the 
authenticity of origins, of cultural continuity and belonging, post-colonial 
counter-discourses offer to Nation that promise of origin-al desire (for the 
Mother, for origins), about which the subjects of the dominant Nation-al 
discourse had been anxious since the Symbolic alienation of Nation raised 
the spectre of uncertain legitimacy .. On the other hand, even post-
colonised literary evocations of a cultural land-chora are Symbolised in 
textual form, and are thus vulnerable to (re-)appropriation by the post-
colonising desire to (re-)establish the true body of Nation. The logic is 
something like, 'if the nation cannot be original, then at least it can be 
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indigenous'. The project becomes one of producing the simulacra of 
indigeneity, for the 'true body' is always a contradiction in terms: the 
'true' belongs to the order of the legitimate, the proper, and the 
autonomous; the 'body' belongs to that of excess, of polymorphous 
perversity, of jouissance. Therefore, post-colonial national desire for 
legitimation (the 'true') by incorporating indigenous discourses of 
originality (the 'body') opens a discursive abyss into which 'national' and 
'cultural' subjectivities are always about to fall -- the nation is engulfed by 
an impossible excess, and indigenous discourses are alienated in the 
National Symbolic. 
This hybrid contamination of discourses and subjectivities is not a new 
feature, the belated advent of post-colonialism. It is instigated and 
disavowed in the earliest moments of colonial encounter, and repressed by 
'National consciousness'. It returns, however, to abject the subject in post-
colonialism, where land -- the colonial issue -- is reinscribed differently in 
the post-colonial politics of identity. These political discourses are located 
on the inside-outside rims of the desires/fears they articulate. Thus part of 
the issue is that the dominant discourse (which has repressed the 
implications of a prior and superior indigenous claim to the land) 
appropriates the terms of this repressed discourse in the interests of 
securing an original relation to the land; while indigenous discourses 
seeking to regain their original relation must do so by bringing this claim 
to the 'consciousness' of the nation through the attainment of a 
subjectivity within the national Symbolic. 'Originality' is therefore 
paradoxically alienated in the very necessity of its articulation. In other 
words, post-colonial discourses of the land -- ambivalently signifying 
desires and fears -- traverse the rims -- zones of contention -- on the 'body' 
of national culture. 
It is now useful to return to the formulation I outlined earlier in 
relation to the colonial encounter, filling in the circulation of post-colonial 
discursive impulses in relation to identity and the land. The following· 
table illustrates the colonial disturbance of both temporal and spatial 
constituents of subjectivity, producing the (post-)co!onial subjective 
Entstellung which abjects discourses of identity. 
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A Schematic Representation of 
the Abjection of the Subject of 
Settler Post-Colonial Discourse 
Erotogenic Zone. 
Temporali ty/His tory. 
This refers to the potency in 
(post)colonial cultural and 
political discourse of the problem 
of beginnings and endings. 
Spatiality/Positionality. 
Presence is both temporal and 
spatial, and the latter 'zone' is 
traversed as the question of 
presence and absence, and relative 
positioning -- 'here' and 'there'. 
Politics /Discourse. 
Belonging is both positional and 
possessive (political). In the 
relative inscriptions of 'self' and 
'other' in discourse, these 
discourses must confront their 
production through the locus of 
the Other -- their hybridity, their 
differance. 
Discourses of Fear and Desire. 
Origins /Legi timacy. 
Post-colonial discourses desire, but 
cannot attain both of these: each 
has either been lost (is in the past), 
or has not yet been gained (is in 
the future). Thus presence -- and 
a present which would .elide the 
problem of history -- eludes them. 
Authentici ty/Belonging. 
Post-colonial discourses invoke 
the land as guarantor and 
measure of identity (continuity 
with place or position), and a 
sense of the specificity of place. 
Authority/Subjectivity. 
Post-colonial discourses desire the 
articulation of a subjectivity 
which will enable the production 
of historical and spatial continuity 
-- that is,. to narrativise belonging -
- but each is necessarily born out 
of subjectivity discontinuity, both 
spatial and temporal. 
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The implication of each of these components in the others, and their 
endless circulation around and through each other, conveys something of 
the hybridity of post-colonial discourses of the land, its modes of 
signification and substantive significance. The contamination of one by 
another points to the inability of the National Symbolic to repress or 
sublimate its disturbed authority, and of indigenous discourses to elide 
their loss of 'originality'. The 'subject' is inevitably spoken through both. 
In this abject condition of post-colonial subjective hybridity, how can 
the temptation to -- or imposition of -- a cynical political indifference be 
avoided? Brydon describes her use of the term 'contamination', to 
characterise post-colonial literary discourses in Canada, as 'polemical.'31 
However, I wish to grant it more than polemical value; I use it to invoke a 
descriptive, evocatively affective value which goes some way towards 
suggesting the abjection of the post-colonial subject, not to negate politics, 
but to re-Iocate and re-energise them. This requires the recognition that 
the phallocentric subject of identity, not despite but partly because of its 
alienation in language, is problematically predicated on the purity which 
signifies distance from corporeality and heterogeneity, from the body as the 
site of traversal of contradictory drives and networks of power. As Hodge 
and Mishra argue of what they term the "racist complex," but which could 
be argued of the whole structure of National authority in the (post-) 
colonial context, 
we need ... to locate its point of weakness and insecurity and 
deconstruct its obsessive claims to monolithic unity. the point of 
weakness is also the site of its most massive investment of energies: 
the role of the concept of purity in an impossible enterprise of· 
legitimation .... 
. . . . The price of purity is that the anomolous becomes the focus of 
energy in the system, which seeks to contain and deny the impurity 
that would destroy its constitutive principles. -The impure, the 
hybrid, the bastard, are such threats to the system that they become 
taboo, objects of excessive hatred and disgust. But at the same time 
they are disturbingly attractive, the locus of pleasure and power, 
where change and growth are still possible.32 
The options for asserting purity in the face of its compromise include 
the suppression of difference, ora reactionary absorption into the 
otherness offered by the dominant discourse. But even these are 
ultimately untenable as positions of 'purity'. They are positions of 
disavowal which reinscribe the forces they resist, and which in fact 
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underwrite the cynical indifference of discourses of cultural politics or in 
the politics of cultural production, and circulate through cultures as 
cultural! discursive relativism and pluralism. For example, 'purity' may 
be used by dominant interests against those that threaten them. Referring 
to Aboriginal indeterminacy regarding the boundaries of sacred sites, Ken 
Gelder argues that 
Those anthropologists and consultants who would 'fix' the 
boundaries of Aboriginal sites play into the hands of mining 
companies (if they are not employed by them already) who wait in the 
wings to move into legitimized areas. To promote the indeterminacy 
of the .boundaries of a sacred site certainly frustrates this ambition --
although it has its own hazards for Aboriginal communities, too. 
Mining companies exploit this indeterminacy by challenging the 
authenticity of a claim -- and, it follows, the very 'essence' of the 
sacred. This is postmodernism in its more reactionary guise: A 
mining company discredits Aboriginal authenticity to make its own 
claims appear authentic. Aboriginal communities, on the other 
hand, exploit indeterminacy in order at the very least to defer the 
claims on and about them by mining companies. . . . This may be 
postmodernism in its more revolutionary manifestation.33 
This analysis illustrates the point made by Hodge and Mishra that purity 
becomes the site of the most massive investment of energies in cultural 
and political discourse. Further, such condemnation of Aboriginal land 
claims to the status of inauthenticity is only possible from within the belief 
of the dominant discourse in the purity of its own speaking-position. 
Thus the urgency of problematising the conflation of authenticity with 
subjective purity and the disavowal of the hybridity of the (post-)colonial 
subject this entails, is clear. 
A different danger -- that of an uncritical appropriation of dominant 
discursive forms in gestures of mimicry by Nation's Oth~rs, is exemplified 
in a number of Elizabeth Jolley's texts discussed in Chapter Three: the 
woman as 'migrant subject', in which borrowed 'masculine' positions in 
relation to the land -- possession, mastery, and sublimation -- reflect 
exploitative or 'colonising' relationships between women; the touristic 
consumption of landscapes, idealising responses which are deflated by 
physical proximity to, or contact with, the land; and the appropriation of 
the traditional masculine wealthy subject of land ownership. While Jolley 
demonstrates the dangers of discourse predicated on an impossible 
disavowal of difference -- the feminine accession to phallocentric 
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subjectivity -- as being precisely the reinscription of colonising relations, 
a~d while she is (usually) critical of these reinscriptions, her insistence on 
women who speak and write the land does not address how both women 
and land may be differently inscribed in discourse. 
The problem of absorption into otherness in order to protect the 
integrity of cultural difference lies in the political indifference of cultural 
relativism, which actually strengthens the legitimacy of the status quo. 
Diana Brydon asks, "Whose interests are served by ... retreat into 
preserving an untainted authenticity? Not the native groups seeking land 
rights and political power."34 In relation to women as Others of the 
valorised masculine National subject, Schaffer is critical of those who 
"depict the land, in defiance of the tradition, as a loving, mysterious, 
powerful and positive force," as inversions of patriarchal ideology: "These 
writers complete the masculine representations by filling in the missing 
content -- the other side."35 Aritha Van Herk's The Tent Peg might be read 
as just such an inversion of a patriarchal myth, the identification of 
woman with the land, appropriating its full ambivalence in order to 
critique masculine distance from the land by positing an essentially closer 
relationship between it and women. However, while this constitutes a 
moment of the novel's articulation, the relationship to the land 
exemplified by J.L. is one which is critical of the land-mother myth, even 
in its benign guise. Through J.L., the novel is critical of patriarchal 
arrogance and a subjective morphology which can only perceive others in 
relation to the self, a position from which it claims mastery and autonomy. 
Post-colonial discourses and post-colonial cultures are abject to the 
extent that they attempt to articulate 'truth', 'authenticity', and 'identity' 
according to a phallocentric morphology, within the contaminated space of 
dislocation and belatedness. Provisionally to invoke an idealist sep;;lration 
between the following terms, cultural-discursive tension arises, not out of 
their contamination as such, but in relation to the claims to authenticity 
and the attempts to retain an authoritative (National) subjectivity -- a 
position from which to speak a (national) identity -- which necessarily are 
articulated in post-colonial societies. While post-colonial discourse has 
been described by Brydon as seeking ita way to define differences that do 
not depend on myths of cultural purity or authenticity but that thrive on 
an interaction that 'contaminates' without homogenizing,"36 she concedes 
that "While post-colonial theorists embrace hybridity and heterogeneity as 
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the characteristic post-colonial mode, some native writers in Canada resist 
what they see as a violating appropriation to insist on their ownership of 
their stories and their exclusive claim to an authenticity that should not be 
ventriloquised or parodied. "37 Similarly, it has been argued that 
"Whatever its limitations, national identity is often the only shield the 
colonized have against the peremptory characterizations of the 
colonizer."38 It would be reductive to argue too easily that post-colonial 
discourses celebrate cultural-discursive contamination; constituent 
discourses are rarely so tolerant of competing claims to its highly interested 
and libidinal terms. Rather, post-colonialism comprises discourses 
through which their contamination is inadvertently and abjectly spoken. 
Broadly speaking, settler post-colonial discourses of the land negotiate 
indigenous land-claims, discourses of National authority and legitimation, 
and the constellation of discourses around national autonomy and 
identity. Each of these comprises varying combinations of discursive 
mode or authority: the sacred, traditional, historical, economic 
(productivity and consumption), conservation, social justice, defence, and 
more. Land is a 'right', a resource, self-definition, a link between past and 
present, a text, and so on. An article in The Weekend Australian 
illustrates the abject confusion of discourses and significations in the post-
colonial context.39 I quote it almost in its entirety in order to present as 
many examples of such discursive contamination as possible, and have 
underlined what I consider to be key examples, providing some 
commentary on conflicts and paradoxes. 
7. III. (iv). Conflict between social justice and preservation of the 
en vironm ent. 
Greens divided on Aboriginal land rights. 
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The fight by Aborigines for the right to hunt in national parks holds the 
promise that ancient skills will be kept alive. But it is also threatening 
some of the most enduring alliances of the conservation movement.! 
David Buchanan, Jamie Bogle and Warren Kerr are Kuku Yalanji 
tribesmen who escort paying tourists through tribal rainforest next to 
Mossman Gorge National Park in North Queensland, where they 
demonstrate traditional hunting rituals using spears and boomerangs and 
supplement their grocery shopping.2 
Like many Queensland Aborigines, they believe an extension of their 
hunting rights into national parks -- made possible under the State's new 
Aboriginal Land Act -- would soothe the wounds of white settlement.3 
Some in the environment movement concur with this view and equate 
the importance of social justice with that of environmental preservation.4 
But others shudder at the prospect of the pursuit of traditional food 
sources on traditional land with guns, four-wheel drive vehicles and 
outboard motors.s 
So, amid a shower of insults such as "green redneck racist" and 
"conservationists captured by guilt", alliances built on the bold campaign 
against a road through the Daintree rainforest in the early 1980s are 
crumbling.6 
1 Tradition and conservation are often politically and discursively linked in discourses of 
preservation, but here they are divided by incompatible ideas of what should be preserved, 
and how such preservation should be undertaken. 
2 Tradition, the object of preservation, has already been turned into consumer item -
tourist entertainment -- which is paradoxically symptomatic of the basis of the social and 
economic changes which have generated the need for concern about preservation of 
traditions, and the means by which this is being sought. The irony is sustained by the 
observation that 'tradition' is also put to the utilitarian purpose, by the tribesmen, of 
supplementing their livelihood within, rather than independent of, the dominant cash 
economy. I do not make this point to be critical of tl}.e strategies of the Aboriginal 
tribesmen, but simply to emphasise the post-colonial strategic and discursive hybridity. 
3 At this point, discourses of tradition and economic livelihood as the basis of hunting 
rights claims are located within a post-colonial discourse of social justice in relation to a 
history of colonial oppression. 
4 Social justice is equated with environmental preservation, but even the expression of 
their equality occurs within a discourse which already assumes their fundamental 
separateness. 
S In this discourse,'tradition' is invoked by the dominant culture as a tool of social and 
political suppression of hunting rights claims, and the perpetuation of colonial power 
relations with regard to land rights. Paradoxically, the very accession to (the technologies 
of) modernity, posited as the means to subject-status within the nation, is used to de-
authenticate and disqualify their claims. 
6 Post-colonialism cannot unproblematically be characterised as a tolerant pluralism of 
social and political discourses, even among those who would contest major industrial and 
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Conservationists supportive of hunting rights say that Aborigines 
practised sound land management before white settlementl and that non-
Aboriginals have been responsible for rampant species extinction. 
But opponents retort that indigenous people now prefer modern 
conveniences to tradition .... 
Mr Buchanan, 36, is one of only 100 remaining Kuku Yalanji people,2 
and agreed that hunting on traditional land helped restore his people's 
dignity.3 
He said the Kuku Yalanji would apply under the Aboriginal Land Act for 
hunting rights in sections of Mossman Gorge National Park and Daintree 
National Park where their ancestors once roamed along the 'dreaming 
track'.4 
'Our people used to walk along there in the Dream Time, and they used 
to go hunting. We want to get that back so we can go hunting,' he said.s 
.... We would only take enough for what we need for our families.'6 
While most tribesmen hunted with spears and boomerangs 'like the old 
people', others were known sometimes to use guns, Mr Buchanan said. 
Hunting in national parks is by no means guaranteed under the 
legislation, which requires Aborigines to apply for inalienable freehold 
title on the grounds of traditional or historical association. Only gazetted 
parks will be subject to claims but none has been gazetted and it is widely 
rumoured that a maximum of only four parks will be? 
economic interests. Instead, affective agonism/ antagonism is found among discourses in 
dispute, so that the effects of contestatory positioning require specific calculation for each 
circumstance. 
1 This is a (post-colonial) reversal of the beliefs that Aboriginals did not manage the land, 
beliefs which in tum were held to be justification for colonisation. 
2 There is an discomfiting relationship between conservational discourse which refers to 
'rampant species extinction', and this statement of numbers of tribesmen, which could be 
read within the same discourse, thus objectifying Aboriginals as part of the land. 
3 The above statement of numbers of Kuku Yalanji people becomes all the more 
disconcerting when the same sentence, which begins with objectifying conservationist 
discourse, invokes the humanist notion of the dignity of these people. 
4 There is a conflict here between discourses of (white) legislation as mediating access to 
the land and what may legally occur on that land, and the claim to traditional ancestral 
association with the land which precedes that law. 
S The Aboriginal claim is made on the basis of regaining ancestral links to land, pointing 
both to rights prior to the (white) law, and the social justice of regaining what has 
wrongfully been taken. 
6 Aboriginal claims to hunting rights do not invoke the preservation of tradition as 
something distinct from material life, but as inextricably part of it, as a matter of livelihood 
and family support. 
7 This sentence traverses the incompatible discourses of white legislation and mediation 
of access to the land, and the traditional and historical association (authenticity) required in 
order to gain access through that (white) law. 
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After a park has been gazetted and a claim lodged, a park management 
plan must be developed through consultation between Government and 
the Aboriginal community, and it is in the management plan that hunting 
rights may be specified .... 
But the director of the Cape Tribulation Tropical Research Station, Dr 
Hugh Spenser, fears that the opportunity to obtain hunting rights would 
'open a Pandora's box' because any management plan could not be 
properly policed.1 
'The only genuinely feasible way to manage national parks is to take an 
entirely hands-off approach,' Dr Spenser said.2 
.... Dr Spenser said hunting in national parks in the 1990s and beyond 
would threaten the viability of animal species. 'There are more 
(Aborigines) than there were before white settlement, the areas have been 
under far more pressure so the numbers of animals are probably far 
reduced,' he said.3 
The chairman of Douglas Shire Council, Mr Mike Berwick, who is a 
high-profile north Queensland conservationist attacked the prospect of 
hunting rights for 'putting one of our most important national assets in 
the hands of a minority group.'4 
'They're not the best educated minority group,' Mr Berwick said. 
'I really do think national parks come before social issues.'s 
A principal teacher of Aboriginal community rangers at Cairns College of 
TAFE and former vice-president of the Australia Conservation 
Foundation, Ms Rosemary Hill, said she was working with the National 
Parks and Wildlife Service to convince sceptical park rangers that their 
management techniques could be enhanced by Aboriginal involvement, 
and that hunting rights would not jeopardise their work.6 
1 Despite the Aboriginal 'ethical' claim to the land (priority, authenticity), the law is the 
final arbiter and policer of access. 
2 Aboriginal access to the land is now being inhibited by advocacy of the very approach to 
'land management' of which colonisers accused Aborigines as justification for their 
proprietorial rights. . 
3 Again, Aborigines are located within a broadly ecological discourse which conflates them 
with all 'species' on the land whose balance must be mananged by white (conservational) 
law. 
4 There is implicit definition, here, of the valorised subject of Nation whose position 
guarantees access to 'national assets' against the access of 'minority groups'. White 
colonisation and settlement rendered Aborigines a 'minority', and now this is being used 
to exclude them from claims not only to national assets, but to national subjectivity. The 
true national subject - the 'us' is inscribed. 
5 This is a reversal of the earlier equation of national parks with social issues. Ironically, 
national park and conservation promotional discourse explicitly presents these as social 
issues themselves, in appeals to the preservation of wildlife and the natural environment 
'for our children and our children's children'. 
6 Even when Aboriginal access to national park land is advocated, this is on the basis of 
their contribution to (the white notion 00 park management techniques, one which will 
sustain the priority of 'national parks' as the way in which people relate to the 'natural 
environment'. 
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In this clamour of discourses characteristic of post-colonial hybridity and 
abjection, we find tradition, tourism, livelihood, and conservation both 
resistant to, and deeply implicated in, one another. Aborigines, as well as 
subjects of claims to rights which would keep traditions alive, preserve 
dignity, and supplement their livelihood, are objects of discourses of 
conservation and ecology. While some discourses propose the equal 
importance of environmental and social issues, others use conservationist 
interests to instal the dominant National subject for whom national parks 
are a resource, against minority groups whose discounted claim on this 
'national resource' diminishes their status as included in the valorised 
national 'us'. Further, while the advent of national parks is part of the 
same modernisation that generally identifies hunting with guns and 
vehicles, Aborigines are condemned for not articulating their claims 
within the confines of 'authentic tradition'. Even where traditional 
hunting 'rights' are granted, these -- despite_grounds in historical and 
traditional association -- are entirely mediated and 'policed' by the Law. 
Clearly these discourses are all located on the inside-outside rims of 
each other, and while the positions from which they are articulated are 
discernable in relation to the complex of power relations into which they 
are inserted and through which they are inscribed, these positions 
themselves traverse multiple subjectivities-in-discourse, and require 
specific calculation of their effects. For example, the Aboriginal seeking 
hunting rights is not simply the subject of tradition, of disourses of 
cultural survival and economic livelihood, of modernity, and so on, but 
each and all of these. But the situation is more complex still: all of these 
discourses are located on the borders of local (cultural/national) 
mediation, and inter-national circulation. Resource issues -- the 
productivity of the land and consumerism (including tourism) -- defence, 
social and environmental concerns, while identified as central to -cultural 
or national self-definition and autonomy, circulate within inter-national, 
even global, forms, and point to the lack of autonomy of cultural and 
national discourses. Thus the post-colonial culture or nation is abjected by 
the problematisation of the very (discursive) autonomy that is asserted in 
discourse. Again, post-colonialism as 'subject' of national or cultural 
identity is unlocatable, drawn into the abyss. 
Through analysis of discourses of the land as central to identity, I have 
shown that post-colonial cultural identity is threatened from within, in 
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the heterogeneity of hybrid discourses which problematise subjective 
integrity, while at the same time being threatened from without by their 
implication in the circulation of international discursive forms, 
problematising autonomy. Nation and patriarchy may be likened in their 
respective relations to the land and to the maternal body; that is, maternity 
may be seen as the ground upon which patriarchy is erected. Therefore, 
just as 'national identity' is only tenable to the extent of repression or 
sublimation of difference, the social-subjective organisation of patriarchy 
produces its valorised subjectivity by containing woman-as-Mother. 
Having linked Nation and patriarchy, I now link land and mother as the 
bodily-connoted abject of the National subject. I discuss three novels 
which are crucially about the maternal body and its resistance to 
patriarchal containment; its difference within patriarchy both as otherness 
in relation to the masculine norm, and as fertility -- difference and 
multiplicity within itself which produces a deferral of paternity-as-identity. 
Audrey Thomas's 'trilogy' of novels, Mrs Blood,4o Songs My Mother 
Taught Me,41 and Blown Figures,42 addresses the confrontation of 
'phallocracy' by the maternal body, not to valorise the maternal body as . 
women's identity, but to abject the phallocentric subject with what it 
excludes, critiquing its pretensions to mastery and autonomy. Beginning 
with Mrs Blood's exploration of the phallocentric mind-body split which 
identifies 'woman' with 'body', the trilogy moves to Songs, and Isobel's 
tracing of her problematic relationship with her mother within this social 
context, and then to Blown Figures, and the dismantling of the unified and 
autonomous self. 
7. IV. The Transgressive Writing of the Maternal Body. 
The feminine can be understood as abject for masculinity. It is needed 
in order to erect the latter into positivity, but it must be disavowed in order 
to establish that positivity. It is externalised by the masculine and 
therefore constitutes a threat to 'identity' from outside, while its source is 
always from inside that identity, as its excess. Although it returns to 
invade the phallic identity as if from outside, it is not strictly an-other. 
The relation of masculine and feminine is not one of sexual difference, 
because the feminine is neither a sex (it is no-sex), nor different (it is the 
negative of the Same). In relation to the bodily constitution of the abject it 
could be posited that the scopic drive, actualised through the eyes, 
constitutes the eyes as rims through which light enters and the image is 
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'expelled', or externalised on to the bodies of 'women'. Sexual difference 
is expressed not in terms of 'masculine' and 'feminine', but 'men and 
mothers'.43 This requires further analysis of the relations between 
maternity, subjectivity and abjection, both for the phallocentric Symbolic 
and, importantly, for those unspeakable beings, women. 
Grosz explains that "For women, the only socially recognised, validated 
position in the Symbolic is as mother. "44 However this is hardly a position 
of 'proper' subjectivity, but an indirect, 'borrowed' place, in which 
"maternity ... connects the woman to a 'symbolic-paternal' axis, on which 
her body is marked as phallic and/or castrated of the male attribute." Her 
pathway towards Symbolic significance is by way of the child, for "if the 
maternal body provides the means by which the child acquires a symbolic 
place (even if by abandoning her), the child in turn provides the 
conditions under which the woman-mother has indirect access to the 
Other." However, the maternal body is the abject for the subject, as His the 
mother's body which is expelled in order to delimit the 'clean and proper' 
Symbolic body. Similarly, the encroachment of maternity in and on to the 
Symbolic can be seen as the latter's abjection, disturbing the stability of its 
law. For example, 
Based on her own pre-oedipal and oedipal attachments, the woman-
as-mother remains divided. She produces the 'social matter' that, in 
being subjected to the father's law, provides subjects for the social 
formation. On the other hand, maternity is also a breach in the 
symbolic, an unspoken jouissance whose form is always reduced to be 
never exhausted by the symbolic.45 
The transgressive energies of jouissance pose a threat to the security of 
the Symbolic law. The maternal body is therefore "the site that must be 
territorialised, marked by a proprietorial name, contained by it, for the 
father's law to be accepted by the child. She must be recognised as his, and 
regulated by his law -- hence the castrating brand on her body."46 
To the extent that motherhood involves activities of nurturance in 
relation to the infant -- for whom, in the pre-oedipal, she is phallic -- the 
mother approaches the condition of 'subject'. It is also to this extent that 
she is subject to abjection, as the processes of her body associated with 
maternity, from menstruation to lactation, occur outside of Symbolic 
subjectivity; these are not things she, as subject, does: 
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Like the abject,· maternity is the splitting, fusing, merging, 
fragmenting of a series of bodily processes outside the will or control 
of a subject. Woman, the woman-mother, does not find her 
femininity or identity as a woman affirmed in maternity but, rather, 
her corporeality, her animality, her position on the threshold 
between nature and culture. Her 'identity' as a subject is betrayed by 
pregnancy; and undermined in lactation and nurturance, where she 
takes on the status of the part-.object, or breast for the child.47 
If the maternal body is denied a 'proper', active place in the Symbolic 
because of the constitutive improprieties of this body, rendering it unable 
to be cleanly delimited in relation to its 'animality', then the specifically 
phallocentric investment of linguistic subjectivity in the subject's divorce 
from corporeality may constitute a site of contestation of those very 
subjective structures. In according, for example, the bodily substances 
associated with the abject -- those which threaten the subject -- the status of 
a language of the body, (the) speaking and writing (the) body, a breakdown 
of the distance between the subject and the body becomes possible. This 
would point to the possibility of a new Symbolic which would admit, and 
hear, women as subjects. 
Mrs Blood, Songs, and Blown Figures are a trilogy of novels by Audrey 
. Thomas which negotiate through their protagonist Isobel, the mother as 
abjection, and the abjection of the mother. As is now familiar, 
phallocentric subjectivity is predicated on the Imaginary split into self and 
other, and the Symbolic separation of the subject from the body. The 
protagonist in these novels by Thomas is a woman for whom this splitting 
is less covered by, than pervasive of, her attempts to articulate an identity 
in the Symbolic. Instead of the unitary'!', Isobel is split between 'Mrs 
Thing' and 'Mrs Blood' in Mrs Blood. These names themselves evoke, as 
does the novel, the radical subject/body separation required for 'clean and 
proper' subjectivity. Nevertheless, her less stable position in the Symbolic, 
and less secure subjectivity are enacted through the gradual and 
transgressive merging of these 'ideally' separate spheres, while the novel's 
title suggests the ultimate triumph of the body over the order which 
would silence it. In Songs, Isobel's childhood and adolescent 
consciousness is already divided between third-person 'Isobel' (or 'she') 
and first-person 'I' (also her initial). As a child, she remembers, "I had 
addressed post-cards to myself. 'Dear Isobel./ Having a swell time.! Your 
friend.! I"' (27). Still later, the same splitting persists as she describes how 
"Only Isobel was moving, now under the shadow of Panther Mountain. It 
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was suddenly cold and I shivered" (178). However, in Blown Figures, not 
only are there multiple 'Isobels', all inhabitants of different places and 
times of her life so far, but other 'characters' appear to be mirrored alter-
egos of Isobel, so that 'she' may be split into IsobellMiss Miller ("Don't 
speak to me, Miss Miller. I am sure I shall split. I will split! (190», and 
Isobel/Delilah ("The blood which links all women was linking them now" 
(479». The objective or separate existence of these characters is occasionally 
doubted, or doubtful. Isobel tells herself that "Delilah Rosenberg does not 
exist. Or perhaps it is you? Perhaps this is only Delilah's dream? Have 
you thought about that at all?" (164). Similarly, she tells Miss Miller, 
"You're only a sort of thing in my dream, Miss Miller; you're only a sort of 
thing in my dream" (297), but soon undermines the security of her own 
. objective status: "Ah, Isobel, how do you like belonging to another 
person's dream?" (301). The instability of her identity is literally reflected 
in the (mirror-)image she perceives of her 'self': "I can do anything I want 
with Isobel. I can make her fat or thin, like a funhouse mirror. Give her 
an elegant back -- she always wanted an elegant back -- a lisp, a limp, a 
missing finger, a wart on the end of her nose, a lover, a husband, a dead 
child" (140). However, the assumption of a position of mastery of the split 
between self and image is ironic: she does not choose a dead child. Such 
mastery is an illusion of masculine subjectivity which, even as an illusion, 
is less available to women. Thus while seeing, or recognising herself in 
the field of the Other -- in the dream of another -- as do all subjects, her 'I' 
is not isomorphic with her 'self' as the masculine 'I' is; instead, it gives 
way and leaves an undecidable merging of self and other which is precisely 
not 'clean and proper' subjectivity. 
The multiplicity of Isobel's selves is unable to be contained by the flat 
mirror of mimetic representation and self-distance. The failure of this 
mirror to return her 'self' to her in its image is earlier suggested in Songs: 
'''Isobel, do you remember when [mother] smashed the bathroom mirror 
with a cold-cream jar?'/ 'No.'/ 'Of course you do. The frame hung there 
for days and one night, brushing your teeth, you chanced to look up and 
saw only a blank piece of cardboard and not your face. Your face had 
disappeared.'/ 'I remember. I thought it was an omen at the time'" (84). 
The mirror that fails to reflect her image also fails to instigate the 
conditions necessary for symbolisation -- self-representation in language. 
From childhood, Isobel has a difficult relationship to naming systems, and 
the relationship of their authority to their 'authenticity'. She reflects on 
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"Rome. Syracuse. Ithaca. Troy. Years later I was to wonder what scholar-
gypsy had wandered through our state, bestowing such illustrious names 
on places (which seemed to me then, years later) so singularly lacking in 
lustre" (13). Her attempts to realise the identity of name and object are 
destabilised by Harry, himself a transgressor of the Symbolic Law in 
refusing the position it offers him as grandfather in favour of simply being 
called 'Harry'. As Isobel craves the assurance of authenticity, even her 
own name comes to trouble her with its possible inauthenticity: 
('Harry, what d'you call this tree?' 
'It doesn't matter.' 
'It does. It does. What d'you call it, Harry?' 
'Why don't you name it yourself? Why take a name that someone 
else has given it?' 
'Because that's its real name.' 
'No, Isobel. It's not.' 
'What's its real name, then?' 
'God knows. I don't.' 
'Is my real name not Isobel?' 
'It might be. Wait and see.') (87-8) 
However, Harry is able to assume a (colonising) position of authority to 
bestow names, while Isobel intuits the elusiveness of that position for 
herself. Eventually names come to lose their integrity and become the 
stuff of 'knock-knock' jokes (142; 188; 196). 
The Symbolic that cannot guarantee that her 'real' name is Isobel, 
cannot provide her with her proper name as 'woman', for it cannot 
articulate sexual difference. Maternity, as the proof of sexual difference 
which still cannot be represented, confronts the Symbolic with the abyss of 
abjection at its borders, a "hole into which the subject may fall when its 
identity is put into question."48 It constitutes the fluidity through which 
'woman' exceeds the solid Symbolic and rejoins her corporeality. In a 
Symbolic system which valorises unity, it is experienced as the splitting of 
the self, evoked, for example, in Mrs Blood's description of giving birth as 
being "Consumed with pain. Consummated. That was at eight and the 
child was born at ten. Rip. Rip. And then rest in peace" (183). Even the 
young Isobel of Songs has articulated the splitting (and doubling) of her 
self in maternity: "Once I had two rag dolls, mother and baby, whom I 
called 'Me' and 'Mimi' .... Ten years later I came upon them by accident, 
bleached featureless by the wind and sun and rain .... It was like finding 
two small corpses .... Isobel, perhaps they are your totems?" (19). It is 
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significant that these passages both combine the notions of maternal 
splitting and of death. Maternity is the death of (the mastery of) the 
'subject' -- a provisional term in relation to women -- not only because 
"'She' does not exist as such,"49 but because it confronts the proper 
(masculine) subject of the Symbolic with his corporeality, and thus his 
mortality, as well as the failure of his autonomy and integrity. As Grosz 
explains, "If the object is the external support of the subject, the abject is 
more the fading, instability or even disappearance of the subject."50 
The dangers posed to the Symbolic by maternity, and by maternal desire 
-- the desire which would keep the subject from identifying with, and 
acceding to the Law/Name/No of the Father -- require that desire to be 
policed, both on a subjective and a socio-cultural level. Social taboos serve 
to isolate women, particularly in their maternal function, both by 
identifying them as potential contaminators of cultural purity, or the 
idealised purity of culture, and by ensuring their removal from potential 
(male) victims of such contamination. Kristeva points out that abjection 
"takes the form of the exclusion of a substance (nutritive or linked to 
sexuality), the execution of which coincides with the sacred since it sets it 
up."51 In Blown Figures, such taboos are on one level represented as 
constitutive of tribal African (Ghanaian) social relations. They include the 
forbidding of contact between 'woman' and the cultural-sacred, even when 
the sacred is abstracted from the bodily, or the female: "No woman may 
possess or touch a drum and yet the tense membrane is made from an 
elephant's ear (pref. female), the hairy side outermost" (240). This example 
clearly evokes the dependence of language on the maternal body, while 
excluding that body from speech/language. Taboos acknowledge the 
source of female/bodily profanity, so that liThe tumpane drums taboo 
most rigidly:/ Blood in any form/ Menstruating wOll1:en/ Jaw bone or 
skulls" (241). Further, they attribute blame for 'natural' misfortune, thus 
regulating social behaviour or relations, especially that of, or in relation to, 
women: "Infidelity on the part of the woman, if not immediately. 
confessed, can lead to a miscarriage or the death of the woman in child-
birth" (310). Similarly, 
A miscarriage at any period is attributed to any of the following 
causes: 
1. Adultery on the part of the wife 
3. Little red ants falling upon her 
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5. The machinations of a co-wife (kora) ... 
9. The sight of blood 
10. A pregnant woman should not look upon a monkey or upon any 
deformity, even a badly carved wooden figure, 'lest she give birth to a 
child like it.' (311) 
That women, and in particular mothers, are transmitters of such 
beliefs, thus regulating their daughters' relation to the socio-Symbolic, will 
be addressed shortly. Nevertheless, such explanations of 'accidents of 
birth' in relation to maternal behaviour instantiate the abjection of the 
Symbolic: in 'rationalising', they seek to cover the abject; they both blame 
the maternal body, and thus admit it, and at the same time they remove it, 
or disavow its power precisely through its containment in the socio-
Symbolic Law. 
Quite apart from women's 'active' breaking of such taboos, the sense of 
an inevitable association between maternity and abjection, contained in 
the location of maternity outside of subjective agency, is evoked in those 
events to which ensuing misfortune is attributed: red ants falling, like 
menstrual blood, as a 'fact of nature'; sexual desire in its 'natural' form, 
unlegislated or un-Symbolised (in marriage, or its social approximations). 
Indeed the impossibility of dissociation of the maternal/body from the 
abject is suggested in the impossible -- in the sense that any sacred ideal is 
strictly (the) impossible -- belief that "Somewhere in this land there is a 
sacred village in which no one is allowed to die. Nor is any woman there 
allowed to bleed" (337). As Grosz explains, the sacred, institutionalised in 
religion, is claimed by Kristeva to "wrest the subject away from the abyss of 
abjection, to displace abjection,"52 the response also exemplified by 
Katherine in The Well. This function is found in Song~, in the figure of 
Aunt Harriet. Scandalised by the suggestion that the now adolescent Isobel 
and her older sister Jane attend a dance, with its implications of 
developing teenage sexuality, Aunt Harriet sat "praying, head bowed now, 
mumbling at her lap. A red sun, enormously swollen, burst and stained 
the evening sky" (124). Thus religion is confronted by that which 
establishes both its necessity and also its limits: the fertile life of the body 
cannot be totally excluded. Indeed, Aunt Harriet's denial of the life of the 
body casts her into the 'opposite' but inseparable abjection represented by 
the death of the body, as she -- 'she' in (the) place of the body -- "rocked 
slowly back and forth in our dead grandma's rocking chair" (125). 
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Clearly, then, the dependence of the socio-Symbolic order on the 
exclusion of the body is not simply a feature of tribal societies or 'other' 
cultures. While the otherness of Africa is demonstrated, particularly in 
Mrs Blood and Blown Figures, as a construct of 'western' narcissism, what 
is excluded or disavowed is not without, but within. Just as the excess of 
the subject is displaced on to the feminine, that of 'western' culture is 
displaced on to the 'African other'. Mrs Thing reflects that 
The old myths about the enormous size of the Negro's penis have 
been dissipated, but it is interesting that they ever got started; for this 
is white man's myth -- savagery, lust, enormous prowess and 
enormous appetite. 'Like animals.' Our lust has been 
intellectualized into love between the sheets, maybe once or twice a 
week and not at all if she doesn't feel like it. Nothing forced. All 
gentle. Yet often this is sham. Gentleness masks indifference, 'love' 
masks the absence of desire. (118) 
The Imaginary production of the cultural Other by the western gaze is 
suggested in Mrs Thing's young son, still innocent or unacculturated to 
western racism, "holding hands with Negroes without even thinking 
about it -- colourblind, happy" (161). The narcissism of the gaze means that 
the Other is seen, not in its alterity, but in its inferior replication of the 
Eurocentric/phallocentric model. Thus cultural colonisation constructs its 
subjects to have a psychical investment· in identification with the 
coloniser, just as a woman is required to despise her/maternal castration, 
and identify with masculinity in order to appropriate, and necessarily only 
approximate, subjectivity. 
As I have argued, abjection is the affect of re-cognition of the 
disavowed hybrid status of the cultural Other in the colonial encounter. 
Kristeva has included "hybrids" as implied in the "prohibition against 
leavened bread"53 which is found among the prohibitions in Leviticus 
signifying the exclusion of the abject. A link between Bhabha's analysis of 
colonial-cultural hybridity and Kristeva's of abjection may therefore be 
posited. European culture is dependent for its self-recognition, and the 
recognition of its superiority, on the gaze which produces the Imaginary, 
but inferior, Other, and on the desired return of the gaze (of recognition). 
This has been illustrated by the discussion above. However, the 'Other' is 
negative by virtue of its attributed 'animality', and thus necessarily 
excluded from the properly cultural sphere. Nevertheless the dependence 
on 'its' animality for the delimitation of the 'western' self returns as the· 
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bodily constitution, dependence, and debt of that self. For example, Mrs 
Thing, in hospital in West Africa, reflects, "I was white and therefore 
vulnerable" (36). She is entirely dependent, like an infant in the semiotic 
chora, on the care, feeding and cleaning of the African nurses Elizabeth, 
Alexandria, Esther, and Grace Abounding (46; 112) and on the authority of 
Doctors Biswas and Shankar (92-4; 96; 131-3), just as she is dependent at 
home on Joseph's cooking, tidying, washing, and child-care (152). In such 
contexts, received patterns of interaction -- "Madame must not cry in the 
presence of the natives" (92) -- are meaningless. Such dependence 
confronts the 'self' with its 'birth' out of the body of the other, so that 
identity is not clearly bounded. The Other, as cultural or racial difference, 
is the threat to identity from within, as sexual difference is for 
phallocentric subjectivity and patriarchal social relations. Africa is within 
the cultural self represented by white Isobel; it is her, and her culture's 
constitutive debt. Thus Blown Figures includes the epigraph, "'We have 
all Africa and her prodigies/Within us', Sir Thomas Browne, Religio 
Medici, 1642." It now becomes possible to read the representations of 
African cultural beliefs, practices and taboos in that novel in relation to the 
consciousness of Isobel, and its failure to repress the abject, or her own 
status as the abject. These representations are better seen as projections of 
her own bodily fears and desires, rather than intellectualised 'cultural 
comparativism'. As Mrs Thing, she concedes that "My Africa is only real 
for me" (43), and by the end of Blown Figures, she and 'Africa' have 
merged in the rite of propitiation which she sought in her journey into the 
abject, to purify the abject. Kristeva's claim that "The various means of 
purifying the abject -- the various catharses -- make up the history of 
religions, and end up with that catharsis par excellence called art,"54 
suggests a reading of Blown Figures, perhaps the whole trilogy, as just such 
a catharsis. 
Just as 'Africa' is identifiable by its constitution as being within, it is 
also demonstrated as being so through the identification of many socio-
cultural beliefs and practices in Isobel's Euro-American cultural context 
which are founded upon the (attempted) exclusion of the body. The 
isolation by frank taboo of the maternal body is reflected in often less 
overtly articulated isolation, hiding, or social absence of the bodily signs of 
sexual desire, fertility, and maternity in Isobel's childhood and adult 
worlds. For example, where there is sexual desire, conventions of 
propriety attempt to silence it. In Blown Figures, Isobel describes the 
465 
attempts to silence, by the force of social convention and masculine 
authority, not simply the 'act' itself, but sexual pleasure, those moments 
beyond the Symbolic into which her body projected her: 
Those strange sounds -- not words exactly -- pre-verbal, originating in 
the very darkest centre of the body and rising through the mouth, like 
smoke -- excited her .... Later, a child in the bedroom or their own 
strange aversion (habit now) to letting go. They were like deaf-mutes. 
It bothered her and sometimes, frantic with delight at what was 
happening between them she would cry out, but he never made a 
sound. She became ashamed, again, of her abandonment. (95) 
Sexual desire is linked to the animality of the body which abjects the 
subject and endangers the social order: it is likened to "a large unruly and 
utterly hopeless dog .... To chain him up would not be enough ... he 
might get away and crash through the prize borders or run into the High 
Street and cause accidents" (215). 
Menstruation is ideally contained by a similar silence and invisibility, 
even between mothers and daughters, despite the reference in Blown 
Figures to "The blood which links all women" (479). Mrs Blood, for 
example, retrieves a childhood memory, when "Mama looked down in 
the paper bag she was carrying and said, 'Now isn't that the limit. I wanted 
paper napkins.'/ But when we said, 'What's the matter?' she said never 
mind" (164). If the sign of fertility is excluded from the proper articulation 
of the social order, so is its proof. Again, Mrs Blood recalls, "I don't 
remember seeing a pregnant woman when I was a child. Nor asking a 
question about sex. Where were all the pregnant women?" (163). 
Finally, birth itself must also be invisible, unlinked to any bodily 
processes which remind the social order of the 'mess' (the bloodshed) on 
which it is built, and which it tries to cover. As Isobel reminds, indeed 
reproves, herself in Blown Figures, following the birth of her child all 
blood was cleaned away so that "when Jason came you were spotless and 
sitting up" (394). The inability of the Symbolic to admit (into itself) the 
excess of the 'clean and proper', phallic body-ideal, is demonstrated as 
resulting in further practices of isolation. In Blown Figures, the isolation 
of the mother is described, in the 'African' context, in the return of a 
woman "to her mother's house, to await confinement ... [because of] the 
always-present dread that she might be going to bring forth some 
monstrosity~ Among her own clanfolk this would be kept a secret, and so 
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ridicule or other consequences to her husband's people would be avoided" 
(309). 
Isobel is keenly aware of the structuring of the socio-Symbolic by its 
repression of the body. Those who acknowledge, or live in contiguity with 
the body, whose subjective cover over the abject is ineffective or absent, are 
isolated as suffering madness. Kristeva argues that "Owing to the 
ambiguous opposition I/Other, Inside/Outside -- an opposition that is 
vigorous but pervious, violent but uncertain -- there are contents, 
'normally' unconscious in neurotics, that become explicit if not conscious 
in 'borderline' patients' speeches and behaviour."55 Indeed it is the 
rebellious life of the body which Isobel meets in her work in a mental 
hospital in Songs. She is welcomed to "the shit ward" (147), where she 
sees old naked ladies with "gray pubic hair, white pubic hair, streaks of 
brown excrement on their faces and legs" (147). Despite her early reaction 
of horror, she finds that "Two weeks later I could pick up a ball of shit and 
toss it back to Sophie" (148). Such an admission of the abject is described by 
Isobel as the loss of her "mind's virginity" (148), while the incarceration of 
the sexual language of the body, or more correctly, the language of the 
sexual body -- jouissance -- is represented in the response of the patient to 
sexual stimulation: "'It's the only time she ever says an intelligible word'" 
(155). By contrast, and as an illustration of the Symbolic intolerance of the 
excesses of madness, Isobel considers her own mother who regularly 
locked herself away and even committed acts of destruction (82; 84) and 
then distanced herself from her outbursts, retreating back into the safety of 
Symbolic containment: 
Which was worse, Isobel? The sound of the key from the inside, 
locking her in, or sitting downstairs or waiting in your bedroom for 
the key to turn again? When she might burst out like a circus 
animal, like the real Grace Poole, roaring, biting, eager to attack. 
Or when she called us all together and laughed her little laugh and 
asked us to forget. (46) 
Patterns of repression are set down for Isobel within the initial social 
context of the family. In Songs, she recalls "We lived in a house where the 
body was virtually denied any existence -- certainly any pleasant one .... 
Bodies were ugly, shameful things" (63). Bodily processes, the excesses of 
the subject, are unspeakable for her and her family. In relation to her 
parents, Isobel "found that the sound of their chewing was enough to 
drive me into cramps of rage. I stuck my nails into my palms until they 
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bled. It seemed incredible to me that I wouldn't murder one or both of 
them before the summer was out" (138). The unspeakable parts of the 
body and bodily processes, those which cannot be spoken but themselves 
threaten to 'speak' through the lapses in the subject, are submitted to, and 
silenced by, containment within elaborate systems of euphemism (63-5). It 
is specifically the abjection belonging to the danger to identity and integrity 
from outside to which these processes pertain, most graphically 
represented in Blown Figures in both its exclusion and its return, when 
Isobel had met 
a mIning engineer who told her how his wife was mIssIng 
something, had a little sack attached to her .... How could he have 
married her, knowing? How could he stand to see her naked, with 
her shamefilled secret? Yet now, watching Mrs Hankinson, Isobel 
was made fully aware for the first time of the foulness we .all carry 
within us, the reservoirs of pee, the huge sausage-casing holding back 
our shit. (67) 
Also associated with the abjection of waste is the corpse, and social 
practices serve to distance this "transitional matter, mixture; [for] it is 
above all the opposite of the spiritual, of the symbolic, and of divine 
law. "56 The sacred village referred to in Blown Figures which forbade 
women to bleed, also forbade anyone to die (337). It is the corpse which 
confronts the subject with its imprisonment by time and mortality: 
"8.01/8.02/ ... ./8.03/ ... 'Isobel, you are dying faster than the day'" (18), 
whispers inside her head, in Songs. Isobel describes the disavowal of these 
bodily processes exemplified when her father would visit his parents' 
grave and plant a geranium, "his hands scented with damp earth and 
geranium leaves" (36). This represents the covering of the idea of the 
smell of decay (thus admitting it) with the scent of life and growth. The 
grass around the grave described as "green and soft" (~6) symbolises the 
covering of the cold rigidity of the corpse. The erection of white marble 
tombstones in the form of angels (36) represents the insistence on the 
spiritual (paradoxically rendered material) as a cover over the profane 
materiality of the body. 
Yet the subject finds it difficult to relinquish its illusory hold over the 
body: it is that hold which, after all, brings it into being. Family graves 
serve to disavow separation in death, while Isobel's mother "vowed she'd 
never be buried with a pack of Clearys" (37), as if the bodies in the ground 
were Clearys in a more essential way than simply for the living/subject. 
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Thus she refuses the non-social, non-subjective, non-identity of the body. 
Death is denied in the projection of a continued coherence of the subject 
and the life of the body. This is evoked in Blown Figures in the passage 
concerning "Donating Your Corpse" (290). The informaHon provided 
locates the subject in the abject space between agency -- the ability to choose 
to donate the corpse -- and the loss of subjective mastery of the body, not to 
'nature', but to the Symbolic which precedes and supercedes, in short 
which masters the subject: "Legally your corpse does not belong to you" 
(290). Yet the Symbolic is then confronted with its own foundation on the 
material rather than the sacred, in the concept of ownership and its 
implications of money, or at least a relation of exchange which interrupts 
the binary Imaginary, and thus the grounds of the unity, autonomy and 
integrity of the subject. The subject is always in debt (to the Other). 
However, the Isobel of Blowfiz Figures embarks 011 a joufn,ey to 
confront her abjection, and thus does not isolate the body, even in death; 
instead "she understood and accepted the terrible pull of the dead, knew 
she was as haunted as any old derelict house of her childhood, that there 
was within her a small ghost which had to be propitiated and set free" 
(194). The threat from outside identity is therefore acknowledged also to be 
within, and constitutive of it, undermining the clean and proper 
delineation of phallocentric subjectivity. 
Although abjection is a;n effect of phaUocentific subject,ivity, whiteh its,elf 
privileges the masculine as positivity, the implka'Hon of mothers i[ll th,e 
preservation of that order cannot be overlooked, nor the specitfkity of its 
transmission from mother to daughter, where eadll. is determined to 
represent the abjection of the other. While maternity in the sense of 
pregnancy and birth is held to be a process without an agent, the functions 
of nurturance take place "at the level of the subject,"57 and are 
manifestations of "maternal authority."58 They do not, however, 
represent a subjectivity for women, as suggested in Isobel's mother's 
phallic identification. She frequently assumes the role of guardian and 
enforcer of the Symbolic Law, in contrast to her husband's failures in this 
function, represented in Songs, for example, in the ineffectual -- castrated? 
-- character of his speech. He often responds, when addressed, wilth the 
truncated '''Wha ... ?III (74; 81; 89). On the other hand it is she who, when 
she thought she heard someone in the house at night, "stood in the 
kitchen, a lumber jacket over her nightgown, hair 'straggling down her 
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back. She had snatched up one of the two rifles that hung over the 
fireplace. Stood there now flushed and triumphant, the rifle in her hands" 
(90). Similarly it is her authority which makes Isobel apprehensive. 
Aware that her father is nearby when she meets a boy by the lake, she 
explains, "I was truly scared now. Not really of my father but of what my 
father would say. Of what he would tell my mother" (179). 
Jason's mother, as Isobel's mother-in-law, functions as the guardian of 
the Symbolic order by mediating Isobel's relation to that order through her 
husband .. It has been shown how Jason's mother's presence stifled Isobel's 
expressions of sexual desire and sexual pleasure, thereby preventing 
disruption to the totality of accession of the husband/son to Symbolic 
subjectivity. Yet this function could also be seen as phallocentrism's 
determination of a structured competition between mother(-in-law) and 
wife (potential outlaw, through her sexual/maternal desire).59 On the one 
hand, as Irigaray glosses the argument of Freud, "If woman wishes to 
attract man, she must identify herself with his mother,"60 and therefore 
take the place of his mother -- a relation characterised as aggression in the 
Imaginary economy. On the other hand, if the mother has been denied the 
desire of the son, she may represent the Law for the wife in order to 
prevent her from gaining what the mother has had to relinquish for that 
Law. This suggests Kristeva's discussion in "Women's Time" of women's 
"counterinvestment" in the socio-Symbolic contract, where she may, "by 
counterinvesting the violence she has endured [in relation to that 
contract], make of herself a 'possessed' agent of this violence in order to 
combat what was experienced as frustration."61 Thus it is Jason's mother 
who, in Blown Figures, "did the sheets every Monday morning" (215), the 
silence of their pure whiteness rebuking Isobel with her body's 
inappropriate transgressions, for "she had haemorraged, so briefly, in 
Jason's parents' house, on Jason's mother's clean white sheets" (214). She 
recalls the birth of her daughter Mary: "You always bled a lot, even then. 
His mother came to see you and, embarrassed, you asked if she would 
mind washing [the nightgown] out for you. Why embarrassed, Isobel, why 
EMBARRASSED?" (394). The intrusion of the Symbolic Mother into the 
desire of the woman/daughter is suggested in Isobel's meditation on the 
demand of that Law that maternity and desire be clearly separated, that the 
Mother be asexual: 
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Curled up against Jason in the big old bed she listened while he read 
her Don Quixote and pushed down her terrible desire for him, a 
desire which (oh! she understood, she really did!) because of her great 
belly, because of the big old bed (his parents had moved into the guest 
room) because of his mother (a light sleeper) in the next room, 
because of the sheets on Monday mornings, because of the very 
nature of the house they were living in was no longer reciprocated. 
Because, too, she had become for him once and for all MOTHER? 
Because her desires for the pleasures of the body should have been 
tempered or superceded by her concern with and absorption by the 
great mystery inside her? (215-6) 
The abjection of the maternal body is, however, intially experienced 
(for the woman) in the relation between the daughter and her own 
mother. The daughter's ability to separate herself, in oedipalisation, from 
her mother is severely impeded by the recognition of their common 
'castration'. Similarly, the mother's radical splitting of herself in 
pregnancy62 is redoubled in the externalisation (in birth) of a part of herself 
who is not herself, but another her-self. The daughter reminds the mother 
of her own 'castration'. Each is therefore implicated in the abjection of the 
other. For Isobel's mother, in Songs, her daughters seemed to be "an 
affront to her, the awkward and visible proof to herself, as well as to Harry, 
the neighbors, society at large, that she had been intimate with this 
FAILURE, this lame excuse for a man" (63). Isobel realises that for her 
mother, who has invested, or found, too much of her self in her 
daughters, "Each insult to me or Jane was a terrible insult to her" (68). 
There occurs a reversal of positions in which her mother becomes the 
indignant and uncomprehending (and spiteful) child left 'out of social 
events: "'Why not? You're just as good as she is. They say her father's got 
a touch of the tarbrush anyway. Who does she think she is?'" (68), while 
Isobel assumes the mother's cold authority for her mother: '''Could we 
drop it?'" (68). 
Blame becomes a term of relation between Isobel and her mother. Her 
mother explains the stretch marks ... [which] happened when she was 
carrying me because I was too big" (64), while for Isobel, the sight of her 
mother's body confronts her with the proof of her own bodily origins, her 
own implication in the body which "filled me with shame and deep 
disgust. She had large heavy breasts, and her stomach, which stuck out 
when she took off her corsets, was covered with minute blue-white scars, , 
very fine, like the lines on an ice-skating rink" (64). The mutual 
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antagonism is suggested in Isobel's recollection that "I could not bear to 
think of her as having bodily sensations and functions at all. Blood spots 
on the back of her nightgown made me want to vomit, and she herself 
called menstruation by derogatory names" (64), while the guilt or shame 
inherited by the daughter from her relation to the mother underlies 
Isobel's memory that "For three months after I began to menstruate I slept 
naked on the floor of my bedroom so as not to spot the sheets and let her 
know" (64). 
Isobel's miscarriage, the focus of Mrs Blood and the background to 
Blown Figures, links the abjection of the maternal body and the abjection 
of the corpse. The link is prefigured however, in Mrs Blood, in the motif 
of the accident involving the milk truck, "the milk truck on its side and 
another car smashed underneath it and blood and milk together running 
all across the road" (20). This may be seen as the abject mingling of 
maternal nurturance, which sustains the body but compromises the 
autonomy of the subject, and the blood which represents both fertility --
the organic origins and the debt of the subject to the mother -- and death, 
both as the limit of subjectivity to which the subject is drawn, and the 
mortality of the body, the excess and underside of the subject. Isobel's body 
is the site of the social repressions and controls upon which the Symbolic 
order depends: for that order, she is utterly (the) abject. Isobel is 
inseparably implicated in the ambiguities of blood and the threats of life 
and death associated with it. She flees reminders of it, such as when she 
"saw a man thump clots of tomato sauce on a fillet of sheet-white fish and 
she fled the pavilion in terror" (193). 
Her own body-limits lack clean and clear delineation, as she discovers, 
as Mrs Thing, in relation to others, "It is impossible for me to see other 
people as separate from myself. Jason is my husband; Mary my daughter; 
Nicholas my son" (191). In relation to her own body/consciousness, Mrs 
Blood declares, "I am covered with memories like barnacles. Weighed 
down, encrusted with them so that only the vague outline of my original 
shape remains" (148). Her lack of sense of a 'clean and proper' body is 
dramatised in the texts through the 'Alice' motif, from Lewis Carroll's 
novels, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking 
Glass. In Mrs Blood, for example, Mrs Thing describes how her feet "seem 
terribly far away and most unreliable in relation to the heaviness which 
seems to envelop the rest of me. I remember Alice's debate about how she 
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would send Christmas presents to her feet" (121). In Songs, Isobel recounts 
during the blood-donating episode, that "I sat looking down at my hand, 
which seemed about to be about ten times its normal size and had 
assumed a curious throbbing existence of its own. The second pill made 
me even more detached than before" (202). In Blown Figures one of the 
numerous 'Alice' passages: "I MUST BE GROWING SMALL AGAIN" 
(88), combines the unstable perception of body-size, and the swelling of the 
maternal body in pregnancy and its diminishment in miscarriage, where 
the mother as 'agent' is 'not there'. The breakdown of Isobel's subjective 
boundaries is further suggested in Blown Figures when "There was a dull 
thud from somewhere near the pig pen. Isobel felt the red hot blood pour 
from her divided throat" (139; see also 140). 
Each of the three novels has enacted Isobel's problematic relationship 
to the Symbolic. The many split selves, the failure of 'self-mastery', testify 
to her inability to unify 'her-self' into coherence: she is never the same as 
herself. Even in childhood, Isobel has recognised the inability of the 
mimetic mirror of phallocentrism to 'produce' her presence; her specular 
absence for that order points to the lack of a stable name, or place, for her 
(as 'woman') in the Symbolic order of language and subjectivity. 
As these novels have further illustrated, phallocentrism determines 
that it is Mothers who are excluded from the socio-Symbolic: taboos 
indentify women/mothers as a danger to men, but implicitly as a, danger to 
the Symbolic Law. But the emphasis is on the social production of the 
abject, of its place in the production of the cultural forms of the sacred, 
taboos, rituals, beliefs, protocol, 'civility', and so on. The life and death, 
and the debt, of the body are culturally contained. However, it is clear that 
containments and repressions cannot finally exclude the cultural excess; 
accidents do happen. Life and death -- milk and blood -- meet and mingle 
into inseparability; the subject confronts the body in inseparability. Isobel 
is the abject for the Symbolic, but each of the novels posits the insistence of 
her body on having the 'last word'. Her maternal-bodily transgressions of 
the socio-Symbolic stain the white sheets of a patriarchal order founded on 
the 'clean and proper' ideal self. 
However, Thomas does not posit the valoristion of the body in any 
essential, biologistic sense, over language and subjectivity: this would be 
utopian inefficacy. For example, haemorrhaging on the point of 
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miscarriage, Mrs Blood says, "I am vulnerable; I am allied to vulture. One 
hovers just above the bed .. The other -- smaller -- one has begun his 
tearing from the inside. My baby, my own. When you do that you are 
allied to these foul-mouthed scavengers" (207). Mrs Blood cannot control 
what is happening to her body or to her unborn child; the process is 
without subjectivity. Significantly, it is the bodily-connoted Mrs Blood 
who, finding this utter submission to the body intolerable, asks "What I 
really want to know is, granted the non-existence of a God, benign or 
otherwise, who is responsible for all this?" (209). 
These novels demonstrate the need for the excess of culture/the 
Symbolic to confront that order, contaminate it with what it excludes, in 
order to disIllantle the phallocentric structure which excludes difference 
and forecloses on relations. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter I return to 
the metaphor of Nation as phallocentric Self, and as productive of 
identities of Otherness, and explore some of the consequences for that 
morphology of post-colonial discourses which abject the unity and 
integrity of the National subject. 
7. V. Purity as Paranoia: The Phallocentric Project(ion). 
Subjectivity requires identification with the Other -- the Law -- and as I 
have argued, the Law is not innocent or neutral, but is gendered 
(masculine). It produces gendered subjects differentially with reference to 
the phallus: masculine presence and feminine absence. Therefore, while 
alienating both masculine and feminine 'subjects' in language, the 
Symbolic order is more foreign for women~ It is women's exclusion from 
the Symbolic, or rather their presence as absence, which sustains its phallic 
Law and underwrites its continuity. The difficulty of subjectivity for 
women is shown, in Thomas's novels, to produce relations of guilt, 
shame, and blame between women: Isobel, Jane and their mother; Isobel 
and Delilah; Isobel and other mothers. Women represent each others' 
failure through offering identification with absence or lack. 
Even the valorised masculine subject of phallocentrism is not 
autonomous, but is spoken through the locus of the Other. The means by 
which this constitutively non-autonomous subject posits itself to be whole 
and self-sustaining is by paranoid foreclosure on one term of the 
Imaginary identifications instigated in the mirror encounter. The mirror 
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reflects the self as whole (through the ideal image/reflection), and as split 
into self and other. However, in paranoia, 
anything perceived as noxious within the ego (in the interior, as it 
were) is then projected onto external objects: the 'subject' thus 
endows the external world with what it takes to be its own worst 
tendencies and qualities .... 
This [process of] projection is undertaken in order to maintain the 
fiction, exactly, of a wholeness and wholesomeness in the 'subject's' 
internal economy. In other words, the fictional delusion of goodness 
and plenitude, going by the name of'!', demands the expulsion, the 
destruction even, of the 'subject's' own impropriety and division.63 
I suggest that this paranoid subjective structure characterises 
phallocentrism's production and vilification of difference, objectified 
within that system as 'woman', the Imaginary repository of the 
inadmissable terms of the hybrid self: the animality of the body -- the 
fertility which threatens the supervalence of the Law with the bodily debt 
to the (M)other, and the desire that attests to the compromise of 
autonomy; and the 'castration' (in language) of the subject. Because 
woman is absence, man can be presence. 
While the paranoiac disavows the implication of the Self in the 
(position of) the Other, "making the inside and the outside distinct 
repositories," maintaining the "fixity and obstinacy of the outside,"64 there 
are two paradoxes which, as in any system of 'purity', are both the points of 
greatest investment and those which are the most vulnerable or weakest.65 
First, as Smith argues, "in their projective mechanism [paranoid 
symptoms] both defend and alienate the ego. Projection defends the ego 
insofar as it demarcates it, gives it an impregnable border with a vigilant 
bord.er patrol; it also alienates it insofar as it cuts it off from its own 
production."66 Thus the efficacy of paranoia is that the defended ego, the 
whole(some) '1', may speak unproblematically as the subject of his/her 
dis.course. However, the full capability of the subject -- its productivity -- is 
disavowed. Second, the Other represents paradoxical cerning and denial 
of alterity. The Other, 'known' as radically external to the subject is, in fact, 
not an identity-to-itself, but a position in relation to the Self, empty but for 
the projections of the Self. This (disavowed) projection of the Self into the 
Other effectively negates the possibility of the knowledge of alterity -- the 
subject or world independent of, and structurally indifferent to, the Self 
(that is, another Self, for itself). 
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This problem of the Other was explored in the Thomas trilogy. Mrs 
Thing -- Isobel alienated from her bodily-self -. is unable to acknowledge 
the alterity of others (191), while Mrs Blood -. Isobel's bodily 
problematisation of subjectivity -- finds she cannot delineate her 'clean 
and proper' self from the endless growth and flux effected by the 
admission and incorporation of Otherness within herself (148). At this 
point it is useful to remember that in paranoia, the Other (which, as a 
projection of the Self's excess, may be 'read' through both the unconscious 
and the Law), is bad or problematic for the subject. In the mirror 
encounter, however, the other is good; it represents the ideal of the self, 
the object of libidinal attachment. Paranoia could be seen as positioned as 
a response in the 'gap' between the identification with the image (as ideal), 
and the 'perception' of the self split by the mirror. Language -. the Other -. 
sutures this split, and as such is not bad for the subject, but is the site and 
the sign of the subject's alienation. But language also cerns the 'self' --
produces the 'I' .- in its articulation, or Othering of the other. 
'Articulation' implies a hingeing term which mediates self and other and 
interrupts the stasis of the dyad. Thus in my formulation, the (bad, 
external) Other is the product of the Othering (alienation, articulation) of 
the (good, desired) other. 
The perception of the lack in the Other confirms the wholeness or 
plenitude of the perceiving subject. Therefore, Otherness must be 
recognised as constitutive of the (phallocentric, privileged) Self at the same 
time as the Self produces the Other. I have argued that in epistemological 
terms, the phallocentric Self is a colonising self, while in cultural terms, as 
they relate to (post-)colonial societies, Otherness is a product of the western 
colonial gaze -- the ambivalent and paranoid construct of its narcissism. 
The need to produce the whole(some)ness of the weste~n colonial ~ubject 
(and thus to legitimate the colonial project) requires the projection of lack 
on to the Other. This is homologous with the notion of 'lack' as 'noxious' 
for the phallus; lack of the phallus is understood as 'castration' / silence (as 
an absence rather than a difference). I have also suggested that the Other, 
produced in the colonial encounter, and constitutive of the valorised 
National subject of settler societies, is repressed by that National subject. 
Post-colonial discourses represent the 'return of the repress~d'. 
It is both necessary and instructive to examine the relationship of 
paranoia to narcissism, distinguishing between colonial and post-colonial 
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narcissisms in their location, or rather their si(gh)ting of the Other. In 
colonial narcissism, the Other is distinguished from the Self as bad in the 
sense of being not whole, or 'castrated'. By implication, the Self is whole. 
Just as phallocentrism defines/constitutes femininity as the (bad) lack of 
the phallus, an Imaginary identification, so Imaginary (specular) 
identifications identify, for example, colour, race, cultural difference, as the 
mark· of 'castration'. However, there is another moment to this 
narcissism: the Other, as 'lacking', is dependent on the Self, a dependence 
which confirms the value of the Self. The narcissism of the western gaze 
is gratified not simply by the difference, but by the aspiration to sameness it 
produces but denies. For example, in: Blown Figures we find the 
marketing of skin lighteners and body-building products in a manner 
which places the Other in the locus of (the reflection of) the Same, while 
retaining the phallic mark of difference (474; 496). Yet even the approach 
to sameness, like the approach of the arrow to the target calculated by 
Zeno's theorem, disturbs colonial authority.67 The subject is confronted 
with the problem that the 'castrated' Other, who 'wants to be' the same, 
but cannot, represents the threat of 'castration' for the subject. As Smith 
argues, "however perfect, hygienic, and secure this [paranoid] system may 
seem with its cerning of both inside and outside, its fictional methodology 
... returns against the 'subject. "'68 
Post-colonial narcissism must be differently founded than National 
narcissism. Confronted by the constitutive splitting of the self at the 
colonial scene, which instigated colonial hybridity (disavowed by Nation), 
the Self must repair itself, reconstitute itself whole and anew. It does so by 
absorbing the Other -- the remainder of the split self -- back into itself, 
enacting a 'return' to pre-split origins, to legitimacy. Thus the Other 
reconfirms the self into a new, whole(some) Self. How~ver, the effect of 
the whole new Self -- the truth or authenticity of identity -- is the 
reactivation of paranoid defence mechanisms. Not only are they 
reactivated, they are necessarily relocated: the bad, threatening Other must 
be external. This may be illustrated with reference to Australia, Canada 
and new Zealand as settler post-colonial societies. 
As I have argued above, Nation's Others are constructs of the founding 
delineation of the National Self through a phallocentric, Imperialist, 
Imaginary order. They represent less the detumescence of the phallic 
Nation than its confirmation, the response to the spectacle of its desire. 
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For example, I pointed out in Chapter One that, in the preface to the 
volume of essays entitled Culture and Identity in New Zealand, there 
appeared the apology that "There are some glaring gaps in this book. We 
regret the absence of chapters on Maori-Pakeha relations, on working-class 
culture ... and contributions from Maori women, from Pacific Islanders, 
from lesbian feminists, all of which were originally planned for 
inclusion."69 What I suggested to be remarkable here was the security 
with which these 'absences' were identified as absent 'presences'; as if the 
(w)hole were knowable in terms of the desire of the part. Further, 
however, the image of the 'glaring gap' points to the perception of the 
feminine 'nothing-to-be-seen' which activates masculine anxiety 
regarding castration. In other words, such ideal completion would provide 
Nation with its feminine object of desire, and in perceiving the feminine 
desire for, or lack of, the phallus of signification or Symbolisation, would 
confirm Nation's status as possessor of the phallus. 
Therefore, post-colonial national discourse strengthens its claim to 
legitimacy through 'fuller' representation, and to ethical integrity through 
the self-representation of its constituent Others. However, its integrity is 
also located in the fact that these identities belong to the order of the Same, 
determined by the phallocentric Imperial-National Imaginary. For 
example, it is that order which projects and reflect's identities of race, 
colour, gender, sexuality, class and so on, founded on its perception of the 
unitary Self, and the negative but also unified Other. It would appear, 
then, that the failure of inclusion is more troubling to a discourse of 
nation seeking redemption, than the flattery of its narcissistic gaze which 
enables it to reflect a fuller, more desirable self. 
The new, redeemed post-colonial nation, where the post-colonised are 
represented and the post-colonisers are authenticated, speaks for identity, 
integrity, autonomy, self-representation, the value of the specific and the 
local, and the value of history, as that narrative of progress(iveness) 
towards the just inclusion of previously omitted identities. In this 
formulation, post-colonial discourse stands for the delimitation of the 
boundaries of legitimate cultural activity. In its own security of identity, 
threats to that identity are necessarily projected as external.' This could be 
termed the 'paranoid' moment of post-colonial discourse, the "dual 
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passage between self-affirmation and self-defense."70 For example, Laura 
Mulvey has argued that 
The question of Canadian national identity is political in the most 
direct sense of the word, and it brings the political together with the 
cultural and ideological issues immediately and inevitably. For the 
Canada delineated by multinational, international finance, U.S. 
economic and political imperialism, national identity is a point of 
resistance, defining the border fortifications against exterior colonial 
penetra tion. 71 
Similarly in the Introduction to Culture and Identity in New Zealand, 
referred to earlier, Willmott argues that New Zealand "can either succumb 
to increasing economic and cultural dependence . . . or it can begin to 
develop a sense of autonomous identity that unites our people in 
opposing internal exploitation of the disadvantaged and external 
exploitation by the mighty."n While the external threat to identity is 
figured in political and economic terms as neo-imperialism, post-
modernism is frequently (though arguably) identified as its cultural 
moment. During has argued that "The play of passions that we call 
postcolonial .... wish[es] once and for all to name and disclaim 
postmodernism as neo-imperialist."73 
Relations between post-colonialism and post-modernism have been 
expressed in terms of radical spatial and strategic separateness. SIemon 
refers to "the major fault-lines that run[] between them,"74 while Helen 
Tiffin locates them in terms of "European post-modernism and Euro-
American post-structuralism," as opposed to post-colonial "cultures and 
texts outside Europe."75 Along with spatial or geographic separation, post-
colonial critics refer to those of strategy. SIemon claims that post-
modernist theory and post-colonial criticism have remained more or less 
separate in their strategies and foundational assumptions,"76 while Arun 
Mukherjee, who identifies post-modernism as "largely a white European 
cultural phenomenon,"77 argues that "the postmodernist label does not 
apply to texts of native and African-American women."78 Thus in post-
colonial discourse (about post-colonialism) a certain morphology of the 
Self is suggested: post-colonialism is bounded, whole, unique, and 
autonomous. It represents here, inside, and identity, while post-
modernism belongs there, outside, and is a threat to identity from outside. 
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The unnegotiable closure of the borders between 'self' and 'other' has 
been described by Smith in terms of the 'claustrophilic' tendencies of 
paranoia. However he goes on to note that "the importance of these 
symptoms ... is that they absolutely depend upon an initial opening of 
those spheres, an opening which is the threat they themselves are 
designated to ward off."79 Such an initial opening may be posited at the 
moment of the colonial encounter, when the very constitution of 'self' 
and 'other' is inseparable from their mutual contamination by each other, 
producing colonial cultural hybridity. Further, and more specifically in 
relation to settler post-colonialism, it could be suggested that the cultural 
scene was opened to post-modernism from the moment of emergence of a 
dominant capitalist order which, from the modern project of national 
development through to the post-modern elision of national boundaries 
as effective economic and cultural designators of identity, projected the 
impossibility of retaining such economic and cultural separateness from 
the centres of trade and military power. This post-colonial insistence on 
the post-modern as 'not-self' may be seen as a defence or disavowal of the 
self's implication in it. 
7. VI. Post-Modernism as Abject for Post-Colonialism. 
As Smith has noted, the "fictional methodology ... [of paranoia] 
returns against the 'subject,lt' and there are moments in post-colonial 
discourse in which post-modernism, even as it is being radically 
externalised from the post-colonial Self, can be found already to have 
contaminated it from an undecidable position inside and outside the Self. 
Thus, post-modernism may also be recognised as abject for post-
colonialism, invoking Kristeva's description of abjection as, for instance, 
"what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect lJorders, 
positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite."80 
Further, she explains, 
The abjection of self would be the culminating form of that 
experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its objects are 
based merely on the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its 
own being .... [A]l1 abjection is in fact recognition of the want on 
which any being, meaning, language, or desire is founded. 81 
It can be shown in relation to post-colonialism that the 'loss' and the 
'want' are those of the body (of heterogeneity or alterity which signify the 
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impurity and implication of the Self) upon whose exclusion 
phallocentric/lmperial subjectivity is predicated. 
It becomes necessary to acknowledge those abject moments in the 
debate, including within the terms of specific contributions, which indicate 
an encounter, one which cannot be so clearly or cleanly contained -- or 
prevented -- by oppositional structures. Linda Hutcheon refers to the 
"problematic site of interaction"82 between the post-modern and the post-
colonial, naming this site variously a "playground" and a "battlefield."83 
Similarly, SIemon acknowledges "an on-going critical struggle" between 
them with regard to the "contested terrain" of textual interpretation.84 
Even Simon During's suggestion that "postcolonialism is to be viewed 
quite simply as a resistance to postmodernism,"85 points to the persistence 
of a relation, determined by the abject fact that (the issue of) post-
modernism keeps returning, threatening the 'clean and proper' self of 
post-colonialism with its excess(iveness). Therefore, its expulsion becomes 
a matter of continual process, rather than a once-and-for-all event. 
Further, this compromises the claim to autonomy of post-colonialism; 
rather, its status as the Ideal Symbolic body must be viewed as the effect of 
its repeated assertion. 
The site of interaction between post-colonialism and post-modernism 
is problematic because it consists of ambiguously inside/outside 'rims' on 
the 'body' of post-colonial nations, cultures, discourses, or texts. The 
expulsions of the pos t-modern confirm the permeability of its boundaries 
and the inefficacy of their existing formulation. For example, Tiffin argues 
that 
Given the extent to which European postmodernism and Euro-
American post-structuralism have increasingly invested in (;ultural 
relativity as a term in some of their most radical insights, it is ironic 
that the label of 'post-modern' is increasingly being applied 
hegemonically to cultures and texts outside Europe, assimilating post-
colonial works whose political orientations and experimental 
formations have been deliberately designed to counteract such 
European appropriation.86 
Along with spatial oppositions, we have here the defensive/offensive 
oppositions of post-colonial victim and post-modern aggressor. Yet the 
argument continues with the suggestion that these post-colonial works 
"have themselves provided the cultural base and formative colonial 
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experience on which European philosophers have drawn in their apparent 
radicalisation of linguistic philosophy."87 It is therefore necessary to 
examine the source of apparent failure of the defences (intentions, 
strategies) suggested here. What I suggest will be found is a complicity of 
the structuring of the post-colonial Self in its vulnerability to the 
incursions of the post-modern Other. 
Three discursive 'rims' which compromise the integrity of post-
colonial discourse and identity (whether of an entire culture or, for 
example, a specific text), three discursive points of the incursion and 
expulsion of the abject represented by post-modernism, and in post-
colonial discourse about post-modernism, are the notions of desire (and 
the ambivalence of seduction), appearance, and strategy. Post-colonial 
discourse is at its most abject when located on, or faced with, these rims of 
undecidability. 
First, as Tiffin argues, "while Euro-American post-structuralist theories 
offer exciting possibilities to post-colonial theoreticians, it would be 
dangerous if they were accepted without rigrorous interrogation from post-
colonial perspectives."88 However, as well as the unquestionable need for 
such interrogation, I argue that there is a need to interrogate just as 
rigorously the source of desirability or attraction held by such theories, and 
also the structuring of post-colonial perspectives themselves. For example, 
in this construction of the post-colonial subject or theoretician as the 
desiring (and thus incomplete and non-autonomous) subject, are we 
directed towards recognition of the legacy of separation from a 'cultural' 
chora of un-Self-conscious undifferentiation? Do post-structuralist 
theories _evoke more primal or original desires, reaching back to a cultural 
plenitude and heterogeneity, and the tension of their loss in the 
construction of the unitary subject? . Is the desire the dependence of the 
subject on the recognition of the Other? On the other hand, the desiring 
subject is an active subject and thus less amenable to description as passive 
victim. 
There have been a number of expressions of post-modern seduction of 
post-colonialism. There is also, in such contexts, frequently a conflation of 
the 'post-modern' with some notion of the 'American way of life', the 
latter generally a short-hand for consumerism and represented in the 
spread of American popular culture. In one explicit example, it has been 
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claimed from a New Zealand perspective, that "For many people in the 
world, the American way of life, even with all its inequalities, is highly 
attractive -- one may say seductive. "89 However, as Jane Gallop points out, 
"as with all seductions, the question of complicity poses itself. The 
dichotomy active/passive is always equivocal in seduction."9o Initially, it 
may seem scandalous to suggest post-colonial complicity. After all, there 
are so many assertions of post-colonial propriety, resistance, and 
boundaries against post-modern incursion (or "penetration" as Mulvey 
put it). Arun Mukherjee expresses her support for "the objections raised 
by the post-colonial critics against post-modernist readings of non-
European texts."91 She points out that post-colonial writers "want us to 
believe the truth claims of the history they themselves are providing,"92 a 
point also made by SIemon, who differentiates the "mimetic or referential 
purchase" of [post-colonial] textuality from -- and against -- ungrounded 
post-modern claims of the "constructedness of all textuality."93 However, 
it could be suggested that post-colonial discourse is seductive to post-
modernism precisely because of the closed, innocent body it presents; that, 
to cite SIemon again, "postmodernism needs its (post-)colonial Others in 
order to constitute or to frame its narrative of referential fracture."94 At 
the same time, though, post-colonial national! cultural discourse asserts its 
purity and innocence in relation to the advances of post-modernism, and 
so there is a mutuality in which post-colonialism must at least concede 
that it displays the very terms -- history, representation, truth -- that post-
modernism most consistently violates. 
Second, discussions of the relation between post-colonial and post-
modern textuality are often forced to acknowledge the appearance of 
similarity in their strategies. Mukherjee refers to "antirealist 
representation, parody, auto-referentiality, problematizing of history,"95 
but warns that "surface similarities may turn out to be deceptive since the 
semiotic codes of cultures are often not interchangeable .... [W]hat may 
seem postmodernist and new to cultural outsiders may seem quite 
ordinary and traditional to those from within a culture. "96 In this case, 
while she suggests an undecidable, quality of textuality, amenable to 
different readings, the recourse is to a cultural insider whose authorial 
intentions or privileged reading casts others as intrusive or invasive. Yet 
we have already seen the apparent inefficacy of intentions and deliberate 
strategies in preventing such transgressive readings. SIemon makes the 
similar observation that "Hutcheon's framing of the postmodern field is 
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important, for the general textual practice she defines ... resembles -- at 
least on the surface -- the kind of reiterative textual energy which ... 
marks out an especially interesting moment within a broadly post-colonial 
literary activity."97 Thus he is required to call on depths or intentions to 
differentiate them. Again I would argue the need to interrogate the 
position from which that which looks the same may be revealed as 
different. It requires a securely centred identity, one which points to the 
entrapment, or possibly even complicity of that identity in the terms of the 
Symbolic field of the Other from which it is articulated. As During has 
noted, "the postcolonial self knows itself in universal terms, that is, in 
terms of the international centres of a colonial past. Yet the images and 
texts it produces as 'its own' can affect it as if they have have passed 
through no 'external detour', no world which is not their own. "98 The 
implications of this may be clarified by moving on to the third of these 
'rims of abjection'. 
Post-colonial discourses variously characterise post-modernism as 
totalising, assimilative, appropriative, neo-universalising, and neo-
imperialist, while post-colonial cultural authenticity and specificity are 
posited as target-objects and victims of such energies. Mukherjee 
complains of post-colonial replication of these very energies when she 
states that she finds "the proprietary tendencies of the post-colonial critics 
with regard to 'post-colonial work' equally problematic."99 As well as 
differentiating between post-colonial societies, she points to differences 
within, such as those between "the experiences of white and non-white 
post-colonials,"lOO and argues that "post-colonial societies ... have their 
own internal centres and peripheries, their own dominants and 
marginals."lOl She specifies race, class, gender, language, religion, 
ethnicity and political affiliation. While such ident~ties or p()sitions 
constitute the basis of exploitation and oppression, as sites of resistance, 
they may function to circumscribe or limit the possibilities of forging truly 
decolonised relations. They may concentrate critical and activist energies 
into themselves as if they were natural, original identities, and not the 
products of an Imaginary order which constructed the dominant National 
subject they contest. It is therefore worth considering the appeal of post-
colonial counter-discourses to post-colonising institutions, the way in 
which they are often too easily appropriated and assimilated by the very 
structures and discourses they seek to challenge. 
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It could be argued that like post-modernism, post-colonialism has its 
own moments of neo-universalising, not so much in the use of the term 
'post-colonial' to refer to a range of different cultural contexts and 
products, but rather in the positing of one true post-colonial voice, the 
authentic post-colonial subject, thus eliding both the complexity of 
subjectivity in settler post-colonial cultures, and the multiplicity of subject-
positions in relation to their histories of colonisation.102 On the other 
hand, it is necessary to acknowledge that settler post-colonial discourses of 
resistance to the structures of power and subjectivity which informed 
nationalism tend, in their attempts to recuperate 'nation' as a viable 
cultural and political structure, to replicate -- or at least supplement -- the 
discursive structures they putatively oppose. There is the danger that, 
through the commodification of discourses or symbols of identity and 
authenticity, these 'values' are lent to the project of post-colonising 
cultural legitimation; they are emptied of specificity and circulated as 
signifiers in an exchange of indifference. This may even be the result of 
sincere intentions to include previously unrepresented otherness. For 
example, During argues with regard to the rapturous reception in New 
Zealand .. of Keri Hulme's The Bone People, and "the desire of New 
Zealand to see a reconciliation of its postcolonising and postcolonised 
discourses," that "The reconciliation is achieved, but the price of that 
success is that the otherness of the Maori is destroyed."I03 Therefore, when 
Tiffin suggests that the indigenous writers of, for example, Australia and 
New Zealand "are able to challenge European perspectives with their own 
metaphysical systems," while the non-indigenous writers may enact 
"subversive manoeuvres from within European positions,"I04 it is 
necessary to acknowledge both the efficacy of the specification of these 
positionalities, and the inextricable mutual implication of each in the 
other in the settler post-colonial context. 
Linda Hutcheon may therefore be wrong in her apparently persuasive 
argument that 
The current post-structuralist/postmodern challenges to the coherent, 
autonomous subject have to be put on hold in feminist and post-
colonial discourses, for both must work first to assert and affirm a 
denied or alienated subjectivity: those radical postmodern challenges 
are in many ways the luxury of the dominant order which can afford 
to challenge what it securely possesses. lOS 
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Part of the appeal of such an argument lies in its isomorphism with 
dominant historical narratives of continuous progress, in which each 
'stage' is both 'self-evident' and supposedly indispensable, toward a 
commonly agreed goal. Instead, post-colonial and feminist discourses are 
in a position to expose the alienation -- from the body, its heterogeneity 
and desire -- of all subjectivity founded in the dominant western-
humanist valorisation of identity. They are in a position to infiltrate 
phallic Sameness with their disruptive excess. Rather than erecting and 
reasserting more and more defensive boundaries against transgressive 
desires, it would be useful to extend Tiffin's formulation of a clearly 
unacceptable position for post-colonial cultures as "a peripheral term in 
Europe's self-questioning,"106 to discover the opportunity for actively 
using post-modern challenges in post-colonialism's Self-questioning. By 
retaining a perspective on post-colonialism which names the difference 
within the self which refuses to be unified and absorbed, which will always 
exceed totalising impulses, post..:colonialism will more successfully resist 
the absorption of a promised, redemptive difference into the same, 
emptying it into the mere signifier of that difference. In other words, if a 
post-colonial culture or text is not the same as itself, it resists being made 
the same as its Other. 
As Gallop argues, "Perhaps any text can be read as either body (site of 
contradictory drives and heterogeneous matter) or Law,"107 and I would 
argue that many current formulations of post-colonial discourse are 
grounded in Law. The question then becomes, whose Law is it, and 
further, what is lost in the "tendency to accept a traditional, unified, 
rational, puritanical self -- a self supposedly free from the violence of 
desire"?108 What is lost is the body -- the specificity and difference post-
colonialism claims to name -- in the "clean and proper ... fully symbolic" 
body which bears "no trace of its debt to nature."109 
7. VII. Against the Identity of the Text. 
Throughout this thesis, and in a more condensed form in this chapter, 
I have argued the hybridity, abjection, paranoia and contamination of the 
phallocentric subject of identity as it attempts to speak through the post-
colonial condition, whether it speaks an 'individual', racial, cultural, 
gender, class, or even a national subjectivity. I have argued the need to re-
think the structures of subjectivity through which post-colonial discourse 
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produces and articulates positions, to enable an agency which strategically 
negotiates irreducible difference. In other words, rather than identity, I 
have focused on strategies of positionality which acknowledge the 
interpellations and the resistances, the politics and the desires, the 
Symbolic legitimacy and the heterogeneous excess, of the 'subject'. I now 
argue that the (post-colonial) literary text may be considered as such a 
complex and contradictory 'subject', and that consequently it has no 
essential identity, but rather, requires the assumption of agency through 
the practices of reading if its discursive dynamics -- or slippage -- are to be 
momen tarily hal ted to effect. 
This may be illustrated with reference to Ian Wedde's Symmes Hole,110 
and to the question of textual identity posed in terms of the post-
colonial/post-modern opposition discussed and problematised above. In 
short, my intention is to explore the problems of the question, Is Symmes 
Hole a post-modern or a post-colonial text? I want to show that the 
question, based on the oppositional model of identity, is ultimately as self-
defeating in this (post-colonial New Zealand) context as it is in more 
generally critical cultural discourse. Symmes Hole challenges the 
possibility of thinking in these terms, as Williams argues: "It is a mistake 
to categorise Wedde within the descriptions post-modernism, modernism, 
post-colonialism. He belongs wholly to none of them, although each is 
present in his writing."1ll Certainly to reduce the text to anyone of these 
'identities' would be reductive, but the issue is more complex than one of 
an admixture of two or more of them -- as well as others such as anti-
modernism, nationalism, parochialism.1l2 Indeed, any or all of these may 
characterise facets of specific post-colonial discourses. Rather, Symmes 
Hole serves as an example of the need to dismantle the monolithicity of 
the terms post-modern and post-colonial themselves, in order to produce 
certain moments of its critical textual strategies. 
In unpacking the terms post-modernism and post-colonialism we may 
discover the possibility for more complex relations than opposition or 
identity within and between them in late twentieth-century post-
colonialism. The fact that I continue to use the term 'post-colonialism' 
demonstrates that such dismantling does not seek to empty it of 
significance, to deny it critical purchase, but on the contrary to point to its 
irreducible diversity and to invest it with flexible agency. Freed from the 
stasis of the binary opposition of post-modernism and post-colonialism, 
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the text may be read in terms of its articulation of a problematic and a 
critique, its flexibility and efficacy in producing multiple intersections 
between them, as textual features are specified in relation for their effects: 
in short, the text as productive of agency, not mortgaged to identity. 
Because I have attempted to demonstrate and explore the multiple and 
contradictory character of post-colonialism throughout this thesis, 
preceding discussion may, for now, be relegated to the position of 
'backdrop' against which I examine some dismantlings of post-
modernism. I shall then return to specify, in relation to the post-modern, 
the post-colonial moments which have informed my argument. This is a 
strategic gesture which, as at the beginning of the chapter, is intended to 
problematise the very autonomy that post-colonial discourses are inclined 
to ~voke -- while granting them a particular force of specificity. 
, Symptomatic of the need to dismantle the monolithicity of 'post-
modernism' as posited in its opposition to post-colonialism, is the critical 
disagreement among its commentators as to whether it names an aesthetic 
genre or style -- and if so, whether it is optimistic, celebratory, even 
liberatory,113 or trivial, misdirected and to be lamented,114 -- or whether it 
is a period term which "turns directly towards the state of Western culture 
either to describe the contours of popular and mass media expression or to 
highlight the cultural manifestations ('commodifications') of the most 
recent stage in the history of its industrial-economic infrastructure."llS 
Although rarely a celebratory understanding, this conception is variously 
and very differently critiqued on nea-Marxist grounds by, for example, 
Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton,l16 and by writers for whom it names 
the "culture for which all master-narratives have decayed and ceased to 
grip," and the emergence of "a sweeping overview of the NOW," depthless 
and historyless.117 
The notion of 'two archives', however, raises the problem of a relation 
between them: it cannot simply be a matter of one more 'accurately' 
describing or defining post-modernism, at least not without the 
specification of a (third) position from which such a judgement may be 
made. For example, even when understood in terms of the 'totalising 
energies of late capitalism', a position paradoxically outside of these is 
posited, from which this character may be known, and indeed critiqued. 
There is still, in other words, within some form of discontinuity within 
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the concept itself, a space for agency. While Baudrillard would seem to 
deny it,llS post-colonialism, feminism, class analysis and so on, do position 
themselves, however successfully or convincingly, in active relation to 
post-modernism, to search for strategic compatibilities and to mount 
critiques. They therefore insist upon the need to transcend the stasis of 
theoretical opposition, and to theorise agency. N evertheless~ even the 
ultimately stultifying 'relation' of oppositon attests to the non-unity of, or 
discontinuity within, the post-modern. Therefore, I believe it is not a 
matter of whether post-modernism is ludic or apocalyptic, liberatory or 
totalising, adversarial or complicit in relation to the oppressive master-
narratives, or late capitalism's totalising energies. Rather, it is a matter of 
seeing that post-modernism comprises moments which, while neither 
unified or autonomous in themselves, allow for more or less flexible 
articulation of any number of these characteristics. But the question 
remains, how? 
Wilson argues that the 'two archives' "overlap and coincide. They 
form this nexus not only because they appeal to some of the same 
evidence, but also because whatever becomes evidence (for either archive) 
can be analyzed in both ways."119 Perhaps an example would be the 
'evidence' of post-modern 'difference' or 'otherness': does this attest to 
the liberation of minority subjectivities or discourses from oppressive 
master-narratives, or to a cultural or discursive pluralism which, in its 
indifference, re-inscribes sameness? Again the need for agency has been 
invoked, but its space remains unspecified. Simon During refuses post-
modernism the status of a cultural dominant, and proceeds to differentiate 
'post-modern thought' -- which provides a space for otherness (and which 
corresponds approximately to Wilson's culture-aesthetic archive) -- from 
'post-modernity' -- which, as the cultural outcome of the totalising 
energies of late capital, denies 'otherness' (and corresponds, again 
approximately, to Wilson's period-term archive).120 Thus the difference is 
not simply one of value, but is ontological, like sexual difference, beyond 
the positive-negative, specular-reflective model, and beyond the reductive 
tendency for one to become the derived manifestation of the other, 
primary realm.1 21 
However, for that difference to be articulated, a third term is required, 
one which fulfills a syntactic rather than a semantic function; which not 
only establishes a dynamic between the two, but which instigates an 
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economy of exchangeability such that post-colonialism or feminism, for 
example, may enter the relation and disrupt the self-sufficient inevitable 
moments of post-modernism with their subversive questions. Therefore, 
I find Frow's three-term analysis of post-modernism ontologically and 
methodologically illuminating for post-colonialism, while it enables a 
relation between post-modernism and post-colonialism. 
Grounding his argument in the concept of the 'modern', Frow points 
to the value of distinguishing between three conceptual moments: 
modernism (a bundle of cultural practices, some of them adversarial); 
modernization (an economic process with social and cultural 
implications); and modernity (which overlaps with the 
modernization process, but which I understand as a philosophical 
category designating the temporality of the post-traditional world). 
The same distinction of ontological levels holds good, mutatis 
mutandis, for post-modernism, post-modernization, and post-
modernity)22 
He is concerned to point out that these moments are not autonomous, the 
point being, rather "to make possible their more complex and 
contradictory articulation."123 Further, apart from overlap, there is 
internal differentiation, suggested in the description of post-modern 
cultural practices, some of which are adversarial, so that some of which are 
not. It would clearly be problematic to attribute an 'identity' to the post-
modern. 
Of his three moments, Frow grants priority to (post-)modernisation, 
which more than the others, takes on the character of process. 124 It would 
not be appropriate here to rehearse the constitutive features of 
modernisation and post-modernisation identified by Frow. However, it is 
important for this argument to note that, of the .aspects of post-
modernisation, he identifies as the key one that which "describes the 
increasing integration of the aesthetic . . . into the marketing of 
commodities,"12S while at the same time, "the integrating tendencies of a 
regime of flexible specialization affect not only the relations between 
cultural and economic production, but also the spatial ordering of 
production."126 It is here that the space of potential subversion of post-
modern totalising energies may be found; that is, a space for post-
colonialism to enter the relation, for 
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The salient features of a post-Fordist regime are ... those which 
concern the rapidity of motion of capital between nations and sectors, 
its ability to set nations and regions in competition against each other, 
and its ability to undercut the price and conditions of labour by means 
of extra territorialization .... [B]ut against this movement should be 
balanced the reverse process by which sweatshops and outworking 
systems based on migrant and female labour are established in the 
heart of metropolitan society. 
The result of this new speed and flexibility of capital is neither a 
colonial order of direct domination nor a neo-colonial order of 
indirect domination of one nation-state by another, but a world 
system -- which we might call precisely 'post-colonial' -- in which 
dominance is exercised by international capital through the agency of 
dominant nation-states and regions but in large part independently of 
their control.127 
I have cited Frow's argument at length because it suggests three points 
crucial to this stage of my argument: it points to the vulnerability within 
the post-modern, located in a constitutive paradox, or discontinuity -- that 
of the increasing centralisation and dispersal of capital -- in its principal 
moment; it locates the post-colonial, not outside or innocent of the 
processes of post-modernisation, but as implicated; and at the same time it 
opens a space for the functioning of the local, post-colonial culture as 
'resistance' to the assimilative energies of the post-modern, a space located 
by the phrase I have emphasised above. 
I will treat the first of these as an enabling condition for the 
consideration of the second and third, prior to dismantling 'post-
colonialism' itself, so that it is not reduced to the sole status of "a 
peripheral term in Europe's self-questioning,"128 but is active in a process 
of mutual engagement and critique. With regard to the implication of 
post-colonialism in post-modernism, it would seem a remarkable 
historical elision, in relation to Australia, Canada, and.New Zealand, to 
view Europe and America as radically 'Other' to their local cultural selves. 
As During has pointed out, post-colonial discourses of authenticity and 
identity, whose which challenge Eurocentric hegemony, are constructed in 
ways that are accessible only after (in the manner of) Europe itself.129 Even 
post-colonial societies, in the late twentieth-century, cannot avoid taking 
their place within the economic, social and cultural structures of late 
capitalism. Indeed, with its concomitant consumerism and media-
technology saturation, this cultural-economic era defies, and tends towards 
the increasing obsolescence of, national boundaries in comparison with 
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multi-national corporations, trade conglomerates, and economic and 
defence pacts. It becomes increasingly problematic for even the post-
colonial nations to assert themselves as singular and separate from the 
world systems in which they must participate. 
However, it is in post-colonial societies that questions of cultural 
difference are foregrounded; questions which may serve to limit the 
proliferation of plural post-modern micro-narratives, and to shore up 
against the global wave of cultural indifference serving the interests of the 
spread of first-world commodity markets. So post-colonialism may 
function, through its constitutive discourses and cultural practices, as 
resistance, while at the same time being to some extent complicit in post-
modernisation. It is therefore necessary to specify constitutive moments of 
post-colonialism, which like Frow's post-modern, are neither unified nor 
autonomous. Now, while his three-term analysis is useful to the framing 
of a similarly articulable account of the post-colonial, there can be no direct 
translation from one to the other. While appearing to name something 
similar on different terrain, the untranslatability is paramount. With this 
reservation, I suggest it is useful to differentiate 
* post-colonial discourses, cultural products and practices (d. post-
modernism),which are always already hybrid, but which make 
variously allied, or competing and contradictory claims to identity 
and authenticity, and .which could be seen as the building blocks of 
* post-colonialism (d. post-modernity), the state of a newly avowed 
cultural hybridity which abjects its constitutive claims to identity, and 
poses the need to re-think (cultural) agency beyond the failures of 
'identity'; and 
* post-colonisation (d. post-modernisation), the 'problematic' which 
has been addressed in this thesis, and which refers to the 
discursive / cultural! political process which constitutes a repetition, in 
post-colonialism, of the colonial encounter, with re-energised terms 
of cultural difference. 
This third term, to which I have granted priority of concern in my analysis, 
requires further expansion. It is a moment of re-inscription in all 
constitutive discourses or practices, comprising in discourses from 'post-
colonised' subject-positions, the element of displacement, as these 
discourses are submitted to the post-colonising Symbolic Law in the 
positive projects of resistance and contestation -- the positing of new post-
colonial 'knowledges'; and in discourses from the post-colonisers' subject-
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position, the moment of (re)appropriation of the place of the (post-) 
colonised, in the projects of legitimation and authentication. Thus, like 
Frow's post-modernisation, it could be understood further as an economic 
process. Cultural and national 'identity' and affect, place and authenticity, 
become separated from 'origins' or 'reality', and commodified to the extent 
that they have entered a discursive economy. The positivity with which 
post-colonial discourses construct subjectivity is compromised by, but is 
also complicit in, the appropriation of these subject-positions by those who 
perceive their promise of 'authentic legitimacy' (a symptomatically 
contradictory post-colonial desire). However, what is purchased is not 
.authenticity or identity, but the simulacra of these,13o 
Post-colonialism thereby emerges as an abject state which thrusts the 
bodily agent -- the contaminated, hybrid 'subject' -- into the foreground. It 
is through the desires and discontinuities of agency that moments of post-
modernism and post-colonialism may be partially, strategically, detached 
from others to produce post-colonial discourse in critique of post-
modernisation, using post-modern textual strategies which in turn 
question the post-colonising assumption of an innocent, autonomous self. 
When referring to 'post-colonial' discourses or concerns, it is 
important (and at the same time fraught with difficulties), to note that in 
settler post-colonialism, the concerns for identity, authenticity, and local 
autonomy are differently constructed in the different constitutive 
discourses. Their subject-positions are broadly identifiable as those of the 
'post-colonised' and those of the 'post-colonisers'. At the same time, these 
must be recognised as positions of agency, not identity, or subjectivity in 
any sense that disavows hybridity. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 'post-
colonised' projects of political and cultural 'self-determination' are 
fundamentally different, and in many ways opposed, to post-colonisers' 
projects of self-legitimation, self-authentication, and the construction of a 
newly inclusive (legitimating, authenticating) national identity. In this 
sense, Symmes Hole addresses anxieties which conform to the position of 
the 'post-coloniser', locating these within the abjection of the post-colonial 
(national) subject of identity .. 
From the beginning of the novel, the ideal purity of identity is 
engulfed by the reality of constitutive contamination, prompting the quest 
motif: the search for and reassertion of purity of time (the discrete 
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distinctions of past, present and future), place (the cultural authenticity 
and specificity of New Zealand in the 1980s, and the sense of belonging 
threatened by a problematic history and the current incursions of the non-
local), and identity (the isomorphism of the form of the self with the 
purity of time and place). The Researcher-protagonist records the abjection 
of the nation through the 'physical body' of its major islands: he observes 
"That rim of slime around the mussel rocks, where the sewer pipe outfall 
is, out from Picton ... scum on top of the broth of memory" (18). The 
North and South Islands expel into the strait between, for the "shit-eating 
barracouta," the 'foreign' threat to identity, represented by "the bobbing 
rejectamenta of the fast-food franchises whose liverish breath leaks out 
into Picton's commercial centre .... " (18), and by money, as "he sees 
barracouta lunging for turds the colour of old pennies ... [as] the peristaltic 
squeeze of tides pushes him out at Tory Channel" (19). So the Researcher 
himself is (the) abject, "remembering the sour taste of the brown coin, his 
mother's injunction not to put it in his mouth, it was dirty! Right!" (18). 
He is drawn towards an indifference of past and present, the 'real' and its 
signification, as he contemplates "that other sewer outfall, a whole city's 
shit, the Wellington City pipe at Moa Point, no kidding! ... the City Council 
Names Committee doesn't lose any sleep over that one; with a history as 
episodic our we're told ours is, the naming of a sewer outfall after an 
extinct bird doesn't even strike most people as funny" (18-19). Thus the 
moa, an indigenous cultural signifier, is apparently simultaneously dead 
and alive, extinct and present, 'real' and the signification of the 'real', the 
signifier of purity (cultural authenticity) and contamination (a sewer pipe 
outfall). As the Researcher notes, "no episode is ever closed: the moa still 
shits" (19). 
The convergence of past and present into a murky '~ow' continues to 
abject the 'clean and proper' body of the Researcher, now in the disturbing, 
attractive-repulsive, unheimlich reappearance(s) of the colonial New 
Zealand writer, Katherine Mansfield. He contemplates the Cook Strait 
ferry in terms of the image of '''the little steamer all hung with bright 
beads' plying back and forth betw.een the arseholes of 'the present,"' 
anticipating the 'reappearance' of Mansfield herself at a 1980s literary 
function held in the Parliamentary Beehive. Her 'presence' is affectively 
ambivalent for the Researcher: she has a "beautiful, self-pitying sadist's 
mouth" (39), and is productive of a subjective-temporal vertigo: '''Is she 
the one who writes stories?' His bright eyes stared after her, a slim dark 
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woman, she walked away so coolly, yet ... and the way she turned, then ... 
her chin raised just a little ... she was perfect. There could never be .... 'But 
I thought she ... '" (41). The Researcher is stricken with nausea, vomiting 
repeatedly at the incursions of the past into the present, and vice versa, (39; 
45; 46). Indeed, this confusion is integral to the structuring of the novel, as 
suggested when the second, 'historical' strand of the narrative, which 
begins with numerous references to prawn-eating (20; 23; 24; 34; 35), to "the 
reek of hot prawn" (37), and the "taste [of] prawn through Gobblechops's 
grog" (38), is followed immediately by the description of the 1980s literary 
supper: '''Last time I was here they had prawns .. .', whining, 'crumbed, 
king-praw' ... .' The canape burst against the roof of his mouth releasing a 
sac of, warm fishy cat's vomit?" (39). 
This abjection of identity prompts parallel searches for the pure and 
innocent (national) self, two journeys towards (two senses of) home in 
New Zealand in the late twentieth century. One of these involves the 
Researcher's exorcising the guilt and 'inauthenticity' of a colonial past 
(thus re-securing legitimate belonging for the post-colonisers), by tracing 
'true' national origins back to the whaling past, the terms of which 
settlement are constructed as 'natural' in binary opposition to the 
'unnatural' project of Wakefieldian colonisation. The narrative focused 
on whaler James 'Worser' Heberley is structured in terms of oppositional 
binary values defining the unofficial settlers who arrived and stayed in 
New Zealand as a result of contact effected by whaling, and the official 
settlers sanctioned by Wakefield's scheme of systematic colonisation. The 
fundamental opposition between these two types of settler and two bases of 
settlement is evoked in the irreconcilable differences of terminology for 
each other. While Heberley refers to beach people like himself as "us old 
settlers" (206), Wakefield and his followers refer to them ~s "a new people" 
(197), a phrase that would continue trouble and threaten Heberley. On the 
other hand, Wakefield's people are the imperially sanctioned "settlers," 
while Heberley refers to them as "Wakefield's mob" (207). However, 
within the terms of the post-colonial project, Heberley enjoys what Dr 
Keehua Roa, in the Introduction, calls the "natural terms of his 
occupancy" before the threat of "unnatural colonisation"(12). 
The underlying oppositions of 'natural' to 'unnatural' inform this 
entire aspect of the narrative. Heberley's settlement is predicated on the 
terms of fulfillment of 'natural' needs and desires, as John Guard has 
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promised him, '''When you step ashore, you'll take a house there'll be a 
woman to look after you, you can fish just offshore in them sounds huge 
bluecod Heberley just pull the buggers in throw the catch on the beach be 
ready for you when you get back'" (58). Gradually shortened to "woman, 
house, a home" (103), this formulation echoes throughout Heberley's 
'narrative'. It is the antithesis of the artificiality of Wakefield's 'systematic 
colonisation', and indeed the very unplanned character of Heberley's, and 
other beach people's new life, "the life that had chosen them" (107), is 
posited as 'natural' as opposed to history's self-deluding proactive march 
forward. Heberley's life is characterised by his physical and social 
absorption into his new environment, so that "by the time he'd lain down 
in his own plain whare at night and slept till dawn without remembering 
a dream, and by the time he'd almost got used to the name Worser -- well, 
by then it was as though he'd forgotten that Guard had ever tricked him!" 
(217). Wakefield's scheme, on the other hand, constitutes the imposition 
of a foreign physical and social model on to unknown and different 
landscape, a landscape upon which his people appear grossly -- unnaturally 
-- out of place. Heberley sees "Colonel Wakefield flapping his arms, his 
head jerking about as if he expected to see a populous town rise out of the 
ground before his very eyes, English gardens of droopy elms on the 
outskirts ... ./ ... he felt contempt for them. The Colonel's vision ... was 
just plain daft" (191). 
The Colonel and his people do not only look, but sound out of place. 
Whereas Heberley's homecoming is signalled in his linguistic adaption, 
including the acceptance of a new name, conferred by 'natural' chance and 
the 'authenticity' of place (138), the linguistic inappropriateness of the 
Wakefield planners with their middle-class English idiom is a source of 
mirth and contempt for Hebedey: "'Eggs? By Jove ... fresh eggs? ... capital ... 
splendid!'" He remarks, "funny how gentlemen shouted even more than 
common folk -. even when they was only talking they spoke up like that" 
(194). Heberley's social place in his new home is founded on his 
understanding of the priority of the indigenous inhabitants, his 
recognition of the condition, "You're on probation, Pakeha" (192), and the 
protocol that "'1 take my wife's peopie's part'" (206). Wakefield, on the 
contrary, "believed he was obtaining rights, not licences" (192). This 
difference extends to their respective attitudes to the land, which Heberley 
understands as profoundly historical, already meaningful, "steeped in 
human blood", so that "it didn't belong to anyone" (192), despite 
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Wakefield's purchases. Similarly, the Wakefield approach to land is 
exemplified by "Edward Jerningham Wakefield, nephew of the colonel, 
same lad that set fire to a whole mountainside of virgin forest in the 
Pelorus Sound winter of 1839 because he wanted to see what a really big 
blaze looked like" (79). 
Heberley and Wakefield each represent a threat to the other. Heberley 
has cause to dre,ad the implications of the Wakefield scheme for his and 
his family's survival: "he didn't take the Colonel seriously but that clown 
might be towing something bad -- ... the bad would land on the Maori first 
and on the likes of him and Barrett next. And what about his little chaps, 
and his daughter, and his wife? ... and old Ngarewa, and ... ?" (205). While 
Heberley is aware of their status as the 'expendable scum', the 
inadmissable Other of English society abjected to the colonies as the 
imperial garbage dump, Wakefield also perceives them as irritants to the 
integrity and success of systematic colonisation. As Dr Keehua Roa 
explains in the Introduction, "the beach people might drive a subversive 
wedge between exploitable territory and colonial ideal" (8). This is 
precisely the potential that Symmes Hole seeks to explore. Diana Brydon 
might just as easily have been referring. to Symmes Hole when she wrote 
that "The 'effluvium' of British slums bring a tough cultural specificity to 
[the colony] that Britain rejected but our writers now embrace. This 
turning the tables on those who think they have you where they want you, 
this transvaluation of values is part of the post-colonial literary strategy 
that clears a space for history's silenced ones to speak."131 Paradoxically, 
this transvaluation entails the redefinition of 'effluvium' into the basis of 
a 'moral' purity. 
However, the 'clean and proper' national 'body' is also threatened 
from 'without': more recent cultural contamination is identified with the 
economic and cultural processes of post-modernisation, and the seemingly 
relentless thrust of world culture into post-modernity. The Researcher's 
own quest for home both informs and counterpoints Heberley's, as he tries 
to find his way back to his house through the streets of Wellington after a 
literary function in the Parliamentary Beehive. However, the Researcher 
also seeks a sense of national 'home' in the face of a 1980s New Zealand of 
pervasive commodification of multiple cultural significations: 
Like the days you walked through town, everybody was a hunchback, 
or ... this incredible desolation, bulldozers, brown dust and falling 
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masonry ... some young woman slapping the backs of her child's legs 
... the exhausting artificiality of the consumer process, people standing 
between you and what you wanted, charging agency fees .... it was 
like his friend John had said, he'd just driven down from Auckland, 
you look around and suddenly, English trees planted on the eroding 
hillsides, washbrick haciendas in bare paddocks Wizard-of-Oz green 
with superphosphate ... where am I? (47-8) 
The sense of 'placelessness' which results from the confusion of de-
localised cultural signifiers of place, and culminating in the hyperreal, 
greener-than-green of the paddocks which refers, precisely, to a fictional 
place, also informs the Researcher's railings against McDonald's. He has 
divined a 'plot' which extends from Hollow Earth -- Symmes Hole -- to the 
Hollow Mountain of the Big M, and which maps the progressive 
'colonisation of inner space': 
Capt. John Cleves Symmes, hero of the War of 1812, rejected the laws 
of Newton ... he almost got to Congress to provide money to place 
'Old Glory on those interior planets'. The Renaissance wanted to 
'civilise' Caliban ... the Enlightenment wanted to appropriate 'natural 
innocence' ... and Jeremiah Reynolds wanted to get inside -- and his 
descendants did: nuclear submarines and fast food. It may be that 
Wilkes and Reynolds had a metaphorical understanding.... (154) 
Now the McDonald's insignia, the golden M, 
when you looked at it was more like a mountain in off-season grime 
with the snow run off revealing the chucked-aside juice cans and the 
lost broken wristwatches and the ravines full of bent skipoles 
abandoned by fat young executives from the Challenge Finance 
Corporation or by fastfood management trainees whose blood has 
already turned to tomato-sauce that can't keep them warm even 
above a frier. (243) 
It is the garbage dump of the detritus of multi-national ccmsumer 
capitalism; it is the abyss of desolation and contamination into which local 
cultural identity falls, so that the consumer (Researcher) experiences being 
"behind the plateglass window of some robot dunny that's really, literally, 
nowhere" (250). It is the strategic (for capital) non-localised 'nowhere' of 
indistinction, so that it can be, literally, everywhere. Product and service 
are standardised, and marketed as the total McDonald's 'look', with no 
chance, no variation. From the utterly standardised, routinised 
preparation of potatoes for the fries (247), to the milkshake service by 
'android assistants', who "didn't even have to think about the dose, the 
machine cut off automatically without spilling a drop" (245), the 'look' of 
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McDonald's is paradoxically a 'non-look', or a lack of interaction between 
the participants in the production and consumption process, indeed 
between the product(ion) and the assistant. Thus the Researcher concludes 
that "you could hardly blame the kid for that, for that poor android blank 
of his face, when he was never to be allowed ever to juggle milk and 
icecream like a real milkbar artiste" (245). 
McDonald's is critiqued, like colonisation, within the terms of a binary 
opposition between its own 'inauthenticity' and the 'authenticity' of the 
Popular Milkbar. The Popular Milkbar is 'pure' New Zealand, compared 
to the 'contamination' represented by McDonald's, a contamination which 
abjects the subject of post-colonial national identity, denying a place from 
which that identity may be spoken.132 McDonald's occupies that place on 
the borders of the national 'body': it is 'external' in its 'foreignness', or 
rather, simply in its 'non-New Zealandness' (for it is (the representation 
of) nowhere rather than strictly 'foreign'); but it is also 'here', in Courtenay 
Place, Wellington, and its patrons are the youth of that place. Indeed, to 
complicate nostalgic notions of cultural purity, its young Maori patrons are 
Rastafarians. McDonald's food represents the abject for the Researcher, 
"sipping the milkshake thickened with plaster-dust and turdy robot 
peristaltic amoebiasis ooze" (245). His search for 'home' requires that he 
expel it from the 'national body'. In a gesture of expulsion which has 
more to do with purification than defilement, the Researcher 
rammed the last chunk of hamburger into his mouth, and then ran 
into the aisle loudly groaning with both hands over his mouth and 
when he was fairly in the centre of the place, he took his hands away 
and as he lurched for the door mock-barfed to both sides, and shot out 
into Courtenay Place hearing a cheer from the Rasta booths that the 
door cut short. 
He ran sniggering towards the bus-shelters; and he was thinking as 
he reached the other side of the street and made for the public toilet to 
clean the glup off his chin, that he'd done that very silly thing for the 
Popular Milkbar and all it stood for. (265-6) . 
Unlike the 'placeless ness' of McDonald's, sealed behind the plateglass 
windows, the Researcher recalls that as you sat in the Popular Milkbar, 
"you were always aware of being half in the street -- you had a direct 
com~.ection with what was happening out there" (244). Unlike the sterile 
'look' that was a 'non-look' of McDonald's, the food and coffee of the 
Popular Milkbar ensured "your senses lit by siege fires" (251), the service 
was personal, with a "smile, which was for you alone" (244). Unlike the 
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android anonymity of McDonald's, "you'd seen 'Nick the Greek' (cousin) 
put the measure of milk in from the cooler and the two scoops of icecream, 
plunging his dark blackhaired Greek arm down into the icecream tub 
where you could actually see everything that he was doing. And what's 
more, he wanted you to" (244). Even the name, the 'Popular MUkbar' 
makes a claim, within the terms of the Researcher's project, to the 
authenticity of belonging. Its appeal to the demotic, and to 'the people' as a 
socio-cultural 'entity', echoes the terms of his privileging, through 
Heberley as the basis of true New Zealand national belonging, the 
unofficial beach settlers, who derived from the more humble strata of 
British society, and who formed in the 'new' land, an integrated 
community with the original people. 
At this point it would seem that the novel comprises a post-colonial 
critique of post-modernity; however, I wish to place post-modern textual 
features in a pivotal position, in a more complex project of celebration and 
critique. In this, I acknowledge precisely the mix of adversarial and 
complicit functions identified by Frow as characteristic of the cultural 
practices of post-modernism. In itself, the status of any single textual 
feature as critical of, or complicit with, post-modernity is undecidable. 
However, while Symmes Hole comprises numerous post-modern textual 
features -- it has a post-modern 'feel' -- it does not give itself up entirely to 
play, nor even to a 'coherent' reading. My intention is therefore not to 
produce such a reading; nor do I propose a 'depth' model which argues 
that the text 'looks' or 'feels' post-modern, but underneath is really post-
colonial. Instead, I wish to highlight certain crucial intersections of the 
post-colonial and the post-modern. 
Linda Hutcheon argues that "Parody is a perfect postmodern form ... 
for it parodically incorporates and challenges that which it parodies."133 
The 'shape' of Symmes Hole parodies the scholarly historical text: it 
incorporates an Introduction, putatively written by an historical scholar, 
and which makes use of the authenticating convention of footnotes. 
There are acknowledgements at the end of the text which include both 
historical and 'real' fictional texts, and their publication details. However, 
there is both a disclaimer, following these acknowledgements, which 
announces that Symmes Hole "is not remotely a work of scholarship, but 
of fiction" (324), and the declaration by Dr Keehua Roa, author of the 
Introduction, that he is "certain that Wedde makes no claims that Symmes 
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Hole is truth, or fiction" (14). The status of the text is therefore 
problematised as it enacts "the [post-modern] effacement ... of some key 
boundaries or separations between genres and discourses."134 
Intertextuality is often noted as a post-modern characteristic, pointing 
to the act of writing as, in the words of Dr Keehua Roa, "redistribution 
rather than creation" (14). Writing is thus the effect of text on text, as 
"multiple surfaces" rather than depths,135 and rather than the product of a 
controlling subjectivity. Intertextuality acts as the "subvers[ion] of the 
signature and of authorial originality."136 Symmes Hole manifests an 
extraordinary range of intertexts: the most obvious, important, and 
sustained one would be Melville's Moby Dick. Others would include 
allusions to Tennyson (208), Pound (41), and Katherine Mansfield, whose 
"'little steamer all hung with bright beads'" echoes through the text. A 
further form of the blurring of boundaries -- between genres (history, 
fiction), and texts (intertextuality) -- is that of the collapsing of distinction 
between 'high' and 'low' (popular) culture, and in Symmes Hole, 'high' 
cultural literary allusions are given no priority over references to (from) 
popular songs (49-50; 70; 114), and the epigraphs range from Eddie Rabbit to 
Walter Benjamin. These textual manoeuvres may be seen as subversive 
of modernism's cultural elitism, of its valorisation of creative originality 
and of the grand narratives; and for modernism's Others, this may spell 
discursive or cultural 'liberation'. However, the same features 
problematise the 'subject' of 'liberation' and of contestation to the extent, 
for example, that these are founded on notions of authenticity and origins; 
they conform to a "new configuration of the cultural domain ... a changed 
relation between culture and economic production .... [which has] 
transformed the relationship of apparent exteriority between the cultural 
and the economic. "137 
One implication of this is that the subject of 'culture' is simultaneously 
the subject of an exchange-relation -- of exchangeability -- which is 
inconvenient for projects of subjective autonomy or integrity. The 
construction of reading and writing subjectivities is problematic in 
Symmes Hole, undermining modernist-humanist notions of a centred, 
controlling and transcendant subject. In Craig Owens' formulation, "post-
modernists ... expose the tyrrany of the signifier, the violence of its 
law."138 It would appear, then, that there is an author, Ian Wedde, who 
has obtained the services of an historian, Dr Keehua Roa, to write an 
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Introduction for his novel. Dr Keehua Roa's Introduction follows most of 
the conventions of a separate text: it is separately copyrighted; it refers to 
Wedde in the third person, and to its author's having met Wedde at a 
"whaling and whale conservation" conference whose place and time are 
specified as Canada, four years prior to writing (13), thereby suggesting the 
verifiability of these statements; and it refers to its own status as an 
enthusiast's introduction, a gesture not conventionally carried out by the 
author of a text. The tone of the Introduction is one of scholarly 
speculation, and it suggests a reading of the novel, again not something 
that writers generally provide with their texts. However, there are other 
indications that the Introduction cannot be separated from the fiction 
which follows. The pagination of the Introduction is not separate from the 
novel, and Dr Keehua Roa refers suggestively to its "long (almost shared) 
gestation" (13). More importantly, the name 'Dr Keehua Roa' translates as 
Dr Long Ghost, the name of the character described as the 'genius' of the 
novel (12), and whose controlling spirit is suggested in the section title, 
"Ghost Writing." Dr Keehua Roa, as a relatively conventional historian, 
suggests the mirror image of Doctor Long Ghost, the historical subversive 
who, "At Goethe's death-bed cry of 'More Lightf' ... carries in a smoky, 
hectic, and confusing lamp" (12). However, Doctor Long Ghost, although 
an impressive figure of education and talent (37), is not what he seems: for 
a start, it is pointed out that he was not a real doctor, but merely "the 
steward, which is good enough to give him control of the medical 
supplies" (150). The reference to Doctor Long Ghost's medical supplies 
invokes the character of the Researcher whose historical hallucinations are 
drug-induced, a point which will be expanded shortly. If the mirror image 
holds, then the stability of Dr Keehua Roa's identity is also in doubt. 
Finally, Doctor Long Ghost's declaration that-"lt's time to write the new 
Georgicon" (37) recalls the name of another of Wedde's ~exts, a volume of 
poetry published in 1984, and in which a number of motifs important in 
Symmes Hole also appear.139 
Post-modern 'historylessness' is perhaps the feature most clearly on 
the border between post-modernism and post-colonialism. Jameson 
discusses "the transformation of reality into images, the fragmentation of 
time into a series of perpetual presents,"140 and this is a moment of post-
modernity exemplified in the Moa Point sewer outfall (18). However, the 
distinctions of past and present collapse further for the Researcher, who 
becomes so disoriented by the whaling past into which he has submerged 
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himself that he 'becomes' Herman Melville. He reflects that "Two years 
after discharging from the United States Herman's married and the 
famous author of two books. Debate rages on both sides of the Atlantic 
over whether he's a bullshit artist" (186). Similarly, on his way 'home', 
and constructing his 'story', the Researcher wonders whether his antics 
will be 'read' by passers-by as those of "'Some young pisshead ... dope fiend 
... dole bludger ... sex pervert ... subser' subversive ... ' -- how did they know 
he wasn't a, Courtenay Place bus-shelter sherry bood-head? ... executive for 
the Challenge Finance Corporation? ... MacDonald's Fast Foods 
franchisee?" (70). 
Subject to "the eternal present of history" (108), the Researcher is 
enmeshed in the circulations of 'historical' engulfment and projection. 
Further into his journey 'home', he overhears two drug-runners: "'What 
was that?' from the parade, as the boat bottomed. 'Sounded like .. .'/'Go for 
it Galky, cops've ... !" (76). He watches "the slightly Asiatic eyes of the man 
called, was it Galky? ... Galkin? What? ... saw the flat eyes look through the 
darkness and see him at the same moment as the name Calkin clanged 
into place in his cowering head" (77). An historical connection is made as 
he remembers that "that's the name of the doctor on the sloop Vostok 
which came to Queen Charlotte Sound with the Bellingshausen-lazarev 
Antarctic Expedition in 1820, he's a, a dead Russian?" (77). This 
identification is 'realised' as the Researcher, abjected by this loss of 
historical-temporal perspective (75-7), becomes involved in the drug-
runners' activities. Much later, the status of the histories he produces is 
questioned by the discovery that he has "stuck a leviathan track of Galkin's 
'frozen trevalli-bait' up his nose ... waiting for history to come to him" 
(242). 
Thus the particular force of the problematisation of the 'pastness of the 
past' is found in the Researcher's implication in his histories. His 
attempts to recall and recount the past are constantly interrupted by the 
materiality of his present. His narrative includes commentary on his own 
physical comfort or discomfort at the moment of narration. At one such 
point, he reflects that "He was enjoying himself now. This was easy. It 
was familiar -- it was rea!!" (149), while soon after, "He paid no attention to 
the sounds that came up to him from below. But when the washing-
machine began to grind away he felt his mind flinch" (151). More 
generally, Symmes Hole suggests the implication of the late. twentieth-
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century post-colonial present in the construction of the past. Located in 
the New Zealand of the 1980s, the novel explores constructions of the past 
which address present anxieties to naturalise New Zealand beginnings and 
to reconstitute an authentic guilt-free basis of belonging, founded on the 
'natural' terms of a shared occupancy. However, the problematisation of 
this project, which constitutes post-colonisation, is predicated on the 
problematisation of the very possibility of the recovery of 'innocence', and 
demonstrates similarly the impossibility of the 'high ground' of 
unimplicated subjectivity in the production of historical accounts. This is 
hilariously dramatised when the Researcher, who has been hiding in the 
ceiling of his house (in history), announces to his family, unaware of his 
presence and eating dinner in the room below, "'Now Hear This ... This is 
God!"', at which the ceiling gives way and he falls through, "slap-bang into 
the family dinner" (189). This represents the collapse of the narrative, 
historical 'God's-eye-view'. 
The post-modern textual features may therefore be employed in a 
critique of post-colonisation. One of the moments of the post-colonising 
project problematised in Symmes Hole is nostalgia. The Researcher's 
nostalgia for a 'home' in New Zealand prompts his 'search' for Heberley, 
whose own basis of belonging may be linked to nostalgic desires (for 
'home'). Recognising that for him, there is no possible return to England, 
Heberley's experience of unfamiliar places is mediated by memories of 
England, and invocations of his mother: "Above, now that there was no 
flicker of fire-light to blind him, the stars blazed in a clear sky ... at its 
height it was almost the colour of ripe mulberries, Dorset mulberries, 
Weymouth mulberries. Mother ... his lips met on the beginning of the 
word, preparing a kiss" (27). Even following his mother's death, his new 
life is the product of nostalgia: he is drawn ashore by the 'familiar' smell 
of what he believes to be pigeon pie, but which turns out to be the native 
weka. Thus Heberley's 'home' is founded on a misrecognition, pointing 
to the fact that nostalgia always speaks an irrecoverable separation from its 
source; to regain its 'object' can never be to regain original plenitude. As 
if to illustrate this, 'Heberley' is left, by the Researcher, on a boat at sea, 
dreaming of the satisfaction of the 'natural' appetites and the domestic 
'ideal' of sharing a meal with his family: 
And then he remembered he'd been on deck and hadn't eaten -- he 
was famished. He thought, Wonder what they're eating at home? ... 
fish and potato and some greens, I'll be bound! ... my good God, 
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wouldn't I just like to be having some! ... wouldn't I like to be with 
the whole mob, right now, this minute, there ... fish and spud and 
turnip-top, my God! (235) 
Further, Heberley's quest for home is the product of the Researcher's 
own nostalgic quest. The Researcher is nostalgic for Heberley as 
representative of the idea of home, and as he attempts to narrativise 
Heberley into coherent presence, reflects: "But it's got you, this yarn that's 
as much like a search as it's like a memory.... But if it's got you, this 
staggering yarn that's as much quest as knowledge, then you don't stop 
just because there's no one ... no one but you, listening .... " (25). Indeed, 
numerous parallels may be found between the quests of Heberley and the 
Researcher, pointing to the implication of the (desires of the) latter in the 
construction of the former. The domestic base he eventually finds after an 
arduous journey through the night is imbued with the affect of 'landfall', 
as the terms of his (unsteady) arrival echo those of the beaching of ex-
whalers like Heberley, and the sojourn of Melville with the exotic 
Marquesan, Fayaway: "'God, you, you look so lovely!' -- falling toward her 
dark tumble of hair ~ .. and the fading fragrance of cocobutter night-cream, 
that coconut.... As his full weight landed on her shoulder she stumbled 
back against the sink and put her arms around him to steady him, and he 
stood, leaning heavily on her" (120). Later, though, even he is found, 
separated from his family, and longing to join them for "tarakihi, and sure 
enough! -- mashed spud! And ... greens, broccoli with some cheese" (189). 
The Researcher's nostalgic construction of Heberley is problematised as 
the basis for a coherent history of national belonging, and the source of 
'authentic', culturally integrated, demotic New Zealand identity, in the 
actual incoherence of Heberley's subjectivity. The Researcher attempts to 
discover, buried beneath the official historical accounts (the 'success story' 
of colonisation), another history whose bringing to the- surface will heal 
national-subjective discontinuities. However, Heberley's historical 
'failure' is enacted (or in another sense pre-figured) in his failed attempts 
to produce his discourse, or recount his story. He has difficulty holding his 
story together in his own head, attempts evoking an almost physical 
struggle with its elements: 
'I was two years cabin boy on the, Sarah Margaret? ... captain's name 
was Sheether belonging to Scarborough in the Hamburg trade in 
1822.' He paused, panting ... right so far ... he steadied the pieces in his 
mind, picking them up one and then the next ... like swinging the 
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lead through a reef. 'That November there was a heavy gale in the 
south-west, we sailed to London and I left the ship, what?', as the 
pieces tumble ... 'Wait, then?' I ... I took lodgings in St Anne Street 
then I went on a cruise until my money ran out, then I went salvage 
diving then I went to the West Indies, then ... " but he's lost it again. 
(29) 
He evokes the precise opposite of subjective mastery in his stumbling, 
faltering, and self-questioning, and thus fails to retain an audience: "If he 
was a great storyteller there might be an audience. But he has this 
questioning inflection; it's as though he's always asking himself, What 
happened? Is this how it was? Was I there then? Do I remember? What 
does it mean?" (22). As a result, his brief successes in narrating to someone 
else are always soon interrupted, leaving him helplessly in mid-sentence: 
"'Anyway, I wasn't letting them out of my ... hang on, what's ... ?'/'Goin' 
'shore.' The bottle hits the water. 'My God. You the worst storyteller I 
ever heard, boy'" (25). His own submersion in the process of trying to 
articulate his meanings often draws him down into silence in mid-word: 
"what about down there, the Southern Pacif' ... ?" (36). However, it is less 
Heberley's individual failure to articulate that is evoked than the failure of 
narrative conventions to account for the many-layered, multiply 
significant, and subversive (of Old World historical certainties) experiences 
and realities. As Heberley is asked, "'Man, where the hell have you been, 
I'd like to know ... ?"', he can only attempt to respond, despairing, 
"'Nowhere, I mean, I .. .', meaning, How can I even begin to tell the story of 
it?" (69). 
Indeed, Heberley's incoherent 'narrative' and the post-modern textual 
features of the novel subvert the whole notion of 'plot', a notion central to 
the Researcher's post-colonising project. He has conceived of systematic 
colonisation in terms of the coherence of a narrative .plot, with.all its 
claims to mastery, and to the suppression of other narratives, and 
incoherent 'events'. Now, lost in history and his own paranoid 
subjectivity, he divines, as I have pointed out, an historical 'plot' which 
links whaling credit economics, "shadowy millionaire and crank" (153) 
Jeremiah Reynolds' backing of the Great Expedition whose hidden agenda 
was the opportunity to search for Symmes Hole, the passage to the centre 
of the earth and whose space was believed by John Cleves. Symmes to be 
habitable, and the colonisation of 'inner space' by Ray Kroc's McDonald's' 
Fast Foods Empire. For the Researcher, this history represents the 'plot' of 
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'neo-colonisation'. Both 'colonisation' and neo-colonisation' constitute 
narratives which have enabled him to project Otherness as external 
(British, middle-class, American, McDonald's), to the authentic New 
Zealand (demotic, naturally Maori-identified) identity it suppresses, and 
which he seeks to rediscover and to produce as a counter-history. 
However, his own search for national innocence is the product of 
paranoia, the same attempt to create a narrative coherence -- a plot -- from 
the high ground of moral unimpeachability. The paradox is that what he 
attempts is precisely the elision of the very ruptures and discontinuities 
from which post-colonial discourses emerge; whose earlier elision in the 
interests of a hegemonic nationalism founded on the colonial past effected 
the suppression of Nation's (and colonisation's) Others, and which now 
trouble its authority. Post-colonisation, in this guise, is the call to 'forget 
again'. 
The Researcher attempts to reconnect the present to origins in terms of 
the narrative continuity of plots, their deliberateness and design, but it is a 
project that taxes, even exhausts its materials. His narratives are full of 
disruptive qualifiers and changes of direction: "History -- no, cancel that .. 
. ./Fate is preparing one of those conjunctions which with the advantage of 
hindsight we can say looks ... inevitable" (151). He can discover no 
natural ordering or narrativisation of events, as he flounders among his 
'facts': "Captain Ahab .... a wilful, brilliant seaman who would happily 
sail his entire complement of mortal crew down Symmes Hole -- but more 
of that soon./No, now" (153). Both the return to the past and the 
narrativisation of the past in terms of organised and linear, progressive 
history are, despite his own best efforts, undermined by the contingencies 
of the present and the fallibility of the subject. The Researcher's fallibility 
is dramatised in the status of his histories as the product of drug-induced 
paranoid hallucinations, so that the unreliability of the producer 
destabilises the account itself. 
The critique of post-modernity in Symmes Hole entails that moment 
of post-modernisation which reduces history to a commodity whose 
production is tied to market forces and patterns of consumption. It is 
dressed up, for example, in media entertainment gimmicks such as the 
'Today in History' slot on breakfast radio (141-52); indeed, the Researcher 
contemplates history as a slotgame (rather than the comparative 
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reassurance of a 'plot') in which agency and accountability are surrendered 
to the machinations of what Wilson termed "dark implacable forces:" 
and the rules of the game are, you can't choose whom to blow away 
into the eternal present of history, you can only choose which side to 
take, in the 'historically verifiable' question of who fired the first shot 
across the stream and in which direction -- only the machine has a 
way of jamming and returning your coin, and the logic of its choices 
remains impenetrable: ... an epistemology based on the unknown 
rather than the known .... (l08) 
The Researcher's nostalgia for 'pure' history is symbolised by his 
'pursuit' of the legendary White Whale, pure precisely because it was a-
historical, and its domain was the a-historical sea. However, when a 
whale appears in the bay in his present, he cannot simply see it. It is 
caught up in the links between the entertainment and the fast-food 
industries, as "A couple of alert take-away food wagons had arrived on the 
scene, and a drink and snofreeze van ... the cheerful crowd munched 
burgers and ate ice-cream" (112). What he discovers, though, is that there 
never was a time when a whale was just a whale. He has investigated the 
past when the whale was the commodity sought in large-scale hunting and 
trade relations between nations and peoples; now, as he watched the whale 
in the bay, "He was thinking how no more than maybe twenty years ago .. 
. the harbour would have quickly filled with boats bent on sporting 
massacre. And now the crowd had a proprietary air ... a man in a wetsuit 
swam out like an emissary toward the whale and her calf" (112-3). Thus 
the discourse of conservation produces just another historical construction 
of the whale, another claim to the whale. The Researcher's wife is 
uncomprehending of his lack of immediate response, his recourse instead 
to whaling dates and facts and the historical significance (113). But as he 
reflects to himself, "What you wanted was your dream of the whale living 
without time, what you got was a glimpse of a survivor, and then the 
'wasted time' of not even being sure any more whether you could see it or 
not -- it wasn't just as simple as she thought. .. " (115). 
His own attachment to the symbol of the White Whale is no less a 
discursive mediation, and represents no less of a commodification of 
history than the entertainment-value effected by post-modernisation's 
conflation of the aesthetic and the economic. In his post-colonising 
attempt to construct a counter-history which appeals to the purity of the 
White Whale, the Researcher attempts to purchase authenticity and 
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belonging. This is not to argue that there is 'pure' history, outside of this 
process, but that the post-colonial project should not be a search for the 
'truth' of pure origins -- these are always already lost -- but the critical 
calculation and analysis of 'market forces' and 'costs' driving discourses 
and political engagement. It is in this spirit that Symmes Hole posits the 
strategic value of 'failed histories', arguing that the process of 
narrativisation falsifies history in attributing to it coherence and closure. 
The Researcher acknowledges that his search has raised rather than 
answered questions, re-opened episodes rather than closed them. Just as 
Mocha Dick successfully terrorised whalers in revenge for their killings, by 
failing to conform to any predictable pattern or plan, confounding the 
chances of "authenticated sightings" (165), the Researcher inherits Doctor 
Long Ghost's advice to Melville. Having come to the realisation that "he 
has to go back, he has to construct and plant the slow bomb that will 
fumigate the quarantine hulk of his nation's consciousness" (161), 
Melville is told by Doctor Long Ghost that "what you have to be, is an 
anarchist to whom this authority is meaningless .... you have to be 
unafraid and therefore without respect . . . incorrupt and therefore a 
failure" (181). It is after this that Melville declares his "'earnest desire to 
write those sorts of books which are said to "fail" "' (187). This is arguably 
the strongest debt that Symmes Hole owes to the Melville connection. 
A counter-history which is constructed to appear in its positivity is 
argued, in Symmes Hole, to be ultimately less troubling to the official 
version than one which is allowed to remain threateningly beneath the 
surface of the nation's consciousness. Therefore, the ·'failure' of the 
Researcher's history, suggested in the unreliability of his subjectivity and 
the inconclusiveness of his 'findings' serves, not to refuse it the status of a 
counter-truth, and instead to make a series of suggestions and conn_ections 
which disrupt the integrity of official history. 
The novel is critical of both neo-imperialising post-modernity, and of 
the Researcher's paranoid response of trying to re-discover and preserve 
the integrity of a post-colonial (national) self by projecting Otherness 
outside as an external force or threat.. In this way, it addresses issues of 
post-modernity in the face of post-colonial anxieties, but through post-
modern narrative strategies exposes the otherness within post-colonialism 
rather than external to it. A productive engagement with the questions of 
any reified position is achieved through the negotiation of the insights of 
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both post-colonialism and post-modernism. Doctor Dieffenbach's 
reflection on Worser's mistrust of Colonel Wakefield with his 'new 
people' rhetoric suggests a critical analogy for post-colonialism and post-
modernism: 
He is right, our mistrust of Colonel Wakefield is parenthetical -- mine 
intellectual, Worser's animal: mine makes me sad, Worser's makes 
him angry. My sadness can see into the future, and his anger will 
show him the present moment to attack ... without my sadness, his 
anger will spring at a decoy and waste itself ... without his anger, my 
sadness will vindicate itself uselessly in some European university. 
We need each other . ... we must have an understanding, Worser and 
1. If we do not, we will end by contribUting equally to the evil that is 
already here .... (208) 
Therefore, rather than questions of the identity of the text, it is more 
useful to examine the questions post-modernism raises in post-colonial 
space for the subject, desire and resistance. The critique of humanist 
discourses of identity, including post-colonial ones, signalled in the 
discovery of the empty origin, and the instability of the subject's place in 
discourse (or culture) nevertheless may acknowledge their provisional 
necessity. The point is to retain the problematising moment to prevent 
such discourses from erecting themselves into monolithic structures 
which repress difference. Post-colonialism comprises variant and 
contradictory moments which attest to the location of Otherness not 
simply as external to the innocent, autonomous self, but within. 
In this third Section of the thesis, I have developed the preceding 
discussion of post-colonial discourses into a consideration of subjective 
and duscursive problematics, informed by an understanding of post-
colonialism as a condition of (subjective) instability resulting from the re-
introduction of what the dominant (National) discourse excludes. In 
Chapter Six, I posited, through a reading of the 'hybridity' of subjects in an 
encounter with difference, an analogy between the productions of sexual 
and colonial difference, and in Chapter Seven I employed the theory of 
abjection to suggest a reading of the non-autonomy and non-integrity of 
settler post-colonial subjectivities. Therefore, the third Section so far 
comprises an argument for understanding difference and otherness as 
constitutive of the post-colonial self, and for cultural and political agency 
which relinquishes its privileging of (imperially-connoted) purity and 
sameness. Rather than a conclusion, I offer as a final chapter to this 
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Section, and to the thesis, a textual and cultural 'case-study' in the 
discourses and problema tics which have informed the preceding 
discussions. In Chapter Eight I present a reading of Witi Ihimaera's The 
Matriarch. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
IN SEARCH OF THE MATRIARCH: A CASE STUDY. 
This thesis analyses settler post-colonialism as a complex of 
problema tics, relating in very broad terms to knowledge, culture and 
identity, which cannot be understood simply and unidirectionally as 
'decolonisation'. The reference of these problema tics is inter-disciplinary, 
pointing to post-colonialism as a rubric which problematises disciplines, or 
categories of knowledge. I have posited post-colonial study as properly 
'cultural studies', its field being 'discourse' in the broad sense of a 
"complex of signs and practices which organises social existence and social 
reproduction."l This understanding has implications for the reading of 
literary texts under the rubric of post-colonialism. Stephen SIemon has 
argued that "Post-colonial literary writing ... can be read not only as 
literature, but also as a form of cultural criticism and cultural critique. "2 
Further, though, it is an understanding which places literary texts 
alongside those of textual commentary and criticism, cultural commentary 
and journalism, autobiography, historical, theoretical and other non-
fictional texts, in a practice of discourse analysis which both lends itself to 
the description of 'case-study', and questions the objectivity of disciplinary 
demarcations. Indeed, critiques of colonial discourse have identified in the 
imperialist project the complicity of the epistemological basis of the Age of 
Enlightenment and its forms of the wills to truth and knowledge. Post-
colonial (re)readings either implicitly problematise or actively address 
those processes of the ordering of knowledge and the consititution of the 
Other. 
In this chapter, the discussion of Witi Ihimaera's The Matriarch3 is 
intended as such a 'case study', invoking the inter-disciplinarity and inter-
textuality of the term -- the many discourses and texts within the novel, as 
well as the discourses of reviewers, critics, and other commentators. The 
text is presented as a paradigmatic instance of themes andproblematics 
which have figured in the thesis, and is consistent with the spirit of Simon 
During's statement that post-colonialism is a "problematising" rubric for 
the reading of texts.4 The emphasis in this chapter is on reading practice, 
contextuality, and problems of reading position, matters which emerged, 
for example, in relation to Symmes Hole, in contestation of the notion of 
the identity of the text. In short, I argue that the subject of post-colonial 
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culture is a reading subject, for post-colonial cultural production and 
communication, whether literary or of other forms, are predicated upon 
prior readings, as Tiffin notes: "Texts constructed those worlds, 'reading' 
their alterity assimilatively in terms of their own cognitive codes."s 
The Matriarch is both constituted by, and problematises readings, and 
thus I do not (indeed, I believe, cannot) offer a coherent reading of the text. 
Nevertheless, my discussion must be grounded in some enabling 
premises, a 'proto-reading' which is acknowledged as provisional, 
incomplete, and symptomatically contradictory (where I demonstrate that I 
cannot read the text without becoming a reader, without adopting unifying 
subject-positions). The Matriarch comprises Tamatea Mahana's 
"imaginative reconstruction" (1) of his grandmother Artemis (the 
Matriarch), and the early relationship between them, in order to discover 
"the significance of her life and her teachings for the meaning and purpose 
of his own life as heir to her mana and her mission. However, within this 
teleological quest narrative, sections which focus on family and genealogy, 
cosmology, mythology and history, and land and identity, are all 
significant in themselves, suggesting that the process or journey is the 
point of his narrative, and that Artemis is less the 'destination' than the 
'vehicle'. The non-linearity of the text, comprising its non-chronological 
narrative structure, fragmented episodes, repetitions and rewritings, and 
plot and character 'inconclusions', points to the activity of reading as a 
process. It invokes Tiffin's statement that "Decolonization is process, not 
arrival,"6 and suggests therefore that 'if is to be discerned on a micro-
~ 
narrative, and 'micro-power' level, not as a teleological grand recit. The 
non-linearity of the text and the many unresolved questions point to a lack 
of cl()~~re which is also tlt~matisedwithin the novel. Certainly the lack of 
closure casts the novel as non-autonomous, 'failing' to unify ~nto an 
authoritative and self-sufficient discourse or truth, a situation which has 
resulted in some readers qualifying their responses with the anticipation of 
the promised sequel volume to The Matriarch.7 However, the effect of the 
open-endedness within The Matriarch is, I believe, more important. The 
implicit dependence upon other knowledges, other texts, enacts the open-
endedness of a living, as opposed to· museumified, culture. Rather than 
forcing martyrdom to 'tradition', this open-endedness enables change and 
growth to be conceived of within the terms of agency, including the 
appropriation of useful tools and knowledges. If it is possible to admit, for 
example, that Riria wanted Thomas Halbert "because he was strange. A 
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Pakeha. She was curious about the strangeness" (34), then an active agency 
has been posited which allows for the active negotiation of the ambivalent 
effects of such an encounter. This is most clearly illustrated in the 
rebuilding of the meeting-house, Rongopai: 
In the way of the young, the glorious colours and the exuberance had 
been applied with little reference to tradition, an obvious break with 
the past. But I have always liked to think that the prophet [Te Kooti] 
would have approved, for just as he had blended the Christian faith 
with the Maori culture to speak for the people in the new world, so 
also had the young people attempted to show the blending of the old 
ways with the new and the world of the Maori in the lands of 
Pharaoh. (190) 
The description of Rongopai presents an exhilarating bricolage, but 
concludes with the affirmation, "We still live. We still breathe. We are 
still Maori" (195). 
The events of Artemis' life culminate in the dramatic events on the 
Wellington marae in 1949, but the attempt to reconstruct the truth and 
meaning of these is contextualised by the recollection of her accounts of 
the lives of the warrior-ancestor Te Kooti, and the parliament~rian­
ancestor Wi Pere Halbert. Tamatea's attempt to unravel the meanings and 
mysteries of Artemis and the problematisation of that attempt are 
therefore two constitutive aspects of the text combining to raise questions 
of knowledge, truth, and identity~} Certainly the centrality of Maori and the 
construction of counter-discourses are essential aspects of the novel; but 
the effect of these is predominantly one of questioning modes of 
knowledge, of a post-colonial epistemological rather than (post-modern) 
ontologic~l focus. The Matriarch incorporates the thematics of identity, 
land, belonging, discursive territory, authority and authenticity, textuality 
and history, while instantiating and invoking in the process of its reading 
(both the readings it enacts and those it produces) the analytical 
problema tics of subjectivity, hybridity, abjection, paranoia, contamination, 
and agency which have constituted this thesis. 
To argue that The Matriarch is paradigmatic is not to say that it is 
'typical'; indeed its difference from preceding fiction has been noted. Peter 
Beatson termed it New Zealand's "first real 'problem novel' since it 
contains no clear indications of how it should be interpreted," and 
observed that it "contains moral paradoxes rare in both Maori and Pakeha 
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literature. "8 It should be noted that 1986 also saw the publication of 
Symmes Hole and Potiki, both novels which effect reconsiderations of 
broad sweeps of New Zealand history, which premise authentic (national) 
identity on Maori, and which pose particular challenges to and problems 
for the dominant European-informed reading practices in that country. 
Further, it could be argued that many of the problems presented by The 
Matriarch were encountered earlier in relation to Hulme's The Bone 
People: the mix of realism and fantasy, the representations of mythic and 
historical time, character and plot credibility, and questions of Maori 
'authenticity'. Certainly The Bone People does not pose the same problem 
of unifying voice that The Matriarch doesj if anything, it manifests the 
opposite problem of their distinction, as the voices of a number of 
characters converge on Kerewin's. Yet arguably to a greater degree than 
other New Zealand novels, The Matriarch refuses to offer any privileged 
reading position, thereby positing no privileged post-colonial 'subject'. 
One way of approaching the difficulty of constructing an identity or a 
settled 'reading' of The Matriarch is to examine two statements within two 
critical responses to the novel which appeared in reviews shortly after 
publication. Janet Potiki concluded her review with the declaration that 
The Matriarch "is at~9_ngain the search for redefinition of ourselves 
within Aotearoa -;~d beyondj"9 Alex Calder began his review with the 
observation that "WftlIhimaera's The Matriarch seemed to have all the 
status of a civic monument well before publication."lO Both affirmations 
of the significance of the novel, these two statements apparently lead in 
opposing directions. Potiki's invokes Maoriness as both the quality of the 
text (taonga) and the context of its reception and significance (Aotearoa). It 
creates an aura of authenticity and even 'presence', as the taonga is 
precious in its own right and refers to traditional time, while the· 'civic 
monument' is, in this context, a Pakeha image which refers to historical 
time, and invokes the absent presence of representation: a monument is 
not so much a precious or important object as an object which signifies an 
important figure or event. Thus two differently accented statements of 
value invoke two different politicsj but this is where tensions within each 
of the statements problematise the unidirectionality or integrity of their 
discourse. ) Calder's 'civic monument', while representing history and 
modernity, is a static image which functions as an aesthetic sign, while 
Potiki's 'taonga' is, importantly, a 'tool' in the service of the sjearch for self-
redefinition, an active image evoking change and growth.,n this sense, 
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Calder's description refers also to, or invokes the establishment of, 
tradition (stasis)~ and Potiki's, history (change). 
This tension both between and within their discourses exemplifies 
Simon During's argument with regard to the cultural and discursive 
politics of settler-majority post-colonial states, where 
a politics of identity replaces a politics of enlightenment. There the 
project of the colonized peoples becomes the preservation of a 
cultural identity (supposedly) grounded in the era before the modern 
to which current needs and wants attach. And New Zealand ... 
stands as the paradigmatic instance of such states, because ... it is here 
that the border which divides and joins the politics of enlightenment 
to the politics of cultural identity is most fiercely contested.ll 
The Matriarch and discourses produced in response to this text are located( 
exactly on this border, where each contaminates the other, abjecting the \ 
subject of each. It is an abject position for the subject of 'culture', and for I 
I 
the reading subject, for it offers no readily available or privileged position \ 
I 
from which it is purely identical with itself. Instead, there is a non- '\ 
identity, difference, or negativity, which is productive of agency: the I 
I 
politics of cultural identity constitute an Imaginary sphere which is I 
articulated through Symbolic principles of enlightenment, or modernity; I 
at the same time, those principles require an Imaginary wholeness Of) 
identity to which they attach, and which are offered in Maori discourses of 
cultural identity. It is the vertiginous oscillation between these moments; 
which abjects the subject of post-colonial traditional cultural identity and 
the subject of post-colonial modernity; but their separation is only possible\(\ 
as a paranoid and idealist gesture. 
Such gestures are made by two further reviewers of the novel, locating 
them at opposite poles of a literary-political spectrum. Bo.th C.K. Stead and 
Atareta Poananga vilify the text for its difference from their own literary-
critical assumptions -- and the difference of the text from 'itself' -- and at 
the same time they disavow the difference or tensions within their own 
discourses. However, the critical positions of each are at least articulated, 
including their assumptions about the ·function of literary writing. Stead 
asserts that "the true work of fiction [is] to make us see,"12 and in deploring 
Ihimaera's "political posturing", argues that "His proper task was the craft 
of fiction. He owed it to himself to write a more considered novel -- one 
which used the language more scrupulously. Everyone would be better 
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served by a more truthful image."13 Conversely, Poananga complains that 
"There has been little or no critique of how or where Maori writing can 
contribute to the promotion of Maori values./lnstead, the craft aspects of 
writing are emphasised; technique, style, the mastery of European criteria.-
- of what good writing is supposed to be."14 She believes that the work of 
Maori writers "needs to be evaluated according to our indigenous 
consciousness. "15 
It would appear then, that the discourses of Stead and Poananga are 
radically opposed: for one, literature is an autonomous field instantiating 
internal aesthetic governing principles; for the other, it is a means to an 
end, and it is evaluated according to the principles which govern that 
extra-literary end to which it appeals. Both are forced to articulate their 
assumptions about the function of art, and each assumes the paranoid 
position of excluding (the terms of) the other: Stead excludes politics from 
his critical practice, while Poananga excludes the 'craft aspects' of writing; 
both exclude the impact, influence, encounter with the racial, cultural 
other from their notion of literary form. It is now theoretical orthodoxy 
that opposite poles of a binary opposition are implicated in each others' 
constitution, so it is quite predictable that they will appeal to the same 
grounds or criteria of self-constitution. As a result, their discourses share a 
border of identity and difference, stasis and change, and in the case of 
discourses on The Matriarch, tradition and modernity, culture and 
enlightenment. While the articulation of polar positions is a (paranoid) 
response to the hybridity of, and abjection (of a privileged position of pure 
and autonomous subjectivity) threatened by such a border, these positions 
are inevitably drawn back to it. Thus within the opposition may be found 
both troubling and enabling middle grounds. Both Stead and Poananga 
posit forms of autonomy and integrity -- Stead's called 'aesthetic' and 
Poananga's called 'cultural' or 'racial'. Similarly, both actually posit 
literature as a 'decolonising' force. Poananga is explicit about it, claiming 
that "It is crucial that indigenous literature be a decolonising force,"16 and 
that the means to decolonisation is the promotion of Maori nationalism. 
Stead, on the other hand, implicitly posits literary decolonisation in the 
guise of a mature literary nationalism, the artistic evolution from colonial 
status to writing which, in its coherence, effects a denial of the depth of 
colonial fragmentation. Thus while Stead's nationalism is Eurocentric, 
Poananga's is similarly overcast by the shadow of Europe. 
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Both Poananga and Stead appeal to notions of realism and 'truth'. It is 
not a literalist notion of realism to which Stead appeals, but an aesthetic 
consistency and integrity, enabling the reader unproblematically to 'see' 
through the transparency of language, that language whose 'scrupulous' 
use produces the 'truthful' image. In other words, Stead's truth conforms 
to principles internal to (a certain conception of) language itself. Poananga 
grounds 'truth' and 'reality' outside of language, but still conforms to a 
notion of language as transparent to these principles. Her realism is at 
times literalist. She objects, for example, to a passage in The Matriarch 
which describes the manner of Artemis' birth: To the passage which 
describes "The Matriarch .... The midwife saw at her birth not only that 
one eye was swimming in blood. She also saw that the Matriarch had her 
hands at her own throat as if attempting to strangle herself" (50), Poananga 
responds that "the latter is impossible for a new born child."17 
Similarly, whereas Stead objects to a lack of 'artistic truth', Poananga 
deplores what she regards as errors of fact in recording Maori traditional 
cultural practices. Against a central premise of the text's representation of 
Artemis' grandeur in defying protocol to speak on a marae, a right 
normally reserved for men, she invokes the discourse of historical 
certainty to correct misconceptions: 
The marae was never a patriarchal instit~tion before the Pakeha. The 
paepae, the front seat, where Maori men in some tribes sit for the 
whaikorero, was a post-European invention. It has now become an 
important symbol reflecting male power. Ihimaera makes much of 
the matriarch daring to challenge this male prerogative of speaking 
rights. In doing so, he reinforces all the mythical traditions about 
Maori women.18 
It would seem that Poananga objects to the representation of post-colonial 
manifestations of Maori cultural practice, which after all is the only 
possible context for the discourses within The Matriarch, favouring the 
'purity' of 'pre-colonial' cultural tradition. Her argument invokes Tiffin's 
observation that the processes of subversion and appropriation which 
have informed literary decolonisation have "frequently been accompanied 
by the demand for an entirely new or wholly recovered 'reality', free of all 
colonial taint. )Given the nature of the relationship between colonizer and 
~/" 
colonized, with its pandemic brutalities and cultural denigration, such a 
demand is desirable and inevitable. But ... such pre-colonial cultural 
purity can never be fully recovered."19 
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Indeed, this impossible demand underlies the grounding of 
Poananga's criticism, in the name of 'pre-colonial authenticity,' of the 
representations of patriarchy and sexism in The Matriarch. She has 
referred to the novel as "a profoundly woman-hating book,"2o and 
challenges many of its basic premises about Maori cultural practice. Along 
with the contestation of the notion that pre-European marae operated in 
patriarchal fashion cited above, she objects to the constant assertion in the 
novel that 
women were not tapu (sacred) but noa (common), and for this reason 
are usually not allowed to speak on the marae. Doing so invites dire 
consequences. This is patently false. All Maori, men and women, 
have their own tapu; it is not gender specific. Women possess their 
own tapu, as do men, they were and are allowed to speak on many 
marae. That all women are restricted because to speak would violate 
the marae and male tapu are post-Pakeha rationalisations.21 
There are a number of problems raised by this statement. The first is the 
question of her own access to the truth, of traditional authenticity. A 
paradox here is that authenticity is located at least in part on a temporal 
scale in relation to origins, and so the closer to the 'original', pre-colonial 
state of Maori culture that information was collected, the more authentic it 
is likely to be. Yet textual sources are dependent upon literacy, a situation 
exacerbated by the disruption to oral transmission of cultural knowledge 
effected by urbanisation and dislocation. It is not possible to reverse the 
disruptions to 'knowledge' effected by the infiltration of literacy into an 
oral culture, a point which Poananga implies in her own observation that 
"Like Eve in christian mythology, in Maori mythology women [sic] was 
created by man (one wonders about the extent of Christian influence here,. 
since Maori sources for these myths are post-colonial and told by Maori 
men to white men)."22 Earliest sources are most likely to be the recorded 
observations of white officials or anthropologists themselves. Therefore, 
. despite temporal closeness to origins, reliability is 'contaminated' by 
'inauthentic' subjectivity. As a result, Poananga argues, 
Pakeha, women included, have unquestioningly accepted the Pakeha 
version of the status of Maori women, historically and in the present. 
Books and research conducted by Pakeha male and female academics 
have generally portrayed the lives, roles and status of Maori women 
as oppressive, inferior and secondary to that of men. Maori men 
since colonisation have generally accepted this, for several reasons.23 
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Among the reasons she gives is the "socialisation" of Maori male 
consciousness according to the imperatives of colonisation, a process she 
figures purely as imposition rather than as interaction and adaption, 
which themselves are implied in her suspicions about the construction of 
the 'Maori' creation myth. However, this points to a second source of 
information about Maori cultural practices and beliefs: white 
transcriptions of Maori informants. Even these raise the question of the 
status of information given to be transcribed; its interpretation is 
ultimately a reading of both that information and the subjectivity of the 
informant. In a different context, During suggested that (questionable) 
assumptions which may underpin the reception of cultural information 
include "that the enunciating subject ... is the 'Maori' rather than 
particular individuals or iwi (tribes); ... [that] utterances were constative 
rather than illocutionary; and ... that their propositions refer to a coherent 
body of esoteric knowledge."24 
Thus it is necessary to return to the question of the source and status of 
Poananga's own authority. The irretrievability of orally transmitted 
'traditional' knowledge from within a post-colonial, literate and urban 
context leaves a gap, or a silence at and as the origin. Poananga fills it with 
the noise of refutation and assertion -- claims that representations are 
"patently false," that women "have their own tapu." Ironically, she also 
uses white sources to inform her own discourse of contestation. She cites 
Kate Millet's Sexual Politics in her challenging of the misogyny she 
attributes to The Matriarch, and Jane S. Jaquette's discussion of archetypal 
literary representations of female characters.25 Even 'tradition' is rendered 
epistemologically void, even risky, as Poananga accuses Ihimaera· of 
"blending 'fact' which masquerades as 'tradition', borrowed from white 
sources, with fiction,"26 and argues that "Maori men's sexism is now little 
different to that of their Pakeha counterparts -- except they use so-called 
'traditions' to legitimate and laud their superiority over Maori women."27 
The fact that Poananga and Stead both appeal to 'truth' and realism points 
to their identification (and disavowal) of two types of truth and two 
sources of truth. The effect of their contradictory claims to the 'same' 
values is to destabilise notions of truth itself, indeed to politicise it, and by 
extension to politicise the discourse(s) which 'produces' it. 
To return now to Poananga's argument about men's and women's 
tapu and their right to speak on the marae, and to relate it back to The 
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Matriarch, she overlooks a crucial aspect of the events on the Wellington 
marae in 1949. Artemis seeks to speak not on her own, but on another 
marae, and thereby provokes specifically inter-tribal rivalries. In almost 
totally ignoring this reading of Maori disunity, Poananga more successfully 
accommodates her feminism within her Maori nationalist discourse -- or 
vice versa. Collectivity of subjects and unity of subjective consciousness 
characterise her reading assumptions. Thus she focuses in her review 
upon specific women characters and their relationships, reading them in 
terms of their assumed status as representational (of 'real people') and 
representative (of 'women', or 'Maori women'), and consistent with this, 
is critical of the representations of women's power in the novel: "This is 
not the power of Maori women as we know it; embracing, nurturing, and 
positively directed."28 The assumptions underpinning Poananga's 
response instantiate the problem of reading in post-colonial New Zealand 
that a 'collective' or 'communal' indigenous ethos collides with the 
"""'{ 
dominant settler 'individual' one. As a result, a character may be reacr~ot l 
simply as an individual but as representative of a group, culture or race 
(Maori women); and in a social context of indigenous struggle (and of 
Pakeha desire), such representations are under pressure to be positive. 
However, Poananga finds that "The women characters that are createcfare 
destructive stereotypes of women, the mother and the daughter consumed 
by rivalry over men. Their natural strengths and closeness as women are 
never a feature."29 The assumption of women's natural closeness is 
symptomatic of the grounding of her argument in 'pre-colonial' 
authenticity or tradition for a reading which is only possible in the post-
colonial context of consciousness of patriarchy and sexism. Indeed, she 
evokes the difficulty of expressing respective status, and the nature of the 
social relationship between men and women: "1 hesitate to use the word 
'equal' for it inadequately describes the relationship, In a sense, a 
comparison with Pakeha cannot be made. Ours as Maori was 'normal. "'30 
It is only by obscuring the tribal social context of rivalries that she is able to 
posit women's 'natural closeness'; and only within the post-colonial 
ontological and epistemological 'fracture' with the plenitude of the past (as 
'normal', where tapu was not gender-specific), is she able to constitute 
'women' as a 'group'. ' \ 
The critical affect which greeted the novel may be characterised by Alex 
Calder'S telegrammatic "WOW STOP BUT."31 Even if the 'WOW' refers 
only to the sheer size of the novel, most responses have been impressed, 
~-
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or simply overwhelmed, and at the same time troubled. A theme that 
runs consistently, and arguably centrally, through critical responses to The 
Matriarch, is that of the novel's failure. Usually this is an evaluative 
rather than an enabling descriptive term. The most insistent source of 
failure has been the critical identification of the text's lack -- failure -- of 
unity. i The Matriarch manifests, for some critics, a lack of imaginative 
7!"q"",~ 
unity. For example, in Michael King's view, "Ihimaera's vision is not 
sufficiently penetrative to unify the many disparate parts into a single 
work of the imagination." He continues that "Most dissatisfying from the 
reader's point of view is that the novel fails to tie up the dangling 
questions it raises about the grandmother's shadowy past, leaving a feeling 
of immense dissatisfaction."32 Elizabeth Caffin similarly argues that 
"What is missing in a novel of undoubted power is a single confident 
artistic vision, that engagement with the capacity of language to 
transform. "33 Stead, whose overall evaluation of the novel is that "for me 
it certainly [fails]," identifies an important source of failure in the lack of 
unity of tone and voice: "In style the novel moves from conventional 
fiction, to expository prose~ to rhetorical argument, to historical record 
(including many pages of Hansard). The tone swings back and forth 
between the gradiose and the banal. All this puts a great strain on any 
sense of artistic unity. "34 A third failure of unity has been identified by 
Janet Po tiki, who argues that "While the device of having the story told 
through the eyes of many different people in different times is challenging, 
it distances us from the unity of each event and makes the overall work 
less cohesive. "35 The Matriarch is therefore judged to fail expectations of 
the unity of imagination or artistic vision, of tone and voice, and of event. 
It is certainly not my wish to contradict these claims, to discover unity, 
but rather to examine their implications: what do they seek to_ unify?, 
according to what critical and political criteria is unity sought? 
questions are consistent with the spirit of Calder's observation that "these 
expectations of a 'penetrative unifying vision,' of seamless narrative 
progression, of characters whose past is wholly resolved, wholly knowable, 
are only apparently natural; they are genre specific, genre bound."36 Calder 
who reads the novel as (failed) 'epic',points not simply to its failure, but to 
the necessity of its failure in these terms, thus historicising and relativising 
the genre itself. Similarly, while Williams does not shy away from the 
notion of failure, he contextualises it, so that the term is more descriptive 
than baldly evaluative: "this matter of organising perspective, of the place 
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from which the narrative voice proceeds, is a cultural as much as a literary 
problem for the author."37 
The desire for unity and the failure of unity identified in critical 
discourse about The Matriarch actually doubles the textual and discursive 
" 
strategies of the novel itself. In other words, this tension -- or failure -- ~ 
I' 
may be extended beyond the discourse of literary criticism and thematised I 
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as the post-colonial cultural critique performed by Ihimaera'~!~~!i While 
'readings' seek to control meaning and stabilise identity, the effect of The 
Matriarch is to desire unity and to work against it, showing it to be at best 
illusory, at worst an insidious political post- or re-colonisation. Therefore, 
The Matriarch abjects the subject of the 'reading', casting her/him into an 
abyss of ambivalence (WOW STOP BUT) occasioned by this border of unity 
and fragmentation. The desire for wholeness (with the past, with the self) 
sought by Tatnatea through the attempted recovery of the original 
presence of Artemis, is in conflict with the desire for subjectivity through 
, 
which that wholeness of original presence could (ideally) be articulated.",~ 
Desire for wholeness always tends towards the silence which is the end of 
desire; such wholeness therefore poses the danger of engulfment in a 
plenitude which absorbs and suffocates the subject. At the same time, the 
desire for subjectivity and autonomy is dependent upon the loss of the 
plenitude of origins. The question of how to speak origins -- one of the 
questions of The Matriarch in its 'discourse of Maori identity' moment --
may never be resolved; origins fall into an abyss of silence. Jonathan Lamb 
cites Geoffrey Hartman on language, but the point is applicable more 
generally to cultural identity: "'The extreme result of ideas of purity in 
language is glottophagia or swallowing one's tongue.' Domesticated, the 
paradox would work something like this: Try to transcend the silence at 
, the pseudo-origin by the big voice of a genuine originali.ty, and you'll fall 
back into silence. "38 In such a context, Lamb argues, "originality js in a 
direct relation to muteness."39 Indeed, the problem of recovering an 
originality in language or cultural identity is precisely that language and 
cultural identity are predicated on an irreversible departure from origins. 
Nevertheless, neither The Matriarch nor the settler post-colonial cultural 
context could possibly be characterised as an abyss of silence; if origins are 
silent, they themselves emerge as a veritable clamour of discourses. 
How then do fragmentation and unity work in the novel? The 
thematisation of their irresolution may be found in the problematisation 
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of the mirror of mimesis and identity. The belief that the function of art is 
to 'make us see' is questioned by showing that we cannot simply see, but 
that we are subjects of a gaze. In The Matriarch's enactment of the 
ambivalence of the mirror relation as both unity (the Imaginary illusion of 
wholeness) and fragmentation (the split into perceiver and perceived, a 
split disavowed by narrativising the connection through the articulation of 
the illusorily whole 'I'), the novel problematises the naturalness or 
givenness of both identity and narrative. Mirrors are invoked from, and 
indeed as the outset of the narrative: Artemis has told Alexis of Tamatea, 
"'I have made him into a likeness as unto me'" (13). When Alexis tells 
this to Tamatea, it becomes the instigating moment of the text: "It was 
Uncle Alexis who started it all" (1), narrates Tamatea, and as he embarks 
on the search for the meaning of Artemis' expression of a relation of 
likeness between them, he reflects "I think the matriarch would have 
approved of this. After all, she was the one who turned my own life into 
fiction from fact" (1). There are two contradictory directions in which this 
statement leads: on the one hand it becomes clear this early that Tamatea's 
search for the truth of Artemis is also a search for himself, pointing to an 
original unity, an archaic plenitude, of their identity: Artemis has declared 
that "the manner of our births was the same and we have been created one 
and the same" (113);40 on the other hand, the statement itself reverses the 
'expected' movement towards the plenitude of truth and instead points 
away from it towards language, and the processes of myth-making. 
Tamatea will only achieve an "imaginative reconstruction of the woman 
who wore pearls in her hair, the matriarch who ruled the Mahana family 
for three generations" (1). Yet even the phrase 'imaginative 
reconstruction' invokes both the idea of the 'fictional' -- a departure from 
a form of 'truth' --, and that of the Imaginary, which is the mirror 
reflection of wholeness. 
Images of smashed mirrors dramatise the fragmentation of the subject. 
Uncle Alexis, whose health is failing and whose eyesight has failed, whose 
initial response was the refusal to speak (to instantiate and to disavow his 
fragmented condition, or lack of wholeness), demonstrates the 
inevitability of the fragmentation of the subject by smashing all the 
mirrors in the house and exposing the whole mirror reflection as an 
illusion: "'This is a house of the blind', he said, 'and the blind don't need 
mirrors'" (356). His regained is associated with the shattering of Imaginary 
wholeness. 41 There is also an incident in Artemis' life which addresses the 
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dangers of the illusions of Imaginary wholeness posed by the mirror of 
mimesis. When, in her sinister encounter with an elder on the 
Wellington marae in 1949, Artemis is observed to transmute into a giant 
devouring spider, the young Tamatea perceives her trapped behind its 
multi-faceted eyes, and smashes them in order to release her: he "stepped 
suddenly to one side and, reaching up, shattered the dark crystals of its eyes 
so that they fell like mirror shards around him" (266). The reference to 
mirror shards suggests that she has been trapped in some illusory space, 
perhaps within the illusion of her own powers (she admits, '''My 
invocation took me too far'" (266) ), or else by the myths and legends 
created about her and her powers, themselves culminating in the illusion 
of her transmutation -- an image or bodily reflection of psychical or 
spiritual powers. The 'realisation' of the spider is long prepared for in the 
text by the imagery of her black gown and veil, and by that of spinning (76), 
and weaving, both suggesting the web: in the eyes of the young Tamatea, 
"grandmother wove such magic" (lOS; see also 247; 397). However, as the 
fragmented representation of Artemis' character (and the 'meaning' of this 
occurrence) suggests, her release from behind the eyes of the spider does 
not confer her with presence, but with the broken shards of a self 
fragmented in and by language. Similarly, if Tamatea is created as a 
'likeness unto' Artemis, then the implications of these broken mirrors 
must be addressed in relation to his fictional identity or character, and to 
the unity of his narrating subjectivity. 
This problem of the 'characters' of Artemis and Tamatea has been 
critically observed. Stead is irritated by the hazy and unclear images of 
both Artemis and Tamatea, asking for example, "what exactly it is that the 
matriarch achieves:" 
She is represented as triumphant against all odds, having to call up 
magical forces as well as her powers as an orator and as tribal and 
family politician to defeat her and Tamatea's enemies. What the 
outcome of all this effort appears to be is the protection of the mana of 
Tamatea. But Tamatea has little identity in the story except as its 
narrator, and recipient of these benefits.42 
Although Tamatea is implicated in the novel's 'failures' of 
characterisation, the meaning of this failure may be located through an 
analysis of the 'failure' of Artemis. It is her 'character' which seems most 
to compromise the conventions of the humanist realist novel in terms of 
which critics like Stead insist upon reading. He complains, in relation to 
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the characterisation of Artemis, that "The language becomes florid as if 
with the effort of conjuring into being a greatness that has no foundation 
in fact, nor even, perhaps, in the imagination of the novelist. At no time 
did I really believe in the greatness of Artemis. Worse, I was never 
entirely persuaded that the novelist believed it either." Pointing to a 
passage of such florid writing, he concludes that "everyone of these over-
written passages ... diminished my sense of the reality of the figure whose 
stature they were meant to enhance."43 
But were they? More important than Ihimaera's intentions, though, I 
would argue that the aUenatingly florid declarations of greatness function 
as enactments of alienation in and by language; language itself is 
foregrounded, problematising the accessibility of Artemis as presence. She 
functions in The Matriarch in part as evidence that language is the only 
means by which identity may be articulated or known. Further, her 
representation in language may be read as the articulation of desire. 
Tamatea's narrativisation, his search for the meaning, of Artemis, posits 
her as the object of his desire; in fact it locates her as a representation of his 
desire for meaning, identity, and plenitude. She is not the lost object, but 
the mark of loss. In 'his' search for 'her', the mark of his desire, and 'unto 
whom he is a likeness', Tamatea is both perceiver and perceived, 
rendering Artemis essentially absent, merely a representation. Thus Tom 
Weston is correct when he notes that "She figures as a two-dimensional 
object, a key actor, but in a set piece,44 as is Calder, who observes that "As a 
character, the matriarch has zero-degree of interest. She is invoked, not 
described, not 'gone into."'45 The point is not to seek some interest in 
Artemis herself, but to attend to what precisely is invoked in Tamatea's 
pursuit and representation of her. Similarly, Tamatea functions as the 
figure of the reader, the post-colonial subject/writer of cultural identity, 
whose excesses in language in the attempt to represent Artemis (the 
cultural plenitude of the past), reflect the excess of possible representations 
(the competing readings); Among the many different and often 
contradictory accounts, legends, anecdotes, attitudes and influences which 
. comprise her, Artemis cannot be fixed. Tamatea's uncle, Whai Mahana 
tells him, "'Beauty, intellectual skill, and the ability to debate in a hostile 
arena -- these are the three things that your grandmother had. She was a 
real Maori woman of the kind about whom legends are told'" (26); but 
later he is told by his Aunt Hiraina, "'Of course you're talking about the 
legend not the person. "' She continues: 
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'''People used to think that your grandmother Artemis was some 
kind of witch. That she could stop the sun. Or change into a spider. 
Or cause nga pungawerewere to fall upon the elder of the paepae. 
Rubbish. All these incidents were coincidental. . . . Your 
grandmother believed in God, Tamatea. She was a Godly woman 
who prayed to our Atua every morning and every night. No such 
woman would ever have been possessed by the devil. Certainly not 
Mum.'" (354) 
There is, conversely, the cynical, unattributed view that she "'made a 
religion out of herself .... It wasn't just love she demanded of all of you. It 
was veneration. She chose you [Tamatea] to be her high priest'" (447). 
Evidence and substantiation themselves belong to the order ot language 
and subjectivity. 
The excess of representations of Artemis is further compounded by the 
operatic-theatrical motif, which governs both her representation and 
indeed the organisation of the text itself. The non-autonomy of her, (and) 
of post-colonial identity, is demonstrated in the associations of the Verdi 
operatic passages which comprise many expressions of patriotic or 
nationalistic sentiment. 46 Passages from Nabucco, for example, make 
allusion to the Old Testament account of captive Jews in Canaan, which in 
turn invokes the discourse of Te Kooti and his Old Testament based 
Ringatu religion, "the power of the [Maori] people in bondage in Egypt" 
(136): "Arpa d'or ... 0 simile di Solima ai fati traggi un suono di crudo 
lamento ... Golden Harp ... Just as for the cruel fate of Jerusalem, intone a 
strain of bitter lamentation, otherwise let the Lord inspire you with a 
meoldy to give us strength to suffer ... "(292). Further, Verdi passages 
draw in the Italian Risorgimento, for which he served as 'musician-
laureate', and which itself is echoed in the 'dual-armed' struggle of Te 
Kooti and parliamentarian Wi Pere Halbert respectively against Pakeha 
appropriation of Maori land. Finally, these passages and their associations 
converge in the figure of Artemis, descendant of Te Kooti and Wi Pere, 
who apparently travelled to Italy, and whose mission, "To save Waituhi" 
(15), addresses political land issues in settler society. It is she who sings the 
arias, and thus she may be understood as the culminating figure of these 
far-reaching associations and motifs of Maori/Italian/Jewish/Ringatu 
unification into identity, in resistance to foreign domination: "A costro 
schiava non sono ... della mia patria degna sara. I am not a slave ... I will 
be worthy of my native land" (13), she sings from Aida. She is likened to a 
diva: "There is a photograph of the Italian diva, Renata Tebaldi, which 
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suggests something of the look of the matriarch in later years .... The 
matriarch was like a diva herself" (13). The quality of her voice is 
described in such opera tic terms: "Her voice was honeyed and loving, 
intimate and full of pride, and there was a tinge of triumph flooding 
through it like a glorious cantilena" (285); even her spoken words "filled 
the air with ageless music" (294). 
The non-integrity of (her) identity is invoked in the artifice 
represented in the theatrical motif: Artemis as artifice. Images of her 
(self-)cultivation, of her self as image, of her roles and performances, 
abound in the text, dramatising the impossibility of locating a true or 
essential Artemis. Whai Mahana recalls, "'she looked so fantastic with 
those pearls and black gowns, quite out of place. She had a mystique, and 
I'm sure she cultivated it on purpose'" (26). Further, at various points, the 
manner of her (self-)representation means that she is 'misrecognised' as a 
large black bird (210), a giant devouring spider (265), and an Italian heiress 
Miss A.R. Marchesi. Tamatea discovers a report in the social column of 
the New Zealand Herald: 
'An affecting scene was enacted when the retired MP, Mr Wi Pere 
Halbert, met young Italian heiress, Miss A.R. Marchesi, just off the 
American Queen .... Her hair was dressed in the Italian style with 
pearls at the nape of the neck. Her complexion was olive from the 
Mediterranean sun. Suffice to say, however, that she suprised all, 
when Wi Pere responded to her, by calling in Maori to him.' (436) 
She makes entrances and exits, and is concerned with timing and effect. 
Throughout the text, the journalist's accounts of Artemis' appearance and 
speaking at the 1949 hui stress the theatricality of her actions and timing. 
The account of the tension Artemis caused by keeping the Prime Minister 
waiting at the hui reaches a dramatic climax: 
'Let the door be closed,' the elder said. 
The door closing, closing. 
The matriarch bent her head in grief. 
She covered her face in her veil. 
'Tutakina te tatau.' 
'Homai te toka ki ahau,' she said.. 
The door closing, closing. 
'Bring me the axe.' (407) 
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The veil she wears suggests the stage curtain: "('And as you were looking 
at her, she reached up with her hands to her head and began to pull her 
dark veil back down and over her face')" (76). The italicised words draw 
attention to the dramatic significance of the co-incidence of this action 
with the eclipse of the sun: "('The veil slowly descending. And as it did 
so, the clouds began to join across where once had been a brief space of 
sunlit sky./'So be it,' the matriarch said'/With a ponderous rumbling, like 
iron gates closing, the sun began to go out')" (78). The journalist refers to 
the incident as Artemis' "brilliant coup de theatre" (92). 
The operatic-theatrical motif extends to the structuring of the text itself, 
and the representation of other characters and events, foregrounding the 
status of the text as artifice. Structured in five Acts, it suggests the 
theatricality of opera, comprising drama, music, dance, costume, stage-
setting and more. There are episodes introduced by passages which read as 
stage directions, such as the narrator's theatrical allusion upon introducing 
Wi Pere Halbert's story: "It is now time to bring in from the wings the 
matriarch's great-uncle, the Honourable Wi Pere Halbert. ... I have at least 
given you the stage to yourself. . .. But one stage direction, just one --
while you are telling it, think of yourself as the Maori with his own hands 
around his neck" (301). Other passages are suggestive of filmic techniques, 
such as fade-ins and fade-outs, and even 'special effects' of lighting and 
sound. For example, Tamatea is gradually constructing his memory of 
Artemis: 
There is no noise at first; simply a whistling of the wind through 
cracks in the bone and a conjuring of the ghosts. Then the sounds 
begin to tighten, take shape, take form. The breath from the throat 
stirs the magical powers so long locked inside the runes ... and the 
song begins. The song stirs other runes, but in one's own memory, 
teasing and shifting back the dust in concentric. circles, eddying 
outward. Something begins to glimmer there. A wreath around a 
face. The face of a patrician woman. The matriarch. (18) 
Later the narrative account of the Matawhero Retaliation is divided into 
three parts: "Prelude" (143), a musical term; "Close-Up" (145), a 
photographic or film term; and "The Attack" (160), which evokes drama or 
film. The mixture of performance· metaphors is consistent with the 
governing opera motif. 
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Within this bricolage, even the intertextuality and the exposed textual 
seams draw attention to both the plurality and the constructedness of The 
Matriarch. Within the Acts there are chapters, within which are 
'episodes'. Chapters are numerically identified and seem less important as 
structures in. themselves, but serve to draw together collections of 
episodes. The latter are the most visibly and insistently fragmenting 
structures in the text, varying in length from a few lines (see 196; 228), to a 
number of pages (213-220), and separated into blocks of text by rows of stars. 
They are fragmented between time frames of mythic, historical and 
personal past, and non-chronological narrative 'presents'. Intertextuality 
also fragments the narrative. Much of the fourth Act, "The Statesman," 
comprises speeches by Wi Pere Halbert taken from the Parliamentary 
Hansard. The text also encompasses, as well as Tamatea's narrative, 
excerpts from a document prepared by Wi Pere and handed to the Gisborne 
Times shortly before his death (301); letters, such as that of Te Kooti to 
Governor Grey (174-6); government and journalistic reports; personal 
testimonials and eyewitness accounts of crucial events. Throughout the 
text, but particularly in the second Act, "The Song of Te Kooti," the Bible is 
invoked in Artemis' discourse. The novel offers no sense of getting to 
its/ Artemis' 'true' meaning or identity, but rather, enacts the search itself 
and the necessary failure of its desire for unity. 
Just as non-autonomy and non-integrity govern the differance of 
textual and character identity, so are history and narrative events devoid of 
unity and stability. As has been noted, Potiki is concerned that the many 
voices and viewpoints of The Matriarch work against the unity of events. 
However, within the context of the novel's multiple fragmentations, this 
would seem to be precisely the point. There is a counter-discursive 
moment, for example, in the re-naming of what has. been known in 
Pakeha historical accounts as the Matawhero Massacre. Glossing the 
account of his historian friend John Lawrence, Tamatea explains that 
when he refers to the 'Matawhero Massacre' what he is really 
referring to is Te Kooti Rikirangi's retaliation against a whole history 
of Pakeha abuse of Maori people, custom and land. He is referring to 
an attack made by Te Kooti Rikirangi in return for his false arrest and 
imprisonment on the Chatham Islands -- Wharekauri. He is 
referring to an act of utu. (71) 
This emphasises the centrality of subject-position in conferring unity or 
meaning on events, that such meaning does not inhere in them. Then 
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Ihimaera goes a step further than producing the counter-story: within this 
'new' context or meaning, details are unstintingly provided which once 
again invoke the description of 'massacre' (170). Thus the events have not 
simply another meaning, but more than one meaning. The discourse is 
perhaps consistent with Tiffin's description of counter-discourses which 
"seek not just to expose and 'consume' the biases of the dominant, but to 
erode their own biases."47 Nevertheless, the multiple meanings do not co-
exist peacefully in a pluralist 'utopia'; they are in active competition. The 
journalist, who for the moment assumes a position on the 'high ground' 
of objectivity, concludes that '''All truth is fiction really, for the teller tells 
it as he sees it and it might be different from some other teller. This is why 
histories often vary, depending on whether you are the conqueror or not'" 
(403). Yet, despite his opening qualification, it is inevitably subject-position 
which effects the measure of 'truth'. Tamatea is in search of 'truth' and is 
hence concerned about the reliability of his sources, and "misrepresenting 
the past" (219). Grounded in 'Maori identity', counter-discourses are 
presented which mock as they rewrite the meaning of hegemonic 
historical accounts: 
The Treaty has ... been praised for its high-mindedness, its Attempt 
at an Honourable Solution to Accommodating the Needs of the 
Pakeha (and Maori), its Integrity. The trouble is that the Treaty has 
never had any status in domestic or international law. The Pakeha 
signed it knowing it was worthless. 
Now from te taha Maori, the view is different. The British Crown 
has consistently broken its contract (and all you Pakeha lawyers can 
argue until the cows come home that the Treaty wasn't a legal 
document but we believe it is). (73) 
Such representation -- and re-presentation -- of history in Th e 
Matriarch troubles both Stead and Poananga. Stead objects quite bluntly 
that "the film of history can't be re-run to suit the moral values of the 
present moment,"48 a view which begs the question of when history has 
ever not been written according to (at least someone's) current moral 
values (including the ethics of scholarship). The implication that there is a 
site of transcendant truth is specifically problematised by much post-
colonial writing, including fiction, as Tiffin argues: "by forcing re-readings 
of fiction through history and history through fiction [post-colonial texts] 
emphasize the complicity of western narrative and history in that process 
[of material capture and annihilation of alterity], deliberately eschewing an 
539 
apparently transparent realism."49 In relation to The Matriarch, Williams 
points out that 
Stead's view fails to do justice to the novel's ambitions and to the 
particular pressures -- cultural and historical -- which influenced [The 
Matriarch's] manner of construction. Ihimaera's understanding of 
history is so radically different from ... Stead's that to accuse him of 
misrepresenting history is, from one perspective, simply to miss the 
point. The question is, whose history is being misrepresented?SO 
And yet these questions of point of view and truth seem almost redundant 
in the light of Stead's own expression, 'the film of history', implying 
already the status of history as construct and as artifice, even invoking the 
suggestion that it is not 'true'! In other words, Stead's own appeal to 
transcendant truth -- the truth of history, itself outside of history -- is 
couched in terms of an artificial construct which depends upon point of 
view. 
Poananga also criticises the novel's misrepresentation of history. She 
argues that liThe Matriarch is a clear political statement for it accurately 
reflects and condones a collaborationist and distorted approach to the 
history of Maori and Pakeha. Ihimaera does not begin to understand what 
colonialism is. The Matriarch is not promoting a cultural nationalism but 
seeks to bury it in conflict and unreality."S1 Poananga's discourse begins by 
opposing the distortions of (collaborationist) politics to history 
(colonialism), and yet reveals that the truth of history would be that which 
promotes cultural nationalism, an unquestionably political goal and one 
which at the same time curiously excludes 'conflict'. Indeed, she excludes 
the possibility of a reading of the novel as a textual dramatisation of 
colonialism and its cultural effects, whether or not this derives from 
Ihimaera's conscious political understanding. Further, she is forced to 
hold. 'colonialism' and 'cultural nationalism' in radical opposition, 
disavowing the emergence of the latter as a hybrid product of the former. 
Perhaps most ironically, in claiming that Ihimaera buries history and 
cultural nationalism in 'unreality', she accuses the novel of being fictional. 
This latter point of course echoes Stead's own reference to the 're-running 
. of the film of history', at the same time as it reaches back to the very 
different functions of literature articulated by Stead and Poananga. 
The representation of historical events on the Wellington marae in 
1949 serves as an illustration of the desire for textual unity and the 
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problematisation of that desire in the textual fragmentation effected by 
them .. By appearing in fragments they instantiate narrative and textual 
non-unity, and the desire which effects the continuation of the narrative 
journey; however in recurring throughout the novel, the events comprise 
an incident which to some extent unifies the narrative. Similarly, the 
'incident' draws other episodes and events into itself as the reader is 
presented with (often italicised) phrases, and repeated, retold events which 
echo earlier ones, as if these have all pointed to the latest moment or 
event, or as if subsequent ones relate back to an originating moment of 
meaning. For example, we read of the eyes of the elder being smothered by 
spiders, '''Help me. Help me', they pleaded./ 'Have mercy upon me'" 
(353). Similarly, Tamatea recounts, "I looked again at my Aunt and her 
eyes were pleading, 'Have mercy on her'" (357), and we recall the 
supplication in the passage from Verdi's Un Ballo in Maschera sung by 
Artemis, and uttered at other points throughout the text: "Miserere, 
miserere d 'un povero cor miserere di me, Signor. Have mercy, have pity, 
have mercy on me Lord" (341). Each of these refers to different narrative 
strands and motifs, but their echoes suggest the possibility of finding 
connections between them. Thus it is possible for the reader either to 
construct a large teleological narrative which moves ever forward to 
ultimate enlightenment, or to construct an account whose authority is 
grounded in the authenticity of origins and whose echoes simply 
reproduce (the meaning of) an originary moment. 
Nevertheless, either narrative strategy requires the active engagement 
of the reader in a process which must foreground reading as process rather 
than passivity, as construction rather than discovery of meaning. That 
meanings (or readings) do not offer themselves up naturally is enacted in 
the non-autonomy and non-integrity of the account of the 1949 events. In 
the third Act, "The Time of the Spider," episodes of the account are 
interspersed with that of the voyage of the ancestral Takitimu canoe from 
the mythical origin of Hawaiki, to and around New Zealand. The reader is 
encouraged to read the one through, or in relation to, the other. Similarly, 
the account of the events on the marae foregrounds the multiplicity of 
perspectives and beliefs, making it impossible to determine from within 
the text itself, a privileged reading. Tamatea compiles and presents 
transcripts of interviews with individuals who were present when the 
'falling spiders' incident occurred. However, beyond consensus that 
spiders descended in great numbers from the rafters of the dining hall, the 
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nature and the meaning of the incident vary from one witness to another. 
The first is alerted to the falling spiders by the direction of Artemis' gaze, 
but he attributes no greater role to her in the incident than this. His 
reference to the spiders in Maori, in the context of a predominantly 
English-language narrative ('''And then they came, nga pungawerewere'" 
(348) ), suggests his interpretation of their significance based in 'Maori 
tradition', The second witness implicitly attributes the precipitation to 
Artemis' spiritual powers through the juxtaposition of ideas in his 
narrative: 
'And above all else she had a power that can only be described as 
supernatural. ... Then she shouted in Maori, it seemed like a shout, 
and it was like having a thunderbolt flashing through my head .... I 
saw these beautiful webs, like fragile cathedrals, strung between the 
rafters. Suddenly, they ripped open. Hundreds of small black spiders 
suspended from crystal threads, began to fall like a black cloud.' (349-
50) 
The third witness, in contrast, attributes the incident and its larger 
meaning to God, and to the battle of good anq evil which culminated in 
her own 'salvation': "'The elders say that what happened was my 
deliverance from evil. They say that it was not accidental that I was there. 
I was chosen to be there'" (350). The fourth produces an entirely 
naturalistic explanation, contextualising it within accounts of similar 
incidents on previous occasions: "'It must have been the vibrations or 
sounds which caused the spiders to appear in so dramatic a fashion'" (352). 
Finally, the fifth declares unequivocally, "'It was she, Artemis, who caused 
them to do this. I swear it II , (352). 
These accounts demonstrate the encounter of different ontologies, 
epistemologies, and even eschatologies, pointing to a problem for 
representations of 'reality' in settler post-colonial writing. Referring to 
Ihimaera's textual strategy generally, Williams refers, for example, to the 
use of 'fantasy' in The Matriarch, but argues that it is IIfantasy in a very 
particular sense. Here fantasy is regarded not as a mere departure from 
reality, an escape into daydream or wish fulfillment, but as an imaginative 
means of giving expression to interpretations of experience other than the 
dominant one."52 He thus suggests that discursive power relations --
dominance and marginalisation -- influence the need to employ fantasy as 
a tool for the expression of ontological and epistemological difference, 
while fantasy is posited as the representation of that marginalised 
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knowledge and reality. It is surely an ambivalent gesture to employ the 
marginal to represent marginalised reality. 
However, I would argue that the effects of the alternation of the 
mythical Takitimu journey narrative and the 1949 marae events suggest a 
complexity in discursive power relations, as well as ontology and 
epistemology, which is characteristic of settler post-colonial New Zealand. 
The myth may be read as providing a quest narrative which grounds 
Artemis' discourse, and even the events themselves, in an originary 
moment, the moment whose plenitude she invokes to authorise her 
position and her discourse. It is therefore, despite the 'fantasy' of the 
journey narrative, an 'authenticating' textual-discursive gesture. At the 
same time, though, the myth-narrative itself demonstrates the 
interpolation of specifically twentieth-century, and more importantly, 
post-colonial, 'inauthenticities'. When the felling of the tree to make the 
canoe is described as including "a symbolic stroke, not touching the bark at 
all, yet the tree is seared, as if by laser" (255), we may regard the 
importation of twentieth-century scientific terminology as an example of 
continuity across time, the evolution of oral narratives along with changes 
in the social context, rather than simply as an example of post-colonial 
alienation from authenticity.53 Even the inclusion in the narrative of 
passages such as "And should any person abuse the tapu then, 10, the 
penalty was death, just as surely as it had been death in biblical times for 
any person who touched the Ark of the Covenant" (255), while betraying 
the discursive and substantive infiltration of the Bible, may be read as 
continuity through cultural syncretism. This too is more closely related to 
the process of narrative evolution than to the post-colonial self-
consciousness and epistemological fracture evident in the following 
passage of the myth narrative: 
The cargo of gods. The more mundane minds have imagined them 
as being mere carvings of wood and stone, relics representing the 
children of Ranginui, the Sky Father, and Papatuanuku, the Earth 
Mother. I like to visualise the gods as being creatures of light and 
darkness, gods of the Maori pantheon. (260) 
The unalienated consciousness would not have imagined the gods as 
anything but simply the gods, while the reference to the "Maori pantheon" 
belongs to a cultural self-consciousness which is post-colonial. Similarly, 
references to "the other legendary canoes" (264; my italics), and "legendary 
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beasts" (274; my italics), bespeak the disconnection from the plenitude of 
'original belief'. 
There is an encounter within each of the mythical (Takitimu) and 
historical (1949) discourses, so that the terms 'mythical' and 'historical' 
cannot be purely and autonomously attributed to each respectively. For 
while the Takitimu narrative has been historicised, the 1949 marae 
incident has attained, through association, juxtaposition, and discursive 
interpolation, a legendary status. Both are therefore legends, one of long 
standing and the other in the making. Along with the encounter of the 
mythic and the historical is that of the sacred and the secular. In settler 
post-colonial New Zealand, the power relations between them are more 
complex than dominance and marginalisation. Each desires the other, and 
neither fully attains it; yet nor does it retain its own integrity.54 
As I have stated, The Matriarch exemplifies the centrality and, in 
settler post-colonalism, the problem of the reader. Further, the novel 
actually thematises this problem in addressing issues of genealogy, issues 
which become of focal importance in the 1949 marae incident. Genealogy 
apparently offers itself up as a 'natural' text, 'written' by biological 'fact', 
but this is shown in The Matriarch to be an oversimplification. Indeed, 
even 'biological fact' is a problematic notion, particularly for a patrilineal 
genealogy, for spatio-temporal reasons whose implications were explored 
in Chapter One. This problem and the implications of the Maori cultural 
practice of reciting genealogies (whakapapa) expose the political 
constructedness of lines of descent and relation, dependent upon the 
political exigencies of recognition, so that the recitation could be 
characterised as narration involving the narrative practices of selection, 
exclusion and connection. Whakapapa reach back to the beginnings of 
mythical time, to the gods, and progress through the honouring of 
ancestors. They are "the history of the people" (230), recited in order to 
establish the mana of a speaker or an iwi, to establish lines between people 
and the land, the belonging that confers the right to speak. However, 
inclusion in the whakapapa or genealogy depends upon recognition, and 
exclusions serve political ends. For example, it is narrated, in The 
Matriarch, in relation to a dispute over land, that Thomas Halbert had two 
sons: 
It was Riria who bore the son Wi Pere Halbert .... During the hearing 
of his claim to the property he stated that Wi Pere Halbert was his 
544 
only child at the time of the purchase. His omission of Otene Pitau 
can be explained only by the suggestion that, as Lazarus had adopted 
that child, Thomas Halbert felt he had no further claim. What is 
important here, however, is that Thomas Halbert acknowledged Wi 
Pere as his son and heir. (34) 
This pattern is doubled in the issue -- the focus of Act Five, "Succession," 
of whether Te Ariki, Tamatea's father, had another older son. Tamatea 
confronts Te Ariki: '"I need to be sure on one matter, Te Ariki. Is Toroa 
my brother?'/'I have already told you, no'.j' .... Is Toroa your son?'/'And 
on this I have told you also, nolll (394-5). The rivalry is intially played out 
between the grandparents Artemis and Ihaka, and relates to their own 
differing lines of descent. Ihaka is of Tuhoe descent, and the implication is 
that the boy Toroa is Te Ariki's son by Awhina, a Tuhoe woman whom 
Ihaka had wanted him to marry to forge a link, for political reasons, with 
his own people, for '"a gift connection may be severed, a human link 
cannot'" (365). However, Artemis has determined that Tamatea, son of Te 
Ariki and Tiana, is the eldest son, and Te Ariki largely complies by 
avoiding public acknowledgement of Toroa. When Ihaka intervenes to 
make Toroa his foster-child, the matter is further complicated, and the 
battle is finally fought between Toroa and Tamatea, first through 
Tamatea's three renunciations of Toroa (398), and then in spiritual-
physical violence (401). 
Central to Maori political life, and ultimately textual constructs whose 
meanings are written and read, genealogies in The Matriarch instantiate 
the problem of the post-colonial reader. Maori reading positions are 
problematised by the account of rivalry between Tamatea and Toroa, as 
Ripeka Evans explains: 
[Ihimaera's] portrayal of Tamatea and Toroa can only occur in an 
inter-tribal context. Tamatea, the main male chara'cter of the story, 
takes his name from the ancestor who captained the Takitimu canoe. 
Toroa is also an ancestral name. Toroa was the captain of the 
Mataatua. The names themselves are endowed with mana and tapu 
and symbolize the iwi to which they belong. Those descended from 
Toroa could, and perhaps would in Maori terms, be affronted that 
their tupuna's name is used and abused when Tamatea takes away 
Toroa's mana. So you see a seemingly interesting by-play for Pakeha 
readers between characters in the story has other connotations for 
Maori readers.55 
545 
This is partly a problem of the rivalry being played out beyond the marae, 
beyond the localised context of a specific battle for supremacy, where only 
participants and their supporters or detractors are present, now 
disseminated into a much wider readership and with no structures of 
redress; in other words, it is the problem of the dissemination and the 
fixity of the text. Perhaps too, the problem is the (post-)colonial one of the 
constitution of the racial and cultural group, 'Maori', a hybrid 
identification invoking metonymic readings which conform to the binary 
pair of 'Maori' and 'Pakeha'. For example, a 'Maori' spiritual counter-
discourse constructed and placed in opposition to the Graeco-Judeo-
Christian derived 'Pakeha' tradition places an unexpected strain on the 
very authentic originality it invokes: 
The many retellings of this cosmic genealogy in The Matriarch are 
more than an innocent introduction to the basics of Maori 
mythology. They have a double ideological and political function. 
They work to confer a central position in the universal scheme of 
things upon the Maori, who have been marginalized in Western 
cosmology. 
But ... by foregrounding the legends surrounding his own canoe, 
the hero of the novel makes daring political use of his mythic 
ancestry during his in-fighting with tribal rivals. Having placed the 
Maori at the centre of the cosmos, Tamatea goes on to place his own 
family, and ultimately himself, at the centre of Maoridom.56 
It would seem that it is the constitution of the hybrid 'Maoridom', ,in 
relation to Pakeha, which has made such a centring gesture possible. 
Further, it is a secularising gesture of hubris; but even as such its 
'meaning' is ambivalent: on the one hand· it could be argued that the 
hubris of Tamatea exemplifies that of the reader, placing the self at the 
centre of a universe of expectations, values and judgements; on the other 
hand, to place the reader at the centre of the text demonstrates the 
dependence of truth and meaning on reading itself, challenging the notion 
(itself a 'reading') that these inhere in the text.57 
To locate meaning in the reader renders meaning, and the identity of 
the text, unstable and ambiguous. It emphasises the divisions and 
fragmentations of a culture. Where the desire for unity and meaning and 
cultural identity characterises the narcissism of a settler post-colonial 
society, images of fragmentation are disturbing and are resisted. In a text 
such as The Matriarch which appears to offer no fixed or even privileged 
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reading, it is not surprising that critical response should turn to the figure 
of the author to stabilise and fix the meaning, to authorise a reading, to 
identify and even instantiate a privileged subjectivity. Thus Beatson 
notes, "It is hard for the Pakeha reader to know how much Tamatea's 
passion for personal and family prestige is 'approved' by the author, how 
much he is being condemned for the sin of hybris [sic] or the related Maori 
offence of whakahihi. "58 Here, the novelist is appealed to as the centre and 
guarantor of moral value in the text; even readings critical of it are 
predicated at least to some degree in critiques of Ihimaera's subjective 
coherence, producing some remarkable slippage between Ihimaera and 
Tamatea. Their conflation is symptomatic of a desire for unity and an 
intolerance of instability or difference. For example, Stead argues that "It is 
almost impossible to see [Tamatea] as separate from the novelist, which in 
turn makes the whole work appear to be a gross piece of personal 
mythologizing. "59 It does not occur to Stead that his search for the 
wholeness of character is a trap laid by the novel, and so the 'failure' of 
Tamatea results in the displacement of that search on to (readings of) 
Ihimaera.60 Even the latter are charged with the burden of the wholeness 
of the ideal-image. Stead appears indignant that "On p. 370 Ihimaera 
repeats Te Kooti's cry -- 'We are still slaves in the land of Pharaoh.' It is 
strange coming from a man much honoured in his own country and now 
serving as New Zealand Consul in New York."61 This argument 
constitutes a suppression of difference --textual difference, and the 
difference of Maori protest -- in holding the narrative to the author's 
subjectivity, and even his extra-fictional 'success'. 
Poananga's reading of the novel through the (read) subjectivity of 
Ihimaera similarly seeks to suppress difference, though the emphasis is on 
difference within Maori (and its critical metonym, Ihimaera). She locates 
the split nature of subjectivity represented in the nove1 in terms of the 
existential experience of the colonising/ colonised culture, and expressed in 
terms of 'hands around their own throats' (50; 79; 80; 127; 301), to 
"Ihimaera's own inability to resolve his identity confusions .... This is a 
dilemma for anyone who cannot choose between being indigenous or 
being part of the occupiers. . . . [S]uch people are referred to by Maori as 
'split-arse.'''62 She understands identity as a matter of conscious choice, 
and Maori identity as identification with Maori nationalist politics, so that 
Ihimaera is deemed an outs~erJ-- expressed as 'such people' and 'split 
arse' by Maori -- in the same review that is predicated on the need for 
accountability of Maori writers like Ihimaera to the values of 
nationalism. In her argument for the unity of Maori consciousness, ' 
suspicious of the Pakeha approval attained by Ihimaera and n 
generally of adulation afforded Maori writers in New Zealand.63 
This ad~ion of the Maori writer is indeed a phenomenon in need of 
analysis. Williams has observed that "The rise of the novelist as 'star' in 
the middle eighties, with Hulme and Ihimaera as revered figures, helped 
book sales, but it did little for the state of the novel as an art form in New 
Zealand."64 I want to set aside the question of 'the novel as an art form,' or 
at least to deny it the status of an autonomously aesthetic question, and to 
regard 'book sales' as something more than a matter of interest to 
publishers and retailers. Instead I want to focus on the phenomenon of 
'novelist as star' itself. The term 'star' evokes, in this age of television, 
video,MTV, an image which, simultaneously smaller and larger than life, 
is transmitted into the very living spaces of the population. It would seem 
to overshadow the more solitary and invisible connotations of the figure 
of the novelist. Yet the term 'star' is remarkably apt. If the 'star' of the 
visual and sound entertainment media is understood precisely as image, 
and if that image is understood as the ideal self/other (that ambiguous 
mirror reflection which instigates relations of identification -- narcissism 
and aggression), and if novelists such as Hulme and Ihimaera are analysed 
as image, noting for example, radio, television. and magazine 'appearances' 
which· construct and market them as such, some important questions 
about reading in post-colonial space emerge. It becomes necessary to ask 
what their images represent, and what desires for identification they 
address. What cultural or national anxieties -- subjective fractures -- are 
'sutured' by (dis)placing wholeness on to an ideal-other? Which 
subjectivities are appropriated to this function? Why should it be, for 
example, Hulme and Ihimaera who have been afforded" 'star' status, and 
not, again for example, Stead himself -- the academic, critic, fiction writer, 
poet, cultural critic, all-round 'man of letters'? 
Clearly, Ihimaera and Hulme address particular cultural and national 
anxieties of settler post-colonial New Zealand. To the Pakeha reading 
position they offer, both in themselves and through texts conferred with 
the status of mirrors reflecting a national self, consciousness, or cultural 
identity, an image of the 'self' as indigenous, soothing the anxieties of 
belonging which attend the de-legitimation of colonialism. Where the 
\ ! 
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questions of 'Pakeha culture', and of national unity, are similarly anxious 
ones, they offer the perhaps vicarious experience of cultural 
(re)construction. At the same time as such post-colonising appropriations 
occur, identification with the images represented by the likes of Ihimaera 
and Hulme flatters national narcissism regarding the ethical 'wholeness' 
of social justice; to put it crudely, these writers represent Maori success in a 
Pakeha-dominated cultural milieu. Conversely, for a Maori reading 
position such writers also embody Maori literary subjectivity and success, 
but from the point of view of gaining an active voice in the construction of 
a literary culture -- the opportunity to add new stories, challenge existing 
ones, rewrite history. This is commonly imaged as a kind of cultural 
'healing' of a people, beginning to re-effect the discursive community and 
continuity among Maori that was disrupted with the effects of large-scale 
urbanisation on oral cultural transmission. Therefore, much 
national/ cultural value is invested in these ideal 'representations' or 
images of the (national! cultural) 'self' of settler post-colonialism. 
Similarly, the state of the novel as art form, and book sales, could be 
argued to indicate wider than purely 'aesthetic' desires and criteria as 
constituting literary production and consumption in the settler post-
colonial context. The text is not simply a cultural object, but a cultural 
'tool'. 
~ 
It is now necessary to foreground, however, a problem with the 
attempt to stabilise meaning and identity through the figure of the author 
which has been implicit in my argument so far. The problem with the 
notion of the author's subjectivity, when this is assumed to conform to 
and to confer principles of identity and unity; is that it is only emergent in 
the acts of reading and writing themselves. 'Subjectivity' is not something 
the author simply has, but rather 'it' is read through her/his discourse. It 
is only accessible through reading. This means that a- reading position 
emerges simultaneously with a writing- or speaking-position, and we have 
already seen the destabilising influence of the 'reader' for notions of 
transcendental 'truth'. This explains why, even when The Matriarch is 
read through the figure of Ihimaera, Stead can conclude that "we have the 
novelist as warrior, the novel as taiaha or mere, the reader as ally or 
enemy,"65 images of violence and conflict, while Poananga characterises 
the novelist, in relation to the same text, as "split-arse,"66 and the novel as 
"Maori apologism."67 Further,the notion of the 'star', whether novelist or 
any other cultural figure, is one caught in a tension between the public 
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implications of a role -- the screen/image on to which expectations and 
demands are projected, and which is the object of dissemination and 
'readings' -- and the private spheres of identity, autonomy and integrity 
which define the 'individual'. The tension is predicated on a disavowal of 
the illusory or Imaginary status of the 'individual'. It is grounded in that 
moment when the public image appeals to the private identity to 
authenticate itself, and in reproducing and disseminating that identity (as 
image, but as 'true'), sets up an apparent paradox, one which inhabits, for 
example, the genre of autobiography. The tension is similarly present 
when the public image is defined against the private self, such as the writer 
or artist who insists that her/his text does not simply mirror a private self, 
an argument which foregrounds 'creativity' and 'originality'. 
A parallel tension inhabits the image/text itself: between its public 
position, its status as reproduced, disseminated and read, and its legal 
(copyright) status as privately owned and its claim to authorial creative or 
scholarly originality. It is within the context of these tensions that The 
Matriarch problematises author-centred readings and indeed any notion of 
subjective coherence. It has already been noted that The Matriarch refuses 
a single narrative voice, or even a stable and stabilising controlling 
consciousness 'behind' the many narrative voices. Similarly, the wide-
ranging intertextuality of the novel's composition functions to 
problematise simple notions of original authorial creativity. Rather than 
positing the individual as productive of narrative or text, it therefore 
suggests that texts are socially produced. Indeed while The Matriarch is 
explicit about its debts to prior reading of other texts, the point is relevant. 
to all cultural production. If culture is a sociai concept, how can its product 
be other than socially produced? 
There are specific issues which arise in relation to The Matriarch, and 
to reading practices in settler post-colonial culture. It has already been 
noted that the novel has been criticised for a failure of unity of tone and 
voice. One source of this 'failure' has been identified as the many passages 
of 'didactic' information provided in the novel -- Maori mythology and 
beliefs, explanations of Maori cultural practice and protocol, in many cases 
drawn from other textual (and oral) sources. The question which is 
suggested is that of the cultural necessity of such intertextuality (and a 
concomitant degree of disruption in narrative coherence) in a context 
where reader knowledge of cultural underpinnings cannot be assumed. 
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The question spreads to include reading practices in relation to texts whose 
reference to other cultural knowledge or texts is not explicit in the 
narrative, but whose assumptions or premises are grounded in these other 
knowedges. 
Nevertheless, Ihimaera does refer to other texts and this, too, generates 
problems of reading. On the one hand, the status of 'sources' raises 
political issues of authenticity and acceptability. As was seen in relation to 
Poananga's review of The Matriarch, 'white' sources are increasingly 
challenged as inauthentic compared with the 'authenticity' of Maori 
sources which represent either Maori accuracy, or political expediency. On 
the other hand, (although related to this latter point), 'authentically' Maori 
knowledge was shown in The Matriarch to raise the problem of its status 
as specific to a particular tribal background: this problem includes both its 
reading or representation as 'Maori', and that of its contestation as a matter 
of inter-tribal politics and difference. One example of this occurs in 
relation to the novel's use of the spider motif. Poananga objects to it on 
the grounds that spiders are 'traditionally' bad omens for Maori.68 
Further, although it could be argued that their appearance in The 
Matriarch, including in the form of Artemis' characterisation, conforms to 
their significance as 'ominous' this raises another problem for Poananga 
for the reading of the motif: "It reveals the power of Maori women as 
spiderlike -- weaving webs of mystical and physical destruction, hate, evil, 
and manipulation over the men in their lives. Maori women using 
spiritual power to entice and entrance men and once having captured their 
prey, sucking the life out of them."69 The problems suggested in the 
'reading' of the spiders recall those which were discussed in relation to a 
feminist reading of the texts. In fact this argument is a moment in such a 
reading, and although it problematises the reception of the novel in a post-
colonial context, it further illustrates my contention that post-colonial 
'contamination' is productive of readings, and of discourse. Nevertheless, 
there is still the question of (the suppression of) other meanings or 
significance attached to spiders in 'Maori tradition'.70 
Another implication of the social production of the text is that it 
problematises its private ownership. How can something produced in 
interaction with the wider network of practices, discourses and texts which 
comprise the cultural context, be owned by the individual? Yet, if The 
Matriarch critiques and dismantles the individutll as cultural producer, the 
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Pakeha law reconstitutes it as owner of cultural property. The New 
Zealand legal system reflects the cultural origins of the settler-descended 
majority and accepts private ownership of writing under copyright; and 
further, despite his textual manoeuvres against individual creative 
autonomy, Ihimaera's own novel is subject to copyright. How then is one 
to read the lifting of whole passages, unacknowledged, from the An 
Encyclopaedia of New Zealand,71 itself still under copyright? Despite the 
consistency of the gesture with the general direction of the novel's 
strategies, it is inconsistent with his practice of acknowledging other 
textual and oral sources. Indeed, it could be argued that inconsistency is 
more 'consistent' with the novel's 'failures' of narrative and textual unity, 
but it would nevertheless seem clear that there is an argument of 
plagiarism to be made. Williams has argued the issue of plagiarism 
cogently in his own discussion of The Matriarch, and it need not be 
rehearsed here.n However, I wish to focus on his important observation 
that "there is at least ·an unconscious irony in the fact that the material he 
has appropriated from Sorrenson deals with a much more significant act of 
appropriation: the taking of Maori land after the Land Wars of the mid 
nineteenth century. "73 
Despite the unquestionable fact that the appropriation of Maori land 
throughout New Zealand's history of white settlement and the 
appropriation of passages from the An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand are 
incomparable in terms of scale and significance, I would suggest that it is 
useful to hold the incomparability of scale as a sobering qualification while 
positing, in different terms, their comparability, as implied in Ihimaera's 
gesture. In this context the meanings and significations attached to each --
the land and the encyclopaedia -- may be explored. In other words I wish 
to address their specific comparability, the common ground of land as 'text' 
and text as 'land'. An encyclopaedia is commonly ·understood as a 
collected body of diverse and comprehensive knowledge, while 
etymologically, the emphasis is on the encapsulation and containment of 
that knowledge. Further, its contents conform to the ontological and 
epistemological norms of the socio-cultural context of its production. In 
this spirit, the claim is made in the Foreword to the encyclopaedia that it 
contains, in its three volumes, material "covering all aspects of New 
Zealand life."74 Similarly, Tamatea's discourse, indeed the whole text, 
posits the land as the source and object of knowledge for Maori culture; 
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Tamatea describes the land in terms of a text, its scope determined by 
landscape features or mutually decided boundaries: 
These boundaries, and the stories attached to their making, would be 
memorised. In this way, the entire land was like a living geography 
text and history book in one. The minutiae of life ... all imprinted 
and still living, inscribed on the land. And to ensure the continuity 
of the tribal memory, the people would traverse the land from time 
to time and from generation to generation. (103; my underlining) 
I have emphasised those terms which are explicitly textual, but others such 
as 'geography' and 'history' have epistemological implications -- they 
name categories of knowledge -- and the process of maintaining continuity 
of knowledge by traversing the land suggests the reading of the land. An 
early lesson Artemis teaches Tamatea is that of reading the land, and in 
doing so to produce his own subject-position, the distinguishing of self and 
other: '''This is our land, mokopuna. Here. Now look. There, is the 
boundary between us and the Ngati Porou to the east. There we have the 
Whanau A Apanui to the north. There, to the south, we have the Ngati 
Kahungunu people with whom we have close affiliations'" (5). 
Boundaries are implicit in the formation of subjectivity, and they establish 
tribal identity, where a people are known in relation to their land. 
Conversely, it is necessary to 'know' the land if one is to know oneself: 
'Because this is your land, you must know it like it knows itself, and 
you must love it even more than it loves itself. You must get' to 
know its very boundaries, e mokopuna, and every part of it because 
without this knowledge you are lost. Without it you do not possess 
the land. You become a person without a homeland.' (95) 
Clearly, much of the significance of the land lies in its conferral of 
belonging and identity. A similar effect is achieved in the title of An 
Encyclopaedia of New Zealand. It organises its contents under the identity 
of New Zealand, defining inclusions and exclusions in relation to this 
expression of place. Indeed, through a kind of metonymy, the 
encyclopaedia could be understood as a textual representation of, or the 
epistemological and ontological mapping of the nation. 
The encyclopaedia and the land are linked by questions of discursive 
authority, by their shared implication in issues of property and propriety. 
Thus as well as Imagina.ry questions of identity and belonging, their 
relationship invokes Symbolic ones of authority and the law. The latter, 
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while characterising the discernment of self and other, and establishing 
subjectivity in relation to place (or specifically land, in The Matriarch), are 
also foregrounded in An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand. The very 
existence of the encyclopaedia was the result of a Government Cabinet 
decision, we are told by the editor, whose Preface bears the authorising 
under-signature of Parliament House. The text bears all the authority of 
the Law; and considering the submission of all textuality to the law of the 
Symbolic, it is not difficult to forge another link between the text and the 
land in post-colonial culture as the land, too, is inextricably enmeshed in 
the processes of textuality and legality. Textuality fulfils a central but 
ambivalent role between unification and fragmentation in post-colonial 
Maori land-claims. 
'Land' as theme and motif most strongly effects narrative and textual 
unity in The Matriarch, and at the same time manifests post-colonial 
cultural and discursive fragmentation. Thus an examination of discourses 
of the land in the novel may serve as a 'case study' of many of the novel's 
features, within this treatment of The Matriarch as a case study in relation 
to the argument of the overall thesis. The land constitutes a unifying 
motif in the novel, in that it underlies the central concerns or events of 
each of the five Acts. In the first, "Waituhi," the land is shown to be the 
basis of 'traditional' family life. Yet there is also an ambivalence in 
expressions of this relation, for they are premised on a prior departure 
from that 'original' relation, as Tamatea narrates upon his return from the 
city: "Every approach to Waituhi was a rebirth. At the same time it was 
also an acknowledgement of loss,' for this was the womb of my life and it 
had given life to the family of the womb, generation after generation" (90). 
The second Act, "The Song of Te Kooti," concerns the Land Wars of the 
1860s and their aftermath in confiscations of Maori land by the Crown and 
the exile of Te Kooti Rikirangi Te Turuki to Wharekauri -- themes of 
dispossession and dislocation within the textually unifying motif of the 
land (see 133ff.) The third Act, "The Time of the Spider," centres around 
the protest against the loss of Maori lands, in the Maori form of a hui and 
on Maori ground of a marae, and brings to a crux the notions of the 
inextricability of land and identity. It illustrates the self as known through 
belonging to a particular land, and the function of the land in conferring 
subjectivity -- the position from which, and the right to, speak. The 
identity of Artemis with the land is invoked as we are told that "Her voice 
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struck the reverberating drum of the land, and the sound boomed out, 
loud and long ... "(293). However, although she tells Tamatea that "For 
the moment it is sufficient that you understand about your 
turangawaewae, this footstool which is yours in this land between Maunga 
Haumia and the Waipaoa" (292), it is her own transgression of the laws of 
subjective propriety -- the right to speak conferred by standing on one's 
own land -- that- is a principal source of contention on the Wellington 
marae: "The matriarch, a woman and therefore not tapu, was standing 
where only men stood. Yes, she was high-born, and she had spoken on the 
marae in her own lands, but this marae was outside her tribal boundaries 
and therefore could give her no genealogical and spiritual protection" 
(111). The fourth Act, "The Statesman," changes ground in the struggle to 
retain Maori sovereignty over remaining Maori lands, from the Maori 
marae to the Pakeha parliament. It represents transcriptions from Hansard 
of speeches by parliamentarian Wi Pere Halbert, relating to particular land 
Bills and Laws. Finally, the fifth Act, "Succession," draws together most of 
the principal episodes of the text, and perhaps because these are so many 
and diverse, the unifying function also effects a narrative fragmentation. 
Issues of continuity and belonging, and of struggle, in relation to the land, 
reach a climax in the rivalry between Tamatea and Toroa over their 
respective positions, and their place in relation to the family land. For 
example, the terms of Tamatea's response when, during their youth Toroa 
moves from Rotorua to Gisborne, invoke the 
sovereignty of the self with that over the land: 
incursion had been struck" (382). 
association of the 
"The first territorial 
Within this consideration of the centrality of land to Maori identity, 
therefore, is an emphasis on disunity among Maori, usually relating to 
differing lines of descent. In terms of a discourse of Maori nationalism, the 
representation of disunity among Maori would be understood as diverting 
attention from the real enemy -- the Pakeha.75 However, on the one hand 
these territorial rivalries could be argued to reflect pre-European inter-
tribal relations more 'authentically' than does a unified 'Maori' discourse, 
thus being consistent with the illocutionary, if not the constative, force of 
Poananga's invocation of authenticity in 'tradition'; and on the other, it 
would be useful to consider what the effect would be of representing a 
culture whose 'wholeness' is dependent upon unity with the land, which 
even in the (post-)colonial context of dislocation and dispossession, retains 
that core of wholeness. Nevertheless this argument must admit its own 
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disturbance by the recognition that 'Maori' wholeness or unity is, precisely, 
inauthentic in terms of pre-European tribal politics, so that it cannot 
represent any core of original plenitude. Overall then, the unification of 
the text through the concern of each of the Acts with some aspect of the 
land, is disrupted by the substantive issues of fragmentation these invoke. 
As well as unifying the structural organisation of the text, the land is 
also that which unifies the various themes and categories of knowledge 
explored in the novel. Indeed, the novel suggests that cosmology, 
genealogy, history, journeys and identity attain their significance in 
relation to the land. For example, we read of the expeditious recitation of 
the genealogy as crucial to effect a waiver of traditional restrictions in order 
to meet the requirements of the new conditions of land protest. An 
unnamed Maori man at the hui tells a journalist: 
"'Now that this woman has established her right to be here, she needs 
to be welcomed in the hongi. And after that, then will come the real 
fireworks. This old lady hasn't come all this way for nothing. 
Although this is the last day of the hui, she will probably demand the 
right to speak about her lands on the East Coast. This is what all this 
is about .- the land.'" (246) 
In other words, the land is shown to form the basis of Maori ontology and 
epistemology. Yet the basis of these activities lies in an understanding that 
"'The Maori are the tangata whenua of this land, e mokopuna, always 
remember that. Our tribal histories tell us of the arrival of seven canoes to 
this Land of the Long White Cloud'" (230), and further, that "'there is a 
[spiritual] dimension beyond the physical world which you must 
understand. Then, and only then, will you truly be a person who will love 
the land'" (293). 
While an overarching concern with the land confers a unity upon 
narrative themes and events, it is also the ground of fragmentation, 
through acknowledgement of the conditions of dislocation and 
dispossession. These are what characterised colonial history for the Maori 
people: "The land, always the land. The Maori people possessed it, but the 
white man has always lusted for it .... Let's admit it: the Land Wars began 
when the Maori lost the upper hand in Aotearoa, and particularly around 
1858 when the census revealed that in a small space of thirty years, there 
were already more white settlers than indigenous dwellers" (238). 
Similarly in the context of (post-)colonial SOciety, we read of the 
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fragmenting impact of urbanisation on the possibility of Maori cultural 
continuity with tradition: "'it drove a wedge between the old and the new. 
How can the old generation teach the new generation if they are not there 
to listen? Ah yes, this is how the discontinuity developed between the old 
and the young. It was a great faultline, right across the population'" (232). 
It was a faultline not only within. the Maori population itself, but between 
Maori and Pakeha, creating an identifiable class of poor citizens. Tamatea 
recalls "a university lecturer in Auckland who took his geography class on 
a field trip to Otara, pointing out the typically Maori ghetto dweller in his 
typically Maori home" (105),76 
Against, but also in the context of, these dislocations, there are 
evocations of a traditional, spiritual unity with the land, attempts to 
express something prior to and beyond the disruptions of colonisation. 
However, the closer to 'origins' such discourse tries to reach, the more 
overtly alienated in and by language itself it becomes, recalling the same 
paradox which troubled the representation of the grandeur of Artemis. 
For example, Tamatea describes how the voice of Artemis 
seemed to open a crystal gate, lifting the portcullis between ourselves 
. and the past, and we were in some otherworld. A world where gods 
and men commune. Where timelessness begins and there is no 
separation of past and present. A world energised with glowing forces 
and creatures of light fading in and out of the landscape. 
. . . . And her voice sounded a deeper drum. It splintered the 
physical landscape so that I was able to see into the essence of things .. 
. . I saw into the geological structures of the earth, and the diamond 
sparkling structure of the mountains ... were one and the same with 
the gleaming cellular structure of my body. (293; my underlining) 
The range of reference and the anachronistic tension of some of the diction 
with the expression of 'timelessness' that is sough~ in the passage 
(examples of which I have underlined), compromises the 'transparency' of 
its effect to its object(ive). The attempt to convey the 'quality' of the vision 
draws on the unlikely metaphors of 'crystal' and 'diamond'; archaic 
references to 'gods' and 'creatures' combine with twentieth-century 
scientific discourses such as physics and biology which provides 
expressions such as 'energised', and 'cellular structure'. Further, the 
expression of the idea of a world beyond the physical resorts to the textual 
strategy of italics, as if sheer insistence would make the claim more 
believable. My point is not a rehearsal of Stead's argument that this 
indicates Ihimaera's individual imaginative failure, but rather to treat the 
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'failure' as symptomatic of a discursive impossibility: how could this idea 
have been represented without drawing alienating attention to the 
language itself? Such innocent transparency is lost at the very moment it 
seeks expression. 
This paradox similarly haunts post-colonial articulations of Maori 
unity in contestation of Pakeha; in fact it is a moment of such articulation, 
for expressions of unity are necessarily predicated on a prior loss or 
fragmentation. Would such an idea need to have been expressed outside 
of, or prior, to the context of colonisation? There are expressions of 
solidarity with the struggles of ancestors, which enact the belief in the 
presence of the ancestors in an eternal present. Artemis tells Tamatea, for 
example, that "'what happened to Te Kooti is what has happened to all of 
us unless we fight on and hold on to the truth'" (133). The narrative 
includes an important episode in Maori protest against the loss of lands to 
the Pakeha -- the 1975 land march. The representation occurs in a manner 
which both implicitly and explicitly points to the effects of both unification 
and fragmentation. A rallying speech at the outset of the march 
exemplifies the implicit subjective division: 
'The march promises to be one of the most significant events of the 
decade,' Te Matakite said, 'and to the Maori people, it will be the 
climax to over 150 years of frustration and anger over the continuing 
alienation of their lands. Land means much more to the Maori 
people than it does to any other New Zealander. To them it has a 
deep spiritual value. You can realise then the frustration the Maori 
people have had over the last 150 years as they have seen their lands 
gradually fall out of their hands'. (235; my underlining) 
The speech begins in a manner which suggests a Maori speaker addressing 
a Maori audience, even articulating the collective identification, 'the 
Maori people', as a means of effecting group solidarity and identity with 
each other and with their forebears. However, this identification is 
disturbed by the reference to 'their' lands rather than 'our' lands, 
problematising the position of the speaker, and when the 'meaning' of the 
land to Maori people is articulated -- referring to 'them' -- the discourse is 
'contaminated' by the gratuitousness of this explanation for a Maori 
audience. The question of whom the 'You' addresses is thus raised along 
with that of the subject-position of the speaker. An empirical explanation, 
such as a mixed Maori and Pakeha audience, is less the point than the 
increasing subjective fragmentation manifested in the discourse, its 
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ensuing didacticism further emphasising the encounter of different 
subjects and different epistemological codes. Thus, while aspects of the 
march are shown to have unified Maori people throughout New Zealand, 
such as the custom that "When darkness fell, they would make for a 
friendly marae, there to be formally welcomed by the tangata whenua of 
the land" (235), we read that at its conclusion "a splinter group developed 
of young protestors who decided to pitch a tent in the grounds of 
Parliament. ... They were vilified by their elders; in tum, they accused 
their elders of having sold out to the Pakeha" (370). 
Significantly, the figure of the Pakeha emerges as the force behind this 
disunity. Implicitly, the strategies of the young protestors invoke 
international forms of political protest -- the Black Power and anti-
Vietnam war movements -- which locate Maori protest within an 
international discursive context. This both alienates it from the integrity 
of its own cause, and effects an identification with other indigenous and 
oppressed groups, a gesture which is specified elsewhere in the text.77 
According to the logic of binary opposition which locates the Pakeha at one 
pole of racial and cultural identity, and the Maori at the other, the Pakeha 
stands for the loss of Maori political integrity and subjective coherence. To 
the extent that actions can be identified with Pakeha beliefs and practices, 
they are alien or even actively antagonistic to Maori. 
This binary opposition, one which informs the discourse of Poananga, 
is nevertheless both invoked and problematised in The Matriarch through 
exploration of particular characters' relations and attitudes to the land. 
Articulations of contestatory unity or coherence -- with Maori, or with 
one's own political struggles in relation to the land -- are compromised by 
(post-)colonial cultural and subjective fragmentation. For example, 
Tamatea's father Te Ariki describes the financial difficulties for his farm 
incurred by low wool prices and early sale of lambs. He explains of 
Tamatea's Uncle Danny, "'he didn't put any money into the farm and he 
probably took a lot out, but he says different. He's asked for a third of the 
farm's value and I don't think he should have it'" (56). Then, when Uncle 
Alexis asks for a piece of "prime land" for one of his sons to return to 
Waituhi and build a house, Te Ariki similarly refuses. As he explains to 
Tamatea, "'Your grandmother gave that piece of land to me .... She said to 
me, Te Ariki, that land down by the river is for you and Tiana"' (57). In 
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the ensuing debate between Tamatea and Te Ariki, it is Tamatea who 
reminds his father of Maori attitudes to the land: 
'I can understand why grandmother gave you the land but, as I see it, 
the land is family land. You were the eldest son, yes, and she gave 
you the land, yes, but I think she gave it to you for safekeeping for the 
family.' 
'She said it was for me and your mother.' 
'It was not hers to give, and it is not yours to take for yourself and 
my mother. You should let Uncle Alexis have the land. It is 
important for the young people to return to WaituhL' (57) 
Despite Tamatea's clarity with regard to proper procedure, Te Ariki is not 
represented simply as the subject of his own selfishness, or even his 
individual interpellation by a colonised subjectivity. The debate between 
Tamatea and Te Ariki is less one between the culturally proper and 
improper attitudes of two subjects than between post-colonial social 
economy and Maori tradition. When Te Ariki admits to Tamatea, '"I 
don't know son, I just don't know. The family all seem to be crowding in 
on me these days wanting this thing or that. It is not easy"' (57), he recalls 
the basis of his reluctance to share the land in the current economic strain 
on the farm, the context of the relation to the land as an economic one, so 
that the family's needs and wants must principally be addressed with 
money. The mere possession of land is now economically insufficient in a 
predominantly urban culture in which farming is tied to (inter)national 
financial issues and markets.78 Tamatea expresses Te Ariki's dilemma as 
"The Pakeha in him warring with the Maori" (58), and as crucial as the 
'warring' relation in describing the different values placed on land, is the 
location of that war "in him". 
The identification of the struggle as between Maori and Pakeha, and its 
location within the post-colonial subject, is expressed in The Matriarch 
most explicitly in terms of the essentialism of 'blood'. Artemis, Te Ariki's 
mother, is. "Possessed of Maori and Pakeha blood" (50), the latter 
attributable to Wi Pere Halbert, son of a Maori mother, Riria, and a Pakeha 
father, Thomas Halbert. These lines of descent provide a context for 
Artemis' own declaration of individual claim to a piece of land: '''This 
place is very important to me .... It was important to my great-uncle also. 
He gave me this piece of land to be mine and mine alone. Everything else 
is held in common by all but this earth -- ' she bent down and clawed at the 
dirt' -- is mine'" (424). Two generations before, Wi Pere's anger over his 
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Pakeha father's sale of land which was to be his birthright, the anger 
arguably attributable to his own Pakeha blood, prompted him into 
parliamentary politics. Pakeha 'blood' is therefore found at the source of 
Maori expressions of individual possession of land. 
It might seem that the descent lines 'contaminated' with Pakeha 
'blood' from the early nineteenth century are demonstrated as redeemed 
in Tamatea's insistence upon the principle of family lan~, and the 
importance of the return of young people to these lands. However, to take 
his discourse both at face value and as unproblematically the centre of 
moral privilege in the novel would be to overlook the context of his own 
position of privilege. The novel represents a socio-cultural context which 
extends beyond the benefits attained by Tamatea into a more ambivalent 
picture of Maori struggle and survival. Artemis' choice of Tamatea as her 
successor has implications for other family members. Her daughter Circe 
argues that "'To give him all would be to make the rest of us destitute. I 
will not agree to signing away our birthright''' (360). The cost to the other 
family members, measured in terms of a spiritual sickness (357), is 
implicitly related to the economic changes and social ravages wrought by 
urbanisation. The form of Tamatea's cousin Raina's 'sickness' is 
determined by the urban environment in which she and her family live. 
Alcohol, drugs, prostitution, and theft all comprise both her mate and her 
means of survival on the streets. Further, Tamatea himself is not 
consistently the subject of coherent principles of Maori traditional belief; 
his own irretrievable loss of origins is dramatically figured at the novel's 
conclusion in a nightmare sequence which is represented as the 
culmination nightmares which bega.n early in his childhood. As Calder 
points out, "as Tamatea explores his memories of childhood ... he finds 
not identity but the murder of identity, not the guarantee and solace of an 
. origin but the frightening displacement of origins."79 
The Matriarch is a novel which is problematic for any reading position, 
for it offers no image of 'wholeness' -- 'political' or 'aesthetic', subjective 
or cultural -- which would resolve the text's difference, and with which to 
identify. Yet if it did offer such an Imaginary wholeness, this would 
constitute either a disavowal or a misrecognition of difference, 
manoeuvres which characterise the colonising gaze itself. It would be to 
enact an elision of history, subsuming the very ground upon which 
contestation of (post-)colonial oppression depends -- contestation which 
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includes the project of rewriting history as a crucial strategy of 
decolonisation. Indeed the textual 'wholeness' of subjective coherence 
and narrative seamlessness would constitute the text as metaphorical 
'land', which may itself be colonised, invoking (post-)colonising 
identification which would amount, in Margery Fee's memorable phrase, 
to a "literary land-claim."80 
Instead, The Matriarch enacts, as it addresses, the subjective and 
historical fractures of colonisation, and the instability of a culture on the 
faultline, the border between indigenous traditional identity and the 
European historical project of enlightenment. Thus, it posits 'land' as the 
basis of traditional Maori identity, as the context for the cultural 
production and transmission of mythologies, cosmologies, genealogies, 
politics, and social protocol, as the grounds of spiritual and physical well-
being; and it illustrates the post-colonial identification of land as the 
ground of healing and renewal of a disrupted, dispossessed and dislocated 
Maori people and their culture; but it also problematises the link between 
the past and the future through the eternal present/presence of the land by 
exploring it fully within the post-colonial society which now inhabits it. 
The post-colonial context has altered the nature of the Maori relationship 
to the land. Within the logic of urbanisation which accompanies 
nationhood -- a nationhood which suppressed Maori identity and 
difference -- land becomes a commodity, and productive of resources, 
within an exchange economy which interpellates as its privileged subjects 
of consumption the individual rather than the community, the nuclear 
family rather than the whanau. Further, Maori relationships to their own 
cultural identity are problema tis ed, as inter-tribal politics are disrupted by 
and themselves disrupt, discourses of unity in contestation. 
The novel does not resolve these tensions: land -remains central, 
though its meanings and significance continue to instantiate the difference 
and the struggles of the traditional and the modern. Indeed, in this way 
The Matriarch may be seen as paradigmatic of post..,colonialism in New 
Zealand. It is the site of discursive encounters -- not the tolerant 
encounters of inclusiveness and indifference, but discourses in violent 
struggle for epistemological and ethical supremacy. The text eschews the 
post-colonisation -- the silencing of discourse and difference -- which 
would be effected by their resolution. Further, and perhaps most crucially 
for an understanding of the complexities of settler post-colonialism, the 
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struggle is shown to occur within discourses, as each is contaminated by 
the demands and incursions of others. Finally, then, the novel 
exemplifies the argument of this thesis that post-colonialism in the settler 
society may usefully be seen as the problematic rather than the (re)solution 
of the cultural inheritances of colonisation. 
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